HB9 



— 





Copyright^?. 



COPWUGHT DEPOSE 



LECTURES 



ON 



SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY; 



BY THE / 

KEY. CHAELES G. FINNEY, 

LATE PRESIDENT OF OBERLIN COLLEGE AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY. 



EDITED BY 

PEES. J. H. FAIRCHILD. 



•o r 



OBEELIK, OHIO: 

E. J". GOODEICH. 

1878. 






COPYRIGHT, 1878, BY E. J. G00T>B1CH. 



BTBnEOTTPED 
BY 
MI t-TEREOTYTE CO. 



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NOTE BY THE EDITOR. 



Two editions of President Finney's Lectures on Systematic 
Theology have been published — the first in this country in 1846, 
the second in England in 1851, — the English edition being 
somewhat more full than its predecessor. Both editions have 
been exhausted, and the book has disappeared from the 
market. 

The present edition has been prepared from the English 
edition by a process of condensation, omitting, to some extent, 
restatements or repetitions of the argument, paragraphs of a 
hortatory character, and other parts not essential to the ex- 
pression or elucidation of the doctrine. 

Aside from these omissions, no changes have been made. 
No liberties have been taken with the author's style or thought. 
Every sentence is his own, and even in those parts where, in 
the judgment of the editor, the author's views are not elaborated 
with perfect consistency, as in the presentation of sin as selfish- 
ness, and in the lectures on sanctification, no attempt has been 
made to secure consistency, as might have been done by judi- 
cious omissions. The author was in the habit of thinking and 
speaking for himself while living, and no one can undertake to 
speak for him now that he is dead. 

This condensed edition, it is believed, will not be less valu- 
able, as an exponent of Mr. Finney's teaching, than the English 
edition, but even more valuable. Unnecessary bulk in a volume 
is a hinderance and discouragement to the reader. -The topics 
will be found to be presented with all necessary fulness. 

J. H. F. 

Oberlin College. 1878. 



PREFACE. 

BY EEV. GEOEGE EEDFOED, D.D., 

EDITOR OF THE ENGLISH EDITION. 



The Lectures of the Eev. Professor Finney, which are here given 
to the British public, were first delivered to the class of theological I 
students at the Oberlin College, America, and subsequently published' 
there. They were unknown in this country, except to a few of the 
Author's personal friends, until his arrival in England, about two years 
since. His name, however, was well known, and several of his works 
had been extensively read. 

The Editor having had the pleasure and honor of forming a per- 
sonal acquaintance with the Author soon after his arrival in this coun- 
try, did not long remain ignorant of his Theological Lectures. After 
his first hasty perusal of them, he ventured strongly to recommend 
their publication, both for the sake of making the British churches 
better acquainted with the Author's doctrinal views, and also on 
account of the direct benefit which students, and other inquirers into 
the theory of gospel doctrines, would be likely to derive from a work 
so argumentative, and so unlike all the works on systematic and dog- 
matic theology known to the English schools. After due consultation 
and deliberation, the Author pressed upon the Editor the work of 
revision, and placed the Lectures in his hands, with the request that 
he would read them carefully, and suggest such alterations as he might 
deem desirable to adapt the work to the English reader ; and then 
submit the whole to the Author's adoption or rejection. 

This task the Editor undertook, and has performed in the best 
manner his time and ability would allow. The Author has carefully 
examined every part of his work again, and made such corrections and 
alterations as to him seemed needful. The Editor has merely per- 
formed the part of a friend, in suggesting such improvements as might 



vi PREFACE BY DR. REDFORD. 

make the Authors meaning better understood ; but without interfer- 
ing with that meaning, and without intending to give it an unqualified 
approbation. In fact, the Lectures have been to a considerable extent 
re-written by the Author, and in this edition proceed as strictly from 
his own pen, as in the American edition. 

The Editor, however, would not have ventured to recommend the 
publication of these Lectures in this country, if he had not deemed 
them, as a whole, eminently deserving the attention and examination 
of British theologians. When they first came into his hands, they 
struck him as so pleasingly unlike all the other systems of dogmatic 
theology and moral philosophy it had ever been his lot to peruse, so 
thorough in their grappling with difficulties, and often so successful 
in the solution of them; so skillfully adjusted to modern metaphysical 
speculations, and so comprehensive of what is valuable in them ; so 
manifestly the production of a masculine intellect and independent 
thinker, that he was not only pleased with the air of freshness and 
originality thrown over old themes of dry and elaborate discussion, 
but greatly benefited and instructed by some of the Author's dews of 
important moral and theological questions. It may not be the same 
with all the Author's English readers ; but assuredly few will rise from 
the perusal of the whole work without confessing that, at least, they 
have seen some points in a new and impressive light, have been con- 
strained to think more closely of the opinions they hold, and in other 
respects have been benefited by the perusal. 

As a contribution to theological science, in an age when vague 
speculation and philosophical theories are bewildering many among all 
denominations of Christians, this work will be considered by all com- 
petent judges to be both valuable and seasonable. Upon several 
important and difficult subjects the Author has thrown a clear and 
valuable light which will guide many a student through perplexities 
and difficulties which he had long sought unsuccessfully to explain. 
The Editor frankly confesses, that when a student he would gladly 
have bartered half the books in his library to have gained a single 
perusal of these Lectures ; and he cannot refrain from expressing the 
belief, that no young student of theology will ever regret the purchase 
or perusal of Mr. Finney's Lectures. 

One recommendation he begs respectfully to offer to all readers 
whether old or young ; it is this : suspend your judgment of the 
Author and his theology until you have gone completely through his 
work. On many subjects, at the outset of the discussion, startling 
propositions may be found which will clash with your settled opinions ; 



PREFACE BY DR. REDFORD. vii 

but if you will calmly and patiently await the Authors explanation, 
and observe how he qualifies some strong or novel assertions, you will 
most probably find in the issue, that you have less reason than you 
supposed to object to his statements. 

In many respects Mr. Finney's theological and moral system will 
be found to differ both from the Calvinistic and Arminian. In fact, 
it is a system of his own, if not in its separate portions, yet in its con- 
struction ; and as a whole is at least unique and compact ; a system 
which the Author has wrought out for himself, with little other aid 
than what he has derived from the fount itself of heavenly truth, and 
his own clear and strong perception of the immutable moral principles 
and laws by which the glorious Author of the universe governs all his 
intellectual creatures. 

There is one circumstance that will recommend the volume, and 
ought to recommend it, to impartial inquirers who are not bound to 
the words of any master save their Divine one ; it is, that the Author 
in his youth was trained in none of the theological schools of his 
country, and had imbibed, therefore, no educational preference for one 
system more than another. He had been disciplined to argumenta- 
tion, logic, and the laws of evidence, in a very different arena ; and 
had advanced in the science of the Law before he had felt the truth 
of Christianity, or thought of studying its doctrines. His views, there- 
fore, will be found more deserving of attention and examination, from 
the fact of his mental independence in the formation of them. 

Should the work be read in a calm, devout, unprejudiced and 
liberal spirit, there can be no doubt that the reader will derive both 
pleasure and instruction. The earnestness, single-mindedness, deep 
piety, and eminent usefulness of the Author, both as a preacher and 
lecturer, justly entitle this production of his pen to the candid and 
patient investigation of English divines. 

Apart from the peculiarities which will be observed, and the criti- 
cal objections to which some will deem his theology justly liable, there 
can be no doubt that many will find in it a treasure of inestimable 
worth, a key to many perplexing enigmas, and a powerful reinforce- 
ment of their faith in the Christian verities. With at least the hope 
that such will be the effects of its publication in England, the Editor 
has cheerfully contributed his humble aid, and now commits the work 
to the blessing of Him by whose Word of Truth its real value must 
be final! v tested. 

G. K. 

Worcester, (Eng.) 1851. 



PEEFAOE BY THE AUTHOE. 



1. To a great extent, the truths of the blessed gospel have been hid- 
den under a false philosophy. In my early inquiries on the subject of 
religion, I found myself wholly unable to understand either the oral or 
written instructions of uninspired religious teachers. They seemed to 
me to resolve all religion into states either of the intellect or of the sensi- 
bility, which my consciousness assured me were wholly passive or in- 
voluntary. "When I sought for definitions and explanations, I felt as- 
sured that they did not well understand themselves. I was struck with 
the fact that they so seldom defined, even to themselves, their own posi- 
tions. Among the words of most frequent use, I could find scarcely a 
single term intelligibly defined. I inquired in what sense the terms " re- 
generation," "faith," "repentance," "love," etc., were used, but could 
obtain no answer, at which it did not appear to me that both reason and 
revelation revolted. The doctrines of a nature, sinful per se, of a neces- 
sitated will, of inability, and of physical regeneration, and physical 
Divine influence in regeneration, with their kindred and resulting dog- 
mas, embarrassed and even confounded me at every step. I often said 
to myself, " If these things are really taught in the Bible, I must be an 
infideL" But the more I read my Bible, the more clearly I saw that 
these things were not found there upon any fair principles of interpreta- 
tion, such as would be admitted in a court of justice. I could not but 
perceive that the true idea of moral government had no place in the the- 
ology of the church ; and, on the contrary, that underlying the whole 
system were the assumptions that all government was physical, as op- 
posed to moral, and that sin and holiness are rather natural attributes, * 
than moral, voluntary acts. These errors were not stated in words, but 
I could not fail to see that they were assumed. The distinction between 
original and actual sin, and the utter absence of a distinction between 
physical and moral depravity, embarrassed me. Indeed, I was satisfied 
either that I must be an infidel, or that these were errors that had no 
place in the Bible. I was often warned against reasoning and leaning to 
my own understanding. I found that the discriminating teachers of re- 
ligion were driven to confess that they could not establish the logical 



X PREFACE. 

consistency of their system, and that they were obliged to shut their eyes 
and believe, when revelation seemed to conflict with the affirmations of 
reason. But this course I could not take. I found, or thought I found, 
nearly all the doctrines of Christianity embarrassed by the assumptions 
above-named. But the Spirit of God conducted me through the dark- 
ness, and delivered me from the labyrinth and fog of a false philosophy, 
and set my feet upon the rock of truth, as I trust. But to this day I 
meet with those who seem to me to be in much confusion upon most of 
the practical doctrines of Christianity. They will admit, that sin and 
holiness must be voluntary, and yet speak of regeneration as consisting 
in anything but a voluntary change, and of Divine influence in regenera- 
tion, as anything but moral or persuasive. They seem not at all aware 
of what must follow from, and be implied in, the admission of the exist- 
ence of moral government, and that sin and holiness must be free and 
voluntary acts and states of mind. In this work I have endeavored to 
define the terms used by Christian divines, and the doctrines of Chris- 
tianity, as I understand them, and to push to their logical consequences 
the cardinal admissions of the more recent and standard theological 
writers. Especially do I urge, to their logical consequences, the two ad- 
missions that the will is free, and that sin and holiness are voluntary acts 
of mind. I will not presume that I have satisfied others upon the points I 
have discussed, but I have succeeded at least in satisfying myself. I re- 
gard the assertion, that the doctrines of theology cannot preserve a logi- 
cal consistency throughout, as both dangerous and ridiculous. 

2. My principal design in publishing on Systematic Theology at first, 
was to furnish my pupils with a class or text-book, wherein many points 
and questions were discussed of great practical importance, but which 
have not, to my knowledge, been discussed in any system of theological 
instruction extant. I also hoped to benefit other studious and pious 
minds. 

3. I have written for those who are willing to take the trouble of 
thinking and of forming opinions of their own on theological questions. 
It has been no part of my aim to spare my pupils or any one else the 
trouble of intense thought. Had I desired to do so, the subjects dis- 
cussed would have rendered such an attempt abortive. 

4. There are many questions of great practical importance, and ques- 
tions in which multitudes are taking a deep interest at present, that can- 
not be intelligently settled without instituting fundamental inquiries in- 
volving the discussion of those questions that lie at the foundation of 
morality and religion. 

5. Most of the subjects of dispute among Christians at the present day 
are founded in misconceptions upon the subjects discussed in this volume. 
If I have succeeded in settling the questions which I have discussed, we 



PREFACE. XI 

shall see, that in a future volume most of the subjects of disagreement 
among Christians at the present day can be satisfactorily adjusted with 
comparative ease. 

6. What I have said on " Moral Law " and on the " Foundation of 
Moral Obligation " is the key to the whole subject. Whoever masters 
and understands these can readily understand all the rest. But he who 
will not possess himself of my meaning upon these subjects, will not 
understand the rest. 

7. Let no one despair in commencing the book, nor stumble at the 
definitions, thinking that he can never understand so abstruse a subject. 
Eemember that what follows is an expansion and an explanation by way 
of application, of what you find so condensed in the first pages of the 
book. My brother, sister, friend — read, study, think, and read again. 
You were made to think. It will do you good to think ; to develop your 
powers by study. God designed that religion should require thought 
intense thought, and should thoroughly develop our powers of thought. 
The Bible itself is written in a style so condensed as to require much 
intense study. Many know nothing of the Bible or of religion, because 
they will not think and study. I do not pretend to so explain theology 
as to dispense with the labor of thinking. I have no ability and no wish 
to do so. 

8. If any of my brethren think to convince me of error, they must 
first understand me, and show that they have read the book through, and 
that they understand it, and are candidly inquiring after truth and not 
"striving for masteries." If my brother is inquiring after truth, I will, 
by the grace of God, " hear with both ears, and then judge." But I will 
not promise to attend to all that cavillers may say, nor to notice what 
those impertinent talkers and writers may say or write who must have 
controversy. But to all honest inquirers after truth I would say, Hail ! 
my brother ! Let us be thorough. Truth shall do us good. 

9. It will be seen that the present volume contains only a part of 
a course of Systematic Theology. Should the entire course ever appear 
before the public, one volume will precede, and another succeed the 
present one. I published this volume first, because it contains all the 
points upon which I have been supposed to differ from the commonly 
received views. As a teacher of theology, I thought it due to the church 
and to the world, to give them my views upon those points upon which. 
I had been accused of departing from the common opinions of Christians. 

10. I have not yet been able to stereotype my theological views, and: 
have ceased to expect ever to do so. The idea is preposterous. JSTone' 
but an omniscient mind can continue to maintain a precise identity 
of views and opinions. Finite minds, unless they are asleep or stultified 
by prejudice, must advance in knowledge. The discovery of new truth 



XU PREFACE. 

will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this 
process with finite minds in any world. True Christian consistency does 
not consist in stereotyping our opinions and views, and in refusing to 
make any improvement lest we should be guilty of change, but it consists 
in holding our minds open to receive the rays of truth from every quarter 
and in changing our views and language and practice as often and as 
fast, as we can obtain further information. I call this Christian consist- 
ency, because this course alone accords with a Christian profession. 
A Christian profession implies the profession of candor and of a disposi- 
tion to know and obey all truth. It must follow, that Christian consist- 
ency implies continued investigation and change of views and practice 
corresponding with increasing knowledge. No Christian, therefore, and 
no theologian should be afraid to change his views, his language, or 
his practices in conformity with increasing light. The prevalence of such 
a fear would keep the world, at best, at a perpetual stand-still, on 
all subjects of science, and consequently all improvements would be 
precluded. 

Every uninspired attempt to frame for the church an authoritative 
\ standard of opinion which shall be regarded as an unquestionable exposi- 
tion of the word of God, is not only impious in itself, but it is also a 
tacit assumption of the fundamental dogma of Papacy. The Assembly 
of Divines did more than to assume the necessity of a Pope to give law to 
the opinions of men ; they assumed to create an immortal one, or rather 
to embalm their own creed, and preserve it as the Pope of all genera- 
tions ; or it is more just to say, that those who have adopted that con- 
fession of faith and catechism as an authoritative standard of doctrine, 
have absurdly adopted the most obnoxious principle of Popery, and 
elevated their confession and catechism to the Papal throne and into the 
place of the Holy Ghost. That the instrument framed by that assembly 
should in the nineteenth century be recognized as the standard of the 
'* church, or of an intelligent branch of it, is not only amazing, but I must 
say that it is highly ridiculous. It is as absurd in theology as it would 
be in any other branch of science, and as injurious and stultifying as 
it is absurd and ridiculous. It is better to have a living than a dead 
Pope. If we must have an authoritative expounder of the word of God, 
let us have a living one, so as not to preclude the hope of improvement. 
-" A living dog is better than a dead lion ;" so a living Pope is better 
" than a dead and stereotyped confession of faith, that holds all men bound 
to subscribe to its unalterable dogmas and its unvarying terminology. 

11. I hold myself sacredly bound, not to defend these positions at all 
events, but on the contrary, to subject every one of them to the most 
thorough discussion, and to hold and treat them as I would the opinions 
of any one else ; that is, if upon further discussion and investigation I 



PREFACE. Xlll 

see no cause to change, I hold them fast ; but if I can see a flaw in any / 
one of them, I shall amend or wholly reject it, as further light shall de- 
mand. Should I refuse or fail to do this, I should need to blush for my 
folly and inconsistency, for I say again, that true Christian consistency 
implies progress in knowledge and holiness, and such changes in theory 
and in practice as are demanded by increasing light. 

On the strictly fundamental questions in theology, my views have not, ,. 
for many years, undergone any change, except as I have clearer appre- 
hensions of them than formerly, and should now state some of them, per- 
haps, in some measure, differently from what I should then have done. 

THE AUTHOR. 









/* 



CONTENTS. 






LECTUEE I. 
Moral Government. 

PAGE 

Definition of the term law. — Distinction between physical and moral law. — The 
essential attributes of moral law. — Subjectivity — Objectivity. — Liberty, as 
opposed to necessity. — Fitness. — Universality. — Impartiality. — Practicabil- 
ity. — Independence. — Immutability. — Unity. — Expediency. — Exclusiveness. I 

LECTUEE II. 

Moral Government — Continued. 

Definition of the term government. — Distinction between moral and physical 
government. — The fundamental reason of moral government. — Whose right 
it is to govern. — What is implied in the right to govern. — The limits of this 
right. — Moral obligation. — The conditions of moral obligation 6 

LECTUEE III. 

Moral Obligation. 
Man a subject of moral obligation. — Extent of moral obligation , . . 19 

LECTUEE IV. 

Foundation of Moral Obligation. 

What is intended by the foundation of moral obligation. — Self-evident princi- 
ples. — That the sovereign will of God is not the foundation of moral obliga- 
tion. — The theory of Paley. — The utilitarian philosophy 27 

LECTUEE Y. 

Foundation of Moral Obligation. False Theories. 

Right as the foundation of obligation 38 

LECTUEE VI. 

Foundation of Moral Obligation. False Theories. 

The goodness or moral excellence of God as the foundation of obligation 49 



XVI CONTENTS. 

LECTUKE VII. 
Foundation op Moral Obligation. False Theories. 

PAGE 

Moral order as the foundation of obligation. — The nature and relations of moral 
beings as the true foundation of obligation. — Moral obligation as founded in 
the idea of duty. — The complexity of the foundation of obligation.— Sum- 
ming up 64 

LECTUKE VIII. 

Foundation of Moral Obligation. Practical bearings op the differ- 
ent theories. 

The theory that regards the sovereign will of God as the foundation of moral 
obligation. — The theory of the selfish school. — The natural and necessary 
results of utilitarianism. — Practical bearings and tendency of rightarianism. 
— The practical bearings of the true theory of the foundation of obligation 80 

LECTURE IX. 

Unity of Moral Action. 

What constitutes obedience to moral law. — Obedience cannot be partial.— Possi- 
ble suppositions. — Objections considered 95 

LECTURE X. 

Obedience entire. 

Nothing virtue but obedience to the law of God. — No rule of duty but moral 
law.— Condition of justification 115 

LECTURE XL 

Obedience to the Moral Law. 
What is not implied in entire obedience to the law of God 124 

LECTURE XII. 

Attributes of Love. 

Certain facts revealed in consciousness.— Attributes of that love which consti- 
tutes obedience to the law. — Voluntariness. — Liberty. — Intelligence. — Vir- 
tuousness.— Disinterestedness. — Impartiality. — Universality 135 

LECTURE XIII. 
Attributes of Love — Continued. 
Efficiency .—Complacency.— Opposition to sin.— Compassion 145 



CONTENTS. xvii 

LECTURE XIV. 
Attributes of Love — Continued. 

TAGB 

Mercy. — Justice. — Veracity 157 



LECTURE XV. 

Attributes op Love — Continued. 

Patience.— Meekness.— Self-denial.— Condescension.— Stability.— Holiness, or 
Purity 166 

LECTURE XVI. 

Disobedience to Moral Law. 

What disobedience to moral law cannot consist in. — What disobedience to moral 

law must consist in 180 

LECTURE XVII. 

Attributes of Selfishness. 

Voluntariness. — Liberty. — Intelligence. — Unreasonableness. — Interestedness. — 
Partiality. — Efficiency. — Opposition to benevolence or to virtue. — Cruelty. — 
Inj ustice 183 

LECTURE XVIII. 

Attributes of Selfishness— Continued. 

Falsehood, or lying. — Pride. — Intemperance. — Total moral depravity 196 

LECTURE XIX. 

Sanctions of Moral Law. 

What constitutes the sanctions of law. — In what light sanctions are to be re- 
garded. — Duration of the penal sanctions of the law of God 208 

LECTURE XX. 

Human Government. 



The ultimate end of God in Creation. — Providential and moral governments in- , 
dispensable to the highest good of the universe. — Human governments a 
necessity of human nature. — This necessity will continue as long as human 
beings exist in this world. — Human governments are plainly recognized in 
the Bible as a part of the moral government of God. — Objections answered. — 
The limits of the right of government 214 



xvm 



CONTENTS. 



LECTURE XXI. 

Human Government — Continued. 

i 
No form of civil government universally obligatory. — Revolutions. — In what 

; cases human legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null and void. — The 
rights and duties of governments and subjects in relation to the execution 
of the penalties of law 2: 



LECTURE XXII. 

Moral Depravity. 

Definition. — Distinction between physical and moral depravity. — Mankind both 
physically and morally depraved. — Moral depravity of mankind universal. — 
Moral depravity total 228 

LECTURE XXIII. 

Moral Depravity — Continued. 

Proper method of accounting for moral depravity. — Dr. Woods' view of physical 
and moral depravity examined. — Standards of the Presbyterian Church ex- 
amined 235 

LECTURE XXIY. 

Moral Depravity — Continued. 

Further arguments in support of the position that human nature is in itself sin- 
ful. — The proper method of accounting for moral depravity. — Summary of 
the truth on this subject. — Remarks 245 

LECTURE XXV. 

Atonement. 

Established governmental principles. — The term atonement. — Affirmations of 
reason upon the subject.— The fact of atonement. — Christ's obedience did 
not constitute the atonement. — The atonement not a commercial transaction. 
— The atonement a satisfaction of public justice 258 



LECTURE XXVI. 
Extent op Atonement. 
For whose benefit the atonement was intended. — Objections answered. 



m 



LECTURE XXVII. 
Regeneration. 

The common distinction between regeneration and conversion. — The assigned 
reasons for this distinction. — Objections to this distinction. — What regenera- 



CONTENTS. XIX 

PAGE 

tion is. — The universal necessity of regeneration. — Agencies employed in 
regeneration. — Instrumentalities employed in the work. — The subject both 
passive and active. — What is implied in regeneration 282 

LECTUEE XXVIIL 

Regeneration— Continued. 

Different theories of regeneration examined. — The taste scheme. — The divine 
efficiency scheme. — The susceptibility scheme. — Theory of a divine moral 
suasion. — Objections to this theory. — Remarks ; 291 

LECTURE XXIX. 

Evidences op Regeneration. 

Wherein saints and sinners may agree. — Remarks 300 

LECTURE XXX. 

Evidences op Regeneration — Continued. 

Wherein saints and sinners must differ 309 

LECTURE XXXI. 

Natural Ability. 

y 

The Edwardean notion of ability and of natural inability. — Natural ability identi- 
cal with freedom or liberty of will. — The human will free. — Moral inability 
according to the Edwardean school. — This distinction between natural and 
moral inability nonsensical. — Fundamental error of the Edwardean school 
on the subject of ability. — Another scheme of inability 320 

LECTURE XXXII. 

Gracious Ability. 

What is intended by the term. — This doctrine absurd. — In what sense a gracious 
ability is possible , 341 

LECTURE XXXIII. 
The Notion op Inability. 
oper mode of accounting for it 353 

LECTURE XXXIV. 

Repentance and Impenitence. 

hat repentance is not, and what it is. — What is implied in it. — What impeni- 
tence is not. — What it is. — Some things that are implied in it. — Some evi- 
dences of it 361 



XX CONTENTS. 

LECTURE XXXV. 

Faith and Unbelief. 

f PAGE 

! What evangelical faith is not. — What it is. — What is implied in it. — What un- 
belief is not. — What it is. — What is implied in it. — Conditions of both faith 
and unbelief. — The guilt of unbelief. — Consequences of both faith and un- 
belief. 373 

LECTURE XXXVI. 

Justification. 

| What justification is not. — What it is. — Conditions of justification. — Foundation 

of j ustification „ 382 

LECTURE XXXVII. 

Sanctification. 

Some points that have been settled. — Definition of terms. — The real question. — 

Entire sanctification attainable in this life 402 

LECTURE XXXVIII. 

Sanctification. 

Paul entirely sanctified 423 

LECTURE XXXIX. 

Sanctification. 
j Conditions of its attainment. — Relations of Christ to the soul 433 

LECTURE XL. 

Sanctification. 

Objections answered 448 

LECTURE XLI. 

Sanctification. 
Objections continued 462 

LECTURE XLII. 

Sanctification. 
Remarks 472 



CONTENTS. XXI 

LECTURE XLIII. 

PAGE 

Election 481 

LECTURE XLIV. 

Reprobation 499 

LECTURE XLV. 

Divine Sovereignty 515 

LECTURE XLVI. 

Purposes of God 524 

LECTURE XLVIL 

Perseverance of Saints. 

The different kinds of certainty. — What is not intended by the perseverance of 
the saints 544 

LECTURE XLVIII. 

Perseverance of Saints. 

The doctrine proved 554 

LECTURE XLIX. 

Perseverance of Saints. 

Further proof . . 563 

LECTURE L. 

Perseverance of Saints. 
Objections considered 585 

LECTURE LI. 

Perseverance of Saints. 

Further objections , 605 



SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 



LECTURE I. 



MORAL LAW. 



Law. in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific for 
my purpose, is A kule of action. In its generic signification, it is 
applicable to every kind of action, whether of matter or of mind — 
whether intelligent or unintelligent — whether free or necessary action. 

Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all 
the changes that occur under the law of necessity, whether in matter or 
mind. I mean all changes whether of state or action, that do not consist 
in the states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law of the ma- 
terial universe. It is also the law of mind, so far as its states and 
changes are involuntary. All mental states or actions, which are not 
free and sovereign actions of will, must occur under, and be subject to, 
physical law. They cannot possibly be accounted for, except as they are 
ascribed to the law of necessity or force. 

Moral law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule 
to which moral agents ought to conform all their voluntary actions, and 
is enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept. It is the rule 
for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to neces- 
sary and unintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as opposed to the 
law of necessity — of motive and free choice, as opposed to force of every 
kind. Moral law is primarily a rule for the direction of the action of 
free will, and strictly of free will only. But secondarily, and less strictly, 
it is the rule for the regulation of all those actions and states of mind 
and body, that follow the free actions of will by a law of necessity. 
Thus, moral law controls involuntary mental states and outward action 
only by securing conformity of the actions of free will to its precept. 

The essential attributes of moral law, are, 

1. Subjectivity. It is, and must be, an idea of reason developed in 
the mind of the subject. It is an idea, or conception, of that state of will, 



2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

or course of action, which is obligatory upon a moral agent. No one can 
be a moral agent, or the subject of moral law, unless he has this idea 
developed ; for this idea is identical with the law. It is the law devel- 
oped or revealed within himself; and thus he becomes "a law to him- 
self," his own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this idea, or 
law. 

2. Objectivity.. Moral law may be regarded as a rule of duty, pre- 
scribed by the supreme Lawgiver, and external to self. When thus con- 
templated, it is objective. 

3. Liberty, as opposed to necessity. The precept must lie developed in 
the reason, as a rule of duty — a law of moral obligation — a rule of choice, 
or of ultimate intention, declaring that which a moral agent ought to 
choose, will, intend. But it does not, must not, can not possess the 
attribute of necessity in its relations to the actions of free will. It must 
not, cannot, possess an element or attribute of force, in any such sense 
as to render conformity of will to its precept unavoidable. This would 
confound it with physical law. 

4. Fitness. It must be the law of nature, that is, its precept must 
prescribe and require just those actions of the will which are suitable 
to the nature and relations of moral beings, and nothing more nor 
less ; that is, the intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of the uni- 
verse being given as the ground, and the nature and relations of moral 
beings as the condition of the obligation, the reason hereupon necessarily 
affirms the intrinsic propriety and fitness of choosing this good, and of 
consecrating the whole being to its promotion. This is what is intended 
by the law of nature. It is the law or rule of action imposed on us by 
God, in and by the nature which he has given us. 

5. Universality. The conditions and circumstances being the same, 
it requires, and must require, of all moral agents, the same things, in 
whatever world they may be found. 

6. Impartiality. Moral law is no respecter of persons — knows no 
privileged classes. It demands one thing of all, without regard to any- 
thing, except the fact that they are moral agents. By this it is not in- 
tended that the same course of outward conduct is required of all ; but 
the same state of heart in all — that all shall have one ultimate intention — 
that all shall consecrate themselves to one end — that all shall entirely 
conform, in heart and life, to their nature and relations. 

7. Practicability. That which the precept demands must be possible 
to the subject. That which demands a natural impossibility is not, and 
cannot be, moral law. The true definition of law excludes the supposi- 
tion that it can, under any circumstances, demand an absolute impossi- 
bility. Such a demand could not be in accordance with the nature and 
relations of moral agents, and therefore practicability must always be an 



MORAL LAW. o 

attribute of moral law. To talk of inability to obey moral law is to talk 
nonsense. 

8. Independence. It is an eternal and necessary idea of the divine 
reason. It is the eternal, self-existent rule of the divine conduct, the 
law which the intelligence of God prescribes to himself. Moral law, as 
we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and cannot originate in the 
will of God. It eternally existed in the divine reason. It is the idea of 
that state of will which is obligatory upon God, upon condition of his 
natural attributes, or, in other words, upon condition of his nature. As 
a law, it is entirely independent of his will just as his own existence is. 
It is obligatory also upon every moral agent, entirely independent of the 
will of God. Their nature and relations being given, and their intelli- 
gence being developed, moral law must be obligatory upon them, and it 
lies not in the option of any being to make it otherwise. Their nature 
and relations being given, to pursue a course of conduct suited to their 
nature and relations, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory, inde- 
pendent of the will of any being. 

9. Immutability. Moral law can never change, or be changed. It 
always requires of every moral agent a state of heart,- and course of con- 
duct, precisely suited to his nature and relations. Whatever his nature 
is, his capacity and relations are, entire conformity to just that nature,, 
those capacities and relations, so far as he is able to understand them, is 
required at every moment, and nothing more nor less. If capacity is en- 
larged, the subject is not thereby rendered capable of works of superero- 
gation — of doing more than the law demands ; for the law still, as 
always, requires the full consecration of his whole being to the public in- 
terests. If by any means whatever, his ability is abridged, moral law,, 
always and necessarily consistent with itself, still requires that what is- 
left — nothing more or less — shall be consecrated to the same end as be- 
fore. Whatever demands more or less than entire, universal, and con- 
stant conformity of heart and life, to the nature, capacity and relations 
of moral agents, be they what they may, is not, and cannot be moral law. 
If therefore, the capacity is by any means abridged, the subject does not 
thereby become incapable of rendering full obedience ; for the law still 
demands and urges, that the heart and life shall be fully conformed to 
the present, existing nature, capacity, and relations. Anything that re- 
quires more or less than this, cannot be moral law. Moral law invari- 
ably holds one language. It never changes its requirement. " Thou 
shalt love," or be perfectly benevolent, is its uniform and its only demand. 
This demand it never varies, and never can vary. It is as immutable as 
God is, and for the same reason. To talk of letting down, or altering moral 
law, is to talk absurdly. The thing is naturally impossible. No being 
has the right or the power to do so. The supposition overlooks the very. 



i^ 



4 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

nature of moral law. Moral law is not a statute, an enactment, that 
has its origin or its foundation in the will of any being. It is the law of 
nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent 
imposes on himself and which God imposes upon us because it is entirely 
suited to our nature and relations, and is therefore naturally obligatory 
upon us. It is the unalterable demand of the reason, that the whole be- 
ing, whatever there is of it at any time, shall be entirely consecrated to 
the highest good of universal being, and for this reason God requires this 
of us, with all the weight of his authority. 

10. Unity. Moral law proposes but one ultimate end of pursuit to 
God, and to all moral agents. All its requisitions, in their spirit, are 
summed up and expressed in one word, love or benevolence. This I only 
announce here. It will more fully appear hereafter. Moral law is a pure 
and simple idea of the reason. It is the idea of perfect, universal, and 
constant consecration of the whole being to the highest good of being. 
Just this is, and nothing more nor less can be, moral law ; for just this, 
and nothing more nor less, is a state of heart and a course of life exactly 
suited to the nature and relations of moral agents, which is the only true 
definition of moral law. 

11. Expediency. That which is upon the whole most wise is expedi- 
ent. That which is upon the whole expedient is demanded by moral 
law. True expediency and the spirit of moral law are always identical. 
Expediency may be inconsistent with the letter, but never with the spirit 
of moral law. Law in the form of commandment is a revelation or dec- 
laration of that course which is expedient. It is expediency revealed, as 
in the case of the decalogue, and the same is true of every precept of the 
Bible, it reveals to us what is expedient. A revealed law or command- 
ment is never to be set aside by our views of expediency. We may know 
with certainty that what is required is expedient. The command is the 
expressed judgment of God in the case, and reveals with unerring cer- 
tainty the true path of expediency. When Paul says, " All things are 
lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient," we must not under- 
stand him as meaning that all things in the absolute sense were lawful to 
him, or that anything that was not expedient was lawful to him. But 
he doubtless intended, that many things were inexpedient that are not 
expressly prohibited by the letter of the law, — that the spirit of the law 
prohibited many things not expressly forbidden by the letter. It should 
never be forgotten that that which is plainly demanded by the highest 
good of the universe is law. It is expedient. It is wise. The true spirit 
of the moral law does and must demand it. So, on the other hand, 
whatever is plainly inconsistent with the highest good of the universe is 
illegal, unwise, inexpedient, and must be prohibited by the spirit of moral 
law. But let the thought be repeated, that the Bible precepts always 



MORAL LAW. 5 

reveal that which is truly expedient, and. in no case are we at liberty to 
set aside the spirit of any commandment upon the supposition that ex- 
pediency requires it. Some have denounced the doctrine of expediency 
altogether, as at all times inconsistent with the laiv of right. These 
philosophers proceed upon the assumption that the law of right and the ' 
law of benevolence are not identical but inconsistent with each other. 
This is a common but fundamental mistake, which leads me to remark 
that — Law proposes the highest good of universal being as its end, and re- 
quires all moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this 
end. Consequently, expediency must be one of its attributes. That which 
is upon the whole in the highest degree useful to the universe must be 
demanded by moral law. Moral law must, from its own nature, require ^ 
just that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the high- 
est degree promotive of the public good, — in other words, that which is 
upon the whole in the highest degree useful, and therefore expedient. 
It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right would be ob- 
ligatory if it necessarily tended to and resulted in universal and perfect 
misery. Than which a more nonsensical affirmation was never made. 
The affirmation assumes that the law of right and of good-will are not 
only distinct, but may be antagonistic. It also assumes that that can be 
laiv that is not suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. Cer- 
tainly it will not be pretended that that course of willing and acting that 
necessarily tends to, and results in, universal misery, can be consistent 
with the nature and relations of moral agents. Nothing is or can be 
suited to their nature and relations, that is not upon the whole promo- *' 
tive of their highest well-being. Expediency and right are always and is 
necessarily at one. They can never be inconsistent. That which is upon 
the whole most expedient is right, and that which is right is upon the 
whole expedient. 

12. Exclusiveness. Moral law is the only possible rule of moral ob- 
ligation. A distinction is usually made between moral, ceremonial, civil 
and positive laws. This distinction is in some respects convenient, but is 
liable to mislead, and to create an impression that something can be ob- 
ligatory, in other words can be law, that has not the attributes of moral 
law. Nothing can be law, in any proper sense of the term, that is not 
and would not be universally obligatory upon moral agents under the 
same circumstances. It is law because, and only because, under all the 
circumstances of the case, the course prescribed is fit, proper, suitable, to 
their natures, relations, and circumstances. There can be no other rule 
of action for moral agents but moral law, or the law of benevolence. 
Every other rule is absolutely excluded by the very nature of moral law. 
Surely there can be no law that is or can be obligatory upon moral 
agents but one suited to, and founded in their nature, relations, and cir- 



6 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

cumstances. This is and must be the law of love or benevolence. This 
is the law of right, and nothing else is or can be. Every thing else 
that claims to be law, and to impose obligation upon moral agents, must 
be an imposition and " a thing of nought." 



LECTURE II. 

MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



The primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, 
control by, or in accordance with, rule or law. 

All government is, and must be, either moral or physical ; that is, 
all guidance and control must be exercised in accordance with either moral 
or physical law ; for there can be no laws that are neither moral nor 
physical. 

Physical government is control, exercised by a law of necessity or 
force, as distinguished from the law of free will, or liberty. It is the 
control of substance, as opposed to free will. The only government of 
which substance, as distinguished from free will, is capable, is and must 
be physical. This is true, whether the substance be material or imma- 
terial, whether matter or mind. States and changes, whether of matter 
or mind, that are not actions of free will, must be subject to the law of 
necessity. They must therefore belong to the department of physical 
government. Physical government, then, is the administration of phys- 
ical law, or the law of force. 

Moral government consists in the declaration and administration of 
moral law. It is the government of free will by motives as distinguished 
from the government of substance by force. Physical government pre- 
sides over and controls physical states and changes of substance or con- 
stitution, and all involuntary states and changes. Moral government 
presides over .and controls, or seeks to control the actions of free will : 
it presides over intelligent and voluntary states and changes of mind. 
It is a government of motive, as opposed to a government of force — con- 
trol exercised, or sought to be exercised, in accordance with the law of 
liberty, as opposed to the law of necessity. It is the administration of 
moral as opposed to physical law. 

' Moral government includes the dispensation of rewards and punish- 
ments ; and is administered by means as complicated and vast as the 
whole of the works, and providence, and ways, and grace of God. 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 7 

The fundamental reason of moral government. 

Government must be founded in a good and sufficient reason, or it is 
not right. No one has a right to prescribe rules for, and control the 
conduct of another, unless there is some good reason for his doing so. 
There must be a necessity for moral government, or the administration 
of it is tyranny. Moral government is indispensable to the highest well- 
being of the universe of moral agents. The universe is dependent upon 
this as a means of securing the highest good. This dependence is a good 
and sufficient reason for the existence of moral government. Let it be 
understood, then, that moral government is a necessity of moral beings, 
and therefore right. 

Our nature and circumstances demand that we should be under a 
moral government ; because no community can perfectly harmonize in 
all their views and feelings, without perfect knowledge, or to say the 
least, the same degree of knowledge on all subjects on which they are 
called to act. But no community ever existed, or will exist, in which 
all possess exactly the same amount of knowledge, and where the mem- 
bers are, therefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views, and 
opinions. But if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the 
same amount of knowledge, they will not, in every thing, harmonize, as 
it respects their courses of conduct. There must, therefore, be in every 
community, some standard or rule of duty, to which all the subjects of 
the community are to conform themselves. There must be some head 
or controlling mind, whose will shall be law, and whose decision shall 
be regarded as infallible, by all the subjects of the government. However 
diverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they must all agree, 
that the will of the lawgiver is right, and universally the rale of duty. 
This will must be authoritative, and not merely advisory. There must 
of necessity be a penalty attached .to, and incurred by, every act of dis- 
obedience to this will. If disobedience be persisted in, exclusion from 
the privileges of the government is the lowest penalty that can consis- 
tently be inflicted. The good, then, of the universe imperiously requires 
that there should be a moral governor. 

Wliose right is it to govern ? 

TVe have just seen that the highest well-being of the universe demands, 
and is the end of moral government. It must, therefore/ be his right / 
and duty to govern, whose attributes, physical and moral, best qualify-? 
him to secure the end of government. To him all eyes and hearts should 
be directed, to fill this station, to exercise this control, to administer all 
just and necessary rewards and punishments. It is both his right and 
duty to govern. 

That God is a moral governor, we infer — 



8 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

1. From our own nature. From the very laws of our being, we 
naturally affirm our responsibility to him for our conduct. As God is 
our creator, we are naturally responsible to him for the right exercise of 
our powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity 
to the same rule to which he conforms his whole being, he is under a 
moral obligation to require us to be holy, as he is holy. 

2. His natural attributes qualify him to sustain the relation of a 
moral governor to the universe. 

3. His moral character also qualifies him to sustain this relation. 

4. His relation to the universe as creator and preserver, when con- 
sidered in connection with the necessity of government, and with his 
nature and attributes, confers on him the right of universal government. 

5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to him and to each 
other, render it obligatory upon him to establish and administer a moral 
government over the universe. It would be wrong for him to create a 
universe of moral beings, and then refuse or neglect to administer over 
them a moral government, since government is a necessity of their nature 
and relations. 

G. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless 
he acted in accordance with his conscience. 

7. If God is not a moral governor he is not wise. Wisdom consists 
in the choice of the best ends, and in the use of the most appropriate 
means to accomplish those ends^' If God is not a moral governor, it is 
inconceivable that he should have had any important end in view in the 
creation of moral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any 
suitable means for the promotion of their happiness as the most desirable 
end. 

8. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to 
exert a moral influence over moral agents. 

9. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is 
governed by moral laws, or by laws suited to the nature of moral agents. 

10. If God is not a moral governor, the whole universe, so far as we 
have the means of knowing it, is calculated to mislead mankind in 
respect to this fundamental truth. All nations have believed that God 
is a moral governor. 

11. We must disapprove the character of God, if we ever come to a 
knowledge of the fact that he created moral agents, and then exercised 
over them no moral government. 

12. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God, 
contains a most simple and yet comprehensive system of moral govern- 
ment. 

13. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of moral gov- 
ernment, we are sure of nothing. 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



Wiat is implied in the right to govern ? 



1. From what has just been said, it must be evident, that the right 
to govern implies the necessity of government, as a means of securing an 
intrinsically valuable end. 

2. Also that the right to govern implies the duty, or obligation to 
govern. There can be no right, in this case, without corresponding obli- 
gation ; for the right to govern is founded in the necessity of govern- 
ment, and the necessity of government imposes obligation to govern. 

3. The right to govern, implies obligation, on the part of the subject, 
to obey. It cannot be the right, or duty, of the governor to govern, un- 
less it is the duty of the subject to obey. The governor and subjects are 
alike dependent upon government, as the indispensable means of pro- 
moting the highest good. The governor and the subject must, there- 
fore, be under reciprocal obligation, the one to govern, and the other to 
be governed, or to obey. The one must seek to govern, the other must 
submit to be governed. 

4. The right to govern, implies the right and duty to dispense just 
and necessary rewards and punishments — distribute rewards proportioned 
to merit, and penalties proportioned to demerit, whenever the public in- 
terest demands their execution. 

5. It implies obligation, on the part of the subject, cheerfully to ac- 
quiesce in any measure that may be necessary to secure the end of gov- 
ernment, and in case of disobedience, to submit to merited punishment, 
and also, if necessary, to aid in the infliction of the penalty of law. 

6. It implies obligation, on the part both of the ruler and the ruled, 
to be always ready, and when occasion arises, actually to make any per- 
sonal and private sacrifice demanded by the higher public good — to 
cheerfully meet any emergency, and exercise any degree of self-denial, 
that can, and will, result in a good of greater value to the public than 
that sacrificed by the individual, or by any number of individuals, it 
always being understood, that present voluntary sacrifices shall have an 
ultimate reward. 

7. It implies the right and duty to employ any degree of force, which 
is indispensable to the maintenance of order, the execution of wholesome 
laws, the suppression of insurrections, the punishment of rebels and dis- 
organizes, and sustaining the supremacy of moral law. It is impossible 
that the right to govern should not imply this ; and to deny this right, is 
to deny the right to govern. Should an emergency occur, in which a 
ruler had no right to use the indispensable means of securing order, and 
the supremacy of law, the moment this emergency occurred, his right to 
govern would, and must, cease : for it is impossible that it should be his 
right to govern, unless it be at the same time, and for the same reason, 



I 



10 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

his duty to govern ; and it is absurd to say, that it is his right and duty 
to govern, and yet at the same time, that he has not a right to use the in- 
dispensable means of government. If it be asked, whether an emergency 
like the one under consideration is possible, and if so what might justly 
be regarded as such an emergency, I answer, that should circum- 
stances occur under which the sacrifice necessary to sustain, would 
overbalance the good to be derived from the prevalence of government, 
this would create the emergency under consideration, in which the right 
to govern would cease. 

The limits of this rigid. 

The right to govern is, and must be, just co-extensive with the neces- 
sity of government. We have seen, that the right to govern is founded 
in the necessities of moral beings. In other words, the right to govern is 
founded upon the fact, that the highest good of moral agents cannot be 
secured, but by means of government. But to avoid mistake, and to 
correct erroneous impressions, which are sometimes entertained, I must 
show what is not the foundation of the right to govern. The boundary 
of the right must, as will be seen, depend upon the foundation of the 
right. The right must be as broad as the reason for it. If the reason 
of the right be mistaken, then the limits of the right cannot be ascer- 
tained, and must necessarily be mistaken also. 

1. The right to govern the universe cannot be founded in the fact, 
that God sustains to it the relation of Creator. This is by itself rto rea- 
son why he should govern it, unless it needs to be governed — unless some 
good will result from government. Unless there is some necessity for 
government, the fact that God created the universe can give him no 
right to govern it. 

2. The fact that God is owner and sole proprietor of the universe is 
no reason why he should govern it. Unless either his own good or the 
good of the universe, or of both together, demand government, the relation 
of owner cannot confer the right to govern. Neither God, nor any other 
being, can own moral beings, in such a sense as to have a right to govern 
them, when government is wholly unnecessary, and can result in no 
good whatever to God, or to his creatures. Government, in such a case, 
would be perfectly arbitrary and unreasonable, and consequently an un- 
just, tyrannical and wicked act. God has no such right. No such right 
can, by possibility, in any case exist. 

3. The right to govern cannot be founded in the fact, that God pos- 
sesses all the attributes, natural and moral, that are requisite to the ad- 
ministration of moral government. This fact is no doubt a condition of 
the right ; for without these qualifications he could have no right, how- 
ever necessary government might be. But the possession of these attri- 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 11 

butes cannot confer the right independently of the necessity of govern- 
ment : for however well qualified he may be to govern, still, unless gov- 
ernment is necessary to securing his own glory and the highest well- 
being of the universe, he has no right to govern it. Possessing the 
requisite qualifications is the condition, and the necessity of government 
is the foundation of the right to govern. More strictly, the right is 
founded in the intrinsic value of the interests to be secured by govern- 
ment, and conditioned upon the fact, that government is the necessary 
means of securing the end. 

4. Nor is the right to govern conferred by the value of the interests to 
be secured, nor by the circumstance of the necessity of government 
merely, without respect to the condition just above mentioned. Did not 
God's natural and moral attributes qualify him to sustain that relation 
better than any one else, the right could not be conferred on him by any 
other fact or relation. 

5. The right to govern is not, and cannot be, an abstract right based 
on no reason whatever. The idea of this right is not an ultimate idea in 
such a sense, that our intelligence affirms the right without assigning any 
reason on which it is founded. The human intelligence cannot say that 
God has a right to govern, because he has such a right ; and that this is 
reason enough, and all the reason that can be given. Our reason does 
not affirm that government is right because it is right ; and that this is a 
first truth, and an ultimate idea. If this were so, then God's arbitrary 
will would be law, and no bounds could possibly be assigned to the right 
to govern. If God's right to govern be a first truth, an ultimate truth, 
fact, and idea, founded in no assignable reason, then he has the right to 
legislate as little, and as much, and as arbitrarily, as unnecessarily, as 
absurdly, and injuriously as possible, and no injustice is, or can be done ; 
for he has, by the supposition, a right to govern, founded in no reason, 
and of course without any limit. Assign any other reason, as the foun- 
dation of the right to govern, than the value of the interests to be secured 
and the necessity of government, and you may search in vain for any limit 
to the right. But the moment the foundation and the condition of the 
right are discovered, we see instantly, that the right must be co-extensive 
with the reason upon which it is founded, or in other words, must be 
limited by, and only by the fact, that thus far, and no farther, govern- 
ment is necessary to the highest good of the universe. No legislation can 
be valid in heaven or earth — no enactments can impose obligation, except 
upon the condition, that such legislation is demanded by the highest 
good of the governor and the governed. Unnecessary legislation is inva- 
lid legislation. Unnecessary government is tyranny. It can, in no case 
be founded in right. It should, however, be observed, that it is often, 
and in the government of God universally true, that the sovereign, and 



12 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

not the subject, is to be the judge of what is necessary legislation and 
government. Under no government, therefore, are laws to be despised 
or rejected because we are unable to see at once their necessity, and hence 
their wisdom. Unless they are palpably unnecessary, and therefore un- 
wise and unjust, they are to be respected and obeyed as a less evil than 
contempt and disobedience, though at present we are unable to see their 
wisdom. Under the government of God there can never be any doubt 
nor of course any ground for distrust and hesitancy as it respects the 
duty of obedience. 

Moral Obligation. 

The idea of obligation, or of oughtness, is an idea of the pure reason. 
It is a simple, rational conception, and, strictly speaking, does not admit 
of a definition, since there are no terms more simple by which it may be 
defined. Obligation is a term by which we express a conception or idea 
which all men have, as is manifest from the universal language of men. 
All men have the ideas of right and wrong, and have words by which 
these ideas are expressed, and, perhaps, no idea among men more fre- 
quently reveals itself in words than that of oughtness or obligation. The 
term cannot be defined, for the simple reason that it is too well and too 
universally understood to need or even to admit of being expressed in any 
language more simple and definite than the word obligation itself. 

The conditions of moral 'gation. 

There is a distinction of fundamental importance between the condi- 
tion and the ground of obligation. The ground of obligation is the con- 
sideration which creates or imposes obligation, the fundamental reason 
of the obligation. Of this I shall inquire in its proper place. At pres- 
ent I am to define the conditions of obligation. But I must in this 
place observe that there are various forms of obligation. For example, 
obligation to choose an ultimate end of life as the highest good of the 
universe ; obligation to choose the necessary conditions of this end. as 
holiness, for example ; and obligation to put forth executive efforts to 
secure this end. The conditions of obligation vary with the form of obli- 
gation, as we shall fully perceive in the course of our investigations. 

A condition of obligation in any particular form is a sine qua non of 
obligation in that particular form. It is that, without which, obligation 
in that form could not exist, and yet is not the fundamental reason of 
the obligation. For example, the possession of the powers of moral 
agency is a condition of the obligation to choose the highest good of being 
in general, as an ultimate end, or for its own sake. But the intrinsic 
value of this good is the ground of the obligation. This obligation could 
not exist without the possession of these powers ; but the possession of 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 13 

these powers cannot of itself create the obligation to choose the good in 
preference to the ill of being. The intrinsic difference between the good 
and the ill of being is the ground of the obligation to will the one rather 
than the other. I will first define the conditions upon which all obliga- 
tion depends, and without which obligation in no form can exist, and 
afterward proceed to point out the conditions of distinct forms of obli- 
gation. 

1. Moral agency is universally a condition of moral obligation. The 
attributes of moral agency are intellect, sensibility, and free-will. 

(1.) Intellect includes, among other functions which I need not 
name, reason, conscience, and self -consciousness. As has been said on a 
former occasion, reason is the intuitive faculty or function of the intel- 
lect. It gives by direct intuition the following among other truths : the 
absolute — for example, right and wrong ; the necessary — space exists ; 
the infinite — space is infinite ; the perfect — God is perfect — God's law is 
perfect, etc. In short, it is the faculty that intuits moral relations and 
affirms moral obligation to act in conformity with perceived moral rela- 
tions. It is that faculty that postulates all the a priori truths of science 
whether mathematical, philosophical, theological, or logical. 

Conscience is the faculty or function of the intellect that recognizes 
the conformity or disconformity of the heart and life to the moral law 
as it lies revealed in the reason, and also awards praise to conformity, 
and blame to disconformity to that law. ~ ^lso affirms that conformity 
to the moral law deserves reward, and th^ t disconformity deserves pun- 
ishment. It also possesses a propelling or impulsive power, by which it 
urges the conformity, and denounces the nonconformity of will to moral 
law. It seems, in a certain sense, to possess the power of retribution. 

Consciousness is the faculty or function of self-knowledge. It is the 
faculty that recognizes our own existence, mental actions, and states, 
together with the attributes of liberty or necessity, belonging to those 
actions or states. 

" Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself." By con- 
sciousness I know that I am — that I affirm that space is, — that I also affirm 
that the whole is equal to all its parts — that every event must have a 
cause, and many such like truths. I am conscious not only of these 
affirmations, but also that necessity is the law of these affirmations, that 
I cannot affirm otherwise than I do, in respect to this class of truths. I 
am also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk and write, and I am just 
as conscious that liberty is the law of this choice. That is, I am con- 
scious of necessarily regarding myself as entirely free in this choice, and 
affirming my own ability to have chosen not to sit at my desk, and of 
being now able to choose not to sit and write. I am just as conscious 
of affirming the liberty or necessity of my mental states as I am of the 



1± SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

states tliemselves. Consciousness gives us our existence and attributes, 
our mental acts and states, and all the attributes and phenomena of our 
being, of which we have any knowledge. In short, all our knowledge is 
given to us by consciousness. The intellect is a receptivity as distin- 
guished from a voluntary power. All the acts and states of the intellect 
are under the law of necessity, or physical law. The will can command 
the attention of the intellect. Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, 
and all its phenomena are involuntary, and under a law of necessity. 
Of this we are conscious. Another faculty indispensable to moral 
agency is — 

(2.) Sensibility. This is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling. 
All sensation, desire, emotion, passion, pain, pleasure, and, in short, 
every kind and degree of feeling, as the term feeling is commonly used, 
is a phenomenon of this faculty. This faculty supplies the chronological 
condition of the idea of the valuable, and hence of right and wrong, and 
of moral obligation. The experience of pleasure or happiness develops 
the idea of the valuable, just as the perception of body develops the 
idea of space. But for this faculty the mind could have no idea of the 
valuable, and hence of moral obligation to will the valuable, nor of right 
and wrong, nor of praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness. 

Self-love is a phenomenon of this department of the mind. It con- 
sists in a constitutional desire of happiness, and implies a corresponding 
dread of misery. It is doubtless through, or by, this constitutional ten- 
dency that the rational idea of the intrinsic value of happiness or enjoy- 
ment is at first developed. Animals, doubtless, have enjoyment, but we 
have no evidence that they possess the faculty of reason in the sense in 
which I have defined the term. Consequently they have not, as we sup- 
pose, the rational conception of the intrinsic worth or value of enjoy- 
ment. They seek enjoyment from a mere impulse of their animal nature, 
without, as we suppose, so much as a conception of moral law, obligation, 
right or wrong. 

But we know that moral agents have these ideas. Self-love is consti- 
tutional. Its gratification is the chronological condition of the develop- 
ment of the reason's idea of the intrinsically valuable to being. This 
idea develops that of moral law, or in other words, the affirmation that 
this intrinsic good ought to be universally chosen and sought for its own 
sake. 

The sensibility, like the intellect, is a receptivity or purely a passive, 
distinguished from a voluntary faculty. All its phenomena are under 
the law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct effort, 
feel when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the intellect that 
when the intellect is intensely occupied with certain considerations, the 
sensibility is affected in a certain manner, and certain feelings exist in 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 15 

the sensibility by a law of necessity. I am conscious that when certain 
conditions are fulfilled, I necessarily have certain feelings, and that when 
these conditions are not fulfilled, I cannot be the subject of those feelings. 
I know by consciousness tliat my feelings and all the states and phenom- 
ena of the sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my will. 
By willing I can direct my intellect to the consideration of certain sub- 
jects, and in this way alone affect my sensibility, and produce a given 
state of feeling. So on the other hand, if certain feelings exist in the 
sensibility which I wish to suppress, I know that I cannot annihilate 
them by directly willing them out of existence, but by diverting my at- 
tention from the cause of them, they cease to exist of course and of 
necessity. Thus, feeling is only indirectly under the control of the will. 

(3.) Moral agency implies the possession of free-will. By free-will is 
intended the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in every instance, 
in compliance with moral obligation. Free-will implies the power of 
originating and deciding our own choices, and of exercising our own 
sovereignty, in every instance of choice upon moral questions — of decid- 
ing or choosing in conformity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral 
obligation. That man cannot be under a moral obligation to perform an 
absolute impossibility, is a first truth of reason. But man's causality, 
his whole power of causality to perform or do anything, lies in his will. 
If he cannot will, he can do nothing. His whole liberty or freedom 
must consist in his power to will. His outward actions and his mental 
states are connected with the actions of his will by a law of necessity. If 
I will to move my muscles, they must move, unless there be a paralysis 
of the nerves of voluntary motion, or unless some resistance be opposed 
that overcomes the power of my volitions. The sequences of choice or 
volition are always under the law of necessity, and unless the will is free, 
man has no freedom ; and if he has no freedom he is not a moral agent, 
that is, he is incapable of moral action and also of moral character. 
Free-will then, in the above defined sense, must be a condition of moral 
agency, and of course, of moral obligation. 

As consciousness gives the rational affirmation that necessity is an 
attribute of the affirmations of the reason, and of the states of sensibility, 
so it just as unequivocally gives the reason's affirmation that liberty is an 
attribute of the actions of the will. I am as conscious of the affirmation 
that I could will differently from what I do in every instance of moral 
obligation, as I am of the affirmation that I cannot affirm, in regard to 
truths of intuition, otherwise than I do. I am as conscious of affirming 
that I am free in willing, as I am of affirming that I am not free or volun- 
tary in my feelings and intuitions. 

Consciousness of affirming the freedom of the will, that is, of power 
to will in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse thus to will, is a 



16 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation. For example, no 
man affirms, or can affirm, his obligation to undo all the acts of his past 
life, and to live his life over again. He cannot affirm himself to be un- 
der this obligation, simply because he cannot but affirm the impossibility 
of it. He cannot but affirm his obligation to repent and obey God in 
future, because he is conscious of affirming his ability to do this. Con- 
sciousness of the affirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, 
is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation to comply with 
that requisition. Then no moral agent can affirm himself to be under 
obligation to perform an impossibility. 

2. A second condition of moral obligation is light, or so much knowl- 
edge of our moral relations as to develop the idea of oughtness. This 
implies — 

(1.) The perception or idea of the intrinsically valuable. 

(2.) The affirmation of obligation to will the valuable for its own 
sake. Before I can affirm my obligation to will, I must perceive some- 
thing in that which I am required to will as an ultimate end, that ren- 
ders it worthy of being chosen. I must have an object of choice. That 
object must possess, in itself, that which commends itself to my intelli- 
gence as worthy of being chosen. 

All choice must respect means or ends. That is, everything must be 
willed either as an end or a means. I cannot be under obligation to will 
the means until I know the end. I cannot know an end, or that which 
can possibly be chosen as an ultimate end, until I know that something 
is intrinsically valuable. I cannot know that it is right or wrong to choose 
or refuse a certain end, until I know whether the proposed object of 
choice is intrinsically valuable or not. It is impossible for me to choose 
it, as an ultimate end, unless I perceive it to be intrinsically valuable. 
This is self-evident ; for choosing it as an end is nothing else than choos- 
ing it for its intrinsic value. Moral obligation, therefore, always and 
necessarily implies the knowledge that the well-being of God and of the 
universe is valuable in itself, and the affirmation that it ought to be 
chosen for its own sake, that is, impartially and on account of its in- 
trinsic value. It is impossible that the ideas of right and wrong should 
be developed until the idea of the valuable is developed. Eight and 
wrong respect intentions, and strictly nothing else, as we shall see. In- 
tention implies an end intended. Now that which is chosen as an ulti- 
mate end, is and must be chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic 
value. Until the end is apprehended, no idea or affirmation of obliga- 
tion can exist respecting it. Consequently, no idea of right or wrong 
in respect to that end can exist. The end must first be perceived. The 
idea of the intrinsically valuable must be developed. Simultaneously with 
the development of the idea of the valuable the intelligence affirms, and 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 17 

must affirm, obligation to will it, or, which is, strictly speaking, the same 
thing, that it is right to will it, and wrong not to will it. 

It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation, or of right and 
wrong, should be developed upon any other conditions than those just 
specified. Suppose, for instance, it should be said that the idea of the 
intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the development of the idea of 
moral obligation, and of right and wrong. Let us look at it. It is 
agreed that moral obligation, and the ideas of right and wrong respect, 
directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all intentions must 
respect either means or ends. It is also admitted that obligation to will 
means, cannot exist until the end is known. It is also admitted that the 
choice of an ultimate end implies the choice of a thing for its own sake, 
or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now, from these admissions, it 
follows that the idea of the intrinsically valuable is the condition of moral 
obligation, and also of the idea of moral obligation. It must follow also 
that the idea of the valuable must be the condition of the idea that it 
would be right to choose, or wrong not to choose, the valuable. It is, 
then, nonsense to affirm that the ideas of right and wrong are developed 
antecedently to the idea of the valuable. It is the same as to say that I 
affirm it to be right to will an end, before I have the idea of an end ; or 
wrong not to will an end when as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any 
reason why it should be willed, or, in other words, while I have no idea 
of an ultimate end. 

Let it be distinctly understood then, that the conditions of moral 
obligation, in the universal form of obligation to will the highest well- 
being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, are the possession of 
the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a moral agent, and light 
or the development of the ideas of the valuable, of moral obligation, 
of right and wrong. 

I have defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, L e. 
obligation to be benevolent, to love God and our neighbor, or to will the 
universal good of being for its intrinsic value. Obligation in this form 
is" universal and always a unit, and has always the same conditions. But 
there are myriads of specific forms of obligation which relate to the con- 
ditions and means of securing this ultimate end. We shall have occasion 
hereafter fully to show that obligation respects three classes of the will's 
actions, viz. the choice of an ultimate end — the choice of the conditions 
and means of securing that end — and executive volitions or efforts put 
forth to secure the end. I have already shown that moral agency, with 
all that is implied in it, has the universal conditions of obligation to 
choose the highest good of being, as an ultimate end. This must be 
self-evident. 

Obligation to choose the conditions of this end, the holiness of God 



IS SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and of all moral agents, for example, must be conditioned upon the per- 
ception that these are the conditions. In other words, the perception 
of the relation of these means to the end must be a condition of the obli- 
gation to will their existence. The perception of the relation is not the 
ground but simply the condition of obligation in this form. The rela- 
tion of holiness to happiness as a condition of its existence, could not im- 
pose obligation to will the existence of holiness without reference to the 
intrinsic value of happiness, as the fundamental reason for willing it as 
a necessary condition and means. The ground of the obligation to will 
the existence of holiness, as a means of happiness, is the intrinsic value 
of happiness, but the perceived relation of holiness to happiness is a con- 
dition of the obligation. But for this perceived relation the obligation 
could not exist, yet the perceived relation could not create the obligation. 
Suppose that holiness is the means of happiness, yet no obligation to will 
holiness on account of this relation could exist but for the intrinsic value 
of happiness. 

Conditions of obligation to put forth executive acts. 

Having now defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, 
and also in the form of obligation to choose the existence of holiness as a 
necessary means of happiness, I now proceed to point out the conditions 
of obligation to put forth executive volitions or efforts to secure holiness, 
and secure the highest good of being. Our busy lives are made up in 
efforts to secure some ultimate end, upon which the heart is set. The 
sense in which obligation extends to these executive volitions or acts I 
shall soon consider ; at present I am concerned only to define the condi- 
tions of these forms of obligation. These forms of obligation, be it 
understood, respect volitions and consequent outward acts. Volitions, 
designed as executive acts, always suppose an existing choice of the end 
designed to be secured by them. Obligation to put forth executive 
efforts to secure an end must be conditioned upon the possibility, sup- 
posed necessity, and utility of such efforts. If the end chosen does not 
need to be promoted by any efforts of ours, or if such efforts are impossi- 
ble to us, or if they are seen to be of no use, there can be no obligation 
to make them. 

It is important, however, to observe that the utility of ultimate choice, 
or the choice of an object for its own sake, is not a condition of obligation 
in that form. Ultimate choice, or the choice of an object for its own sake, 
or for its intrinsic value, is not an effort designed to secure or obtain that 
object ; that is, is not put forth with any such design. When the object 
which the mind perceives to be intrinsically valuable (as the good of be- 
ing, for example), is perceived by the mind, it cannot but choose or refuse 
it. Indifference in this case is naturally impossible. The mind, in such 
circumstances, is under a necessity of choosing one way or the other. 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 19 

The will must embrace or reject it. The reason affirms the obligation to 
choose the intrinsically valuable for its own sake, and not because choos- 
ing it will secure it. Nor does the real choice of it imply a purpose or 
an obligation to put forth executive acts to secure it, except upon condi- 
tion that such acts are seen to be necessary, and possible, and calculated 
to secure it. 

Ultimate choice is not put forth with design to secure its object. It 
is only the will's embracing the object or willing it for its own sake. In 
regard to ultimate choice the will must choose or refuse the object en- 
tirely irrespectively of the tendency of the choice to secure the object. 
Assuming this necessity, the reason affirms that it is right, fit, suitable, 
or, which is the same thing, that the will ought, or is under obligation 
to choose, the good or valuable, and not refuse it, because of its intrinsic 
nature, and without regard to whether the choosing will secure the ob- 
ject chosen. 

But executive acts, be it remembered, are, and must be put forth with 
design to secure their object, and of course, cannot exist unless the design 
exist, and the design cannot exist unless the mind assumes the possibility, 
necessity, and utility of such efforts. 



LECTURE III. 

MORAL OBLIGATION. 

Man is a subject of moral obligation. 

That man has intellect and sensibility, or the powers of knowing and 
feeling, has not, to my knowledge, been doubted. In theory, the free- 
dom of the will in man has been denied. Yet the very deniers, have, in 
their practical judgment, assumed the freedom of the human will, as 
well, and as fully as the most staunch defenders of human liberty of will. 
Indeed, nobody ever did or can, in practice, call in question the freedom 
of the human will, without justly incurring the charge of insanity. By 
a necessity of his nature, every moral agent knows himself to be free. 
He can no more hide this fact from himself, or reason himself out of the 
conviction of its truth, than he can speculate himself into a disbelief of 
his own existence. He may, in speculation, deny either, but in fact 
he knows both. That he is, that he is free, are truths equally well known, 
and known precisely in the same way, namely, he intuits them — sees them 
in their own light, by virtue of the constitution of his being. I have 
said that man is conscious of possessing the powers of a moral agent. He 



20 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

has also the idea of the valuable, of right and of wrong ; of this he is 
conscious. But nothing else is necessary to constitute man or any other 
beiug a subject of moral obligation, and the possession of these powers, 
together with sufficient light on moral subjects to develop the ideas just 
mentioned. 

Man, by a law of necessity, affirms himself to be under moral obliga- 
tion. He cannot doubt it. He affirms absolutely and necessarily, that 
he is praise-worthy or blame-worthy as he is benevolent or selfish. Every 
man assumes this of himself, and of all other men of sound mind. This 
assumption is irresistible, as well as universal. 

The truth assumed then is not to be called in question. But if it be 
called in question in theory, it still remains, and must remain, while 
reason remains, a truth of certain knowledge, from the presence of which 
there is, and can be no escape. The spontaneous, universal, and irresist- 
ible affirmation that men of sound mind are praise-worthy or blame- 
worthy, as they are selfish or benevolent, shows beyond contradiction, 
that all men regard themselves, and others, as the subjects of moral 
obligation. 

Extent of moral obligation. 

By this is intended, to what acts and states of mind does moral obli- 
gation extend ? This certainly is a solemn and a fundamentally impor- 
tant question. In the examination of this question, let us inquire first, 
to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly extend. 

1. Not to external or muscular action. These actions are connected 
with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity. If I will to move my 
muscles, they must move, unless the nerves of voluntary motion are par- 
alyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion, that overpowers 
the strength of my will, or, if you please, of my muscles. It is generally 
understood and agreed that moral obligation does not directly extend to 
bodily or outward action. 

2. Not to the states of the sensibility. I have already remarked that 
we are conscious, that our feelings are not voluntary, but involuntary 
states of mind. Moral obligation cannot, therefore, directly extend to 
them. 

3. Not to states of the intellect. The phenomena of this faculty, we 
also know by consciousness, to be under the law of necessity. It is im- 
possible that moral obligation should extend directly to any involuntary 
act or state of mind. 

4. Not to unintelligent acts of will. There are many unintelligent 
volitions, or acts of will, to which moral obligation cannot extend, for ex- 
ample, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants, before the reason is at all 
developed. They must at birth, be the subjects of volition, as they have 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 21 

motion or muscular action. The volitions of somnambulists are also of 
this character. Purely instinctive volitions must also come under the 
category of unintelligent actions of will. For example : a bee lights on 
my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread on a hot 
iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed there are many actions of 
will which are put forth under the influence of pure instinct, and before 
the intellect can affirm obligation to will or not to will. These surely 
cannot have moral character, and of course moral obligation cannot ex- 
tend to them. 

We inquire in the second place, to what acts and states of mind moral 
obligation must directly extend. 

1. To ultimate acts of will. These are and must be free. Intelligent 
acts of will, as has been before observed, are of three classes. First, the 
choice of some object for its own sake, i. e., because of its own nature, or 
for reasons found exclusively in itself, as, for example, the happiness of 
being. These are called ultimate choices, or intentions. Second, the 
choice of the conditions and means of securing the object of ultimate 
choice, as for example, holiness, as the conditions or means of hap- 
piness. Third, volitions, or executive efforts to secure the object of ulti- 
mate choice. Obligation must extend to these three classes of the actions 
of the will. In the most strict and proper sense it may be said, that 
obligation extends directly only to the ultimate intention. 

The choice of an end necessitates the choice of the known conditions 
and means of securing this end. I am free to relinquish, at any moment, 
my choice of an end, but while I persevere in the choice, or ultimate in- 
tention, I am not free to refuse the known necessary conditions and 
means. If I reject the known conditions and means, I, in this act, 
relinquish the choice of the end. The desire of the end may remain, 
but the actual choice of it cannot, when the will knowingly rejects the 
known necessary conditions and means. In this case, the will prefers to 
let go the end, rather than to choose and use the necessary conditions 
and means. In the strictest sense the choice of known conditions and 
means, together with executive volitions, is implied in the ultimate inten- 
tion or in the choice of an end. 

When the good or valuable per se, is perceived by a moral agent, he 
instantly and necessarily, and without condition, affirms his obligation 
to choose it. This affirmation is direct and universal, absolute, or with- 
out condition. Whether he will affirm himself to be under obligation to 
put forth efforts to secure the good, must depend upon his regarding such 
acts as necessary, possible, and useful. The obligation, therefore, to put 
forth ultimate choice, is in the strictest sense direct, absolute and uni- 
versal. 

Obligation to choose holiness, (as the holiness of God,) as the means 



22 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of happiness, is indirect in the sense that it is conditioned, first, upon 
the obligation to choose happiness as a good per se; and, second, upon 
the knowledge that holiness is the necessary means of happiness. 

Obligation to put forth executive volitions is also indirect in the 
sense that it is conditioned ; first, upon obligation to choose an object as 
an end ; and, second, upon the necessity, possibility, and utility of such 
acts. 

It should here be observed, that obligation to choose an object for its 
own sake, implies, of course, obligation to reject its opposite ; and obli- 
gation to choose the conditions of an intrinsically valuable object for its 
own sake, implies obligation to reject the conditions or means of the 
opposite of this object. Also, obligation to use means to secure an in- 
trinsically valuable object, implies obligation to use means, if necessary 
and possible, to prevent the opposite of this end. For example : Obliga- 
tion to will happiness, for its intrinsic value, implies obligation to reject 
misery, as an intrinsic evil. Obligation to will the conditions of the 
happiness of being, implies obligation to reject the conditions of misery. 
Obligation to use means to promote the happiness of being, implies obli- 
gation to use means, if necessary and practicable, to prevent the misery 
of being. 

Again, the choice of any object, either as an end, or a means, implies 
the refusal of its opposite. In other words, choice implies preference, 
refusing is properly only choice in an opposite direction. For this rea- 
son, in speaking of the actions of the will, it has been common to omit 
the mention of nilling, or refusing, since such acts are properly included 
in the categories of choices and volitions. It should also be observed 
that choice, or willing, necessarily implies an object chosen, and that 
this object should be such that the mind can regard it as being either 
intrinsically, or relatively valuable, or important. As choice must con- 
sist in an act, an intelligent act, the mind must have reason for choice. 
It cannot choose without a reason, for this is the same as to choose with- 
out an object of choice. A mere abstraction without any perceived or 
assumed, intrinsic, or relative importance, to any being in existence, can- 
not be an object of choice, either ultimate or executive. The ultimate 
reason which the mind has for choosing is in fact the object of choice ; 
and where there is no reason there is no object of choice. 

2. I have said, that moral obligation respects in the strictest sense 
and directly the intention only. I am now prepared to say still further, 
that this is a first truth of reason. It is a truth universally and neces- 
sarily assumed by all moral agents, their speculations to the contrary, 
in ar.y wise, notwithstanding. This is evident from the following con- 
siderations : 

(1.) Very young children know and assume this truth universally. 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 23 

They always deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused 
of any delinquency to say, "I did not mean to," or if accused of short 
coming, to say, "I meant or intended to have done it — I designed it." 
This, if true, they assume to be an idl-sufficient vindication of themselves. 
They know that this, if believed, must be regarded as a sufficient excuse 
to justify them in every case. 

(2. ) Every moral agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect 
justification, in case it be sincerely and truly made. 

(3.) It is a saying as common as men are, and as true as common, 
that men are to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs, in- 
tentions. It is impossible for us not to assent to this truth. If a man 
intend evil, though, perchance, he may do us good, we do not excuse 
him, but hold him guilty of the crime which he intended. So if he in- 
tend to do us good, and, perchance, do us evil, we do not, and cannot 
condemn him. For this intention and endeavor to do us good, we can- 
not blame him, although it has resulted in evil to us. He may be to 
blame for other things connected with the affair. He may have come to 
our help too late, and have been to blame for not coming when a differ- 
ent result would have followed ; or he may have been blamable for not 
being better qualified for doing us good. He may have been to blame 
for many things connected witli the transaction, but for a sincere, and 
of course hearty endeavor to do us good, he is not culpable, nor can he 
be, however it may result. If he honestly intended to do us good, it is 
impossible that he should not have used the best means in his power, at 
the time. This is implied in honesty of intention. And if he did this, 
reason cannot pronounce him guilty, for it must judge him by his 
intentions. 

(4.) Courts of criminal law have always in every enlightened country 
assumed this as a first truth. They always inquire into the quo animo, 
that is, the intention, and judge accordingly. 

(5.) The universally acknowledged truth that lunatics are not moral 
agents and responsible for their conduct, is but an illustration of the fact 
that the truth we are considering is regarded, and assumed, as a first 
truth of reason. 

(6.) The Bible everywhere either expressly or impliedly recognizes 
this truth. "If there be a willing mind," that is, a right willing or in- 
tention, "it is accepted," etc. Again, "All the law is fulfilled in otie 
word," " love." Now this cannot be true, if the spirit of the whole law 
does not directly respect intentions only. If it extends directly to 
thoughts, emotions, and outward actions, it cannot be truly said that 
love is the fulfilling of the law. This love must be good will, for how 
could involuntary love be obligatory ? The spirit of the Bible every- 
where respects the intention. If the intention is right, or if there be a 



/ 



24: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

willing mind, it is accepted as obedience. But if there be not a willing 
mind, that is, right intention, no outward act is regarded as obedience. 
The willing is always regarded by the scriptures as the doing. "If a 
man look on a woman, to lust after her," that is, with licentious inten- 
tion, or willing, " he hath committed adultery with her already, " etc. 
So on the other hand, if one intends to perform a service for God, which, 
after all, he is unable to perform, he is regarded as having virtually done 
it, and is rewarded accordingly. This is too obviously the doctrine of 
the Bible to need further elucidation. 

3. We have seen that the choice of an end implies, and, while the 
choice continues, necessitates the choice of the known conditions and 
means of the end, and also the putting forth of volition to secure the 
end. If this is true, it follows that the choice of the conditions and 
means of securing an end, and also the volitions put forth as executive 
efforts to secure it, must derive their character from the ultimate choice 
or intention which gives them existence. This shows that moral obli- 
gation extends, primarily and directly, only to the ultimate intention or 
choice of an end, though really, but less directly, to the choice of the 
conditions and means, and also to executive volitions. 

But I must distinguish more clearly between ultimate and proximate 
intentions, which discrimination will show, that in the most strict and 
proper sense, obligation belongs to the former, and only in a less strict 
and proper sense, to the latter. 

An ultimate end, be it remembered, is an object chosen for its own 
sake. 

A proximate end is an object chosen as a condition or means of secur- 
ing an ultimate end. 

An ultimate end is an object chosen because of its intrinsic nature 
and value. 

A proximate end is an object chosen for the sake of the end, and upon 
condition of its relation as a condition or means of the end. 

Example : — A student labors to get wages, to purchase books, to 
obtain an education, to preach the gospel, to save souls, and to please 
God. Another labors to get wages, to purchase books, to get an educa- 
tion, to preach the gospel, to secure a salary, and his own ease and popu- 
larity. In the first supposition he loves God and souls, and seeks, as his 
ultimate end, the happiness of souls, and the glory and gratification of 
God. In the last case supposed, he loves himself supremely, and his 
ultimate end is his own gratification. Now the proximate ends, or im- 
mediate objects of pursuit, in these two cases, are precisely alike, while 
their ultimate ends are entirely opposite. Their first, or nearest, end is 
to get wages. Their next end is, to obtain books ; and so we follow them, 
until we ascertain their ultimate end, before we learn the moral charac- 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 25 

ter of what they are doing. The means they are using, i. e. their im- 
mediate objects or proximate ends of pursuit, are the same, but the ulti- 
mate ends at which they aim are entirely different, and every moral 
agent, from a necessary law of his intellect, must, as soon as he under- 
stands the ultimate end of each, pronounce the one virtuous, and the 
other sinful, in his pursuits. One is selfish and the other benevolent. 
From this illustration it is plain, that strictly speaking, moral character, 
and, of course, moral obligation, respect directly the ultimate intention 
only. We shall see, in the proper place, that obligation also extends, 
but less directly, to the use of means to obtain the end. 

Our next inquiry is, to what acts and mental states moral obligation 
indirectly extends. 

1. The muscles of the body are, directly, under the control of the will. 
I will to move, and my muscles must move, unless there be interposed 
some physical obstruction of sufficient magnitude to overcome the 
strength of my will. 

2. The intellect is also directly under the control of the will. I am 
conscious that I can control and direct my attention as I please, and 
think upon one subject or another. 

3. The sensibility, I am conscious, is only indirectly controlled by 
the will. Feeling can be produced only by directing the attention and 
thoughts to those subjects that excite feeling, by a law of necessity. 

The way is now prepared to say — 

1. That obligation extends indirectly to all intelligent acts of will, in 
the sense already explained. 

2. That moral obligation extends indirectly, to outward or bodily 
actions. These are often required, in the word of God. The reason is, 
that, being connected with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity, 
if the will is right, the outward action must follow, except upon the con- 
tingencies just named ; and therefore such actions may reasonably be re- 
quired. But if the contingencies just named intervene, so that out- 
ward action does not follow the choice or intention, the Bible accepts the 
will for the deed, invariably. "If there be a willing mind, it is accepted 
according," etc. 

3. Moral obligation extends, but less directly, to the states of the 
sensibility, so that certain emotions or feelings are required as outward 
actions are, and for the same reason, namely, the states of the sensibility 
are connected with the actions of the will, by a law of necessity. But 
when the sensibility is exhausted, or when, for any reason, the right 
action of the will does not produce the required feelings, it is accepted 
upon the principle just named. 

4. Moral obligation indirectly extends also to the states of the intellect ; 



26 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

consequently the Bible, to a certain extent, and in a certain sense, holds 
men responsible for their thoughts and opinions. It everywhere assumes 
that if the heart be constantly right, the thoughts and opinions will cor- 
respond with the state of the heart, or will ; " If any man will do his 
will, he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God." " If thine eye 
be single thy whole body shall be full of light." It is, however mani- 
fest, that the word of God everywhere assumes that, strictly speaking, all 
virtue and vice belong to the heart or intention. Where this is right, 
all is regarded as right ; and where this is wrong, all is regarded as 
wrong. It is upon this assumption that the doctrine of total depravity 
rests. It is undeniable that the veriest sinners do many things out- 
wardly which the law of God requires. Now unless the intention decides 
the character of these acts, they must be regarded as really virtuous. 
But when the intention is found to be selfish, then it is ascertained that 
they are sinful notwithstanding their conformity to the letter of the law 
of God. 

The fact is, that moral agents are so constituted that it is impossible 
for them not to judge themselves, and others, by their subjective motives 
or intentions. They cannot but assume it as a first truth, that a man's 
character is as his intention is, and consequently, that moral obligation 
respects, directly, intention only. 

5. Moral obligation then indirectly extends to everything about us, 
over which the will has direct or indirect control. The moral law, 
while, strictly, it legislates over intention only, yet in fact, in a sense less 
direct, legislates over the whole being, inasmuch as all our powers are 
directly or indirectly connected with intention, by a law of necessity. 
Strictly speaking, however, moral character belongs alone to the inten- 
tion. In strict propriety of speech, it cannot be said that either outward 
action, or any state of the intellect, or sensibility, has a moral element 
or quality belonging to it. Yet in common language, which is suffi- 
ciently accurate for most practical purposes, we speak of thought, feel- 
ing, and outward action as holy or unholy. By this, however, all men 
really mean, that the agent is holy or unholy, is praise-worthy or blame- 
worthy in his exercises and actions, because they regard them as pro- 
ceeding from the state or attitude of the will. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 27 

LECTURE IV. 

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

In the discussion of this question, I will first state what is intended 
by the foundation, or ground, of obligation. 

I shall use the terms ground and foundation as synonymous. Obli- 
gation must be founded on some good and sufficient reason. Be it 
remembered, that moral obligation respects moral action. That moral 
action is voluntary action. That properly speaking, obligation respects 
intentions only. That still more strictly, obligation respects only the 
ultimate intention. That ultimate intention or choice, which terms I 
use as synonymous, consists in choosing an object for its own sake, i. e. 
for what is intrinsic in the object, and for no reason that is not intrinsic 
in that object. That every object of ultimate choice must, and does, 
possess that in its own nature, the perception of which necessitates the 
rational affirmation, that it ought to be universally chosen, by moral 
agents, for its own sake, or, which is the same thing, because it is what 
it is, or, in other words still, because it is intrinsically valuable and not 
on account of its relations. 

The ground of obligation, then, is that reason, or consideration, in- 
trinsic in, or belonging to, the nature of an object, which necessitates 
the rational affirmation, that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. It 
is that reason, intrinsic in the object, which thus creates obligation by 
necessitating this affirmation. For example, such is the nature of the 
good of being that it necessitates the affirmation, that benevolence is a 
universal duty. 

I will next call attention to some points of general agreement, and 
some principles essentially self-evident. 

1. In the most strict and proper sense, moral obligation extends to 
moral actions only. 

2. Strictly speaking, involuntary states of mind are not moral actions. 

3. Intentions alone are, properly, moral actions. 

4. In the most strict and proper sense, ultimate intentions alone are 
moral actions, ultimate intention being the choice of an object for its own 
sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object. 

5. While, in the strictest sense, obligation respects only the ultimate 
intention, yet, in a less strict and proper sense, obligation extends to the 
choice of the conditions and means of securing an intrinsically valuable 
end, and also to executive acts put forth with design to secure such end. 
Hence there are different forms of obligation ; for example, obligation to- 



28 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

put forth ultimate choice — to choose the known necessary conditions and 
means — to put forth executive volitions, etc. 

6. These different forms of obligation must have different conditions. 
For example, moral agency, including the possession of the requisite 
powers, together with the development of the ideas of the intrinsically 
valuable, of obligation, of right and wrong, is a condition of obligation 
in its universal form, namely, obligation to will the good of being in 
general, for its own sake ; while obligation to will the existence of the 
conditions and means to the end, or to put forth executive efforts to 
secure the end, have not only the conditions above named, but obli- 
gation in these forms must be conditional, also, upon the knowledge 
that there are conditions and means, and what they are, and also that 
executive efforts are necessary, possible, and useful. 

7. The well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences, 
and especially of moral agents, is intrinsically important, or valuable, 
and all moral agents are under obligation to choose it for its own 
sake. Entire, universal, uninterrupted consecration to this end, or dis- 
interested benevolence is the duty of all moral agents. 

8. This consecration is really demanded by the law of God, as re- 
vealed in the two great precepts laid down by Christ, and this benev- 
olence, when perfect, is in fact a compliance with the entire spirit of 
the law. This is right in itself, and consequently is always duty and 
always right, and that in all possible circumstances ; and, of course, no 
obligation inconsistent with this can ever, in any case, exist. Eeason 
and revelation agree in this ; that the law of benevolence is the law of 
right, the law of nature, and no moral law, inconsistent with this, can 
exist. 

9. Holiness, or. obedience to moral law, or, in other words still, 
disinterested benevolence, is a natural, and of coarse necessary condition 
of the existence of that blessedness which is an ultimate or intrinsic good 
to moral agents, and ought to be chosen for that reason, i. e., that is a 
sufficient reason. Of course, the ground of obligation to choose holiness, 
and to endeavor to promote it in others, as a condition of the highest 
well-being of the universe, is the intrinsic nature of that good or well- 
being, and the relation of holiness to this end is a condition of the obli- 
gation to choose it, as a means to this end. 

10. Truth, and conformity of heart and life to all known and prac- 
tical truths, are conditions and means of the highest good of being. Of 
course, the obligation to conform to such truths is universal, because of 
this relation of truth, and of conformity to truth, to the highest good. 
The intrinsic value of the good must be the ground, and the relation 
-only a condition, of the obligation. 

11. God's ultimate end, in all he does, or omits, is the highest well- 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 29 

being of himself, and of the universe, and in all his acts and dispen- 
sations, his ultimate object is the promotion of this end. All moral 
agents should have the same end, and this comprises their whole duty. 
This intention or consecration to this intrinsically and infinitely valuable 
end, is virtue, or holiness, in God and in all moral agents. God is infin- 
itely and equally holy in all things, because he does all things for the 
same ultimate reason, namely, to promote the highest good of being. 

12. All God's moral attributes are only so many attributes of love or 
of disinterested benevolence ; that is, they are only benevolence existing 
and contemplated in different relations. Creation and moral government, 
including both law and gospel, together with the infliction of penal 
sanctions, are only efforts of benevolence to secure the highest good. 

13. He requires, both in his law and gospel, that all moral agents 
should choose the same end, and do whatever they do for its promo- 
tion ; that is, this should be the ultimate reason for all they do. Conse- 
quently, all obligation resolves itself into an obligation to choose the 
highest good of God, and of being in general, for its own sake, and to 
choose all the known conditions and means of this end, for the sake of 
the end. 

14. The intrinsic value of this end is the ground of this obligation, 
both as it respects God and all moral agents in all worlds. The intrinsic 
value of this end rendered it fit, or right, that God should require 
moral agents to choose it for its own sake ; and of course, its intrinsic 
value, and not any arbitrary sovereignty, was, and is, his reason for 
requiring moral agents to choose it for its own sake. 

15. Its known intrinsic value would, of itself, impose obligation on 
moral agents to choose it for its own sake, even had God never required 
it; or^ if such a supposition were possible, had he forbidden it. Thus, 
disinterested benevolence is a universal and an invariable duty. This 
benevolence consists in willing the highest good of being, in general, for 
its own sake, or, in other words, in entire consecration to this good as 
the end of life. The intrinsic value of this good does, of its own nature, 
impose obligation upon all moral agents to will it for its own sake, and 
consecrate the whole being, without intermission, to its promotion. 

Thus it is self-evident that moral character belongs to the ultimate 
intention, and that a man's character is as the end for which he lives, 
and moves, and has his being. Virtue consists in consecration to the 
right end, the end to which God is consecrated. This end is, and 
must be, by virtue of its own nature, the ground of obligation. That is, 
the nature of this end is such as to compel the reason of every moral 
agent to affirm, that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. This end 
is the good of being, and therefore disinterested benevolence, or good 
will, is a universal duty. 



30 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Now, with, these facts distinctly kept in mind, let us proceed to the 
examination of the various conflicting and inconsistent theories of the 
ground of obligation. 

Of the Will of God as the ground of obligation. 

I will first consider the theory of those who hold that the sovereign 
will of God is the ground, or ultimate reason, of obligation. They hold 
that God's sovereign will creates, and not merely reveals and enforces, 
obligation. To this I reply : 

1. That moral law legislates directly over voluntary action only — 
that moral obligation respects, primarily and strictly, the ultimate inten- 
tion — that ultimate intention consists in choosing its object, for its own 
sake — that ultimate intention must find its reasons exclusively in its 
object — that the intrinsic nature and value of the object must impose 
obligation to choose it for its own sake — that therefore this intrinsic 
value is the ground, and the only possible ground, of obligation to choose 
it for its own sake. It would be our duty to will the highest good of 
God and of the universe, even did God not will that we should, or were 
he to will that we should not. How utterly unfounded then, is the 
assertion, that the sovereign will of God is the ground of obligation. 
Obligation to do what ? Why to love God and our neighbor. That is 
to will their highest good. And does God's will create this obligation ? 
Should we be under no such obligation, had he not commanded it ? 
Are we to will this good, not for its own value to God and our neighbor, 
but because God commands it ? The answer to these questions is too 
obvious to need so much as to be named. But what consistency is there 
in holding that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty, and at the 
same time that the sovereign will of God is the foundation of obligation ; 
How can men hold, as many do, that the highest good of being ought to 
be chosen for its own sake — that to choose it for its own sake is disin- 
terested benevolence — that its intrinsic value imposes obligation to choose 
it for its own sake, and that this intrinsic value is therefore the ground 
of obligation, and yet that the will of God is the ground of obligation ? 

Why, if the will of God be the ground of obligation, then disin- 
terested benevolence is sin. If the will of God does of itself create, and 
not merely reveal obligation, then the will, and not the interest and 
well-being of God, ought to be chosen for its own sake, and to be the 
great end of life. God ought to be consecrated to his own will, instead 
of his own highest good. Benevolence in God, and in all beings, must 
be sin, upon this hypothesis. A purely arbitrary will and sovereignty 
in God is, according to this theory, of more value than his highest well- 
being, and than that of the whole universe. 

But observe, 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 31 

Moral obligation respects ultimate intention, or the choice of an 
end. 

The foundation, or fundamental reason for choosing a thing, is that 
which renders it obligatory to choose it. 

This reason is the thing on which the choice ought to terminate, or 
the true end is not chosen. 

Therefore the reason and the end are identical. 

If, then, the will of God be the foundation of obligation, it must also 
be the ultimate end of choice. 

But it is impossible for us to will or choose the divine willing as an 
ultimate end. God's willing reveals a law, a rule of choice, or of inten- 
tion. It requires something to be intended as an ultimate end, or for 
its own intrinsic value. This end cannot be the willing, commandment, 
law, itself. Does God will that I should choose his willing as an ulti- 
mate end ? This is impossible. It is a plain contradiction to say that 
moral obligation respects, directly, ultimate intention only, or the choice 
of an end, for its own intrinsic value, and yet, that the will of God is the 
foundation, or reason of the obligation. This is affirming at the same 
breath that the intrinsic value of the end which God requires me to 
choose, is the reason, or foundation of the obligation to choose it, and 
yet that this is not the reason, but that the will of God is the reason. 

Willing can never be an end. God cannot will our willing as an end. 
Nor can he will his willing as an end. Willing, choosing, always, and 
necessarily, implies an end willed entirely distinct from the willing, or 
choice, itself. Willing, cannot be regarded, or willed, as an ultimate 
end, for two reasons : — 

(1.) Because that on which choice or willing terminates, and not the 
choice itself, must be regarded as the end. 

(2.) Because choice or willing is of no intrinsic value and of no rela- 
tive value, aside from the end willed or chosen. 

2. The will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation in 
created moral agents. God has moral character, and is virtuous. This 
implies that he is the subject of moral obligation, for virtue is nothing 
else than compliance with obligation. If God is the subject of moral 
obligation, there is some reason, independent of his own will, why he 
wills as he does ; some reason, that imposes obligation upon him to will 
as he does. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral agents, is 
not the fundamental reason of their obligation ; but the foundation of 
their obligation must be the reason which induces God, or makes it obli- 
gatory on him, to will in respect to the conduct of moral agents, just 
what he does. 

3. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he 
could, by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice, which is absurd. 



32 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

4. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he not 
only can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do so ; 
for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon him as 
upon his creatures, he has a right, at any time, to make malevolence a 
virtue, and benevolence a vice. For if his will is the ground of obliga- 
tion, then his will creates right, and whatever he wills, or might will, is 
right simply and only because so he wills. 

5. If the will of God be the foundation of moral obligation, we have 
no standard by which to judge of the moral character of his actions, and 
cannot know whether he is worthy of praise or blame. Upon the sup- 
position in question, were God a malevolent being, and did he require all 
his creatures to be selfish, and not benevolent, he would be just as vir- 
tuous and worthy of praise as now ; for the supposition is, that his sove- 
reign will creates right, and of course, will as he might, that would be 
right, simply because he willed it. 

6. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he has 
no standard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule 
but his own will, with which to compare his own actions. 

7. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he is not 
himself a subject of moral obligation. But, 

8. If God is not a subject of moral obligation, he has no moral char- 
/ acter ; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or non-con- 
formity to moral obligation. The will of God, as expressed in his law, 
is the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out the path 
of duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to act in 
conformity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of G^e>d itself. / 

9. The will of no being can be law. Moral law is an idea of the 
divine reason, and not the willing of any being. If the will of any being 
were law, that being could not, by natural possibility, will wrong ; for 
whatever he willed would be right, simply and only because he willed it. 

10. But let us bring this philosophy into the light of divine revela- 
tion. " To the law and to the testimony ; if it agree not therewith, it 
is because it hath no light in it." 

The law of God, or the moral law, requires that God shall be loved 
with all the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Now it is manifest 
that the love required is not mere emotion, but that it consists in choice, 
willing, intention — i. e., in the choice of something on account of its 
own intrinsic value, or in the choice of an ultimate end. Now what is 
this end ? What is that which we are to choose for its own intrinsic 
value ? Is it the will or command of God ? Are we to will as an ulti- 
mate end, that God should will that we should thus will ? What can be 
more absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous than this ? But again, 
what is this loving, willing, choosing, intending, required by the law ? 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 33 

We are commanded to love God and our neighbor. What is this, what 
can it be, but to will the highest good or well-being of God and our 
neighbor ? This is intrinsically and infinitely valuable. This must be 
the end, and nothing can possibly be law that requires the choice of any 
other ultimate end. Nor can that, by any possibility, be true philoso- 
phy, that makes anything else the reason or foundation of moral obli- 
gation. 

But it is said that we are conscious of affirming our obligation to obey 
the will of God, without reference to any other reason than his will ; and 
this, it is said, proves that his will is the foundation of obligation. 

To this I reply, the reason does indeed affirm that we ought to will 
that which God commands, but it does not and cannot assign his will as 
the foundation of the obligation. His whole will respecting our duty, is 
summed up in the two precepts of the law. These, as we have seen, 
require universal good- will to being, or the supreme love of God and the 
equal love of our neighbor — that we should will the highest well-being 
of God and of the universe, for its own sake, or for its own intrinsic 
value. Eeason affirms that we ought thus to will. And can it be so 
self-contradictory as to affirm that we ought to will the good of God and 
of the universe, for its own intrinsic value ; yet not for this reason, but 
because God wills that we should will it ? Impossible ! But in this 
assertion, the objector has reference to some outward act, some condition 
or means of the end to be chosen, and not to the end itself. But even 
in respect to any act whatever, his objection does not hold good. For 
example, God requires me to labor and pray for the salvation of souls, or 
to do anything else. Now his command is necessarily regarded by me as 
obligatory, not as an arbitrary requirement, but as revealing infallibly 
the true means or conditions of securing the great and ultimate end, 
which I am to will for its intrinsic value. I necessarily regard his com- 
mandment as wise and benevolent, and it is only because I so regard it, 
that I affirm, or can affirm, my obligation to obey him. Should he com- 
mand me to choose, as an ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic value, that 
which my reason affirmed to be of no intrinsic value, I could not possibly 
affirm my obligation to obey him. Should he command me to do that 
which my reason affirmed to be unwise and malevolent, it were impos- 
sible for me to affirm my obligation to obey him. This proves, beyond 
controversy, that reason does not regard his command as the foundation 
of the obligation, but only as infallible proof that that which he com- 
mands is wise and benevolent in itself, and commanded by him for that 
reason. 

If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he might 
command me to violate and trample down all the laws of my being, and 
to be the enemy of all good, and I should not only be under obligation, 
3 



34 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

but affirm my obligation to obey him. But this is absurd. This brings 
us to the conclusion that he who asserts that moral obligation respects 
the choice of an end for its intrinsic value, and still affirms the will of 
God to be the foundation of moral obligation, contradicts his own ad- 
missions, the plainest intuitions of reason and divine revelation. His 
theory is grossly inconsistent and nonsensical. It overlooks the very na- 
ture of moral law as an idea of reason, and makes it to consist in arbi- 
trary willing. 

Paley's theory of Self-interest. 

This theory, as every reader of Paley knows, makes self-interest the 
ground of moral obligation. Upon this theory I remark — 

1. That if self-interest be the ground of moral obligation, then self- 
interest is the end to be chosen for its own sake. To be virtuous I must 
in every instance intend my own interest as the supreme good. Then, 
according to this theory, disinterested benevolence is sin. To live to 
God and the universe, is not right. It is not devotion to the right end. 
This theory affirms self-interest to be the end for which we ought to live. 
Then selfishness is virtue, and benevolence is vice. These are directly 
opposite theories. It cannot be a trifle to embrace the wrong view of 
this subject. If Dr. Paley was right, all are fundamentally wrong who 
hold the benevolence theory. 

2. Upon this hypothesis, I am to treat my own interest as supremely 
valuable, when it is infinitely less valuable than the interests of God. 
Thus I am under a moral obligation to prefer an infinitely less good, be- 
cause it is my own, to one of infinitely greater value that belongs to an- 
other. This is precisely what every sinner in earth and hell does. 

3. But let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed law. If 
this philosophy be correct, the law should read, " Thou shalt love thyself 
supremely, and God and thy neighbor not at all." For Dr. Paley holds 
the only reason of the obligation to be self-interest. If this is so, then I 
am under an obligation to love myself alone, and never do my duty when 
I at all love God or my neighbor. He says, it is the utility of any rule 
alone which constitutes the obligation of it. (Paley' s Moral Philos., 
book ii. chap. 6.) Again he says, " And let it be asked why I am obliged 
(obligated) to keep my word? and the answer will be, Because I am 
urged to do so by a violent motive, namely, the expectation of being 
after this life rewarded if I do so, or punished if I do not." — (Paley'' s 
Moral Philos., book ii. chap. 3.) Thus it would seem, that it is the 
utility of a rule to myself only, that constitutes the ground of obligation 
to obey it. 

But should this be denied, still it cannot be denied that Dr. Paley 
maintains that self-interest is the ground of moral obligation. If this is 
so, i. e. if this be the foundation of moral obligation, whether Paley or any 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 35 

one else holds it to be true, then, undeniably, the moral law should read, 
f Thou shalt love thyself supremely, and God and thy neighbor subordi- 
nate^ ; " or, more strictly, " Thou shalt love thyself as an end, and God 
and thy neighbor, only as a means of promoting thine own interest." 

If this theory be true, all the precepts in the Bible need to be altered. 
Instead of the injunction, " Whatever you do, do it heartily unto the 
Lord," it should read, " Whatever you do, do it heartily unto yourself." 
Instead of the injunction, " Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or 
whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God," it should read, "Do all to 
secure your own interest." Should it be said that this school would say, 
that the meaning of these precepts is, Do all to the glory of God to secure 
your own interest thereby, I answer ; This is a contradiction. To do it 
to or for the glory of God is one thing ; to do it to secure my own inter- 
est is an entirely different and opposite thing. To do it for the glory of 
God, is to make his glory my end. But to do it to secure my own inter- 
est, is to make my own interest the end. 

4. But let us look at this theory in the light of the revealed condi- 
tions of salvation. "Except a man forsake all that he hath he cannot 
be my disciple." If the theory under consideration be true, it should 
read : "Except a man make his own interest the supreme end of pur- 
suit, he cannot be my disciple." Again, "If any man will come after 
me, let him deny himself and take up his cross," etc. This, in con- 
formity with the theory in question, should read : " If any man will 
come after me, let him not deny himself, but cherish and supremely 
seek his own interest." A multitude of such passages might be quoted, 
as every reader of the Bible knows. 

5. But let us examine this theory in the light of other scripture dec- 
larations. "It is more blessed to give than to receive." This, accord- 
ing to the theory we are opposing, should read, " It is more blessed to 
receive than to give." "Charity (love) seeketh not her own." This 
should read, " Charity seeketh her own." " No man (that is, no right- 
eous man) liveth to himself." This should read, "Every (righteous) 
man liveth to himself." 

6. Let this theory be examined in the light of the spirit and exam- 
ple of Christ. " Even Christ pleased not himself." This should read, 
if Christ was holy and did his duty, "Even Christ pleased himself, or 
which is the same thing, sought his own interest." "I seek not mine 
own glory, but the glory of him who sent me." This should read, "'I 
seek not the glory of him who sent me, but mine own glory." 

But enough ; we cannot fail to see that this is a selfish philosophy, 
and the exact opposite of the truth of God. 
The Utilitarian philosophy. 
This maintains that the utility of an act or choice renders it obliga- 



36 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tory. That is, utility is the foundation of moral obligation ; that the 
tendency of an act, choice, or intention, to secure a good or valuable end, 
is the foundation of the obligation to put forth that choice or intention. 
Upon this theory I remark — 

1. That utilitarians must hold, in common with others, that it is 
our duty to will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake ; 
and that the intrinsic value of this good creates obligation to will it, and 
to endeavor to promote it ; that the tendency of choosing it, would be 
neither useful nor obligatory, but for its intrinsic value. How, then, 
can they hold that the tendency of choosing to secure its object, instead 
of the intrinsic value of the object, should be a ground of obligation. 
It is absurd to say that the foundation of the obligation to choose a cer- 
tain end, is to be found, not in the value of the end itself, but in the ten- 
dency of the intention to secure the end. The tendency is valuable or 
otherwise, as the end is valuable or otherwise. It is, and must be, the 
value of the end, and not the tendency of an intention to secure the end, 
that constitutes the foundation of the obligation to intend. 

2. We have seen that the foundation of obligation to will or choose 
any end as such, that is, on its own account, must consist in the intrin- 
sic value of the end, and that nothing else whatever can impose obliga- 
tion to choose anything as an ultimate end, but its intrinsic value. To 
affirm the contrary is to affirm a contradiction. It is the same as to say, 
that I ought to choose a thing as an end, and not yet as an end, that is, 
for its own sake, but for some other reason, to wit, the tendency of my 
choice to secure that end. Here I affirm at the same breath, that the 
thing intended is to be an end, that is, chosen for its own intrinsic value, 
and yet not as an end or for its intrinsic value, but for an entirely differ- 
ent reason, to wit, the tendency of the choice to secure it. 

3. But the very announcement of this theory implies its absurdity. 
A choice is obligatory, because it tends to secure good. But why secure 
good rather than evil ? The answer is, because good is valuable. Ah ! 
here then we have another reason, and one which must be the true rea- 
son, to wit, the value of the good which the choioe tends to secure. 
Obligation to use means to do good may, and must, be conditioned upon 
the tendency of those means to secure the end, but the obligation to use 
them is founded solely in the value of the end. 

4. Does the law require us to love God and our neighbor, because 
loving God and our neighbor tends to the well-being either of God, our 
neighbor, or ourselves ? Is it the tendency or utility of love that makes 
it obligatory upon us to exercise it ? What ! will good, not from regard 
to its value, but because willing good will do good ! But why do good ? 
What is this love ? Here let it be distinctly remembered that the love 
required by the law of God is not a mere emotion or feeling, but willing, 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 37 

choosing, intending, in a word, that this love is nothing else than ulti- 
mate intention. What, then, is to be intended as an end, or for its own 
sake ? Is it the tendency of love, or the utility of ultimate intention, 
that is the end to be intended ? It must be, if utilitarianism is true. 

According to this theory, when the law requires supreme love to God, 
and equal love to our neighbor, the meaning is, not that we are to will, 
choose, intend the well-being of God and our neighbor for its own sake, 
or because of its intrinsic value, but because of the tendency of the in- 
tention to promote the good of God, our neighbor and ourselves. But 
let the tendency of love or intention be what it may, the utility of it 
depends upon the intrinsic value of that which it tends to promote. 
Suppose love or intention tends to promote its end, this is a useful ten- 
dency only because the end is valuable in itself. It is nonsense then to 
say that love to God and man, or an intention to promote their good, is 
required, not because of the value of their well-being, but because love 
tends to promote their well-being. This represents the law as requiring 
love, not to God and our neighbor as an end, but to tendency as an end. 
The law in this case should read thus : " Thou shalt love the utility or 
tendency of love with all thy heart," etc. 

If the theory under consideration is true, this is the spirit and mean- 
ing of the law : " Thou shalt love the Lord and thy neighbor, that is, 
thou shalt choose their good, not for its own sake or as an end, but be- 
cause choosing it tends to promote it." This is absurd ; for, I ask again, 
why promote it but for its own value ? If the law of God requires ulti- 
mate intention, it is a contradiction to affirm that the intention ought to 
terminate on its own tendency as an end. 

5. But it is said that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do 
many things, on the ground, that those things are useful, or tend to 
promote good. 

I answer, that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do many 
things upon condition of their tendency to promote good, but that we 
never affirm obligation to be founded on this tendency. I am under an 
obligation to use the means to promote good, not for the sake of its in- 
trinsic value, but for the sake of the tendency of the means to promote 
it ! This is absurd. 

I say again, the obligation to use means may and must be condition- 
ated upon perceived tendency, but never founded in this tendency. 
Ultimate intention has no such condition. The perceived intrinsic value 
imposes obligation without any reference to the tendency of the inten- 
tion. 

6. But suppose any utilitarian should deny that moral obligation 
respects ultimate intention only, and maintain that it also respects those 
volitions and actions that sustain to the ultimate end the relation of 



38 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

means, and therefore assert that the foundation of moral obligation in 
respect to all those volitions and actions, is their tendency to secure a 
valuable end. This would not at all relieve the difficulty of utilitarian- 
ism ; for in this case tendency could only be a condition of the obligation, 
while the fundamental reason of the obligation would and must be, the 
intrinsic value of the end, which these may have a tendency to promote. 
Tendency to promote an end can impose no obligation. The end must be 
intrinsically valuable, and this alone imposes obligation to choose the end, 
and to use the means to promote it. Upon condition that anything is 
perceived to sustain to this end the relation of a necessary means, we are, 
for the sake of the end alone, under obligation to use the means. 



LECTURE V. 

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

The theory of Right as the foundation of obligation. 

In the examination of this philosophy I must begin by defining terms. 
What is right ? The primary signification of the term is straight. When 
used in a moral sense it means fit, suitable, agreeable to the nature and 
relations of moral agents. Right, in a moral sense, belongs to choice, in- 
tention, and is an intention straight with, or conformed to, moral law. 
The inquiry before us is, what is the ground of obligation to put forth 
choice or intention. Rightarians say that right is the ground of such 
obligation. This is the answer given to this question by a large school of 
philosophers and theologians. But what does this assertion mean ? It is 
generally held by this school, that right, in a moral sense, pertains pri- 
marily and strictly to intentions only. They maintain, as I do, that obli- 
gation pertains primarily and strictly to ultimate choice or intentions, and 
less strictly to executive volitions, and to choice of the conditions and 
means of securing the object of ultimate choice. Now in what sense of 
the term right do they regard it as the ground of obligation ? 

Right is objective and subjective. Right in the objective sense of 
the term, has been recently defined to consist in the relation of intrinsic 
fitness existing between ultimate choice and its object.* For example, 
the nature or intrinsic value of the highest well-being of God and of the 
universe, creates the relation of intrinsic fitness between it and choice, 
and this relation, it is insisted, creates, or is the ground of, obligation. 
* Mahan'K Moral Philosophy. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 39 

Subjective right is synonymous with righteousness, uprightness, 
virtue, 'it consists in, or is an attribute of, that state of the will which 
is conformed to objective right or to moral law. It is a term that ex- 
presses the moral quality, element, or attribute of that ultimate intention 
which the law of God requires. In other words still, it is conformity of 
heart to the law of objective right ; or, as I just said, it is more strictly 
the term that designates the moral character of that state of heart. 
Some choose to regard subjective right as consisting in this state of heart, 
and others insist that it is only an element, attribute, or quality of this 
state of heart, or of this ultimate intention. I shall not contend about 
words, but shall show that it matters not, so far as the question we 
are about to examine is concerned, in which of these lights subjective 
right is regarded, whether as consisting in ultimate intention conformed 
to law, or, as being an attribute, element, or quality of this intention. 

The theory under consideration was held by the ancient Greek and 
Roman philosophers. It was the theory of Kant, and is now the theory 
of the transcendental school in Europe and America. Cousin, in man- 
ifest accordance with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words : 
" Do right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the sake 
of the right. Morality has to do with the intentions." — {Enunciation of 
Moral Law — Elements of Psychology, p. 162.) Those who follow Kant, 
Cousin, and Coleridge state the theory either in the same words, or in 
words that amount to the same thing. They regard right as the foun- 
dation of moral obligation. "Will the right for the sake of the right." 
This must mean, will the right as an ultimate end, that is, for its own 
sake. Let us examine this very popular philosophy, first, in the light 
of its own principles, and secondly in the light of revelation. 

The writer first above alluded to, has professedly given a critical 
definition of the exact position and teaching of rightarians. They hold, 
according to him. and I suppose he has rightly defined the position of 
that school, tha ff subjective right is the ground of obligation.^ We shall 
see, hereafter, that subjective right, or righteousness, can never be a 
ground of moral obligation. We will here attend to the critically defined 
position of the rightarian who holds that the relation of intrinsic fitness 
existing between choice and an intrinsically valuable object, is the ground 
of obligation to choose that object. 

Now observe, this writer strenuously maintains, that the reason for 
ultimate choice must be found exclusively in the object of such choice, 
in other words, that ultimate choice, is the choice of its object for its 
own sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object itself. He also affirms 
repeatedly, that the ground of obligation is, and must be, found exclu- 
sively in the object of ultimate choice, and also that the ground of obli- 
gation is the consideration, intrinsic in the object of choice, which com- 



40 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

pels the reason to affirm the obligation to choose it for its own sake. 
But all this as flatly as possible contradicts his rightarian theory, as above 
stated. If the ground of obligation to put forth ultimate choice is to be 
found, as it certainly must be, in the nature of the object of choice, and 
m nothing extrinsic to it, how can it consist in the relation of intrinsic 
fitness existing between the choice and its object ? Plainly it cannot. 
This relation is not intrinsic in the object of choice. 

Observe, the obligation is to choose the object of ultimate choice, not 
for the sake of the relation existing between the choice and its object, 
but exclusively for the sake of what is intrinsic in the object itself. The 
relation is not the object of choice, but the relation is created by the 
object of choice. Choice being what it is, the intrinsic nature or value 
of the object, as the good of being for example, creates both the relation 
of rightness and the obligation to choose the object for its own sake. 
That which creates the relation of objective rightness must, for the 
same reason, create the obligation, for it is absurd to say that the in- 
trinsic value of the object creates the relation of rightness between itself 
and choice, and yet that it does not impose or create obligation to choose 
itself for its own sake. 

It is self-evident then, that since the object ought to be chosen for 
the sake of its own nature, or for what is intrinsic in it, and not for the 
sake of the relation in question, the nature of the object, and not the 
relation, is, and must be, the ground of obligation. 

But, the writer who has given the above defined position of the right- 
arians, says that "the intelligence, in judging an act to be right or 
wrong, does not take into the account the object nor the act by itself, 
but both together, in their intrinsic relations, as the ground of its affir- 
mation." 

But the nature of ultimate choice, and the nature of its object, the 
good of being, for example, with their intrinsic relations to each other, 
form a ground of obligation to choose — what ? the choice, the object, 
and their intrinsic relations ? No, but simply and only to choose the 
good for its own sake, or solely for the sake of what is intrinsic in it. 
Observe, it is often affirmed by this writer, that ultimate choice is the 
choice of an object for its own sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object 
itself. That the ground of obligation to put forth ultimate choice, must 
in every case, be intrinsic in the object of choice. But the object of 
choice in this case is the good of being, and not the nature of the choice 
and of the good of being, together with the intrinsic relation of rightness 
existing between them. The form of the obligation discloses the ground 
of it. The form of the obligation is to choose the good of being, i. e. 
the object of choice, for what is intrinsic in it. Then, the ground of the 
obligation must be, the intrinsic nature of the good, i. e. of the object of 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 41 

choice. The nature of choice, and the intrinsic relations of the choice, 
and the good, are conditions, but not the ground, of the obligation. 
Had this writer only kept in mind his own most critical definition of 
ultimate intention, his often repeated assertions that the ground of obli- 
gation must be, in every case, found intrinsically in the object of ulti- 
mate choice, and in nothing extraneous to it, he never could have made 
the statement we have just examined. 

The duty of universal disinterested benevolence is universally and 
necessarily affirmed and admitted. But if the rightarian be the true 
theory, then disinterested benevolence is sin. According to this scheme, 
the right, and not the good of being, is the end to, and for which, God 
and all moral agents ought to live. According to this theory, disinter- 
ested benevolence can never be duty, can never be right, but always and 
necessarily wrong. I do not mean that the advocates of this theory see 
and avow this conclusion. But it is wonderful that they do not, for 
nothing is more self-evident. If moral agents ought to will the right for 
the sake of the right, or will good, not for the sake of the good, but for 
the sake of the relation of Tightness existing between the choice and the 
good, then to will the good for its own sake is sin. It is not willing the 
right end. It is willing the good and not the right as an ultimate end. 
These are opposing theories. Both cannot be true. Which is the right 
to will, the good for its own sake, or the right ? Let universal reason 
answer. 

But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God. 

1. In the light of the moral law. The whole law is expressed by the 
great Teacher thus : " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all 
thy heart, and with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy 
strength; and thy neighbor as thyself." Paul says: "All the law is 
fulfilled in one word — love : therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." 
Now it is admitted by this philosophy, that the love required by the law 
is not a mere emotion, but that it consists in willing, choice, intention ; 
that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or in the choice of 
something for its own sake, or, which is the same thing, for its intrinsic 
value. What is this which the law requires us to will to God and our 
neighbor ? Is it to will something to, or respecting, God and our neigh- 
bor, not for the sake of the intrinsic value of that something, but for the 
sake of the relation of rightness existing between choice and that some- 
thing ? This were absurd. Besides, what has this to do with loving 
God and our neighbor ? To will the something, the good, for example, 
of God, and our neighbor, for the sake of the relation in question, is not 
the same as to love God and our neighbor, as it is not willing their good 
for its own sake. It is not willing their good, out of any regard to them, 
but solely out of regard to the relation of fitness existing between the 



42 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

willing and the object willed. Suppose it be said, that the law requires 
as to will the good, or highest blessedness of God and our neighbor, be- 
cause it is right. This is a contradiction and an impossibility. To will 
the blessedness of God and our neighbor, in any proper sense, is to will 
it for its own sake, or as an ultimate end. But this is not to will it be- 
cause it is right. To will the good of God and our neighbor for its own 
sake, or its intrinsic value, is right. But to will it, not for the sake of 
its intrinsic value to them, but for the sake of the relations in question, 
is not right. To will the good because it is good, or the valuable be- 
cause it is valuable, is right, because it is willing it for the right reason. 
But to will it, not for its value, but for the sake of the relation of fitness 
between the willing and the object, is not right, because it is not willing 
it for the right reason. The law of God does not, cannot, require us to 
love right more than God and our neighbor. What ! right of greater 
value than the highest well being of God and of the universe ? Impos- 
sible ! It is impossible that the moral law should require anything else 
than to will the highest good of universal being as an ultimate end, i. e. 
for its own sake. It is a first truth of reason, that this is the most valu- 
able thing possible or conceivable ; and that could by no possibility be 
law, which should require anything else to be chosen as an ultimate end. 
According to this philosophy, the revealed law should read: "Thou 
shalt love the right for its own sake, with all thy heart and with all thy 
soul." The fact is, the law requires the supreme love of God, and the 
equal love of our neighbor. It says nothing, and implies nothing, about 
doing right for the sake of the right. Kightarianism is a rejection of the 
divine revealed law, and a substituting in its stead an entirely different 
rule of moral obligation : a rule that deifies right, that rejects the claim 
of God, and exalts right to the throne. 

2. "AVhether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all 
to the glory of God." Does this precept require us to will the glory of 
God for its intrinsic or relative value, or for the sake of intrinsic fitness 
between the willing and its object ? The glory and renown of God is 
of infinite value to him, and to the universe, and for this reason it should 
be promoted. The thing required here is doing, an executive act. The 
spirit of the requisition is this : Aim to spread abroad the renown or 
glory of God, as the means of securing the highest well-being of the 
universe. Why ? I answer : for the sake of the intrinsic value of this 
well-being, and not for the sake of the relation of fitness existing between 
the willing and the object. 

3. •'•' Do good unto all men, as ye have opportunity." Here again, 
are we required to do the good, for the sake of the good, or for the sake 
of the relation of Tightness, between the doing and the good ? I answer : 
we are to do the good for the sake of the good. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 43 

4, Take the commands to pray and labor for the salvation of souls. 
Do such commandments require us to go forth to will or do the right for 
the sake of the right, or to will the salvation of souls for the intrinsic 
value of their salvation ? When we pray and preach and converse, must 
we aim at right, must the love of right, and not the love of God and of 
souls influence us ? When I am engaged in prayer, and travail night 
and day for souls, and have an eye so single to the good of souls and 
to the glory of God, and am so swallowed up with my subject as not 
so much as to think of the right, am I all wrong ? Must I pray because 
it is right, and do all I do, and suffer all I suffer, not from good-will 
to God and man, but because it is right ? Who does not know, that to 
intend the right for the sake of the right in all these things, instead 
of having an eye single to the good of being, would and must be any- 
thing rather than true religion ? 

,5. Examine this philosophy in the light of the scripture declaration : 
" God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life." 
Now, are we to understand that God gave his Son, not from any regard 
to the good of souls for its own sake, but for the sake of the right ? 
Did he will the right for the sake of the right ? Did he give his Son to 
die for the right, for the sake of the right, or to die to render the salva- 
tion of souls possible, for the sake of the souls ? Did Christ give 
himself to labor and die for the right, for the sake of the right, or for 
souls, from love to souls ? Did prophets, and apostles, and martyrs, and 
have the saints in all ages, willed the right for the sake of the right, or 
have they labored and suffered and died for God and souls, from love 
to them ? 

G. But take another passage which is quoted in support of this phi- 
losophy : " Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right." 
Now what is the spirit of this requirement ? What is it to obey parents ? 
Why, if as this philosophy holds, it must resolve itself into ultimate 
intention, what must the child intend for its own sake ? Must he will 
good to God and his parents, and obey his parents as the means of 
securing the highest good, or must he will the right as an end, for the 
sake of the right, regardless of the good of God or of the universe ? 
Would it be right to will the right for the sake of the right, rather than 
to will the good of the universe for the sake of the good, and obey his 
parents as a means of securing the highest good ? 

It is right to will the highest good of God and of the universe, and 
to use all the necessary means, and fulfil all the necessary conditions of 
this highest well-being. For children to obey their parents, is one 
of the means, and for this reason it is right, and upon no- other condi- 
tion can it be required. But it is said that children affirm their obi iga.- 



4 ± SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tion to obey their parents, entirely irrespective of the obedience having 
any reference, or sustaining any relation, to the good of being. This is 
a mistake. The child, if he is a moral agent, and does really affirm 
moral obligation, not only does, but must perceive the end upon which 
his choice or intention ought to terminate. If he really makes an 
intelligent affirmation, it is and must be, that he ought to will an end ; 
that this end is not, and cannot be the right, as has been shown. He 
knows that he ought to will his parents' happiness, and his own happi- 
ness, and the happiness of the world, and of God ; and he knows that 
obedience to his parents sustains the relation of a means to this end ; 
The fact is, it is a first truth of reason, that he ought to will the good 
of his parents, and the good of everybody. He also knows that obe- 
dience to his parents is a necessary means to this end. If he does 
not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a moral agent, to 
make any intelligent affirmation at all ; and if he has any idea of obedi- 
ence, it is, and must be, only such as animals have who are actuated 
wholly by hope, fear and instinct. As well might we say, that an ox or a 
dog, who gives indication of knowing, in some sense, that he ought to 
obey us, affirms moral obligation of himself, as to say this of a child in 
whose mind the idea of the good, or valuable to being is not developed. 
What ! does moral obligation respect ultimate intention only ; and does 
ultimate intention consist in the choice of something for its own 
intrinsic value, and yet is it true that children affirm moral obligation 
before the idea of the intrinsically valuable is at all developed ? Impos- 
sible ! But this objection assumes that children have the idea of right 
developed before the idea of the valuable. This cannot be. The end 
to be chosen must be apprehended by the mind, before the mind can have 
the idea of moral obligation to choose an end, or of the right or wrong 
of choosing or not choosing it. The development of the idea of the 
good or valuable, must precede the development of the ideas of right 
and of moral obligation. 

Take this philosophy on its own ground, and suppose the relation of 
rightness existing between choice and its object to be the ground of obli- 
gation, it is plain that the intrinsically valuable object must be perceived, 
before this relation can be perceived. So that the idea of the intrinsi- 
cally valuable must be developed, as a condition of the existence of the 
idea of the relation in question. The law of God, then, is not, and can- 
not be, developed in the mind of a child who has no knowledge or idea 
of the valuable, and who has, and can have, no reference to the good of 
any being, in obedience to his parents. 

It is one thing to intend that, the intending of which is right, and 
quite another to intend the right as an end. For example, to choose my 
own gratification as an end, is wrong. But this is not choosing the 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 45 

wrong as an end. A drunkard chooses to gratify his appetite for strong 
drink as an end, that is, for its own sake. This is wrong. But the 
choice does not terminate on the wrong, but on the gratification. The 
thing intended is not the wrong. The liquor is not chosen, the gratifi- 
cation is not intended, because it is wrong, but notwithstanding it is 
wrong. To love God is right, but to suppose that God is loved because 
it is right, is absurd. It is to suppose that God is loved, not from any 
regard to God, but from a regard to right. This is an absurdity and a 
contradiction. To love or will the good of my neighbor, is right. But 
to will the right, instead of the good of my neighbor, is not right. It is 
loving right instead of my neighbor ; but this is not right. 

1. But it is objected, that I am conscious of affirming to myself that 
I ought to will the right. This is a mistake. I am conscious of affirm- 
ing to myself, that I ought to will that, the willing of which is right, to 
wit, to will the good of God and of being. This is right. But this is 
not choosing the right as an end. 

But it is still insisted, that we are conscious of affirming obligation 
to will, and do, many things, simply and only because it is right thus to 
will, and do, and in view of this rightness. 

To this I reply, that the immediate reason for the act, thought of at 
the time, and immediately present to the mind, may be the rightness of 
the act, but in such cases the rightness is only regarded by the mind as 
a condition and never as the ground of obligation. The act must be 
ultimate choice, or the choice of conditions and means. In ultimate 
choice, surely, the mind can never affirm, or think of the relation of 
rightness between the choice and its object, instead of the intrinsic value 
of the object, as the ground of obligation. Nor can the mind think of 
the relation of rightness between the choice of conditions and means, 
and its object, as the ground of the obligation to choose them. It does, 
and must, assume, the value of the end, as creating both the obli- 
gation to choose, and the relation in question. The fact is, the mind 
necessarily assumes, without always thinking of this assumption, its obli- 
gation to will the good, for its own sake, together with all the known 
conditions and means. Whenever therefore it perceives a condition, or 
a means of good, it instantly and necessarily affirms obligation to choose 
it, or, which is the same thing, it affirms the rightness of such choice. 
The lightness of the choice may be, and often is the thing immediately 
thought of, but the assumption is, and must be, in the mind, that this 
obligation, and hence the rightness is created by the nature of the object 
to which this thing sustains the relation of a condition or a means. 

2. But it is said again, " I am conscious of affirming to myself that 
I ought to will the good of being, because it is right.''' That is, 
to will the good of being, as a means, and the right as an end ! which is 



1G SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

making right the supreme good, and the good of being a means to that 
end. This is absurd. But to say, that I am conscious of affirming to 
myself my obligation to love or will the good of God and my neighbor, 
because it is right, is a contradiction. It is the same as to say, I ought 
to love, or intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an ultimate end, 
and yet not to intend the good of God and my neighbor, but intend the 
right. 

3. But it is said, that "■ I ought to love God in compliance with, and 
out of respect to my obligation ; that I ought to will it, because and for 
the reason that I am bound to will it." That is, that in loving God and 
my neighbor, I must intend to discharge or comply with my obligation ; 
and this, it is said, is identical with intending the right. But ought my 
supreme object to be to discharge my duty — to meet obligation, instead 
of willing the well-being of God and my neighbor for its own sake ? If 
my end is to do my duty, I do not do it. For what is my obligation ? 
Why, to love, or will the good of God and my neighbor, that is, as an 
end, or for its own value. To discharge my obligation, then, I must 
intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an end. That is, I must 
intend that which I am under an obligation to intend. But I am not 
under an obligation to intend the right, because it is right, nor do my 
duty because it is my duty, but to intend the good of God and of my 
neighbor, because it is good. Therefore, to discharge my obligation, I 
must intend the good, and not the right — the good of God and my 
neighbor and not to do my duty. I say again, to intend the good, or 
valuable, is right but to intend the right is not right. 

4. But it is said, that in very many instances, at least, I am conscious 
of affirming my moral obligation to do the right, without any reference 
to the good of being, when I can assign no other reason for the affirma- 
tion of obligation than the right. For example, I behold virtue ; I affirm 
spontaneously and necessarily, that I ought to love that virtue. And 
tiiis, it is said, has no reference to the good of being. Is willing the 
right for the sake of the right, and loving virtue, the same thing ? But 
what is it to love virtue ? Not a mere feeling of delight or complacency 
in it. It is agreed that moral obligation, strictly speaking, respects the 
ultimate intention only. What, then, do I mean by the affirmation that 
I ought to love virtue ? What is virtue ? It is ultimate intention, or an 
attribute of ultimate intention. But what is loving virtue ? It consists 
in willing its existence. But it is said that I affirm my obligation to 
love virtue as an end, or for its own sake, and not from any regard to 
the good of being. This is absurd, and a contradiction. To love virtue, 
it is said, is to will its existence as an end. But virtue consists in in- 
tending an end. Now, to love virtue, it is said, is to will, intend its ex- 
istence as an end, for its own sake. Then, according to this theory, I 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 4rf 

affirm my obligation to intend the intention of a virtuous being as an 
end, instead of intending the same end that he does. This is absurd ; 
his intention is of no value, is neither naturally good nor morally good, 
irrespective of the end intended. It is neither right nor wrong, irrespec- 
tive of the end chosen. It is therefore impossible to will, choose, intend 
the intention as an end, without reference to the end intended. To love 
virtue, then, is to love or will the end upon which virtuous intention 
terminates, namely, the good of being ; or, in other words, to love virtue 
is to will its existence for the sake of the end it has in view, which is 
the same thing as to will the same end. Virtue is intending, choosing 
an end. Loving virtue is willing that the virtuous intention should 
exist for the sake of its end. Take away the end, and who would or 
could will the intention ? Without the end, the virtue, or intention, 
would not and could not exist. It is not true, therefore, that in the 
case supposed, I affirm my obligation to will, or intend, without any ref- 
erence to the good of being. 

5. But again, it is said, that when I contemplate the moral excellence 
of God, I affirm my obligation to love him solely for his goodness, with- 
out any reference to the good of being, and for no other reason than 
because it is right. But to love God because of his moral excellence, 
and because it is right, are not the same thing. It is a gross contradic- 
tion to talk of loving God for his moral excellence, because it is right. 
It is the same as to say, I love God for the reason that he is morally ex- 
cellent, or worthy, yet not at all for this reason, but for the reason that 
it is right. To love God for his moral worth, is to will good to him for 
its own sake upon condition that he deserves it. But to will his moral 
worth because it is right, is to will the right as an ultimate end, to have 
supreme regard to right, instead of the moral worth, or the well-being 
of God. 

But it may reasonably be asked, why should rightarians bring forward 
these objections? They all assume that moral obligation may respect 
something else than ultimate intention. Why, I repeal it, should right- 
arians affirm that the moral excellence of God is thefoundation of moral 
obligation, since they hold that right is the foundation of moral obliga- 
tion ? Why should the advocates of the theory that the moral excel- 
lence of God is the foundation of moral obligation, affirm that right is 
the foundation, or that we are bound to love God for his moral excel- 
lence, because this is right ? These are gross contradictions. Rightarians 
hold that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty • that this benevo- 
lence consists in willing the highest good of being in general, for its owi. 
sake ; that this good, by virtue of its own nature, imposes obligation to 
choose it, for its own sake, and therefore, and for this reason, it is right 
thus to choose it. But notwithstanding all this, they most inconsistently 



48 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

affirm that right is universally the ground of obligation. Consistency 
must compel them to deny that disinterested benevolence ever is, or can 
be, duty and right, or to abandon the nonsensical dogma, that right is 
the ground of obligation. There is no end to the absurdities in which 
error involves its advocates, and it is singular to see the advocates of the 
different theories, each in his turn, abandon his own and affirm some 
other, as an objection to the true theory. It has also been, and still is, 
common for writers to confound different theories with each other, and 
to affirm, in the compass of a few pages, several different theories. At 
least this has been done in some instances. 

Consistent rightarianism is a godless, Christless, loveless philosophy. 
This Kant saw and acknowledged. He calls it pure legality, that is, he 
understands the law as imposing obligation by virtue of its own nature, 
instead of the intrinsic value of the end, which the law requires moral 
agents to choose. He loses sight of the end, and does not recognize any 
end whatever. He makes a broad distinction between morality and re- 
ligion. Morality consists, according to him, in the adoption of the 
maxim, " Do right for the sake of the right," or, " Act at all times upon 
a maxim fit for law universal. " The adoption of this maxim is morality. 
But now, having adopted this maxim, the mind goes abroad to carry its 
maxim into practice. It finds God and being to exist, and sees it to be 
right to intend their good. This intending the good is religion, accord- 
ing to him. Thus, he says, ethics lead to or result in religion. — (See 
Kant, on Keligion.) But we feel prompted to inquire whether, when we 
apprehend God and being, we are to will their well-being as an end, or 
for its own sake, or because it is right ? If for its own sake, where then 
is the maxim, ': "Will the right for the sake of the right ?" For if we 
are to will the good, not as an ultimate end, but for the sake of the right, 
then right is the end that is preferred to the highest well-being of God 
and of the universe. It is impossible that this should be religion. In- 
deed Kant himself admits that this is not religion. 

But enough of this cold and loveless philosophy. As it exalts right 
above all that is called God, and subverts all the teachings of the Bible, 
it cannot be a light thing to be deluded by it. But it is remarkable and 
interesting to see Christian rightarians, without being sensible of their 
inconsistency, so often confound this philosophy with that which teaches 
that good- will to being constitutes virtue. Numerous examples of it occur 
everywhere in their writings, which demonstrate that rightarianism is 
with them only a theory that " plays round the head but comes not near 
the heart." 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 49 

LECTURE VI. 

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

I now enter upon the discussion of the theory, that the goodness, or 
moral excellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation. 
To this philosophy I reply, 

1. That the reason of obligation, or that which imposes obligation, is 
identical with the end on which the intention ought to terminate. If, 
therefore, the goodness of God be the reason, or foundation of moral ob- 
ligation, then the goodness of God is the ultimate end to be intended. 
But as this goodness consists in love or benevolence, it is impossible that 
it should be regarded or chosen, as an ultimate end ; and to choose it 
were to choose the divine choice, to intend the divine intention as an ul- 
timate end, instead of choosing what God chooses, and intending what 
he intends. Or if the goodness or moral excellence of God is to be re- 
garded not as identical with, but as an attribute or moral quality of be- 
nevolence, then, upon the theory under consideration, a moral agent 
ought to choose a quality or attribute of the divine choice or intention as 
an ultimate end, instead of the end upon which the divine intention ter- 
minates. This is absurd. 

2. It is impossible that virtue should be the foundation of moral obli- 
gation. Virtue consists in a compliance with moral obligation. But obli- 
gation must exist before it can be complied with. Now, upon this theory, 
obligation cannot exist until virtue exists as its foundation. Then this 
theory amounts to this : virtue is the foundation of moral obligation ; 
therefore virtue must exist before moral obligation can exist. But as 
virtue consists in a conformity to moral obligation, moral obligation must 
exist before virtue can exist. Therefore neither moral obligation nor 
virtue, can ever by any possibility, exist. God's virtue must have existed 
prior to his obligation, as its foundation. But as virtue consists in com- 
pliance with moral obligation, and as obligation could not exist until vir- 
tue existed as its foundation ; in other words, as obligation could not 
exist without the previous existence of virtue as its foundation, and as 
virtue could not exist without the previous existence of obligation, it fol- 
lows, that neither God nor any other being could ever be virtuous, for the 
reason that he could never be the subject of moral obligation. Should 
it be said, that God's holiness is the foundation of our obligation to love 
him, I ask in what sense it can be so. What is the nature or form of that 
love, which his virtue lays us under an obligation to exercise ? It cannot 
be a mere emotion of complacency, for emotions being involuntary states 
of mind and mere phenomena of the sensibility, are net strictly within 

4 



50 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the pale of legislation and morality. Is this love resolvable into benevo- 
lence or good-will ? But why will good to God rather than evil ? Why, 
surely, because good is valuable in itself. But if it is valuable in itself, 
this must be the fundamental reason for willing it as a possible good ; 
and his virtue must be only a secondary reason or condition of the obli- 
gation to will his actual blessedness. But again, the foundation of moral 
obligation must be the same in all worlds, and with all moral agents, for 
the simple reason that moral law is one and identical in all worlds. If 
God's virtue is not the foundation of moral obligation in him, which it 
cannot be, it cannot be the foundation of obligation in us, as moral law 
must require him to choose the same end that it requires us to choose. 
His virtue must be a secondary reason of his obligation to will his own 
actual blessedness, and the condition of our obligation to will his actual 
and highest blessedness, but cannot be the fundamental reason, that 
always being the intrinsic value of his well-being. 

If this theory is true, disinterested benevolence is a sin. Undeniably 
benevolence consists in willing the highest well-being of God and the 
universe for its own sake, in devoting the soul and all to this end. But 
this theory teaches us, either to will the moral excellence of God, for its 
own sake, or as an ultimate end, or to will his good and the good of the 
universe, not for its own sake, but because he is morally excellent. The 
benevolence theory regards blessedness as the end, and holiness or moral 
excellence only as a condition of the end. This theory regards moral 
excellence itself as the end. Does the moral excellence of God impose 
obligation to will his moral excellence for its own sake ? If not, it cannot 
be a ground of obligation. Does his moral excellence impose obligation 
to will his highest good, and that of the universe, for its own sake ? No, 
for this were a contradiction. For, be it remembered, no one thing can 
be a ground of obligation to choose any other thing, for its own sake. 
That which creates obligation to choose, by reason of its own nature, must 
itself be the identical object of choice ; the obligation is to choose that 
object for its own sake. 

If the divine moral excellence is the ground of obligation to choose, 
then this excellence must be the object of this choice, and disinterested 
benevolence is never right, but always wrong. 

2. But for the sake of a somewhat systematic examination of this 
subject, I will — 

(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is. 

(2.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation. 

(3.) Show what moral worth or good desert is. 

(4.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation. 

(5.) Show what relation virtue, merit, and moral worth sustain to 
moral obligation. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 51 

(6.) Answer objections. 

(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is. 

Virtue^ or moral excellence, consists in conformity of will to moral 
law. It must either be identical with love or good- will, or it must be the 
moral attribute or element of good-will or benevolence. 

(2.) It cannot be the foundation of moral obligation. 

It is agreed, that the moral law requires love ; and that this term 
expresses all that it requires. It is also agreed that this love is good- 
will, or that it resolves itself into choice, or ultimate intention. It 
must, then, consist in the choice of an ultimate end. Or, in more com- 
mon language, this love consists in the supreme devotion of heart and 
soul to God and to the highest good of being. But since virtue either 
consists in choice, or is an attribute of choice, or benevolence, it is im- 
possible to will it as an ultimate end. For this would involve the 
absurdity of choosing choice, or intending intention, as an end, instead 
of choosing that as an end upon which virtuous choice terminates. Or, 
if virtue be regarded as the moral attribute of love or benevolence, to 
make it an ultimate end would be to make an attribute of choice an 
ultimate end, instead of that on which choice terminates, or ought to 
terminate. This is absurd. 

(3.) Show what moral worth, or good desert is. 

Moral worth, or good desert, is not identical with virtue, or obedience 
to moral law, but is an attribute of character, resulting from obedience. 
Virtue, or holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and benevolent 
state of the will. Moral worth is not a state of mind, but is the result 
of a state of mind. We say that a man's obedience to moral law is val- 
uable in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or deserving of good, 
because of his virtue, or holiness. But this worthiness, this good desert, 
is not a state of mind, but, as I said, it is a result of benevolence. It is 
an attribute or quality of character, and not a state of mind. 

(4.) Moral worth or good desert cannot be the foundation of moral 
obligation. 

(a.) It is admitted, that good, or the intrinsically valuable to being, 
must be the foundation of moral obligation. The law of God requires 
the choice of an ultimate end. This end must be intrinsically valuable, 
for it is its intrinsic value that imposes obligation to will it. Nothing, 
then, can be the foundation of moral obligation but that which is a good, 
or intrinsically valuable in itself. 

(b.) Ultimate good, or the intrinsically valuable, must belong to, and 
be inseparable from, sentient existences. A block of marble cannot 
enjoy, or be the subject of, good. That which is intrinsically good to 
moral agents, must consist in a state of mind. It must be something 



52 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

"that is found within the field of consciousness. Nothing can be to them 
an intrinsic good, but that of which they can be conscious. By this it 
is not intended that everything of which they are conscious, is to them 
an ultimate good, or a good in any sense ; but it is intended, that that 
cannot be to them an ultimate, or intrinsic good, of which they are not 
conscious. Ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind. 
Whatever conduces to the state of mind that is necessarily regarded by 
us as intrinsically good or valuable, is to us a relative good. But the 
state of mind alone is the ultimate good. From this it is plain, that moral 
worth, or good desert, cannot be the foundation of moral obligation, 
because it is not a state of mind, and cannot be an ultimate good. The 
consciousness of good desert, that is, the consciousness of affirming of 
ourselves good desert, is an ultimate good. Or, more strictly, the satis- 
faction which the mind experiences, upon occasion of affirming its good 
desert, is an ultimate good. But neither the conscious affirmation of good 
desert, nor the satisfaction occasioned by the affirmation, is identical 
with moral worth or good desert. Merit, moral worth, good desert, is 
the condition, or occasion, of the affirmation, and of the resulting con- 
scious satisfaction, and is therefore a good, but it is not, and cannot be 
an ultimate, or intrinsic good. It is valuable ; but not intrinsically val- 
uable. Were it not that moral beings are so constituted, that it meets a 
demand of the intelligence, and therefore produces satisfaction in its 
contemplation, it would not be, and could not reasonably be regarded as 
a good in any sense. But since it meets a demand of the intelligence, it 
is a relative good, and results in ultimate good. 

(5.) Show what relation moral excellence, worth, merit, desert, sus- 
tain to moral obligation. 

(a.) We have seen, that neither of them can be the foundation of 
moral obligation ; that neither of them has in it the element of the in- 
trinsic, or ultimate good, or valuable ; and that, therefore, a moral agent 
can never be under obligation to will or choose them as an ultimate end. 

(b.) Worth, merit, good desert, cannot be a distinct ground, or foun- 
dation, of moral obligation, in such a sense as to impose obligation, irre- 
spective of the intrinsic value of good. All obligation must respect, 
strictly, the choice of an object for its own sake, with the necessary con- 
ditions and means. The intrinsic value of the end is the foundation of 
the obligation to choose both it and the necessary conditions and means 
of securing it. But for the intrinsic value of the end there could be no 
obligation to will the conditions and means. Whenever a thing is seen 
to be a necessary condition or means of securing an intrinsically valuable 
end, this perceived relation is the condition of our obligation to will it. 
The obligation is, and must be, founded in the intrinsic value of the 
end, and conditionated upon the perceived relation of the object to the 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 53 

end. The intelligence of every moral agent, from its nature and laws, 
affirms, that the ultimate good and blessedness of moral beings is, and 
ought to be, conditionated upon their holiness and good desert. This 
being a demand of reason, reason can never affirm moral obligation to 
will the actual blessedness of moral agents, but upon condition of their 
virtue, and consequent good desert, or merit. The intelligence affirms 
that it is fit, suitable, proper, that virtue, good desert, merit, holiness, 
should be rewarded with blessedness. Blessedness is a good m itself, 
and ought to be willed for that reason, and moral agents are under obli- 
gation to will that all beings capable of good may be worthy to enjoy, 
and may, therefore, actually enjoy blessedness. But they are not under 
obligation to will that every moral being should actually enjoy blessed- 
ness, but upon condition of holiness and good desert. The relation that 
holiness, merit, good desert, etc., sustain to moral obligation, is this : 
they supply the condition of the obligation to will the actual blessedness 
of the being or beings who are hoi} 7 . The obligation must be founded 
in the intrinsic value of the good we are to will to them. For it is ab- 
surd to say, that we are, or can be, under obligation to will good to them 
for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, and yet that the obligation 
should not be founded in the intrinsic value of the good. Were it not 
for the intrinsic value of their good, we should no sooner affirm obliga- 
tion to will good to them than evil. The good or blessedness is the 
thing, or end, we are under obligation to will. But obligation to will 
an ultimate end cannot possibly be founded in anything else than the 
intrinsic value of the end. Suppose it should be said, that in the case 
of merit, or good desert, the obligation is founded in merit, and only 
conditioned on the intrinsic value of the good I am to will. This would 
be to make desert the end willed, and good only the condition, or means. 
This were absurd. 

(c.) But again, to make merit the ground of the obligation, and 
the good willed only a condition, amounts to this : I perceive merit, 
whereupon I affirm my obligation to will — what ? Not good to the de- 
serving because of its value to him, nor from any disposition to see him 
enjoy blessedness for its own sake, but because of his merit. But what 
does he merit ? Why, good, or blessedness. It is good, or blessedness, 
that I am to will to him, and this is the end I am bound to will ; that is, 
I am to will his good, or blessedness, for its own intrinsic value. The 
obligation, then, must be founded in the intrinsic value of the end, that 
is, his well-being, or blessedness, and only conditioned upon merit. 

(6.) I am to answer objections. 

(a.) It is objected, that, if virtue is meritorious, if it merits, de- 
serves anything, this implies corresponding obligation, and that merit, 
or desert, must impose, or be the ground of, the obligation to give that 



5-t SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

which is merited. But this objection is either a mere begging of the 
question, or it is sheer logomachy. It assumes that the words, desert 
and merit, mean what they cannot mean. Let the objector remember, 
that he holds that obligation respects ultimate intention. That ultimate 
intention must find the grounds of its obligation exclusively in its object. 
Now, if desert or merit is a ground of obligation, then merit or desert must 
be the object of the intention. Desert, merit, must be willed for its own 
sake. But is this the thing that is deserved, merited ? Does a meritorious 
being deserve that his merit or desert should be willed for its own sake ? 
Indeed, is this what he deserves ? We understanding^ speak of good 
desert, the desert of good and of evil ; can a being deserve that his desert 
shall be chosen for its own sake ? If not, then it is impossible that desert 
or merit should be a ground of obligation; for be it remembered, that 
whatever is a ground of obligation ought to be chosen for its own sake. 
But if good desert deserves good, it is self-evident that the intrinsic value 
of the good is the ground, and merit only a condition, of obligation to 
will the actual and particular enjoyment of the good by the meritorious 
individual. Thus merit changes merely the form of obligation. If an 
individual is wicked, I ought to will his good as valuable in itself, and 
that he should comply with the necessary conditions of happiness, and 
thereupon actually enjoy happiness. If he is virtuous, I am to will his 
good still for its intrinsic value ; and, since he has complied with the 
conditions of enjoyment, that he actually enjoy happiness. In both 
cases, I am bound to will his good, and for the same fundamental reason, 
namely, its intrinsic value. Neither the fact nor the ground of obliga- 
tion to will his good is changed by his virtue ; the form only of the obli- 
gation is changed. I may be under obligation to will evil to a particu- 
lar being, but in this case I am not bound to will the evil for its own 
sake, and therefore, not as an end or ultimate. I ought sometimes to 
will the punishment of the guilty, not for its own sake, but for the sake 
of the public good ; and the intrinsic value of the good to be promoted 
is the ground of the obligation, and guilt or demerit is only a condition 
of the obligation in that form. If merit or desert be a ground of obli- 
gation, then merit or desert ought to be chosen for its own sake. It 
would follow from this, that ill desert ought to be chosen for its own 
sake, as well as good desert. But who will pretend that ill desert ought 
to be willed for its own sake ? But if this is not, cannot be so, then it 
follows, that desert is not a ground of obligation, and that is not an 
object of ultimate choice, or of choice at all, only as a means to an end. 

(b.) It is asserted, in support of the theory we are examining, that 
the Bible represents the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, or 
as a foundation of the obligation to love him. 

To this I answer, the Bible may assign, and does assign the goodness 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 55 

of God as a reason for loving him, but it does not follow, that it affirms, 
or assumes, that this reason is the foundation, or a foundation of the 
obligation. The inquiry is, in what sense does the Bible assign the 
goodness of God as a reason for loving him ? Is it that the goodness 
of God is the foundation of the obligation, or only a condition of the 
obligation to will his actual blessedness in particular ? Is his goodness 
a distinct ground of obligation to love him ? But what is this love that 
his goodness lays us under an obligation exercise to him ? It is agreed, 
that it cannot be an emotion, that it must consist in willing something 
to him. It is said by some, that the obligation is to treat him as worthy. 
But I ask, worthy of what ? Is he worthy of anything. If so, what is 
it ? For this is the thing that I ought to will to him. Is he merely 
worthy that I should will his worthiness for its own sake ? This must 
be, if his worthiness is the ground of obligation ; for that which is the 
ground of obligation to choose must be the object of choice. Why, he 
is worthy of blessing, and honor, and praise. But these must all be em- 
braced in the single word, love. The law has forever decided the point, 
that our whole duty to God is expressed by this one term. It has been 
common to make assertions upon the subject, that involve a contradiction 
of the Bible. The law of God, as revealed in the two precepts, "Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thy- 
self," covers the whole ground of moral obligation. It is expressly and 
repeatedly taught in the Bible, that love to God and our neighbor is the 
fulfilling of the law. It is, and must be admitted, that this love consists 
in willing something to God and our neighbor. What, then, is to be 
willed to them ? The command is, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself." This says nothing about the character of my neighbor. It is 
the value of his interests, of his well-being, that the law requires me to 
regard. It does not require me to love my righteous neighbor merely, 
nor to love my righteous neighbor better than I do my wicked neighbor. 
It is my neighbor that I am to love. That is, I am to will his well-being, 
or his good, with the conditions and means thereof, according to its 
value. If the law contemplated the virtue of any being as a distinct 
ground of obligation, it could not read as it does. It must, in that case, 
have read as follows : " If thou art righteous, and thy neighbor is as 
righteous as thou art, thou shalt love him as thyself. But if he is right- 
eous and thou art not, thou shalt love him and not thyself. If thou art 
righteous, and he is not, thou shalt love thyself, and not thy neighbor." 
How far would this be from the gloss of the Jewish rabbies so fully re- 
buked by Christ, namely, "Ye have heard that it hath been said by 
them of old time, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. 
But I say unto you, Love your enemies ; bless them that curse you ; do 
good to them that hate you ; and pray for them that despitef ully use and 



56 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

persecute you. For if ye love them that love yon. what thank have ye ? 
Do not even the publicans the same ? " The fact is, the law knows 
but one ground of moral obligation. It requires us to love God and our 
neighbor. This love is good will. What else ought we to will, or can 
we possibly will to God and our neighbor, but their highest good, or well- 
being, with all the conditions and means thereof ? This is all that can 
be of any value to them, and all that we can or ought to, will to them 
under any circumstances whatever. AVhen we have willed this to them, 
we have done our whole duty to them. "Love is the fulfilling of the 
law." We owe them nothing more, absolutely. They can have noth- 
ing more. But this the law requires us to will to God and our neighbor, 
on account of the intrinsic value of their good, whatever their character 
may be ; that is, this is to be willed to God and our neighbor, as a 
possible good, whether they are holy or unholy, simply because of its 
intrinsic value. 

But while the law requires that this should be willed to all, as a 
possible and intrinsic good, irrespective of character ; it cannot, and 
does not require us to will that God, or any moral agent in particular, 
shall be actually blessed, but upon condition that he be holy. Our obli- 
gation to the unholy, is to will that they might be holy, and perfectly 
blessed. Our obligation to the holy, is to will that they be perfectly 
blessed. As has been said, virtue only modifies the form, but does not 
change the ground of obligation. The Bible represents love to enemies 
as one of the highest forms of virtue : " God commendeth his love toward 
us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." But if love to 
enemies be a high and a valuable form of virtue, it must be only because 
the true spirit of the law requires the same love to them as to others, 
and because of the strong inducements not to love them. Who does not 
regard the virtue of the atonement as being as great as if it had been 
made for the friends, instead of the enemies of God ? And suppose 
God were supremely selfish and unreasonably our enemy, who would 
not regard good- will exercised toward him as being as praiseworthy as it 
now is. Now if he were unjustly our enemy, would not a hearty good- 
will to him in such a case be a striking and valuable instance of virtue ? 
In such a case we could not, might not, will his actual blessedness, but 
we might and should be under infinite obligation to will that he might 
become holy, and thereupon be perfectly blessed. We should be under 
obligation to will his good in such a sense, that should he become holy, 
we should will his actual blessedness, without any change in our ultimate 
choice or intention, and without any change in us that would imply an 
increase of virtue. 

So of our neighbor : we are bound to will his good, even if he is 
wicked, in such a sense as to need no new intention or ultimate choice, 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 57 

to will his actual blessedness, should he become holy. We may be as 
holy in loving a sinner, and in seeking his salvation while he is a sinner, as 
in willing his good after he is converted and becomes a saint. God was as 
virtuous in loving the world, and seeking to save it while in sin, as he is in 
loving those in it who are holy. The fact is, if we are truly benevolent, 
and will the highest well-being of all, with the conditions and means of 
their blessedness, it follows of course, and of necessity, that when one 
becomes holy we shall love him with the love of complacency ; that we 
shall, of course, will his actual blessedness, seeing that he has fulfilled 
the necessary conditions, and rendered himself worthy of blessedness. 
It implies no increase of virtue in G-od, when a sinner repents, to exercise 
complacency toward him. Complacency, as a state of will or heart, is 
only benevolence modified by the consideration or relation of right char- 
acter in the object of it. God, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and saints, 
in all ages, are as virtuous in their self-denying and untiring labors to 
save the wicked, as they are in their complacent love to the saints. 

This is the universal doctrine of the Bible. It is in exact -accordance 
with the spirit and letter of the law. " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself ; " that is, whatever his character may be. This is the doctrine 
of reason, and accords with the convictions of all men. But if this is so, 
it follows that virtue is not a distinct ground of moral obligation, but 
only modifies the form of obligation. We are under obligation to will 
the actual blessedness of a moral being, upon condition of his holiness. 
We ought to will good or blessedness for its own value, irrespective of 
character ; but we ought to will the enjoyment of it, by an individual, 
in particular, only upon condition of his holiness. Its intrinsic value is 
the foundation of the obligation, and his holiness changes not the fact, 
but form, of the obligation, and is the condition of the obligation to will 
his actual enjoyment of perfect blessedness in particular. When, there- 
fore, the Bible calls on us to love God for his goodness, it does not and 
cannot mean to assign the fundamental reason, or foundation of the ob- 
ligation to will his good ; for it were absurd to suppose, that his good is 
to be willed, not for its intrinsic value, but because he is good. Were it 
not for its intrinsic value, we should as soon affirm our obligation to will 
evil as good to him. The Bible assumes the first truths of reason. It is 
a first truth of reason, that God's well-being is of infinite value, and 
ought to be willed as a possible good whatever his character may be ; and 
that it ought to be willed as an actual reality upon condition of his holi- 
ness. Now the Bible does just as in this case might be expected. It 
asserts his actual and infinite holiness, and calls on us to love him, or to 
will his good, for that reason. But this is not asserting nor implying 
that his holiness is the foundation of the obligation to will his good in 
any such sense as that we should not be under obligation to will it with 



58 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strengtn, as a possible good, 
whether he were holy or not. It is plain that the law contemplates only 
the intrinsic value of the end to be willed. It would require us to will 
the well-being of God with all our heart, etc., or as the supreme good, 
whatever his character might be. Were not this so, it could not be 
moral law. His interest would be the supreme and the infinite good, in 
the sense of the intrinsically and infinitely valuable, and we should, for 
that reason, be under infinite obligation to will that it might be, whether 
he were holy or sinful, and upon condition of his holiness, to will the 
actual existence of his perfect and infinite blessedness. Upon our com- 
ing to the knowledge of his holiness, the obligation is instantly imposed, 
not merely to will his highest well-being as a possible, but as an actually 
existing, good. 

Again, it is impossible that goodness, virtue, good desert, merit, 
should be a distinct ground or foundation of moral obligation, in such a 
sense as to impose or properly to increase obligation. It has been shown 
that neither of these can be an ultimate good and impose obligation to 
choose itself as an ultimate end, or for its intrinsic value. 

But if goodness or merit can impose moral obligation to will, it must 
be an obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. But this we have seen 
cannot be ; therefore these things cannot be a distinct ground or founda- 
ti®n of moral obligation. 

But again, the law does not make virtue, good desert, or merit, the 
ground of obligation, and require us to love them and to will them as an 
ultimate end ; but to love God and our neighbor as an ultimate good. 
It does, no doubt, require us to will God's goodness, good desert, worthi- 
ness, merit, as a condition and means of his highest well-being, and of 
the well-being of the universe ; but it is absurd to say that it requires us 
to will either of these things as an ultimate end, instead of his perfect 
blessedness, to which these sustain only the relation of a condition. Let 
it be distinctly understood that nothing can impose moral obligation but 
that which is an ultimate and an intrinsic good ; for if it impose obliga- 
tion, it must be an obligation to choose itself for what it is, in and of 
itself. All obligation must respect the choice either of an end or of 
means. Obligation to choose means is founded in the value of the end. 
Whatever, then, imposes obligation must be an ultimate end. It must 
possess that, in and of itself, that is worthy or deserving of choice as an 
intrinsic and ultimate good. This we have seen, virtue, merit, etc. 
cannot be; therefore they cannot be a foundation of moral obligation. 
But it is said they can increase obligation to love God and holy beings. 
But we are under infinite obligation to love God and to will his good 
with all our power, because of the intrinsic value of his well-being, 
whether he is holy or sinful. Upon condition that he is holy, we are 



FOUNDATION OP OBLIGATION. 59 

under obligation to will his actual blessedness, but certainly we are under 
obligation to will it with no more than all our heart, and soul, and mind, 
and strength. But this we are required to do because of the intrinsic 
value of his blessedness, whatever his character might be. The fact is, 
we can do no more, and can be under obligation to do no more, than to 
will his good with all our power, and this we are bound to do for its 
own sake ; and no more than this can we be under obligation to do, for 
any reason whatever. Our obligation is to will his good with all our 
strength, by virtue of its infinite value, and it cannot be increased by any 
other consideration than our increased knowledge of its value, which 
increases our ability. 

(c.) But it is said that favors received impose obligation to exercise 
gratitude ; that the relation of benefactor itself imposes obligation 
to treat the benefactor according to this relation. 

Answer : I suppose this objection contemplates this relation as a 
virtuous relation, that is, that the benefactor is truly virtuous and not 
selfish in his benefaction. If not, then the relation cannot at all modify 
obligation. 

If the benefactor has in the benefaction obeyed the law of love, if he 
has done his duty in sustaining this relation, lam under obligation 
to exercise gratitude toward him. But what is gratitude ? It is not 
a mere emotion or feeling ; for this is a phenomenon of the sensibility, 
and, strictly speaking, without the pale both of legislation and morality. 
Gratitude, when spoken of as a virtue and as that of which moral obli- 
gation can be affirmed, must be an act of will. An obligation to grati- 
tude must be an obligation to will something to the benefactor. But 
what am I under obligation to will to a benefactor, but his actual highest 
well-being ? If it be God, I am under obligation to will his actual and 
infinite blessedness with all my heart and with all my soul. If it be my 
neighbor, I am bound to love him as myself, that is, to will his actual 
well-being as I do my own. What else can either God or man possess or 
enjoy, and what else can I be under obligation to will to them ? I 
answer, nothing else. To the law and to the testimony ; if any philoso- 
phy agree not herewith, it is because there is no light in it. The virtuous 
relation of benefactor modifies obligation, just as any other and every 
other form of virtue does, and in no other way. Whenever we perceive 
virtue in any being, this supplies the condition upon which we are 
bound to will his actual highest well-being. He has done his duty. 
He has complied with obligation in the relation he sustains. He is- 
truthful, upright, benevolent, just, merciful, no matter what the par- 
ticular form may be in which the individual presents to me the evidence 
of his holy character. It is all precisely the same so far as my obligation 
extends. I am, independently of my knowledge of his character, under 



CO SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

obligation to will his highest well-being for its own sake. That is. 
to will that he may fulfil all the conditions, and thereupon enjoy per- 
fect blessedness. But I am not under obligation to will his actual 
enjoyment of blessedness until I have evidence of his virtue. This 
evidence, however I obtain it, by whatever manifestations of virtue in 
him or by whatever means, supplies the condition upon which I am 
under obligation to will his actual enjoyment or highest well-being. 
This is my whole obligation. It is all he can have, and all I can will to 
him. All objections of this kind, and indeed all possible objections to 
the true theory, and in support of the one I am examining, are founded 
in an erroneous view of the subject of moral obligation, or in a false and 
anti-scriptural philosophy that contradicts the law of God, and sets up 
another rule of moral obligation. 

Again, if gratitude is a moral act, according to this objector, it is an 
ultimate intention, and as such must terminate on its object, and find 
its reasons or ground of obligation exclusively in its object. If this is 
so, then if the relation of benefactor is the ground of obligation to 
exercise gratitude, gratitude must consist in willing this relation for its 
own sake, and not at all in willing anything to the benefactor. This is 
absurd. It is certain that gratitude must consist in willing good to the 
benefactor, and not in willing the relation for its own sake, and that 
the ground of the obligation must be the intrinsic value of the good, and 
the relation only a condition of the obligation in the particular form of 
willing his enjoyment of good in particular. It is now said, in reply to 
this, that the " inquiry is not, what is gratitude ? but, why ought we 
to exercise it ? " But the inquiry is after the ground of the obligation ; 
this, it is agreed, must be intrinsic in its object ; and is it impertinent 
to inquire what the object is ? Who can tell what is the ground of the 
obligation to exercise gratitude until he knows what the object of 
gratitude is, and consequently what gratitude is ? The objector affirms 
that the relation of benefactor is a ground of obligation to put forth 
ultimate choice. Of course, according to him, and in fact, if this 
relation is the ground of the obligation, it is, and must be, the object 
chosen for its own sake. To exercise gratitude to a benefactor, then, 
according to this teaching is, not to will any good to him, nor to myself, 
nor to any being in existence, but simply to will the relation of bene- 
factor for its own sake. Not for his sake, as a good to him. Not for 
my sake as a good to me, but for its own sake. Is not this a sublime 
philosophy ? 

(d.) But it is also insisted that when men attempt to assign a reason 
why they are under moral obligation of any kind, as to love God, they all 
agree in this, in assigning the divine moral excellence as the reason of 
that obligation. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 61 

I answer : — The only reason why any man supposes himself to assign 
the goodness of God as the foundation of the obligation to will good to 
him is, that he loosely confounds the conditions of the obligation to will 
his actual blessedness, with the foundation of the obligation to will it for 
its own sake, or as a possible good. Were it not for the known intrinsic 
value of God's highest well-being, we should as soon affirm our obligation 
to will evil as good to him, as has been said. But if the divine moral 
excellence were the foundation of moral obligation, if God were not holy 
and good, moral obligation could not exist in any case. 

That every moral agent ought to will the highest well-being of God and 
of all the universe for its own sake, as a possible good, whatever their 
characters may be, is a truth of reason. Reason assigns and can assign 
no other reason for willing their good as an ultimate end than its intrinsic 
value ; and to assign any other reason as imposing obligation to will it as 
an end, or for its own sake, were absurd and self-contradictory. Obliga- 
tion to will it as an end and for its own sake, implies the obligation to 
will its actual existence in all cases, and to all persons, when the indispens- 
able conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are seen to be fulfilled in 
God, and therefore upon this condition reason affirms obligation to will 
his actual and highest blessedness for its own sake, the intrinsic value 
being the fundamental reason of the obligation to will it as an end, and 
the divine goodness the condition of the obligation to will his highest 
blessedness in particular. Suppose that I existed and had the idea of 
blessedness and its intrinsic value duly developed, together w r ith an idea 
of all the necessary conditions of it ; but that I did not know that any 
other being than myself existed, and yet I knew their existence and bless- 
edness possible ; in this case I should be under obligation to will or wish 
that beings might exist and be blessed. Now suppose that I complied 
with this obligation, my virtue is just as real and as great as if I knew 
their existence, and willed their actual blessedness, provided my idea of 
its intrinsic value were as clear and just as if I knew their existence. 
And now suppose I came to the knowledge of the actual existence and 
holiness of all holy beings, I should make no new ultimate choice in will- 
ing their actual blessedness. This I should do of course, and, remaining 
benevolent, of necessity ; and if this knowledge did not give me a higher 
idea of the value of that which I before willed for its own sake, the will- 
ing of the real existence of their blessedness would not make me a whit 
more virtuous than when I willed it as a possible good, without knowing 
that the conditions of its actual existence would ever, in any case, be 
fulfilled. 

The Bible reads just as it might be expected to read, and just as we 
should speak in common life. It being a truth of reason that the well- 
being of God is of infinite value, and therefore ought to be willed for its 



62 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

own sake, it also being a truth that virtue is an indispensable condition 
of fulfilling the demands of his own reason and conscience, and of course 
of his actual blessedness, and of course also a condition of the obligation 
to will it, we might expect the Bible to exhort and require us to love God 
or will his actual blessedness, and mention his virtue as the reason or ful- 
filled condition of the obligation, rather than the intrinsic value of his 
blessedness as the- foundation of the obligation. The foundation of the 
obligation, being a truth of reason, needs not to be a matter of revelation. 
Nor needs the fact that virtue is the condition of his blessedness, nor the 
fact that we are under no obligation to will his actual blessedness but 
upon condition of his holiness. But that in him this condition is ful- 
filled, needs to be impressed upon us, and therefore the Bible announces 
it as a reason or condition of the obligation to love him, that is, to will 
his actual blessedness. 

God's moral excellence is naturally, and rightly, assigned by us as a 
condition, not the ground of obligation to receive his revealed will as our 
law. Did we not assume the rectitude of the divine will, we could not 
affirm our obligation to receive it as a rule of duty. This assumption is a 
condition of the obligation, and is naturally thought of when obligation 
to obey God is affirmed. But the intrinsic value and importance of 
the interest he requires us to seek, is the ground of the obligation. 

(e. ) Again : it is asserted that when men would awaken a sense of 
moral obligation they universally contemplate the moral excellence of God 
as constituting the reason of their obligation, and if this contemplation 
does not awaken their sense of obligation nothing else can or will. 

I answer : — The only possible reason why men ever do or can take this 
course, is that they loosely consider religion to consist in feelings of 
complacency in God, and are endeavoring to awaken these complacent 
emotions. If they conceive of religion as consisting in these emotions, 
they will of course conceive themselves to be under obligation to exercise 
them, and to be sure they take the only possible course to awaken both 
these and a sense of obligation to exercise them. But they are mistaken 
both in regard to their obligation and the nature of religion. Did they 
conceive of religion as consisting in good-will, or in willing the highest 
well-being of God and of the universe for its own sake, would they, could 
they, resort to the process in question, that is, the contemplation of the 
divine moral excellence, as the only reason for willing good to him, 
instead of considering the infinite value of those interests to the reali- 
zation of which they ought to consecrate themselves ? 

If men often do resort to the process in question, it is because they 
love to feel and have a self-righteous satisfaction in feelings of com- 
placency in God, and take more pains to awaken these feelings than to 
quicken and enlarge their benevolence. A purely selfish being may be 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 63 

greatly affected by the great goodness and kindness of God to him. I 
know a man who is a very niggard so far as all benevolent giving and 
doing for God and the world are concerned, who, I fear, resorts to the 
very process in question, and is often much affected with the goodness 
of God. He can bluster and denounce all who do not feel as he does. 
But ask him for a dollar to forward any benevolent enterprise, and he 
will evade your request, and ask you how you feel, whether you are 
engaged in religion, etc. 

But it may well be asked, why does the Bible and why do we, 
so often present the character of God and of Christ as a means 
of awakening a sense of moral obligation and of inducing virtue ? 
Answer : — 

It is to lead men to contemplate the infinite value of those interests 
which we ought to will. Presenting the example of God and of Christ, 
is the highest moral means that can be used. God's example and man's 
example is the most impressive and efficient way in which he can declare 
his views, and hold forth to public gaze the infinite value of those inter- 
ests upon which all hearts ought to be set. For example, nothing can 
set the infinite value of the soul in a stronger light than the example of 
God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has done. 

Nothing can beget a higher sense of obligation to will the glory of 
the Father and the salvation of souls, than the example of Christ. His 
example is his loudest preaching, his clearest, most impressive exhibition, 
not merely of his own goodness, but of the intrinsic and infinite value of 
the interest he sought and which we ought to seek. It is the love, the 
care, the self-denial, and the example of God, in his efforts to secure the 
great ends of benevolence, that hold those interests forth in the strongest 
light, and thus beget a sense of obligation to seek the same end. But 
let it be observed, it is not a contemplation of the goodness of God that 
awakens this sense of obligation, but the contemplation of the value of 
those interests which he seeks, in the light of his pains- taking and 
example ; this quickens and gives efficiency to the sense of obligation to 
will what he wills. Suppose, for example, that I manifest the greatest 
concern and zeal for the salvation of souls ; it would not be the contem- 
plation of my goodness that would quicken in a bystander a sense of obli- 
gation to save souls, but my zeal, and life, and spirit would have the 
strongest tendency to arouse in him a sense of the infinite and intrinsic 
value of the soul, and thus quicken a sense of obligation. Should I be- 
hold multitudes rushing to extinguish a flaming house, it would not be 
a contemplation of their goodness, but the contemplation of the interests 
at stake, to the consideration of which their zeal would lead me, that 
would quicken a sense of obligation in me to hasten to lend my aid. 
Revelation is concerned to impress the fact that God is holy, and of 



64 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

course calls on us, in view of his holiness, to love and worship him. Bui 
in doing this, it does not, cannot mean that his holiness is the founda- 
tion of the obligation to will his good as an ultimate end. 

Our obligation, when viewed apart from his character, is to will or 
wish that God might fulfil all the conditions of perfect blessedness, and 
upon that condition, that he might actually enjoy perfect and infinite 
satisfaction. But seeing that he meets the demands of his own intelli- 
gence and the intelligence of the universe, and that he voluntarily fulfils 
all the necessary conditions of his highest well-being, our obligation is 
to will his actual and most perfect and eternal blessedness. 

I am obliged to repeat much to follow the objector, because all his 
objections resolve themselves into one, and require to be answered much 
in the same wav. 



LECTURE VII. 

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

I now come to consider the philosophy which teaches that moral order 
is the foundation of moral obligation. 

But what is moral order ? The advocates of this theory define it to 
be identical with the fit, proper, suitable. It is, then, according to 
them, synonymous with the right. Moral order must be, in their view, 
either identical with law or with virtue. It must be either an idea of 
the fit, the right, the proper, the suitable, which is the same as objective- 
right ; or it must consist in conformity of the will to this idea or law, 
which is virtue. It has been repeatedly shown that right, whether ob- 
jective or subjective, cannot by any possibility be the end at which a 
moral agent ought to aim, and to which he ought to consecrate himself. 
If moral order be not synonymous with right in one of these senses, I do 
not know what it is ; and all that I can say is, that if it be not identical 
with the highest well-being of God and of the universe, it cannot be the 
end at which moral agents ought to aim, and cannot be the foundation 
of moral obligation. But if by moral order, as the phraseology of some 
would seem to indicate, be meant that state of the universe in which all 
law is universally obeyed, and, as a consequence, a state of universal well- 
being, this theory is only another name for the true one. It is the same 
as willing the highest well-being of the universe, with the conditions and 
means thereof. 

Or if it be meant, as 'other phraseology would seem to indicate, that 
moral order is a state of things in which either all law is obeyed, or in 
which the disobedient are punished for the sake of promoting the public 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 65 

good ; — if this be what is meant by moral order, it is only another name 
for the true theory. Willing moral order, is only willing the highest 
good of the universe for its own sake, with the condition aud means 
thereof. 

But if by moral order be meant the fit, suitable, in the sense of law, 
physical or moral, it is absurd to represent moral order as the foundation 
of moral obligation. If moral order is the ground of obligation, it is 
identical with the object of ultimate choice. Does God require us to 
love moral order for its own sake ? Is this identical with loving God and 
our neighbor ? " Thou shalt will moral order with all thy heart, and 
with all thy soul ! " Is this the meaning of the moral law ? If this 
theory is right, benevolence is sin. It is not living to the right end. 

Again it is maintained that the nature and relations of moral beings 
are the true foundation of moral obligation. 

The advocates of this theory confound the conditions of moral obliga- 
tion with the foundation of obligation. The nature and relations of 
moral agents to each other, and to the universe, are conditions of their 
obligation to will the good of being, but not the foundation of the obliga- 
tion. What ! the nature and relations of moral beings the foundation 
of their obligation to choose an ultimate end ! Then this end must be 
their nature and relations. This is absurd. Their nature and relations 
being what they are, their highest well-being is known to them to be of 
infinite and intrinsic value. But it is and must be the intrinsic value of 
the end, and not their nature and relations, that imposes obligation to 
will the highest good of the universe as an ultimate end. 

If their nature and relations be the ground of obligation, then their 
nature and relations are the great object of ultimate choice, and should 
be willed for their own sakes, and not for the sake of any good resulting 
from their nature and relations. For, be it remembered, the ground of 
obligation to put forth ultimate choice must be identical with the object 
of this choice, which object imposes obligation by virtue of its own 
nature. 

The natures and relations of moral beings are a condition of obliga- 
tion to fulfil to each other certain duties. For example, the relation of 
parent and child is a condition of obligation to endeavor to promote each 
other's particular well-being, to govern and provide for, on the part of 
the parent, and to obey, etc., on the part of the child. But the intrinsic 
value of the good to be sought by both parent and child must be the 
ground, and their relation only the condition, of those particular forms of 
obligation. So in every possible case. Eelations can never be a ground 
of obligation to choose, unless the relations be the object of the choice. 
The various duties of life are executive and not ultimate acts. Obligation 
5 



66 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

to perform them is founded in the intrinsic nature of the good resulting 
from their performance. The various relations of life are only conditions 
of obligation to promote particular forms of good, and the good of par- 
ticular individuals. 

Writers upon this subject are often falling into the mistake of con- 
founding the conditions with the foundation of moral obligation. Moral 
agency is a condition, but not the foundation of obligation. Light, or 
the knowledge of the intrinsically valuable to being, is a condition, but 
not the foundation of moral obligation. The intrinsically valuable is the 
foundation of the obligation ; and light, or the perception of the intrin- 
sically valuable, is only a condition of the obligation. So the nature and 
relations of moral beings are a condition of their obligation to will each 
other's good, and so is light, or a knowledge of the intrinsic value of their 
blessedness ; but the intrinsic value is alone the foundation of the obliga- 
tion. It is, therefore, a great mistake to affirm " that the known nature 
and relations of moral agents are the true foundation of moral obligation." 

The next theory that demands attention is that which teaches that 
moral obligation is founded in the idea of duty. 

According to this philosophy, the end at which a moral agent ought 
to aim, is duty. He must in all things "aim at doing his duty." Or, 
in other words, he must always have respect to his obligation, and aim 
at discharging it. 

It is plain that this theory is only another form of stating the right- 
arian theory. By aiming, intending, to do duty, we must understand 
the advocates of this theory to mean the adoption of a resolution or 
maxim, by which to regulate their lives — the formation of a resolve to 
obey God — to serve God — to do at all times what appears to be right — to 
meet the demands of conscience — to obey the law — to discharge obliga- 
tion, etc. I have expressed the thing intended in all these ways because 
it is common to hear this theory expressed in all these terms, and in 
others like them. Especially in giving instruction to inquiring sinners, 
nothing is more common than for those who profess to be spiritual 
guides to assume the truth of this philosophy, and give instructions ac- 
cordingly. These philosophers, or theologians, will say to sinners : 
Make up your mind to serve the Lord ; resolve to do your whole duty, 
and do it at all times ; resolve to obey God in all things — to keep all his 
commandments ; resolve to deny yourselves — to forsake all sin — to love 
the Lord with all your heart and your neighbor as yourself. They 
often represent regeneration as consisting in this resolution or purpose. 

Such-like phraseology, which is very common and almost universal 
among rightarian philosophers, demonstrates that they regard virtue or 
obedience to God as consisting in the adoption of a maxim of life. With 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 67 

them, duty is the great idea to be realized. All these modes of expres- 
sion mean the same thing, and amount to just Kant's morality, which 
he admits does not necessarily imply religion, namely : " act upon a 
maxim at all times fit for law universal," and to Cousin's, which is the 
same thing, namely, " will the right for the sake of the right." Now I 
cannot but regard this philosophy on the one hand, and utilitarianism 
on the other, as equally wide from the truth, and as lying at the founda- 
tion of much of the spurious religion with which the church and the 
world are cursed. Utilitarianism begets one type of selfishness, which it 
calls religion, and this philosophy begets another, in some respects more 
specious, but not a whit the less selfish, God-dishonoring and soul-de- 
stroying. The nearest that this philosophy can be said to approach 
either to true morality or religion, is, that if the one who forms the reso- 
lution understood himself he would resolve to become truly moral instead 
of really becoming so. But this is in fact an absurdity and an impossi- 
bility, and the resolution-maker does not understand what he is about, 
when he supposes himself to be forming or cherishing a resolution to do 
his duty. Observe, he intends to do his duty. But to do his duty is to 
form and cherish an ultimate intention. To intend to do his duty is 
merely to intend to intend. But this is not doing his duty, as will be 
shown. He intends to serve God, but this is not serving God, as will 
also be shown. Whatever he intends, he is neither truly moral nor reli- 
gious, until he really intends the same end that God does ; and this is 
not to do his duty, nor to do right, nor to comply with obligation, nor 
to keep a conscience void of offence, nor to deny himself, nor any such 
like things. God aims at, and intends, the highest well-being of him- 
self and the universe, as an ultimate end, and this is doing his duty. It 
is not resolving or intending to do his duty, but is doing it. It is not 
resolving to do right for the sake of the right, but it is doing right. It 
is not resolving to serve himself and the universe, but is actually render- 
ing that service. It is not resolving to obey the moral law, but is actually 
obeying it. It is not resolving to love, but actually loving his neighbor 
as himself. It is not, in other words, resolving to be benevolent, but 
is being so. It is not resolving to deny self, but is actually deny- 
ing self. 

A man may resolve to serve God without any just idea of what it is 
to serve him. If he had the idea of what the law of God requires him 
to choose, clearly before his mind — if he perceived that to serve God, 
was nothing less than to consecrate himself to the same end to which 
God consecrates himself, to love God with all his heart and his neighbor 
as himself, that is, to will or choose the highest well-being of God and 
of the universe, as an ultimate end — to devote all his being, substance, 
time, and influence to this end ; — I say, if this idea were clearly before 



68 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

his mind, lie would not talk of resolving to consecrate himself to God — 
resolving to do his duty, to do right, to serve God, to keep a conscience 
void of offence, and such like things. He would see that such resolu- 
tions were totally absurd and a mere evasion of the claims of God. It 
has been repeatedly shown, that all virtue resolves itself into the intend- 
ing of an ultimate end, or of the highest well-being of God and the uni- . 
verse. This is true morality, and nothing else is. This is identical 
with that love to God and man which the law of God requires. This 
then is duty. This is serving God. This is keeping a conscience void 
of offence. This is right, and nothing else is. But to intend or resolve 
to do this is only to intend to intend, instead of at once intending what 
God requires. It is resolving to love God and his neighbor, instead of 
really loving him ; choosing to choose the highest well-being of God and 
of the universe, instead of really choosing it. 

It is one thing for a man who actually loves God with all his heart 
and his neighbor as himself, to resolve to regulate all his outward life by 
the law of God, and a totally different thing to intend to love God or to 
intend his highest glory and well-being. Eesolutions may respect out- 
ward action, but it is totally absurd to intend or resolve to form an 
ultimate intention. But be it remembered, that morality and religion 
do not belong to outward action, but to ultimate intentions. It is 
amazing and afflicting to witness the alarming extent to which a spuri- 
ous philosophy has corrupted and is corrupting the church of God. 
Kant and Cousin and Coleridge have adopted a phraseology, and mani- 
festly have conceived in idea a philosophy subversive of all true love to 
God and man, and teach a religion of maxims and resolutions instead of 
a religion of love. It is a philosophy, as we shall see in a future lecture, 
which teaches that the moral law or law of right, is entirely distinct 
from and may be opposite to the law of benevolence or love. The fact 
is, this philosophy conceives of duty and right as belonging to mere 
outward action. This must be, for it cannot be confused enough to talk 
of resolving or intending to form an ultimate intention. Let but the 
truth of this philosophy be assumed, in giving instructions to the anxious 
sinner, and it will immediately dry off his tears, and in all probability 
lead him to settle down in a religion of resolutions instead of a 
religion of love. Indeed this philosophy will immediately dry off, (if 
I may be allowed the expression,) the most genuine and powerful re- 
vival of religion, and run it down into a mere revival of a heart- 
less, Christless, loveless philosophy. It is much easier to persuade 
anxious sinners to resolve to do their duty, to resolve to love God, than 
it is to persuade them really to do their duty, and really to love 
God with all their heart and with all their soul, and their neighbor 
as themselves. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 69 

We note come to the consideration of that philosophy which teaches the 
complexity of the foundation of moral obligation. 

This theory maintains that there are several distinct grounds of 
moral obligation ; that the highest good of being is only one of the 
grounds of moral obligation, while right, moral order, the nature and 
relations of moral agents, merit and demerit, truth, duty, and many 
such like things, are distinct grounds of moral obligation, but that each 
one of them can by itself impose moral obligation. The advocates Of 
this theory, perceiving its inconsistency with the doctrine that moral 
obligation respects the ultimate choice or intention only, seem dis- 
posed to relinquish the position that obligation respects strictly only 
the choice of an ultimate end, and to maintain that moral obligation 
respects the ultimate action of the will. By ultimate action of the will 
they mean, if I understand them, the will's treatment of everything 
according to its intrinsic nature and character ; that is treating every 
thing, or taking that attitude in respect to every thing known to the 
mind, that is exactly suited to what it is in and of itself. For example, 
right ought to be regarded and treated by the will as right because it is 
right. Truth ought to be regarded and treated as truth for its own sake, 
virtue as virtue, merit as merit, demerit as demerit, the useful as useful, 
the beautiful as beautiful, the good or valuable as valuable, each for its 
own sake ; that in each case the action of the will is ultimate, in the sense 
that its action terminates on these objects as ultimates ; in other words, 
that all those actions of the will are ultimate that treat things according 
to their nature and character, or according to what they are in and 
of themselves. 

Now in respect to this theory I would inquire : — What is intended by 
the will's treating a thing, or taking that attitude in respect to it that is 
suited to its nature and character ? Are there any other actions of will 
than volitions, choice, preference, intention ? Are not all the actions of 
the will comprehended in these ? If there are any other actions than 
these, are they intelligent actions ? If, so what are those actions of will 
that consist neither in the choice of ends nor means, nor in volitions or 
efforts to secure an end ? Can there be intelligent acts of will that 
neither respect ends nor means ? Can there be moral acts of will when 
there is no choice or intention ? If there is choice or intention, must 
not these respect an end or means ? What then can be meant by ulti- 
mate action of will as distinguished from ultimate choice or intention ? 
Can there be choice without an object of choice ? If there is an object 
of choice, must not this object be chosen either as an end or as a 
means ? If as an ultimate end, how does this differ from ultimate in- 
tention ? If as a means, how can this be regarded as an ultimate action 
of the will ? What can be intended by actions of will that are not acts 



70 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of choice nor volition ? I can conceive of no other. But if all acts of 
will must of necessity consist in willing or nilling, that is in choosing or 
refusing, which is the same as willing one way or another, in respect to 
all objects of choice apprehended by the mind, how can there be any in- 
telligent act of the will that does not consist in, or that may not and must 
not, in its last analysis, be resolvable into, and be properly considered as the 
choice of an end, or of means, or in executive efforts to secure an end ? 
Can moral law require any other action of will than choice and volition ? 
What other actions of will are possible to us ? Whatever moral law 
does require, it must and can only require choices and volitions. It can 
only require us to choose ends or means. It cannot require us to choose 
as an ultimate end anything that is not intrinsically worthy of choice — 
nor as a means any thing that does not sustain that relation. 

Secondly, let lis examine this theory in the light of the revealed law 
of God. The whole law is fulfilled in one word— love. Now we have 
seen that the will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation. 
Moral obligation must be founded in the nature of that which moral law 
requires us to choose. Unless there be something in the nature of that 
which moral law requires us to will that renders it worthy or deserving of 
choice, we can be under no obligation to will or choose it. It is admit- 
ted that the love required by the law of God must consist in an act of 
the will, and not in mere emotions. Now, does this love, willing, choice, 
embrace several distinct ultimates ? If so, how can they all be expressed 
in one word — love ? Observe, the law requires only love to God and our 
neighbor as an ultimate. This love or willing must respect and termi- 
nate on God and our neighbor. The law says nothing about willing right 
for the sake of the right, or truth for the sake of the truth, or beauty 
for the sake of beauty, or virtue for the sake of virtue, or moral order for 
its own sake, or the nature and relations of moral agents for their own 
sake; nor can any such thing be implied in the command to love God 
and our neighbor. All these and innumerable other things are, and 
must be, conditions and means of the highest well-being of God and our 
neighbor. As such, the law may, and doubtless does, in requiring us to 
will the highest well-being of God and our neighbor as an ultimate end, 
require us to will all these as the necessary conditions and means. The 
end which the revealed law requires us to will is undeniably simple as op- 
posed to complex. It requires only love to God and our neighbor. One 
word expresses the whole of moral obligation. Now certainly this word 
cannot have a complex signification in such a sense as to include several 
distinct and ultimate objects of love, or of choice. This love is to termi- 
nate on God and our neighbor, and not on abstractions, nor on inanimate 
and insentient existences. I protest against any philosophy that contra- 
dicts the revealed law of God, and that teaches that anything else than 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 71 

God and our neighbor is to be loved for its own sake, or that anything 
else is to be chosen as an ultimate end than the highest well-being of 
God and our neighbor. In other words, I utterly object to any philoso- 
phy that makes anything obligatory upon a moral agent that is not ex- 
pressed or implied in perfect good will to God, and to the universe of 
sentient existences. To the word and to the testimony ; if any philoso- 
phy agree not therewith, it is because there is no light in it. The 
revealed law of God knows but one ground or foundation of moral obli- 
gation. It requires but one thing ; and that is just that attitude of the 
will toward God and our neighbor that accords with the intrinsic value 
of their highest well-being ; that God's moral worth shall be willed as of 
infinite value, as a condition of his own well-being, and that his actual 
and perfect blessedness shall be willed for its own sake, and because, or 
upon condition that he is worthy ; that our neighbor's moral worth 
shall be willed as an indispensable condition of his blessedness, and that 
if our neighbor is worthy of happiness, his actual and highest happiness 
shall be willed. This law knows but one end which moral agents are 
under obligation to seek, and sets at nought all so-called ultimate actions 
of will that do not terminate on the good of God and our neighbor. 
The ultimate choice, with the choice of all the conditions and means of 
the highest well-being of God and the universe, is all that the revealed 
law recognizes as coming within the pale of its legislation. It requires 
nothing more and nothing less. 

But there is another form of the complex theory of moral obligation 
that I must notice before I dismiss this subject. 

This view admits and maintains that the good, that is, the valua- 
ble to being, is the only ground of moral obligation, and that in every 
possible case the valuable to being, or the good, must be intended as an 
end, as a condition of the intention being virtuous. In this respect it 
maintains that the foundation of moral obligation is simple, a unit. But 
it also maintains that there are several ultimate goods or several ulti- 
mates or things which are intrinsically good or valuable in themselves, 
and are therefore to be chosen for their own sake, or as an ultimate end ; 
that to choose either of these as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, is 
virtue. 

It admits that happiness or blessedness is a good, and should be willed 
for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, but it maintains that virtue is 
an ultimate good ; that right is an ultimate good ; that the just and the 
true are ultimate goods ; in short, that the realization of the ideas of 
the reason, or the carrying out into concrete existence any idea of the 
reason, is an ultimate good. For instance : there were in the Divine 
Mind from eternity certain ideas of the good or valuable, the right, the 
just, the beautiful, the true, the useful, the holy. The realization of these 



72 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ideas of the divine reason, according to this theory, was the end which 
God aimed at or intended in creation ; he aimed at their realization as 
ultimates or for their own sake, and regarded the concrete realization of 
every one of these ideas as a separate and ultimate good : and so certain 
as God is virtuous, so certain it is, says this theory, that an intention on 
our part to realize these ideas for the sake of the realization is virtue. 
Then the foundation of moral obligation is complex in the sense that to 
will either the good or valuable, the right, the true, the just, the virtu- 
ous, the beautiful, the useful, etc., for its own sake, or as an ultimate 
end, is virtue ; and there is more than one virtuous ultimate choice or 
intention. Thus any one of several distinct things may be intended as 
an ultimate end with equal propriety and with equal virtuousness. The 
soul may at one moment be wholly consecrated to one end, that is, to 
one ultimate good, and again to another ; that is, sometimes it may will 
one good, and sometimes another good, as an ultimate end, and still be 
equally virtuous. 

In the discussion of this subject I will inquire : In what does the su- 
preme and ultimate good consist ? 

1. Good may be natural or moral. Natural good is synonymous with 
valuable. Moral good is synonymous with, virtue. Moral good is in a 
certain sense a natural good, that is, it is valuable as a means of natural 
good ; but the advocates of this theory affirm that moral good is valuable 
in itself. 

2. Good may be absolute and relative. Absolute good is that which 
is intrinsically valuable. Eelative good is that which is valuable as a 
means. It is not valuable in itself, but valuable because it sustains to 
absolute good the relation of a means to an end. Absolute good may 
also be a relative good, that is, it may tend to perpetuate and augment 
itself. Absolute good is also ultimate. Ultimate good is that good in 
which all relative good terminates — that good to which all relative good 
sustains the relation of a means or condition. Eelative good is not in- 
trinsically valuable, but only valuable on account of its relations. 

The point upon which issue is taken, is, that enjoyment, blessedness, 
or mental satisfaction, is the only ultimate good. 

It has been before remarked, and should be repeated here, that the 
intrinsically valuable must not only belong to, and be inseparable from, 
sentient beings, but that the ultimate or intrinsic absolute good must 
consist in a state of mind. It must be something to be found in the field 
of consciousness. Take away mind, and what can be a good per se ; or 
what can be a good in any sense ? 

Again, it should be said that the ultimate and absolute good can not 
consist in a choice or in a voluntary state of mind. The thing chosen is, 
and must be the ultimate of the choice. Choice can never be chosen as 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 73 

an ultimate end. Benevolence then, or the love required by the law, can 
never be the ultimate and absolute good. It is admitted that blessedness, 
enjoyment, mental satisfaction, is a good, an absolute and ultimate good. 
All men assume it. All men seek enjoyment. That it is the only abso- 
lute and ultimate good, is a first truth. But for this there could be no 
activity — no motive to action — no object of choice. Enjoyment is in fact 
the ultimate good. It is in fact the result of existence and of action. It 
results to God from his existence, his attributes, his activity, and his 
virtue, by a law of necessity. His powers are so correlated that blessed- 
ness cannot but be the state of his mind, as resulting from the exercise 
of his attributes and the right activity of his will. Happiness, or enjoy- 
ment, results, both naturally and governmentally, from obedience to law 
both physical and moral. It also shows that government is not an end, 
but a means. It also shows that the end is blessedness, and the means 
obedience to law. 

The ultimate and absolute good, in the sense of the intrinsically valu- 
able, cannot be identical with moral law. Moral law, as we have seen, is 
an idea of the reason. Moral law and moral government must propose 
some end to be secured by means of law. Law cannot be its own end. 
It cannot require the subject to seek itself as an ultimate end. This were 
absurd. The moral law is nothing else than the reason's idea, or concep- 
tion of that course of willing and acting that is fit, proper, suitable to, 
and demanded by the nature, relations, necessities, and circumstances of 
moral agents. Their nature, relations, circumstances, and wants being 
perceived, the reason necessarily affirms that they ought to propose to 
themselves a certain end, and to concentrate themselves to the promotion 
of this end, for its own sake, or for its own intrinsic value. This end can- 
not be law itself. The law is a simple and pure idea of the reason, and 
can never be in itself the supreme, intrinsic, absolute, and ultimate good. 

Nor can obedience, or the course of acting or willing required by the 
law, be the ultimate end aimed at by the law or the lawgiver. The law 
requires action in reference to an end, or that an end should be willed ; 
but the willing, and the end to be willed, cannot be identical. The 
action required, and the end to which it is to be directed, cannot be the 
same. Obedience to law cannot be the ultimate end proposed by law or 
government. The obedience is one thing, the end to be secured by 
obedience is and must be another. Obedience must be a means or con- 
dition ; and that which law and obedience are intended to secure, is and 
must be the ultimate end of obedience. The law, or the law-giver, aims to 
promote the highest good, or blessedness of the universe. This must be the 
end of moral law and moral government. Law and obedience must be the 
means or conditions of this end. To deny this is to deny the very nature 
of moral law, and to lose sight of the true and only end of moral govern- 



74 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. • 

ment. Nothing can be moral law, and nothing can be moral govern- 
ment, that does not propose the highest good of moral beings as its ulti- 
mate end. But if this is the end of law, and the end of government, it 
must be the end to be aimed at, or intended, by the ruler and the sub- 
ject. And this end must be the foundation of moral obligation. The 
end must be good or valuable per se, or there can be no moral law 
requiring it to be sought or chosen as an ultimate end, nor any obligation 
to choose it as an ultimate end. 

But what is intended by the right, the just, the true, etc., being ulti- 
mate goods and ends to be chosen for their own sake ? These may be 
objective or subjective. Objective right, truth, justice, etc., are mere 
ideas, and cannot be good or valuable in themselves. Subjective right, 
truth, justice, etc., are synonymous with righteousness, truthfulness, 
and justness. These are virtue. They consist in an active state of the 
will, and resolve themselves into choice, intention. But we have repeat- 
edly seen that intention can neither be an end nor a good in itself, in 
the sense of intrinsically valuable. 

Again, constituted as moral agents are, it is a matter of conscious- 
ness that the concrete realization of the ideas of right, and truth, and 
justice, of beauty, of fitness, of moral order, and, in short, of all that 
class of ideas, is indispensable as the condition and means of their high- 
est well-being, and that enjoyment or mental satisfaction is the result 
of realizing in the concrete those ideas. This enjoyment or satisfaction 
then is and must be the end or ultimate upon which the intention of 
God must have terminated, and upon which ours must terminate as an 
end or ultimate. 

Again, the enjoyment resulting to God from the concrete realiza- 
tion of his own ideas must be infinite. He must therefore have intended 
it as the supreme good. It is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact 
the supremely valuable. 

Again, if there is more than one ultimate good, the mind must 
regard them all as one, or sometimes be consecrated to one and some- 
times to another — sometimes wholly consecrated to the beautiful, some- 
times to the just, and then again to the right, then to the useful, to the 
true, etc. But it may be asked, of what value is the beautiful, aside 
from the enjoyment it affords to sentient existences ? It meets a 
demand of our being, and hence affords satisfaction. But for this in 
what sense could it be regarded as good ? The idea of the useful, again, 
cannot be an idea of an ultimate end, for utility implies that something 
is valuable in itself to which the useful sustains the relation of a means, 
and is useful only for that reason. 

Of what value is the true, the right, the just, etc., aside from the 
pleasure or mental satisfaction resulting from them to sentient exist- 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. T.« 

ences ? Of what value were all the rest of the universe, were there no 
sentient existences to enjoy it ? 

Suppose, again, that everything else in the universe existed just as 
it does, except mental satisfaction or enjoyment, and that there were 
absolutely no enjoyment of any kind in anything any more than there is 
in a block of granite, of what value would it all be ? and to what, or to 
whom, would it be valuable ? Mind, without susceptibility of enjoy- 
ment, can neither know nor be the subject of good or evil, any more 
than a slab of marble. Truth in that case could no more be a good to 
mind than mind could be a good to truth ; light would no more be 
a good to the eye, than the eye a good to light. Nothing in the universe 
could give or receive the least satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Neither 
natural nor moral fitness nor unfitness could excite the least emotion 
or mental satisfaction. A block of marble might just as well be the 
subject of good as anything else, upon such a supposition. 

Again, it is obvious that all creation, where law is obeyed, tends to 
one end, and that end is happiness or enjoyment. This demonstrates 
that enjoyment was the end at which God aimed in creation. 

Again, it is evident that God is endeavoring to realize all the other 
ideas of his reason for the sake of. and as a means of, realizing that of 
the valuable to being. This, as a matter of fact, is the result of realiz- 
ing in the concrete all those ideas. This must then have been the end 
intended. 

It is nonsense to object that, if enjoyment or mental, satisfaction be 
the only ground of moral obligation, we should be indifferent as to the 
means. This objection assumes that in seeking an end for its intrinsic 
value, we must be indifferent as to the way in which we obtain that end ; 
that is, whether it be obtained in a manner possible or impossible, right 
or wrong. It overlooks the fact that from the laws of our own being it 
is impossible for us to will the end without willing also the indispensable, 
and therefore the appropriate, means ; and also that we cannot possibly 
regard any other conditions or means of the happiness of moral agents as 
possible, and therefore as appropriate or right, but holiness and univer- 
sal conformity to the law of our being. Enjoyment or mental satisfac- 
tion results from having the different demands of our being met. One 
demand of the reason and conscience of a moral agent is that happiness 
should be conditionated upon holiness. It is therefore naturally impos- 
sible for a moral agent to be satisfied with the happiness or enjoyment of. 
moral agents, except upon the condition of their holiness. 

But this class of philosophers insist that all the archetypes of the 1 
ideas of the reason are necessarily regarded by us as good in themselves. 
For example : I have the idea of beauty. I behold a rose. The percep- 
tion of this archetype of the idea of beauty gives me instantaneous pleas- 



76 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

nre. Now it is said, that this archetype is necessarily regarded by me 
as a good. I have pleasure in the presence and perception of it, and as 
often as I call it to remembrance. This pleasure, it is said, demonstrates 
that it is a good to me ; and this good is in the very nature of the object, 
and must be regarded as a good in itself. To this I answer, that the 
presence of the rose is a good to me, but not an ultimate good. It is 
only a means or source of pleasure or happiness to me. The rose is not 
a good in itself. If there were no eyes to see it, and no olfactories to 
smell it, to whom could it be a good ? But in what sense can it be a 
good, except in the sense that it gives satisfaction to the beholder ? The 
satisfaction, and not the rose, is and must be the ultimate good. But it 
is inquired, Do not I desire the rose for its own sake ? I answer, Yes ; 
you desire it for its own sake, but you do not, cannot choose it for its 
own sake, but to gratify the desire. The desires all terminate on their 
respective objects. The desire for food terminates on food ; thirst ter- 
minates on drink, etc. These things are so correlated to these appetites 
that they are desired for their own sakes. Bat they are not and can- 
not be chosen for their own sakes or as an ultimate end. They are, and 
must be, regarded and chosen as the means of gratifying their respec- 
tive desires. To choose them simply in obedience to the desire were self- 
ishness. But the gratification is a good, and a part of universal good. 
The reason, therefore, urges and demands that they should be chosen as 
a means of good to myself. When thus chosen in obedience to the law 
of the intelligence, and no more stress is laid upon the gratification 
than in proportion to its relative value, and when no stress is laid upon 
it simply because it is my own gratification, the choice is holy. The 
perception of the archetypes of the various ideas of the reason will, 
in most instances, produce enjoyment. These archetypes, or, which is 
the same thing, the concrete realization of these ideas, is regarded by 
the mind as a good, but not as an ultimate good. The ultimate good is 
the satisfaction derived from the perception of them. 

The perception of moral or physical beauty gives me satisfaction. Now 
moral and physical beauty are regarded by me as good, but not as ultimate 
good. They are relative good only. AVere it not for the pleasure they give 
me, I could not in any way connect with them the idea of good. The mental 
eye might perceive order, beauty, physical and moral, or anything else ; 
but these things would no more be good to the intellect that perceived 
them than their opposites. The idea of good or of the valuable could 
not in such a case exist, consequently virtue or moral beauty, could not 
exist. The idea of the good, or of the valuable, must exist before virtue 
can exist. It is and must be the development of the idea of the valua- 
ble, that develops the idea of moral obligation, of right and wrong, and 
consequently that makes virtue possible. The mind must perceive 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 77 

an object of choice that is regarded as intrinsically valuable, before it 
can have the idea of moral obligation to choose it as an end. This object 
of choice cannot be virtue or moral beauty, for this would be to have 
the idea of virtue or of moral beauty before the idea of moral obligation, 
or of right and wrong. This were a contradiction. The mind must 
have the idea of some ultimate good, the choice of which would be 
virtue, or concerning which the reason affirms moral obligation, before 
the idea of virtue, or of right or wrong, can exist. The development 
of the idea of the valuable, or of an ultimate good, must precede the 
possibility of virtue, or of the idea of virtue, of moral obligation, or 
of right and wrong. It is absurd to say that virtue is regarded as an 
ultimate good, when in fact the very idea of virtue does not and cannot 
exist until a good is presented, in view of which, the mind affirms moral 
obligation to will it for its own sake, and also affirms that the choice of 
it for that reason would be virtue. 

So virtue or holiness is morally beautiful. Moral worth or excellenoe 
is morally beautiful. Beauty is an attribute or element of holiness, 
virtue, and of moral worth, or right character. But the beauty is not 
identical with holiness or moral worth, any more than the beauty of a 
rose, and the rose are identical. The rose is beautiful. Beauty is one of 
its attributes. So virtue is morally beautiful. Beauty is one of its at- 
tributes. But in neither case is the beauty a state of mind, and, there- 
fore, it cannot be an ultimate good. 

We are apt to say, that moral worth is an ultimate good ; but it is 
only a relative good. It meets a demand of our being, and thus pro- 
duces satisfaction. This satisfaction is the ultimate good of being. At 
the very moment we pronounce it a good in itself, it is only because we 
experience such a satisfaction in contemplating it. At the very time we 
erroneously say, that we consider it a good in itself, wholly independent 
of its results, we only say so, the more positively, because we are so grati- 
fied at the time, by thinking of it. It is its experienced results, that is 
the ground of the affirmation. 
Thus we see : 

1. That the utility of ultimate choice cannot be a foundation of obli- 
gation to choose, for this would be to transfer the ground of obligation 
from what is intrinsic in the object chosen to the useful tendency of the 
choice itself. As I have said, utility is a condition of obligation to put 
forth an executive act, but can never be a foundation of obligation ; for 
the utility of the choice is not a reason found exclusively, or at all, in the 
object of choice. 

2. The moral character of the choice cannot be a foundation of obliga- 
tion to choose, for this reason is not intrinsic in the object of choice. 
To affirm that the character of choice is the ground of obligation to 



78 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

choose, is to transfer the ground of obligation to choose from the object 
chosen to the character of the choice itself ; but this is a contradiction of 
the premises. 

3. The relation of one being to another cannot be the ground of ob- 
ligation of the one to will good to the other, for the ground of obligation 
to will good to another must be the intrinsic nature of the good, and not 
the relations of one being to another. Eelations may be conditions of 
obligation to seek to promote the good of particular individuals ; but in 
every case the nature of the good is the ground of the obligation. 

4. Neither the relation of utility, nor that of moral fitness or right, 
as existing between choice and its object, can be a ground of obligation, 
for both these relations depend, for their very existence, upon the intrin- 
sic importance of the object of choice ; and besides, neither of these re- 
lations is intrinsic in the object of choice, as it must be to be a ground 
of obligation. 

5. The relative importance or value of an object of choice can never 
be a ground of obligation to choose that object, for its relative importance 
is not intrinsic in the object. But the relative importance, or value, of 
an object may be a condition of obligation to choose it, as a condition of 
securing an intrinsically valuable object, to which it sustains the relation 
of a means. 

6. The idea of duty cannot be a ground of obligation ; this idea is a 
condition, but never a foundation, of obligation, for this idea is not 
intrinsic in the object which we affirm it our duty to choose. 

7. The perception of certain relations existing between individuals 
cannot be a ground, although it is a condition of obligation, to fulfil 
to them certain duties. Neither the relation itself, nor the perception 
of the relation, is intrinsic in that which we affirm ourselves to be under 
obligation to will or do to them ; of course, neither of them can be a 
ground of obligation. 

8. The affirmation of obligation by the reason, cannot be a ground, 
though it is a condition of obligation. The obligation is affirmed, upon 
the ground of the intrinsic importance of the object, and not in view of 
the affirmation itself. 

9. The sovereign will of God is never the foundation, though it often 
is a condition of certain forms, of obligation. Did we know the intrinsic 
or relative value of an object, we should be under obligation to choose it, 
whether God required it or not. 

The revealed will of God is always a condition of obligation, when- 
ever such revelation is indispensable to our understanding the intrinsic 
or relative importance of any object of choice. The will of God is not 
intrinsic in the object which he commands us to will, and of course 
cannot be a ground of obligation. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 79 

10. The moral excellence of a being can never be a foundation of 
obligation to will his good ; for his character is not intrinsic in the good 
we ought to will to him. The intrinsic value of that good must be the 
ground of the obligation, and his good character only a condition of 
obligation to will his enjoyment of good in particular. 

Good character can never be a ground of obligation to choose any- 
thing which is not itself ; for the reasons of ultimate choice must 
be found exclusively in the object of choice. Therefore, if character is a 
ground of obligation to put forth an ultimate choice, it must be the 
object of that choice. 

11. Right can never be a ground of obligation, unless right be itself 
the object which we are under obligation to choose for its own sake. 

12. Susceptibility for good can never be a ground, though it is a 
condition, of obligation to will good to a being. The susceptibility 
is not intrinsic in the good which we ought to will, and therefore can- 
not be a ground of obligation. 

13. No one thing can be a ground of obligation to choose any other 
thing, as an ultimate ; for the reasons for choosing anything, as an ulti- 
mate, must be found in itself, and in nothing extraneous to itself. 

14. From the admitted fact, that none but ultimate choice or inten- 
tion is right or wrong per se, and that all executive volitions, or acts, 
derive their character from the ultimate intention to which they owe 
their existence, it follows : — 

(a.) That if executive volitions are put forth with the intention to 
secure an intrinsically valuable end, they are right ; otherwise they 
are wrong. 

(b.) It also follows, that obligation to put forth executive acts is condi- 
tioned, not founded, upon the assumed utility of such acts. Again — 

(c. ) It also follows, that all outward acts are right or wrong, as they 
proceed from a right or wrong intention. 

(d.) It also follows that the rightness of any executive volition 
or outward act depends upon the. supposed and intended utility of that 
volition, or act. Their utility must be assumed as a condition of obliga- 
tion to put them forth, and, of course, their intended utility is a condi- 
tion of their being right. 

(e.) It also follows that, whenever we decide it to be duty to put 
forth any outward act whatever, irrespective of its supposed utility, and 
because we think it right, we deceive ourselves ; for it is impossible that 
outward acts or volitions, which from their nature are always executive, 
should be either obligatory or right, irrespective of their assumed utility, 
or tendency to promote an intrinsically valuable end. 

(f.) It follows also that it is a gross error to affirm the rightness of 
an executive act, as a reason for putting it forth, even assuming that its 



SO SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tendency is to do evil rather than good. With this assumption no 
executive act can possibly be right. When God has required certain 
executive acts, we know that they do tend to secure the highest good, 
and that, if put forth to secure that good, they are right. But in 
no case, where God has not revealed the path of duty, as it respects 
executive acts, or courses of life, are we to decide upon such questions in 
view of the Tightness, irrespective of the good tendency of such acts 
or courses of life ; for their rightness depends upon their assumed good 
tendency. 

But it is said that a moral agent may sometimes be under obligation 
to will evil instead of good to others. I answer : — 

It can never be the duty of a moral agent to will evil to any being 
for its own sake, or as an ultimate end. The character and govern- 
mental relations of a being may be such that it may be duty to will his 
punishment to promote the public good. But in this case good is the 
end willed, and misery only a means. So it may be the duty of a moral 
agent to will the temporal misery of even a holy being, to promote 
the public interests. Such was the case with the sufferings of Christ. 
The Father willed his temporary misery, to promote the public good. 
But in all cases when it is duty to will misery, it is only as a means or 
condition of good to the public, or to the individual, and not as an 
ultimate end. 



LECTURE VIII. 

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 
THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OE THE YARIOES THEORIES. 

It has already been observed that this is a highly practical question, 
and one of surpassing interest and importance. I have gone through the 
discussion and examination of the several principal theories, for the pur- 
pose of preparing the way to expose the practical results of those various 
theories, and to show that they legitimately result in some of the most 
soul-destroying errors that cripple the church and curse the world. 

1. / will begin with the theory that regards the sovereign ivill of God 
as the foundation of moral obligation. 

One legitimate and necessary result of this theory is, a totally erro- 
neous conception both of the character of God, and of the nature and de- 
sign of his government. If God's will is the foundation of moral obliga- 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 81 

tion, it follows that he is an arbitrary sovereign. He is not under law 
himself, and he has no rule by which to regulate his conduct, nor by 
which either himself or any other being can judge of his moral character. 
Indeed, unless he is subject to law, or is a subject of moral obligation, he 
has and can have, no moral character ; for moral character always and 
necessarily implies moral law and moral obligation. If God's will is not 
itself under the law of his infinite reason, or, in other words, it is not 
conformed to the law imposed upon it by his intelligence, then his will 
is and must be arbitrary in the worst sense ; that is, in the sense of hav- 
ing no regard to reason, or to the nature and relations of moral agents. 
But if his will is under the law of his reason, if he acts from principle, 
or has good and benevolent reasons for his conduct, then his will is not 
the foundation of moral obligation, but those reasons that lie revealed in 
the divine intelligence, in view of which it affirms moral obligation, or 
that he ought to will in conformity with those reasons. In other words, 
if the intrinsic value of his own well-being and that of the universe be 
the foundation of moral obligation ; if his reason affirms his obligation 
to choose this as his ultimate end, and to consecrate his infinite energies 
to the realization of it ; and if his will is conformed to this law it fol- 
lows, — 

(1.) That his will is not the foundation of moral obligation. 

(2.) That he has infinitely good and wise reasons for what he wills, 
says, and does. 

(3.) That he is not arbitrary, but always acts in conformity with right 
principles, and for reasons that will, when universally known, compel 
the respect and even admiration of every intelligent being in the uni- 
verse. 

(4.) That creation and providential and moral government, are the 
necessary means to an infinitely wise and good end, and that existing 
evils are only unavoidably incidental to this infinitely wise and benevo- 
lent arrangement, and, although great, are indefinitely the less of two 
evils. That is, they are an evil indefinitely less than no creation and no 
government would have been. It is conceivable, that a plan of adminis- 
tration might have been adopted that would have prevented the present 
evils ; but if we admit that God has been governed by reason in the 
selection of the end he has in view, and in the use of means for its ac- 
complishment, it will follow that the evils are less than would have 
existed under any other plan of administration ; or at least, thatvthe 
present system, with all its evils, is the best that infinite wisdom and 
love could adopt. ' : 

(5.) These incidental evils, therefore, do not at all detract from the 
evidence of the wisdom and goodness of God ; for in all these things he 
is not acting from caprice, or malice, or an arbitrary sovereignty, but is 
6 



S2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

acting in conformity with the law of his infinite intelligence, and oi 
course has infinitely good and weighty reasons for what he does and suf- 
fers to be done — reasons so good and so weighty, that he could not do 
otherwise without violating the law of his own intelligence, and therefore 
committing infinite sin. 

(6.) It follows also that there is ground for perfect confidence, love, 
and submission to his divine will in all things. That is, if his will is not 
arbitrary, but conformed to the law of his infinite intelligence, then it is 
obligatory, as our rule of action, because it reveals infallibly what is in 
accordance with infinite intelligence. We may always be entirely safe in 
obeying all the divine requirements, and in submitting to all his dispensa- 
tions, however mysterious, being assured that they are perfectly wise and 
good. Not only are we safe in doing so, but we are under infinite obli- 
gation to do so ; not because his arbitrary will imposes obligation, but 
because it reveals to us infallibly the end we ought to choose, and the 
indispensable means of securing it. His will is law, not in the sense of 
its originating and imposing obligation of its own arbitrary sovereignty, 
but in the sense of its being a revelation of both the end we ought to 
seek, and the means by which the end can be secured.J> Indeed this is 
the only proper idea of law. It does not in any case of itself impose 
obligation, but is only a revelation of obligation. Law is a condition, 
but not the foundation, of obligation. The will of God is a condition of 
obligation, only so far as it is indispensable to our knowledge of the end 
we ought to seek, and the means by which this end is to be secured. 
Where these are known, there is obligation, whether God has revealed 
his will or not. 

The foregoing, and many other important truths, little less important 
than those already mentioned, and too numerous to be now distinctly 
noticed, follow from the fact that the good of being, and not the arbi- 
trary will of God, is the foundation of moral obligation. But no one of 
them is or can be true, if his will be the foundation of obligation. Nor 
can any one, who consistently holds or believes that his will is the founda- 
tion of obligation, hold or believe any of the foregoing truths, nor in- 
deed hold or believe any truth of the law or gospel. Nay, he cannot, if 
he be at all consistent, have even a correct conception of one truth of 
God's moral government. Let us see if he can. 

(1.) Can he believe that God's will is wise and good, unless he admits 
and believes that it is subject to the law of his intelligence ? If he con- 
sistently holds that the divine will is the foundation of moral obligation, 
he must either deny that his will is any evidence of what is wise and 
good, or maintain the absurdity, that whatever God wills is wise and 
good, simply for the reason that God wills it, and that if he willed the 
directly opposite of what he does, it would be equally wise and good. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 83 

But this is an absurdity palpable enough to confound any one who has 
reason and moral agency. 

(2.) If he consistently holds and believes that God's sovereign will is 
the foundation of moral obligation, he cannot regard him as having any 
moral character, for the reason, that there is no standard by which to 
judge of his willing and acting ; for, by the supposition, he has no intelli- 
gent rule of action, and, therefore, can have no moral character, as he is 
not a moral agent, and can himself have no idea of the moral character 
of his own actions ; for, in fact, upon the supposition in question, they 
have none. Any one, therefore, who holds that God is not a subject of 
moral law, imposed on him by his own reason, but, on the contrary, that 
his sovereign will is the foundation of moral obligation, must, if consist- 
ent, deny that he has moral character ; and he must deny that God is an 
intelligent being, or else admit that he is infinitely wicked for not con- 
forming his will to the law of his intelligence ; and for not being guided 
by his infinite reason, instead of setting up an arbitrary sovereignty 
of will. 

(3.) He who holds that God's sovereign will is the foundation of moral 
obligation, instead of being a revelation of obligation, if he be at all con- 
sistent, can neither have nor assign any good reason either for confidence 
in him, or submission to him. If God has no good and wise reasons for 
what he commands, why should we obey him ? If he has no good and 
wise reasons for what he does, why should we submit to him ? 

Will it be answered, that if we refuse, we do it at our peril, and, 
therefore, it is wise to do so, even if he has no good reasons for what he 
does and requires ? To this I answer that it is impossible, upon the 
supposition in question, either to obey or submit to God with the heart. 
If we can see no good reasons, but, on the other hand, are assured there 
are no good and wise reasons for the divine commands and conduct, it is 
rendered forever naturally impossible, from the laws of our nature, to 
render anything more than feigned obedience and submission. When- 
ever w T e do not understand the reason for a divine requirement, or of a 
dispensation of divine Providence, the condition of heart-obedience to 
the one and submission to the other, is the assumption that he has good 
and wise reasons for both. But assume the contrary, to wit, that he has 
no good and wise reasons for either, and you render heart-obedience, con- 
fidence, and submission impossible. It is perfectly plain, therefore, that 
he who consistently holds the theory in question, can neither conceive 
rightly of God, nor of anything respecting his law, gospel, or government, 
moral or providential. It is impossible for him to have an intelligent 
piety. His religion, if he have any, must be sheer superstition, inasmuch 
as he neither knows the true God, nor the true reason why he should 
love, believe, obey, or submit to him. In short, he neither knows, nor, 



84: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

if consistent, can know, anything of the nature of true religion, and has 
not so much as a right conception of what constitutes virtue. 

But do not understand me as affirming, that none who profess to 
hold the theory in question have any true knowledge of God, or any true 
religion. No, they are happily so purely theorists on this subject, and 
so happily inconsistent with themselves, as to have, after all, a practical 
judgment in favor of the truth. They do not see the logical conse- 
quences of their theory, and of course do not embrace them, and this 
happy inconsistency is an indispensable condition of their salvation. 

(4.) Another pernicious consequence of this theory is that those who 
hold it will of course give false directions to inquiring sinners. Indeed, 
if they be ministers, the whole strain of their instructions must be false. 
They must, if consistent, not only represent God to their hearers as an 
absolute and arbitrary sovereign, but they must represent religion as con- 
sisting in submission to arbitrary sovereignty. If sinners inquire what 
they must do to be saved, such teachers must answer in substance, that 
thev must cast themselves on the sovereignty of a God whose law is solely 
an expression of his arbitrary will, and whose every requirement and 
purpose is founded in his arbitrary sovereignty. This is the God whom 
they must love, in whom they must believe, and whom they must serve 
with a willing mind. How infinitely different such instructions are 
from those that would be given by one who knew the truth. Such an 
one would represent God to an inquirer as infinitely reasonable in all his 
requirements, and in all his ways. He would represent the sovereignty 
of God as consisting, not in arbitrary will, but in benevolence or love, 
directed by infinite knowledge in the promotion of the highest good of 
being. He would represent his law, not as the expression of his arbitrary 
will, but as having its foundation in the self-existent nature of God, and 
in the nature of moral agents ; as being the very rule which is agreeable 
to the nature and relations of moral agents ; that its requisitions are not 
arbitrary, but that the very thing, and only that, is required which is in 
the nature of things indispensable to the highest well-being of moral 
agents ; that God's will does not originate obligation by any arbitrary 
fiat, but on the contrary, that he requires what he does, because it is ob~ 
ligatorv in the nature of things ; that his requirement does not create 
right, but that he requires only that which is naturally and of necessity 
right. These and many such like things would irresistibly commend 
the character of God to the human intelligence, as worthy to be trusted, 
and as a being to whom submission is infallibly safe and infinitely 
reasonable. 

The fact is, the idea of arbitrary sovereignty is shocking and revolt- 
ing, not only to the human heart, whether unregenerate or regenerate, 
but also to the human intelligence. Religion, based upon such a view 



FOUNDATION OP OBLIGATION. 85 

of God's character and government, must be sheer superstition or gross 
fanaticism. 

2. I will next glance at the legitimate results of the theory of the self- 
ish school. 

This theory teaches that our own interest is the foundation of moral 
obligation. In conversing with a distinguished defender of this philoso- 
phy, I requested the theorist to define moral obligation, and this was the 
definition given : "It is the obligation of a moral agent to seek his own 
happiness." Upon the practical bearing of this theory I remark, — 

(1.) It tends directly and inevitably to the confirmation and despot- 
ism of sin in the soul. All sin, as we shall hereafter see, resolves itself 
into a spirit of self-seeking, or into a disposition to seek good to self, and 
upon condition of its relations to self, and not impartially and disinter- 
estedly. This philosophy represents this spirit of self-seeking as virtue, 
and only requires that in our efforts to secure our own happiness, we 
should not interfere with the rights of others in seeking theirs. But 
here it may be asked, when these philosophers insist that virtue consists 
in willing our own happiness, and that, in seeking it, we are bound to 
have respect to the rights and happiness of others, do they mean that we 
are to have a positive, or merely a negative regard to the rights and hap- 
piness of others ? If they mean that we are to have a positive regard to 
others' rights and happiness, what is that but giving up their theory, 
and holding the true one, to wit, that the happiness of each one shall be 
esteemed according to its intrinsic value, for its own sake ? That is, 
that we should be disinterestedly benevolent ? But if they mean that 
we are to regard our neighbor's happiness negatively, that is, merely in 
not hindering it, what is this but the most absurd thing conceivable ? 
What ! I need not care positively for my neighbor's happiness, I need 
not will it as a good in itself, and for its own value, and yet I must take 
care not to hinder it. But why ? Why, because it is intrinsically as 
valuable as my own. Now, if this is assigning any good reason why I 
ought not to hinder it, it is just because it is assigning a good reason 
why I ought positively and disinterestedly to will it ; which is the same 
thing as the true theory. But if this is not a sufficient reason to impose 
obligation, positively and disinterestedly, to will it, it can never impose 
obligation to avoid hindering it, and I may then pursue my own happi- 
ness in my own way without the slightest regard to that of any other. 

(2.) If this theory be true, sinful and holy beings are precisely alike, 
so far as ultimate intention is concerned, in which we have seen all moral 
character consists. They have precisely the same end in view, and the 
difference lies exclusively in the means they make use of to promote their 
own happiness. That sinners are seeking their own happiness, is a truth 



86 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of consciousness to them. If moral agents are under obligation to seek 
their own happiness as the supreme end of life, it follows, that holy beings 
do so. So that holy and sinful beings are precisely alike, so far as the 
end for which they live is concerned ; the only difference being, as has 
been observed, in the different means they make use of to promote this 
end. But observe, no reason can be assigned, in accordance with this 
philosophy, why they use different means, only that they differ in judg- 
ment in respect to them ; for, let it be remembered, that this philosophy 
denies that we are bound to have a positive and disinterested regard to 
our neighbor's interest ; and, of course, no benevolent considerations 
prevent the holy from using the same means as do the wicked. Where, 
therefore, is the difference in their character, although they do use this 
diversity of means ? I say again, there is none. If this difference be 
not ascribed to disinterested benevolence in one, and to selfishness in the 
other, there really is and can be no difference in character between 
them. According to this theory nothing is right in itself, but the in- 
tention to promote my own happiness ; and anything is right or wrong 
as it is intended to promote this result or otherwise. For let it be borne 
in mind that, if moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention 
only, it follows that ultimate intention alone is right or wrong in itself, 
and all other things are right or wrong as they proceed from a right or 
wrong ultimate intention. This must be true. 

Further, if my own happiness be the foundation of my moral obliga- 
tion, it follows that this is the ultimate end at which I ought to aim, 
and that nothing is right or wrong in itself, in me, but this intention or 
its opposite ; and furthermore, that everything else must be right or 
wrong in me as it proceeds from this, or from an opposite intention. I 
may do, and upon the supposition of the truth of this theory, I am 
bound to do, whatever will, in my estimation, promote my own happi-^ 
ness, and that, not because of its intrinsic value as a part of universal 
good, but because it is my own. To seek it as a part of universal hap- 
piness, and not because it is my own, would be to act on the true theory, 
or the theory of disinterested benevolence ; which this theory denies. 

(3.) Upon this theory I am not to love God supremely, and my 
neighbor as myself. If I love God and my neighbor, it is to be only as 
a means of promoting my own happiness, which is not loving them, 
but loving myself supremely. 

(4.) This theory teaches radical error in respect both to the charac- 
ter and government of God ; and. the consistent defenders of it cannot 
but hold fundamentally false views in respect to what constitutes holiness 
or virtue, either in God or man. They do not and cannot know the 
difference between virtue and vice. 

(5.) The teachers of this theory must fatally mislead all who consist- 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 87 

ently follow out their Instructions. In preaching, they must, if consist- 
ent, appeal wholly to hope and fear. All their instructions must tend 
to confirm selfishness. All the motives they present, if consistent, 
tend only to stir up a zeal within them to secure their own happiness. 
If they pray, it will only be to implore the help of God to accomplish 
their selfish ends. 

Indeed, it is impossible that this theory should not blind its advocates 
to the fundamental truths of morality and religion, and it is hardly 
conceivable that one could more efficiently serve the devil than by the 
inculcation of such a philosophy as this. 

3. Let us in the next place look into the natural and, if it's advocates 
are consistent, necessary results of utilitarianism. 

This theory, you know, teaches that the utility of an action or of 
a choice, renders it obligatory. That is, I am bound to will good, not 
for the intrinsic value of the good ; but because willing good tends to 
produce good — to choose an end, not because of the intrinsic value 
of the end, but because the willing of it tends to secure it. The absurd- 
ity of this theory has been sufficiently exposed. It only remains to 
notice its legitimate practical results. 

(1.) It naturally, and I may say, necessarily diverts the attention 
from that in which all morality consists, namely, the ultimate intention. 
Indeed, it seems that the abettors of this scheme must have in mind 
only outward action, or at most executive volitions, when they assert that 
the tendency of an action is the reason of the obligation to put it forth. 
It seems impossible that they should assert that the reason for choosing 
an ultimate end should or could be the tendency of choice to secure it. 
This is so palpable a contradiction, that it is difficult to believe that they 
have ultimate intention in mind when they make the assertion. An ulti- 
mate end is ever chosen for its intrinsic value, and not because choice tends 
to secure it. How, then, is it possible for them to hold that the tendency 
of choice to secure an ultimate end is the reason of an obligation to make 
that choice ? But if they have not their eye upon ultimate intention, 
when they speak of moral obligation, they are discoursing of that which is, 
strictly without the pale of morality. A consistent utilitarian, therefore 
cannot conceive rightly of the nature of morality or virtue. He cannot 
consistently hold that virtue consists in willing the highest well-being of 
God and of the universe as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, but 
must, on the contrary, confine his ideas of moral obligation to volitions 
and outward actions, in which there is strictly no morality, and withal 
assign an entirely false reason for these, to wit, their tendency to secure 
an end, rather than the value of the end which they tend to secure. 

This is the proper place to speak of the doctrine of expediency, a 



88 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

doctrine strenuously maintained by utilitarians, and as strenuously op- 
posed by rightarians. fit is this, that whatever is expedient is right, for 
the reason, that the expediency of an action or measure is the foundation 
of the obligation to put forth that action, or adopt that measure. It is 
easy to see that this is just equivalent to saying, that the utility of 
an action or measure is the reason of the obligation to put forth that 
action or to adopt that measure. But, as we have seen, utility, tend- 
ency, expediency, is only a condition of the obligation, to put forth 
outward action or executive volition, but never the foundation of the 
obligation — that always being the intrinsic value of the end to which 
the volition, action, or measure, sustains the relation of a means. I do 
not wonder that rightarians object to this, although I do wonder at the 
reason which, if consistent, they must assign for this obligation, to wit, 
that any action or volition, (ultimate intention excepted,) can be right 
or wrong in itself, irrespective of its expediency or utility. This is 
absurd enough,' and flatly contradicts the doctrine of rightarians them- 
selves, that moral obligation strictly belongs only to ultimate intention. 
If moral obligation belongs only to ultimate intention, then nothing but 
ultimate intention can be right or wrong in itself. And every thing 
else, that is, all executive volitions and outward actions must be right 
or wrong, (in the only sense in which moral character can be predicated 
of them,) as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate intention. 
This is the only form in which rightarians can consistently admit the 
doctrine of expediency, viz., that it relates exclusively to executive voli- 
tions and outward actions. And this they can admit only upon the 
assumption that executive volitions and outward actions have strictly no 
moral character in themselves, but are right or wrong only as, and 
because, they proceed necessarily from a right or wrong ultimate inten- 
tion. All schools that hold this doctrine, to wit, that moral obligation 
respects the ultimate intention only, must, if consistent, deny that any 
thing can be either right or wrong per se, but ultimate intention. 
Further, they must maintain, that utility, expediency, or tendency to 
promote the ultimate end upon which ultimate intention terminates, is 
always a condition of the obligation to put forth those volitions and 
actions that sustain to this end the relation of means. And still further, 
they must maintain, that the obligation to use those means must be 
founded in the value of the end, and not in the tendency of the means 
to secure it ; for unless the end be intrinsically valuable, the tendency 
of means to secure it can impose no obligation to use them. Tendency, 
utility, expediency, then, are only conditions of the obligation to use 
any given means, but never the foundation of obligation. The obliga- 
tion in respect to outward action is always founded in the value of 
the end to which this action sustains the relation of a means, and the 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 89 

obligation is condition ated upon the perceived tendency of the means to 
secure that end. ' Expediency can never have respect to the choice of an 
ultimate end, or to that in which moral character consists, to wit, 
ultimate intention. The end is to be chosen for its own sake. Ulti- 
mate intention is right or wrong in itself, and no questions of utility, 
expediency, or tendency, have any thing to do with the obligation to put 
forth ultimate intention, there being only one ultimate reason for this, 
namely, the intrinsic value of the end itself./ It is true, then, that what- 
ever is expedient is right, not for that reason, but only upon that condi- 
tion. The inquiry then, Is it expedient ? in respect to outward action, is 
always proper ; for upon this condition does obligation to outward action 
turn. But in respect to ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate 
end, an inquiry into the expediency of this choice or intention is never 
proper, the obligation being founded alone upon the perceived and 
intrinsic value of the end, and the obligation being without any condi- 
tion whatever, except the possession of the powers of moral agency, with 
the perception of the end upon which intention ought to terminate, 
namely, the good of universal being. But the mistake of the utilitarian, 
that expediency is the foundation of moral obligation, is fundamental, 
for, in fact, it cannot be so in any case whatever. I have said, and here 
repeat, that all schools that hold that moral obligation respects ultimate 
intention only, must, if consistent, maintain that perceived utility, 
expediency, etc., is a condition of obligation to put forth any outward 
action, or, which is the same thing, to use any means to secure the end 
of benevolence. Therefore, in practice or in daily life, the true doctrine 
of expediency must of necessity have a place. The railers against 
expediency, therefore, know not what they say nor whereof they affirm. 
It is, however, impossible to proceed in practice upon the utilitarian 
philosophy. This teaches that the tendency of an action to secure good, 
and not the intrinsic value of the good, is the foundation of the obliga- 
tion to put forth that action. But this is too absurd for practice. For, 
unless the intrinsic value of the end be assumed as the foundation of the 
obligation to choose it, it is impossible to affirm obligation to put forth 
an action to secure that end. The folly and the danger of utilitarianism 
is, that it overlooks the true foundation of moral obligation, and conse- 
quently the true nature of virtue or holiness. A consistent utilitarian 
cannot conceive rightly of either. 

The teachings of a consistent utilitarian must of necessity abound 
with pernicious error. Instead of representing virtue as consisting 
in disinterested benevolence, or in the consecration of the soul to the 
highest good of being in general, for its own sake, it must represent 
it as consisting wholly in using means to promote good : — that is, as 
consisting wholly in executive volitions and outward actions, which, 



90 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

strictly speaking, have no moral character in them. Thus consistent 
utilitarianism inculcates fundamentally false ideas of the nature of vir- 
tue. Of course it must teach equally erroneous ideas respecting the 
character of God — the spirit and meaning of his law — the nature of 
repentance — of sin — of regeneration — and, in short, of every practical 
doctrine of the Bible. 

4. Practical leavings and tendency of rightarianism. 

It will be recollected that this philosophy teaches that right is the 
foundation of moral obligation. With its advocates, virtue consists in will- 
ing the right for the sake of the right, instead of willing the good for the 
sake of the good, or more strictly, in willing the good for the sake of the 
right, and not for the sake of the good ; or, as we have seen, the founda- 
tion of obligation consists in the relation of intrinsic fitness existing 
between the choice and the good. The right is the ultimate end to be 
aimed at in all things, instead of the highest good of being for its own 
sake. From such a theory the following consequences must flow. I 
speak only of consistent rightarianism. 

(1.) If the rightarian theory is true, there is a law of right entirely dis- 
tinct from, and opposed to, the law of love or benevolence. The advo- 
cates of this theory often assume, perhaps unwittingly, the existence of 
such a law. They speak of multitudes of things as being right or wrong 
in themselves, entirely independent of the law' of benevolence. Nay, 
they go so far as to affirm it conceivable that doing right might neces- 
sarily tend to, and result in, universal misery ; and that, in such a case, 
we should be under obligation to do right, or will right, or intend right, 
although universal misery should be the necessary result. This assumes 
and affirms that right has no necessary relation to willing the highest 
good of being for its own sake, or, what is the same thing, that the law of 
right is not only distinct from the law of benevolence, but may be directly 
opposed to it ; that a moral agent may be under obligation to will as an 
ultimate end that which he knows will and must, by a law of necessity, 
promote and secure universal misery. Eightarians sternly maintain that 
right would be right, and that virtue would be virtue, although this re- 
sult were a necessary consequence. What is this but maintaining that 
moral law may require moral agents to set their hearts upon and conse- 
crate themselves to that which is necessarily subversive of the well-being 
of the entire universe ? And what is this but assuming that that may be 
moral law that requires a course of willing and acting entirely inconsistent 
with the nature and relations of moral agents ? Thus virtue and benevo- 
lence not only may be different but opposite things ; and benevolence may 
be sin. This is not only opposed to our reason, but a more capital or 
mischievous error in morals or philosophy can hardly be conceived. 



FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION. 91 

Nothing is or can be right, as an ultimate choice, but benevolence. 
Nothing can be moral law but that which requires that the highest well- 
being of God and of the universe should be chosen as an ultimate end. 
If benevolence is right, this must be self-evident. Rightarianism over- 
looks and misrepresents the very nature of moral law. Let any one con- 
template the grossness of the absurdity that maintains, that moral law 
may require a course of willing that necessarily results in universal and 
perfect misery. What then, it may be asked, has moral law to do with 
the nature and relations of moral agents, except to mock, insult, and 
trample them under foot ? Moral law is, and must- be, the law of nature, 
that is, suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. But can that 
law be suited to the nature and relations of moral agents that requires a 
course of action necessarily resulting in universal misery ? Rightarian- 
ism then, not only overlooks, but flatly contradicts, the very nature of 
moral law, and sets up a law of right in direct opposition to the law of 
nature. 

(2.) This philosophy tends naturally to fanaticism. Conceiving as it 
does of right as distinct from, and often opposed to, benevolence, it scoffs 
or rails at the idea of inquiring what the highest good evidently demands. 
It insists that such and such things are right or wrong in themselves, 
entirely irrespective of what the highest good demands. Having thus in 
mind a law of right distinct from, and perhaps, opposed to benevolence, 
what frightful conduct may not this philosophy lead to ? This is indeed 
the law of fanaticism. The tendency of this philosophy is illustrated in 
the spirit of many reformers, who are bitterly contending for the right, 
which, after all, is to do nobody any good. 

(3.) This philosophy teaches a false morality and a false religion. It 
exalts right above God, and represents virtue as consisting in the love of 
right instead of the love of God. It exhorts men to will the right for 
the sake of the right, instead of the good of being for the sake of the 
good, or for the sake of being. It teaches us to inquire, How shall I do 
right ? instead of, How shall I do good ? What is right ? instead of, 
What will most promote the good of the universe ? Now that which is 
most promotive of the highest good of being, is right. To intend the 
highest well-being of God and of the universe, is right. To use the 
necessary means to promote this end, is right ; and whatever in the use 
of means or in outward action is right, is so for this reason, namely, that 
it is designed to promote the highest well-being of God and of the uni- 
verse. But rightarianism points out an opposite course. It says : Will 
right for the sake of the right/ that is, as an end ; and in respect to 
means, inquire not what is manifestly for the highest good of being, for 
with this you have nothing to do ; your business is to will the right for 
the sake of the right. If you inquire how you are to know what is right, 



92 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

it does not direct you to the law of benevolence as the only standard, but 
it directs you to an abstract idea of right, as an ultimate rule, having no 
regard to the law of benevolence or love. It tells you that right is right, 
because it is right ; and not that right is conformity to the law of benevo- 
lence, and right for this reason. Now certainly such teaching is radi- 
cally false, and subversive of all sound morality and true religion. 

(4.) As we have formerly seen, this philosophy does not represent 
virtue as consisting in the love of God, or of Christ, or our neighbor. 
Consistency must require the abettors of this scheme to give fundamen- 
tally false instructions to inquiring sinners. Instead of representing God 
and all holy beings as devoted to the public good, and instead of exhort- 
ing sinners to love God and their neighbor, this philosophy must repre- 
sent God and holy beings as consecrated to right for the sake of the 
right ; and must exhort sinners, who ask what they shall do to be saved, 
to will the right for the sake of the right, to love the right, to deify 
right, and fall down and worship it. There is much of this false mor- 
ality and religion in the world and in the church. Infidels are great 
sticklers for this religion, and often exhibit as much of it as do some 
rightarian professors of religion. It % is a severe, stern, loveless, Godless, 
Christless philosophy, and nothing but happy inconsistency prevents its 
advocates from manifesting it in this light to the world. The law of 
right, when conceived of as distinct from, or opposed to, the law of 
benevolence, is a perfect strait-jacket, an iron collar, a snare of death. 

This philosophy represents all war, all slavery, and many things as 
wrong per se, without insisting upon such a definition of those things as 
necessarily implies selfishness. Any thing whatever is wrong in itself 
that includes and implies selfishness, and nothing else is or can be. All 
war waged for selfish purposes is wrong per se. But war waged for 
benevolent purposes, or war required by the law of benevolence, and en- 
gaged in with a benevolent design, is neither wrong in itself, nor wrong 
in any proper sense. All holding men in bondage from selfish motives 
is wrong in itself, but holding men in bondage in obedience to the law 
of benevolence is not wrong but right. And so it is with every thing 
else. Therefore, where it is insisted that all war and all slavery, or any 
thing else is wrong in itself, such a definition of things must be insisted 
on as necessarily implies selfishness. But consistent rightarianism will 
insist that all war, all slavery, and all of many other things, are wrong 
in themselves without regard to their being violations of the law of be- 
nevolence. This is consistent with such philosophy, but it is most false 
and absurd in fact. Indeed, any philosophy that assumes the existence 
of a law of right distinct from, and possibly opposed to, the law of 
benevolence, must teach many doctrines at war with both reason and 
revelation. It sets men in chase of a philosophical abstraction as the 



FOUNDATION OP OBLIGATION. 93 

supreme end of life, instead of the concrete reality of the highest well- 
being of God and the universe. It preys upon the human soul, and turns 
into solid iron all the tender sensibilities of our being. Do but contem- 
plate a human being supremely devoted to an abstraction, as the end of 
human life. He wills the right for the sake of the right. Or, more 
strictly, he wills the good of being, not from any regard to being, but 
because of the relation of intrinsic fitness or rightness existing between 
choice and its object. For this he lives, and moves, and has his being. 
What sort of religion is this ? I wish not to be understood as holding, 
or insinuating, that professed rightarians universally, or even generally, 
pursue their theory to its legitimate boundary, or that they manifest the 
spirit that it naturally begets. No, I am most happy in acknowledging 
that with many, and perhaps with most of them, it is so purely a theory, 
that they are not greatly influenced by it in practice. Many of them I 
regard as the excellent of the earth, and I am happy to count them 
among my dearest and most valued friends. But I speak of the philoso- 
phy, with its natural results, when embraced not merely as a theory, but 
when adopted by the heart as the rule of life. It is only in such cases 
that its natural and legitimate fruits appear. Only let it be borne in 
mind that right is conformity to moral law, that moral law is the law of 
nature, or the law founded in the nature and relations of moral agents, 
the law that requires just that course of willing and action that tends 
naturally to secure the highest well-being of all moral agents, that re- 
quires this course of willing and acting for the sake of the end in which 
it naturally and governmentally results, and requires that this end shall 
be aimed at or intended by all moral agents as the supreme good and the 
only ultimate end of life ; — I say, only let these truths be borne in mind, 
and you will never talk of a right, or a virtue, or a law, obedience to 
which necessarily results in universal misery ; nor will you conceive that 
such a thing is possible. 

5. Lastly, I come to the consideration of the practical hearings of ivhat 
1 regard as the true theory of the foundation of moral obligation, namely, 
that the intrinsic nature and value of the highest well-being of God and 
of the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation. 

Upon this philosophy I remark — 

That if this be true, the whole subject of moral obligation is per- 
fectly simple and intelligible ; so plain, indeed, that " the wayfaring 
man, though a fool, cannot err therein." 

Upon this theory, every moral agent knows in every possible instance 
what is right, and can never mistake his real duty. 

His duty is to will this end with all the known conditions and means 
thereof. Intending this end with a single eye, and doing what appears 



94 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

to him, with all the light he can obtain, to be in the highest degree cal- 
culated to secure this end, he really does his duty. If in this case he is 
mistaken in regard to what is the best means of securing this end, still, 
with a benevolent intention, he does not sin. He has done right, for he 
has intended as he ought, and acted outwardly as he thought was the 
.path of duty, under the best light he could obtain. This, then, was his 
duty. He did not mistake his duty ; because it was duty to intend as 
he intended, and under the circumstances, to act as he acted. How else 
should he have acted ? 

If a moral agent can know what end he aims at or lives for, he can 
know, and cannot but know, at all times, whether he is right or wrong. 
All that upon this theory a moral agent needs to be certain of is, whether 
he lives for the right end, and this, if at all honest, or if dishonest, he 
really cannot but know. If he would ask, what is right or what is duty 
at any time, he need not wait for a reply. It is right for him to intend 
the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does this, he cannot 
mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs the whole of duty. 
With this honest intention, it is impossible that he should not use the 
means to promote this end, according to the best light he has ; and this 
is right. A single eye to the highest good of God and the universe, is 
the whole of morality, strictly considered ; and, upon this theory, moral 
law, moral government, moral obligation, virtue, vice, and the whole 
subject of morals and religion are the perfection of simplicity. If this 
theory be true, no honest mind ever mistook the path of dut}^. To in- 
tend the highest good of being is right and is duty. No mind is honest 
that is not steadily pursuing this end. But in the honest pursuit of 
this end there can be no sin, no mistaking the path of duty. That 
is and must be the path of duty that really appears to a benevolent 
mind to be so. That is, it must be his duty to act in conformity with 
his honest convictions. This is duty, this is right. So, upon this 
theory, no one who is truly honest in pursuing the highest good 
of being, ever did or can mistake his duty in any such sense as to 
commit sin. 

I have spoken with great plainness, and perhaps with some severity, 
of the several systems of error, as I cannot but regard them, upon the 
most fundamental and important of subjects ; not certainly from any 
want of love to those who hold them, but from a concern, long cherished 
and growing upon me, for the honor of truth and for the good of being. 
Should any of you ever take the trouble to look into this subject, in its 
length and breadth, and read the various systems, and take the trouble 
to trace out their practical results, as actually developed in the opinions 
and practices of men, you certainly would not be at a loss to account for 
the theological and philosophical fogs that so bewilder the world. How 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 95 

can it be otherwise, while such confusion of opinion prevails upon the 
fundamental question of morals and religion ? 

How is it, that there is so much profession and so little real practical 
benevolence in the world ? Multitudes of professed Christians seem to 
have no conception that benevolence constitutes true religion ; that 
nothing else does; and that selfishness is sin, and totally incompatible 
with religion. They live on in their self-indulgences, and dream of heaven. 
This could not be, if the true idea of religion, as consisting in sympathy 
with the benevolence of God, was fully developed in their minds. 

I need not dwell upon the practical bearings of the other theories 
which I have examined ; what I have said may suffice, as an illustration 
of the importance of being well-established in this fundamental truth. 
It is affecting to see what conceptions multitudes entertain in regard to 
the real spirit and meaning of the law and gospel of God, and, conse- 
quently, of the nature of holiness. 

In dismissing this subject, I would remark, that any system of moral 
philosophy that does not correctly define a moral action, and the real 
ground of obligation, must be fundamentally defective. Nay, if consist- 
ent, it must be highly pernicious and dangerous. But let moral action 
be clearly and correctly defined, let the true ground of obligation be 
clearly and correctly stated ; and let both these be kept constantly in 
view, and such a system would be of incalculable value. It would be 
throughout intelligible, and force conviction upon every intelligent 
reader. But I am not aware that any such system exists. So far as I 
know, they are all faulty, either in their definition of a moral action, 
and do not fasten the eye upon the ultimate intention, and keep it there 
as being the seat of moral character, and that from which the character 
of all our actions is derived ; or they soon forget this, and treat mere 
executive acts as right or wrong, without reference to the ultimate in- 
tention. I believe they have all failed in not clearly defining the true 
ground of obligation, and, consequently, are faulty in their definition of 
virtue. 



LECTURE IX. 

UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 



CAH OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW BE PARTIAL ? 

1. What constitutes obedience to moral law ? 

We have seen in former lectures, that disinterested benevolence is all 
that the spirit of moral law requires ; that is, that the love which it re- 



96 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

quires to God and onr neighbor is good-willing, willing the highest good 
or well-being of God, and of being in general, as an end, or for its own 
sake ; that this willing is a consecration of all the powers, so far as they 
are under the control of the will, to this end. Entire consecration to this 
end must of course constitute obedience to the moral law. The next 
question is : Can consecration to this end be real, and yet partial in the 
sense of not being entire, for the time being ? This conducts us to the 
second proposition, namely, — 

2. That obedience cannot he partial in the sense that the subject ever 
does, or can, partly obey and partly disobey at the same time. 

That is, consecration, to be real, must be, for the time being, entire 
and universal. It will be seen that this discussion respects the simplicity 
of moral action, that is whether the choices of the will that have any 
degree of conformity to moral law, are always and necessarily wholly 
conformed or wholly disconf ormed to it. There are two distinct branches 
to this inquiry. 

(1.) The one is, Can the will at the same time make opposite choices ? 
Can it choose the highest good of being as an ultimate end, and at the 
same time choose any other ultimate end, or make any choices whatever 
inconsistent with this ultimate choice ? 

(2.) The second branch of this inquiry respects the strength or inten- 
sity of the choice. Suppose but one ultimate choice can exist at the same 
time, may not that choice be less efficient and intense than it ought to be ? 
Let us take up these two inquiries in their order. 

(1.) Can the will at the same time choose opposite and conflicting ul- 
timate ends ? While one ultimate end is chosen, can the will choose 
anything inconsistent with this end ? In reply to the first branch of this 
inquiry I observe, — 

(a) That the choice of an ultimate end is, and must be, the supreme 
preference of the mind. Sin is the supreme preference of self -gratifica- 
tion. Holiness is the supreme preference of the good of being. Can then 
two supreme preferences co-exist in the same mind ? It is plainly im- 
possible to make opposite choices at the same time, that is, to choose op- 
posite and conflicting ultimate ends. 

(b) All intelligent choice, as has been formerly shown, must respect 
ends or means. Choice is synonymous with intention. If there is a 
choice or intention, of necessity something must be chosen or intended. 
This something must be chosen for its own sake, or as an end, or for the 
sake of something else to which it sustains the relation of a means. To 
deny this were to deny that the choice is intelligent. But we are speak- 
ing of no other than intelligent choice, or the choice of a moral agent. 

(c) This conducts us to the inevitable conclusion — that no choice 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 97 

whatever can be made, inconsistent with the present choice of an ulti- 
mate end. The mind cannot choose one ultimate end, and choose at the 
6ame time another ultimate end. But if this cannot be, it is plain that 
it cannot choose one ultimate end, and at the same time, while in the 
exercise of that choice, choose the means to secure some other ultimate 
end, which other end is not chosen. But if all choice must necessarily 
respect ends or means, and if the mind can choose but one ultimate end 
at a time, it follows that, while in the exercise of one choice, or while in 
the choice of one ultimate end, the mind cannot choose, for the time be- 
ing, anything inconsistent with that choice. The mind, in the choice of 
an ultimate end, is shut up to the necessity of willing the means to ac- 
complish that end ; and before it can possibly will means to secure any 
other ultimate end, it must change its choice of an end. If, for example, 
the soul chooses the highest well-being of God and the universe as an ul- 
timate end, it cannot while it continues to choose that end, use or choose 
the means to effect any other end. It cannot, while this choice continues, 
choose self-gratification, or anything else as an ultimate end, nor can it 
put forth any volition whatever known to be inconsistent with this end. 
Nay, it can put forth no intelligent volition whatever that is not designed 
to secure this end. The only possible choice inconsistent with this end 
is the choice of another ultimate end. When this is done, other means 
can be used or chosen, and not before. This, then, is plain, to wit, that 
obedience to moral law cannot be partial, in the sense either that the 
mind can choose two opposite ultimate ends at the same time, or that it 
can choose one ultimate end, and at the same time use or choose means 
to secure any other ultimate end. It " cannot serve God and mammon." 
It cannot will the good of being as an ultimate end, and at the same time 
will self-gratification as an ultimate end. In other words, it cannot be 
selfish and benevolent at the same time. It cannot choose as an ultimate 
end the highest good of being, and at the same time choose to gratify self 
as an ultimate end. Until self-gratification is chosen as an end, the mind 
cannot will the means of self gratification. This disposes of the first 
branch of the inquiry. 

(2.) The second branch of the inquiry respects the strength or inten- 
sity of the choice. May not the choice of an end be real, and yet have 
less than the required strength or intensity ? The inquiry resolves itself 
into this : Can the mind honestly intend or choose an ultimate end, and 
yet not choose it with all the strength or intensity which is required, or 
with which it ought to choose it ? Now what degree of strength is de- 
manded ? By what criterion is this question to be settled ? It cannot be 
that the degree of intensity required is equal to the real value of the end 
chosen, for this is infinite. The value of the highest well-being of God 
and the universe is infinite. But a finite being cannot be under obliga- 
7 



08 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tion to exert infinite strength. The law requires him only to exert his 
own strength. But does he, or may he not, choose the right end, but 
with less than all his strength ? All his strength lies in his will ; the 
question, therefore, is, may he not will it honestly, and yet at the same 
time withhold a part of the strength of his will ? No one can presume 
that the choice can be acceptable unless it be honest. Can it be honest 
and yet less intense and energetic than it ought to be ? 

"We have seen in a former lecture that the perception of an end is a 
condition of moral obligation to choose that end. I now remark that, 
as light in respect to the end is the condition of the obligation, so the 
degree of obligation cannot exceed the degree of light. That is, the 
mind must apprehend the valuable as a condition of the obligation to 
will it. The degree of the obligation must be just equal to the mind's 
honest estimate of the value of the end. The degree of the obligation 
must vary as the light varies. This is the doctrine of the Bible and of 
reason. If this is so, it follows that the mind is honest when, and only 
when, it devotes its strength to the end in view, with an intensity just 
proportioned to its present light, or estimate of the value of that end. 

We have seen that the mind cannot will anything inconsistent with a 
present ultimate choice. If, therefore, the end is not chosen with an 
energy and intensity equal to the present light, it cannot be because a part 
of the strength is employed in some other choice. If all the strength is 
not given to this object, it must be because some part of it is voluntarily 
withholden. That is, I choose the end, but not with all my strength, or 
I choose the end, but choose not to choose it with all my strength. Is 
this an honest choice, provided the end appears to me to be worthy of all 
my strength ? Certainly it is not honest. 

But again : it is absurd to affirm that I choose an ultimate end, and 
yet do not consecrate to it all my strength. The choice of any ultimate 
end implies that that is the thing, and the only thing, for which we live 
and act ; that we aim at, and live for nothing else, for the time being. 
Now what is intended by the assertion, that I may honestly choose an ulti- 
mate end, and yet with less strength or intensity than I ought ? Is it 
intended that I can honestly choose an ultimate end, and yet not at every 
moment keep my will upon the strain, and will at every moment with 
the utmost possible intensity ? If this be the meaning, I grant that it 
may be so. But I at the same time contend, that the law of God does 
not require that the will, or any other faculty, should be at every mo- 
ment upon the strain, and the whole strength exerted at every moment. 
If it does, it is manifest that even Christ did not obey it. I insist that 
the moral law requires nothing more than honesty of intention, and 
assumes that honesty of intention will and must secure just that degree 
of intensity which from time to time, the mind in its best judgment 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 99 

sees to be demanded. The Bible everywhere assumes that sincerity or 
honesty of intention is moral perfection ; that it is obedience to the law. 
The terms sincerity and perfection in scripture language are synonymous. 
Uprightness, sincerity, holiness, honesty, perfection, are words of the 
same meaning in Bible language. 

Again, it seems to be intuitively certain that if the mind chooses its 
ultimate end, it must in the very act of choice consecrate all its time, and 
strength, and being, to that end ; and at every moment, while the choice 
remains, choose and act with an intensity in precise conformity with its 
ability and the best light it has. The intensity of the choice, and the 
strenuousness of its efforts to secure the end chosen, must, if the inten- 
tion be sincere, correspond with the view which the soul has of the im- 
portance of the end chosen. It does not seem possible that the choice 
or intention should be real and honest unless this is so. To will at every 
moment with the utmost strength and intensity, is not only impossible, 
but, were it possible to do so, could not be in accordance with the soul's 
convictions of duty. The irresistible judgment of the mind is, that the 
intensity of its action should not exceed the bound of endurance ; that 
the energies of both soul and body should be so husbanded, as to be able 
to accomplish the most good upon the whole, and not in a given mo- 
ment. 

But to return to the question : does the law of God require simply 
uprightness of intention ? or does it require not only uprightness, but 
also a certain degree of intensity in the intention ? Is it satisfied with 
simple sincerity or uprightness of intention, or does it require that the 
highest possible intensity of choice shall exist at every moment ? When 
it requires that we should love God with all the heart, with all the soul, 
with all the mind, and with all the strength, does it mean that all our 
heart, soul, mind, and strength, shall be consecrated to this end, and 
be used up, from moment to moment, and from hour to hour, according 
to the best judgment which the mind can form of the necessity and 
expediency of strenuousness of effort ? or does it mean that all the facul- 
ties of soul and body shall be at every moment on the strain to the utter- 
most ? Does it mean that the whole being is to be consecrated to, and 
used up for God with the best economy of which the soul is capable ? 
or does it require that the whole being be not only consecrated to God, 
but be used up without any regard to economy, and without the soul's 
exercising any judgment or discretion in the case ? In other words, is 
the law of God the law of reason, or of folly ? Is it intelligible and just 
in its demands ? or is it perfectly unintelligible and unjust ? Is it a law 
suited to the nature, relations, and circumstances, of moral agents ? or 
has it no regard to them ? If it has no regard to either, is it, can it be, 
moral law, and impose moral obligation ? It seems to me that the law 



100 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of God requires that all our power, and strength, and being, be honestly 
and continually consecrated to God, and held, not in a state of the 
utmost tension, but that the strength shall be expended and employed in 
exact accordance with the mind's honest judgment of what is, at every 
moment, the best economy for God. If this be not the meaning and the 
spirit of the law, it cannot be law, for it could be neither intelligible nor 
just. Nothing else can be a law of nature. What ! does, or can the 
command, " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with 
all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy strength," require that 
every particle of my strength, and every faculty of my being, shall be in 
a state of the utmost possible tension ? How long could my strength 
hold out, or my being last, under such a pressure as this ? What rea- 
son, or justice, or utility, or equity, or wisdom, could there be in such a 
commandment as this ? Would this be suited to my nature and rela- 
tions ? That the law does not require the constant and most intense 
action of the will, I argue- for the following reasons : — 

1. No creature in heaven or earth could possibly know whether he 
ever for a single moment obeyed it. How could he know that no more 
tension could possibly be endured ? 

2. Such a requirement would be unreasonable, inasmuch as such a 
state of mind would be unendurable. 

3. Such a state of constant tension and strain of the faculties could 
be of no possible use. 

4. It would be uneconomical. More good could be effected by a 
husbanding of the strength. 

5. Christ certainly obeyed the moral law ; and yet nothing is more 
evident than that his faculties were not always on the strain. 

Every one knows that the intensity of the will's action depends, and 
must depend, upon the clearness with which the value of the object chosen 
is perceived. It is perfectly absurd to suppose that the will should, or 
possibly can, act at all times with the same degree of intensity. As the 
mind's apprehensions of truth vary, the intensity of the will's action must 
vary, or it does not act rationally, and consequently not virtuously. The 
intensity of the actions of the will, ought to vary as light varies, and if 
it does not, the mind is not honest. If honest, it must vary as light and 
ability vary. 

That an intention cannot be right and honest in kind and deficient in 
the degree of intensity, I argue — 

1. From the fact that it is absurd to talk of an intention right in 
kind, while it is deficient in intensity. What does Tightness in kind 
mean ? Does it mean simply that the intention terminates on the proper 
object ? But is this the right kind of intention, when only the proper 
object is chosen, while there is a voluntary withholding of the required 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 101 

energy of choice ? Is this, can this be, an honest intention ? If so, what 
is meant by an honest intention ? Is it honest, can it be honest, volun- 
tarily to withhold from God and the universe what we perceive to be their 
due, and what we are conscious we might render ? It is a contradiction 
to call this honest. In what sense then may, or can, an intention be ac- 
ceptable in kind, while deficient in degree ? Certainly in no sense, un- 
less known and voluntary dishonesty can be acceptable. But again, let 
me ask, what is intended by an intention being deficient in degree of in- 
tensity ? If this deficiency be a sinful deficiency, it must be a known 
deficiency. That is, the subject of it must know at the time that his 
intention is in point of intensity less than it ought to be, or that he wills 
with less energy than he ought ; or, in other words, that the energy of 
the choice does not equal, or is not agreeable to, his own estimate of the 
value of the end chosen. But this implies an absurdity. Suppose I 
choose an end, that is, I choose a thing solely on account of its own in- 
trinsic value. It is for its value that I choose it. I choose it for its 
value, but not according to its value. My perception of its value led me 
to choose it ; and yet, while I choose it for that reason, I voluntarily with- 
hold that degree of intensity which I know is demanded by my own esti- 
mate of the value of the thing which I choose ! This is a manifest 
absurdity and contradiction. If I choose a thing for its value, this im- 
plies that I choose it according to my estimate of its value. Happiness, 
for example, is a good in itself. Now, suppose I will its existence im- 
partially, that is, solely on account of its intrinsic value ; now, does not 
this imply that every degree of happiness must be willed according to its 
real or relative value ? Can I will it impartially, for its own sake, for 
and only for its intrinsic value, and yet not prefer a greater to a less 
amount of happiness ? This is impossible. Willing it on account of its 
intrinsic value implies willing it according to my estimate of its intrinsic 
value. So, it must be that an intention cannot be sincere, honest, and 
acceptable in kind, while it is sinfully deficient in degree. 

As holiness consists in ultimate intention, so does sin. And as holi- 
ness consists in choosing the highest well-being of God and the good of 
the universe, for its own sake, or as the supreme ultimate end of pursuit ; 
so sin consists in willing, with a supreme choice or intention, self- 
gratification and self-interest. Preferring a less to a greater good, be- 
cause it is our own, is selfishness. All selfishness consists in a supreme 
ultimate intention. By an ultimate intention, as I have said, is intended 
that which is chosen for its own sake as an end, and not as a means to 
some other end. Whenever a moral being prefers or chooses his own 
gratification, or his own interest, in preference to a higher good, because 
it is his own, he chooses it as an end, for its own sake, and as an ultimate 
end, not designing it as a means of promoting any other and higher 



102 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

end, nor because it is a part of universal good. Every sin, then, consists 
in an act of will. It consists in preferring self-gratification, or self- 
interest, to the authority of God, the glory of God, and the good of the 
universe. It is, therefore, and must be, a supreme ultimate choice, or 
intention. Sin and holiness, then, both consist in supreme, ultimate, 
and opposite choices, or intentions, and cannot by any possibility, 
co-exist. 

Five suppositions may be made, and so far as I can see, only five, in 
respect to this subject. 

1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist 
in the same mind. 

2. It may be supposed, that the same act or choice may have a com- 
plex character, on account of complexity in the motives which induce it. 

3. It may be supposed, that an act or choice may be right, or holy in 
kind, but deficient in intensity or degree. Or — 

4. That the will, or heart, may be right, while the affections, or emo- 
tions, are wrong. Or — 

5. That there may be a ruling, latent, actually existing, holy prefer- 
ence, or intention, co-existing with opposing volitions. 

Now, unless one of these suppositions is true, it must follow that 
moral character is either wholly right or wholly wrong, and never partly 
right and partly wrong at the same time. And now to the examination. 

1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist 
in the same mind. 

It has been shown that selfishness and benevolence are supreme, ulti- 
mate, and opposite choices, or intentions. They cannot, therefore, by 
any possibility, co-exist in the same mind. 

2. The next supposition is, that the same act or choice may have a 
complex character, on account of complexity in the motives. On this 
let me say : — 

(1.) Motives are objective or subjective. An objective motive is 
that thing external to the mind that induces choice or intention. Sub- 
jective motive is the intention itself. 

(2.) Character, therefore, does not belong to the objective motive, or 
to that thing which the mind chooses ; but moral character is confined 
to the subjective motive, which is synonymous with choice or intention. 
Thus we say a man is to be judged by his motives, meaning that his char- 
acter is as his intention is. Multitudes of objective motives or considera- 
tions, may have concurred, directly or indirectly, in their influence to in- 
duce choice or intention ; but the intention or subjective motive is always 
necessarily simple and indivisible. In other words, moral character con- 
sists in the choice of an ultimate end, and this end is to be chosen for 
its own sake, else it is not an ultimate end. If the end chosen be the 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 103 

highest well-being of God and the good of the universe — if it be the will- 
ing or intending to promote and treat every interest in the universe, ac- 
cording to its perceived relative value, it is a right, a holy motive, or in- 
tention. If it be anything else, it is sinful. Now, whatever complexity 
there may have been in the considerations that led the way to this choice 
or intention, it is self-evident that the intention must be one, simple, 
and indivisible. 

(3.) Whatever complexity there might have been in those considera- 
tions that prepared the way to the settling down upon this intention, the 
mind in a virtuous choice has, and can have, but one ultimate reason for 
its choice, and that is the intrinsic value of the thing chosen. The high- 
est well-being of God, the good of the universe, and every good accord- 
ing to its perceived relative value, must be chosen for one, and only one 
reason, and that is the intrinsic value of the good which is chosen for its 
own sake. If chosen for any other reason, the choice is not virtuous. 
It is absurd to say, that a thing is good and valuable in itself, but may 
be rightly chosen, not for that but for some other reason — that God's 
highest well-being and the happiness of the universe are an infinite good 
in themselves, but are not to be chosen for that reason, and on their own 
account, but for some other reason. Holiness, then, must always consist 
in singleness of eye or intention. It must consist in the supreme disin- 
terested choice, willing, or intending the good of God and of the uni- 
verse, for its own sake. In this intention there cannot be any com- 
plexity. If there were, it would not be holy, but sinful. It is, there- 
fore, sheer nonsense to say, that one and the same choice may have a 
complex character, on account of complexity of motive. For that motive 
in which moral character consists, is the supreme ultimate intention, or 
choice. This choice, or intention, must consist in the choice of a thing 
as an end, and for its own sake. The supposition, then, that the same 
choice or intention may have a complex character, on account of com- 
plexity in the motives, is wholly inadmissible. 

If it be still urged, that the intention or subjective motive may be 
complex — that several things may be included in the intention, and be 
aimed at by the mind — and that it may, therefore, be partly holy and 
partly sinful — I reply : — 

(4.) If by this it be meant that several things may be aimed at or in- 
tended by the mind at the same time, I inquire what things ? — It is true, 
that the supreme, disinterested choice of the highest good of being, may 
include the intention to use all the necessary means. It may also in- 
clude the intention to promote every interest in the universe, according 
to its perceived relative value. These are all properly included in one 
intention ; but this implies no such complexity in the subjective motive, 
as to include both sin and holiness. 



10i SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(5.) If by complexity of intention is meant, that it may be partly dis- 
interestedly benevolent, and partly selfish, which it must be to be partly 
holy and partly sinful, I reply, that this supposition is absurd. It has 
been shown that selfishness and benevolence consist in supreme, ultimate, 
and opposite choices or intentions. To suppose, then, that an intention 
can be both holy and sinful, is to suppose that it may include two 
supreme, opposite, and ultimate choices or intentions, at the same time ; 
in other words, that I may supremely and disinterestedly intend to re- 
gard and promote every interest in the universe, according to its per- 
ceived relative value, for its own sake ; and at the same time, may su- 
premely regard my own self-interest and self -gratification, and in some 
things supremely intend to promote my selfish interests, in opposition to 
the interests of the universe and the commands of God. But this is 
naturally impossible. An ultimate intention, then, may be complex in 
the sense, that it may include the design to promote every perceived in- 
terest, according to its relative value ; but it cannot, by any possibility, 
be complex in the sense that it includes selfishness and benevolence, or 
holiness and sin. 

3. The third supposition is, that holiness may be right, or pure in 
kind, but deficient in degree. On this, I remark : — 

(1.) We have seen that moral character consists in the ultimate in- 
tention. 

(2.) The supposition, therefore, must be, that the intention may be 
right, or pure in kind, but deficient in the degree of its strength. 

(3.) Our intention is to be tried by the law of God, both in respect to 
its kind and degree. 

(4.) The law of God requires us to will, or intend the promotion of 
every interest in the universe, according to its perceived relative value, 
for its own sake ; in other words, that all our powers shall be supremely 
and disinterestedly devoted to the glory of God, and the good of the 
universe. 

(5.) This cannot mean, that any faculty shall at every moment be 
kept upon the strain, or in a state of utmost tension, for this would be 
inconsistent with natural ability. It would be to require a natural im- 
possibility, and therefore be unjust. 

(6.) It cannot mean that at all times, and on all subjects, the same 
degree of exertion shall be made ; for the best possible discharge of duty 
does not always require the same degree or intensity of mental or cor- 
poreal exertion. 

(7.) The law cannot, justly or possibly, require more than that the 
whole being shall be consecrated to God — that we shall fully and honestly 
will or intend the promotion of every interest, according to its perceived 
relative value, and according to the extent of our ability. 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 105 

(8.) Now the strength or intensity of the intention must, and ought, 
of necessity, to depend upon the degree of our knowledge or light in re- 
gard to any object of choice. If our obligation is not to be graduated by 
the light we possess, then it would follow, that we may be under obliga- 
tion to exceed our natural ability, which cannot be. 

(9.) The importance which we attach to objects of choice, and con- 
sequently the degree of ardor or in tenseness of the intention, must depend 
upon the clearness or obscurity of our view^s, of the real or relative value 
of the objects of choice. 

(10.) Our obligation cannot be measured by the views which God has 
of the importance of those objects of choice. It is a well-settled and gen- 
erally-admitted truth, that increased light increases responsibility, or 
moral obligation. No creature is bound to will any thing with the in- 
tenseness or degree of strength with which G-od wills it, for the plain 
reason, that no creature sees its importance or real value, as He does. 
If our obligation were to be graduated by God's knowledge of the real 
value of objects, we could never obey the moral law, either in this world 
or the world to come, nor could any being but God ever, by any possi- 
bility, meet its demands. 

The fact is, that the obligation of every moral being must be graduated 
by his knowledge. If, therefore, his intention be equal in its intensity 
to his views or knowledge of the real or relative value of different ob- 
jects, it is right. It is up to the full measure of his obligation ; and if 
his own honest judgment is not to be made the measure of his obliga- 
tion, then his obligation can exceed what he is able to know ; which 
contradicts the true nature of moral law, and is, therefore, false. 

If conscious honesty of intention,, both as it respects the kind and 
degree of intention, according to the degree of light possessed, be not 
entire obedience to moral law, then there is no being in heaven or earth, 
who can know himself to be entirely obedient ; for all that any being can 
possibly know upon this subject, is that he honestly wills or intends, in 
accordance with the dictates of his reason, or the judgment which he has 
of the real or relative value of the object chosen. No moral being can 
possibly blame or charge himself with any default, when he is conscious 
of honestly intending, willing, or choosing, and acting, according to 
the best light he has ; for in this case he obeys the law, as he under- 
stands it, and, of course, cannot conceive himself to be condemned by 
the law. 

Good-willing, or intending is, in respect to God, to be at all times 
supreme ; and in respect to other beings, it is to be in proportion to the 
relative value of their happiness, as perceived by the mind. This is 
always to be the intention. The volitions, or efforts of the will to pro- 
mote these objects, may vary, and ought to vary indefinitely in their in- 



106 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tensity, in proportion to the particular duty to which, for the time being, 
we are called. 

But further, we have seen that virtue consists in willing every good 
according to its perceived relative value, and that nothing short of this 
is virtue. But this is perfect virtue for the time being. In other words, 
virtue and moral perfection, in respect to a given act, or state of the will, 
are synonymous terms. Virtue is holiness. Holiness is uprightness. 
Uprightness is that which is just what, under the circumstances, it 
should be ; and nothing else is virtue, holiness, or uprightness. Virtue, 
holiness, uprightness, moral perfection — when we apply these terms to 
any given state of the will — are synonymous. To talk, therefore, of a 
virtue, holiness, uprightness, justice, right in kind, but deficient in de- 
gree, is to talk sheer nonsense. It is the same absurdity as to talk of 
sinful holiness, an unjust justice, a wrong Tightness, an impure purity, 
an imperfect perfection, a disobedient obedience. 

Virtue, holiness, uprightness, etc., signify a definite thing, and never 
anything else than conformity to the law of God. That which is not 
entirely conformed to the law of God is not holiness. This must be true 
in philosophy, and the Bible affirms the same thing. "Whosoever shall 
keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." 
The spirit of this text as clearly and as fully assumes and affirms the 
doctrine under consideration, as if it had been uttered with that design 
alone. 

4. The next supposition is, that the will, or heart, may be right, 
while the affections or emotions are wrong. Upon this I remark : 

(1.) That this supposition overlooks the very thing in which moral 
character consists. It has been shown that moral character consists in 
the supreme ultimate intention, of the mind, and that this supreme, dis- 
interested benevolence, good-willing or intention, is the whole of virtue. 
Now this intention originates volitions. It directs the attention of the 
mind, and therefore, produces thoughts, emotions, or affections. It 
also, through volition, produces bodily action. But moral character does 
not lie in outward actions, the movements of the arm, nor in the volition 
that moves the muscles ; for that volition terminates upon the action 
itself. I will to move my arm, and my arm must move by a law of 
necessity. Moral character belongs solely to the intention that produced 
the volition that moved the muscles to the performance of the outward 
act. So intention produces the volition that directs the attention of the 
mind to a given object. Attention, by a natural necessity, produces 
thought, affection, or emotion. Now thought, affection, or emotion, are 
all connected with volition, by a natural necessity ; that is, if the atten- 
tion is directed to an object, corresponding thoughts and emotions must 
exist, as a matter of course. Moral character no more lies in emotion, 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 107 

than in outward action. It does not lie in thought, or attention. It 
does not lie in the specific volition that directed the attention ; but in 
that intention, or design of the mind, that produced the volition, which 
directed the attention, which, again, produced the thought, which, again, 
produced the emotion. Now the supposition, that the intention may be 
right, while the emotions or feelings of the mind may be wrong, is the 
same as to say, that outward action may be wrong, while the intention 
is right. The fact is, that moral character is, and must be, as the in- 
tention is. If any feeling or outward action is inconsistent with the 
existing ultimate intention, it must be so in spite of the agent. But if 
any outward action or state of feeling exists, in opposition to the inten- 
tion or choice of the mind, it cannot, by any possibility, have moral 
character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral agent, he can- 
not be responsible for. Whatever he cannot control by intention, he 
cannot control at all. Everything for which he can possibly be respon- 
sible, resolves itself into his intention. His whole character, therefore, 
is, and must be, as his intention is. If, therefore, temptations, from 
whatever quarter they may come, produce emotions within him incon- 
sistent with his intention, and which he cannot control, he cannot be re- 
sponsible for them. 

(2.) As a matter of fact, although emotions, contrary to his inten- 
tions, may, by circumstances beyond his control, be brought to exist in 
his mind ; yet, by willing to divert the attention of the mind from the 
objects that produce them, they can ordinarily be banished from the 
mind. If this is done as soon as in the nature of the case it can be, there 
is no sin. If it is not done as soon as in the nature of the case it can be, 
then it is absolutely certain that the intention is not what it ought to be.: 
The intention is to devote the whole being to the service of God and the 
good of the universe, and of course to avoid every thought, affection, and 
emotion, inconsistent with this. While this intention exists, it is cer- 
tain that if any object be thrust upon the attention which excites thoughts 
and emotions inconsistent with our supreme ultimate intention, the at- 
tention of the mind will be instantly diverted from those objects, and 
the hated emotion hushed, if this is possible. For, while the intention 
exists, corresponding volitions must exist. There cannot, therefore, be a 
right state of heart or intention, while the emotions, or affections, of the 
mind are sinful. For emotions are in themselves in no case sinful, and 
when they exist against the will, through the force of temptation, the* 
soul is not responsible for their existence. And, as I said, the supposi- 
tion overlooks that in which moral character consists, and makes it to> 
consist in that over which the law does not properly legislate ; for love,, 
or benevolence, is the fulfilling of the law. 

But here it may be said, that the law not only requires benevolence, 



108 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

or good-willing, but requires a certain kind of emotions, just as it 
requires the performance of certain outward actions, and that therefore 
there may be a right intention where there is a deficiency, either in kind 
or degree of right emotion. To this I answer : — 

Outward actions are required of men, only because they are connected 
with intention, by a natural necessity. And no outward action is ever 
required of us, unless it can be produced by intending and aiming to do 
it. If the effect does not follow our honest endeavors, because of any 
antagonistic influence, opposed to our exertions, which we cannot over- 
come, we have, by our intentions, complied with the spirit of the law, 
and are not to blame that the outward effect does not take place. Just 
so with emotions. All we have power to do, is, to direct the attention 
of the mind to those objects calculated to secure a given state of emotion. 
If, from any exhaustion of the sensibility, or from any other cause beyond 
our control, the emotions do not arise which the consideration of that 
subject is calculated to produce, we are no more responsible for the 
absence or weakness of the emotion than we should be for' the want of 
power or weakness of motion in our muscles, when we willed to move 
them, provided that weakness was involuntary and beyond our control. 
The fact is, we cannot be blameworthy for not feeling or doing that 
which we cannot do or feel by intending it. If the intention then is 
what it ought to be for the time being, nothing can be morally 
wrong. 

5. The last supposition is, that a latent preference, or right intention, 
may co-exist with opposing or sinful volitions. I formerly supposed that 
this could be true, but am now convinced that it cannot be true, for 
the following reasons : 

(1.) Observe, the supposition is, that the intention or ruling prefer- 
ence may be right — may really exist as an active and virtuous state of 
mind, while, at the same time, volition may exist inconsistent with it. 

(2.) Now what is a right intention ? I answer : Nothing short of 
this — willing, choosing, or intending the highest good of God and of the 
universe, and to promote this at every moment, to the extent of our 
ability. In other words — right intention is supreme, disinterested 
benevolence. Now what are the elements which enter into this right 
intention ? 

(a.) The choice or willing of every interest according to its perceived 
intrinsic value. 

(b.) To devote our entire being, now and forever, to this end. This 
is right intention. Now the question is, can this intention co-exist with 
a volition inconsistent with it ? Volition implies the choice of some- 
thing, for some reason. If it be the choice of whatever can promote 
this supremely benevolent end, and for that reason, the volition is con- 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 109 

sistent with the intention ; but if it be the choice of something per- 
ceived to be inconsistent with this end, and for a selfish reason, then the 
volition is inconsistent with the supposed intention. But the question 
is, do the volition and intention co-exist ? According to the supposition, 
the will chooses, or wills, something for a selfish reason, or something 
perceived to be inconsistent with supreme, disinterested benevolence. 
Now it is plainly impossible, that this choice can take place while the 
opposite intention exists. For this selfish volition is, according to the 
supposition, sinful or selfish ; that is, something is chosen for its own 
sake, which is inconsistent with disinterested benevolence. But here 
the intention is ultimate. It terminates upon the object chosen for its 
own sake. To suppose, then, that benevolence still remains in exercise, 
and that a volition co-exists with it that is sinful, involves the absurdity 
of supposing, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same 
mind, or that the will can choose, or will, with a supreme preference or 
choice, two opposites at the same time. This is plainly impossible. 
Suppose I intend to go to the city of New York as soon as I possibly 
can. Now, if, on my way, I will to loiter needlessly a moment,. I neces- 
sarily relinquish one indispensable element of my intention. In willing 
to loiter, or turn aside to some other object for a day, or an hour, I 
must of necessity, relinquish the intention of going as soon as I possibly 
can. I may not design finally to relinquish my journey, but I must of 
necessity relinquish the intention of going as soon as I can. Now, 
virtue consists in intending to do all the good I possibly can, or in will- 
ing the glory of God and the good of the universe, and intending to pro- 
mote them to the extent of my ability. Nothing short of this is virtue. 
If at any time, I will something perceived to be inconsistent with this 
intention, I must, for the time being, relinquish the intention, as it 
must indispensably exist in my mind, in order to be virtue. I may not 
come to the resolution, that I will never serve God any more ; but I must 
of necessity relinquish, for the time being, the intention of doing my 
utmost to glorify God, if at any time I put forth a selfish volition. For 
a selfish volition implies a selfish intention. I cannot put forth a volition 
intended to secure an end until I have chosen the end. Therefore a holy 
intention cannot co-exist with a selfish volition. It must be, therefore, 
that in every sinful choice, the will of a holy being must necessarily drop the 
exercise of supreme, benevolent intention, and pass into an opposite state 
of choice ; that is, the agent must cease, for the time being, to exercise 
benevolence, and make a selfish choice. For, be it understood, that 
volition is the choice of a means to an end ; and of course a selfish voli- 
tion implies a selfish choice of an end. 

Having briefly examined the several suppositions that can be made in 
regard to the mixed character of actions, I will now answer a few objec- 



110 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tions ; after which, I will bring this philosophy, as briefly as possible, 
into the light of the Bible. 

Objection. Does a Christian cease to be a Christian, whenever he 
commits a sin ? I answer : 

1. Whenever he sins, he must, for the time being, cease to be holy. 
This is self-evident. Whenever he sins, he must be condemned ; he 
must incur the penalty of the law of God. If he does not, it must be 
because the law of God is abrogated. But if the law of God be abro- 
gated, he has no rule of duty ; consequently, he can neither be holy nor 
sinful. If it be said that the precept is still binding upon him, but that, 
with respect to the Christian, the penalty is forever set aside, or abro- 
gated, I reply, that to abrogate the penalty is to repeal the precept ; for 
a precept without penalty is no law. It is only counsel or advice. The 
Christian, therefore, is justified no longer than he obeys, and must be 
condemned when he disobeys ; or Antinomianism is true. Until he re- 
pents he cannot be forgiven. In these respects, then, the sinning Chris- 
tian and the unconverted sinner are upon precisely the same ground. 

2. In two important respects the sinning Christian differs widely from 
the unconverted sinner : 

(1.) In his relations to God. A Christian is a child of God. A sin- 
ning Christian is a disobedient child of God. An unconverted sinner is 
a child of the devil. A Christian sustains a covenant relation to God; 
such a covenant relation as to secure to him that discipline which tends 
to reclaim and bring him back, if he wanders away from God. "If his 
children forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments ; if they break 
my statutes and keep not my commandments ; then will I visit their 
transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes. Neverthe- 
less my loving-kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my 
faithfulness to fail. My covenant will I not break, nor alter the thing 
that is gone out of my lips." Ps. lxxxix. 30 — 34. 

(2.) The sinning Christian differs from the unconverted man, in the 
state of his sensibility. In whatever way it takes place, every Christian 
knows that the state of his sensibility in respect to the things of God, 
has undergone a great change. Now it is true, that moral character does 
not lie in the sensibility, nor in the will's obeying the sensibility. Nev- 
ertheless our consciousness teaches us, that our feelings have great power 
in promoting wrong choice on the one hand, and in removing obstacles 
to right choice on the other. In every Christian's mind there is, there- 
fore, a foundation laid for appeals to the sensibilities of the soul, that 
gives truth a decided advantage over the will. And multitudes of things 
in the experience of every Christian, give truth a more decided advan- 
tage over his will, through the intelligence, than is the case with uncon- 
verted sinners. 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. Ill 

Obj. Can a man be born again, and then be unborn ? I answer : 

If there were anything impossible in this, then perseverance would 
be no virtue. None will maintain, that there is anything naturally im- 
possible in this, except it be those who hold to physical regeneration. 
If regeneration consist in a change in the ruling preference of the mind, 
or in the ultimate intention, as we shall see it does, it is plain, that an 
individual can be born again, and afterwards cease to be virtuous. That 
a Christian is able to apostatize, is evident, from the many warnings ad- 
dressed to Christians in the Bible. A Christian may certainly fall into 
sin and unbelief, and afterwards be renewed, both to repentance and 
faith. 

Obj. Can there be no such thing as weak faith, weak love, and weak 
repentance ? I answer : 

If you mean comparatively weak, I say, yes. But if you mean weak, 
in such a sense as to be sinful, I say, no. Faith, repentance, love, and 
every Christian grace, properly so called, do and must consist in acts of 
will, and resolve themselves into some modification of supreme, disinter- 
ested benevolence. 

I shall, in a future lecture, have occasion to show the philosophical 
nature of faith. Let it suffice here to say, that faith necessarily depends 
upon the clearness or obscurity of the intellectual apprehension of truth. 
Faith, to be real or virtuous, must embrace whatever of truth is appre- 
hended by the intelligence for the time being. Various causes may 
operate to divert the intelligence from the objects of faith, or to cause 
the mind to perceive but few of them, and those in comparative 
obscurity. Faith may be weak, and will certainly and necessarily be 
weak in such cases, in proportion to the obscurity of the views. And 
yet, if the will or heart confides so far as it apprehends the truth, which 
it must do to be virtuous at all, faith cannot be weak in such a sense as 
to be sinful ; for if a man confides so far as he apprehends or perceives 
the truth, so far as faith is concerned he is doing his whole duty. 

Again, faith may be weak in the sense, that it often intermits and 
gives place to unbelief. Faith is confidence, and unbelief is the withr 
holding of confidence. It is the rejection of truth perceived. Faith is 
the reception of truth perceived. Faith and unbelief, then, are opposite 
states of choice, and can by no possibility co-exist. 

Faith may be weak also in respect to its objects. The disciples of our 
Lord Jesus Christ knew so little of him, were so filled with ignorance 
and the prejudices of education, as to have very weak faith in respect to 
the Messiahship, power, and divinity of their Master. He speaks of them 
as having but little confidence, and yet it does not appear that they did 
not implicitly trust him, so far as they understood him. And although, 
through ignorance, their faith was weak, yet there is no evidence, that 



112 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

when they had any faith at all they did not confide in whatever of truth 
they apprehended. 

But did not the disciples pray, "Increase our faith ?" I answer : 
Yes. And by this they must have intended to pray for instruction ; 
for what else could they mean ? Unless a man means this, when he 
prays for faith, he does not know what he prays for. Christ produces 
faith by enlightening the mind. When we pray for faith we pray for 
light. And faith, to be real faith at all, must be equal to the light we 
have. If apprehended truth be not implicitly received and confided in, 
there is no faith, but unbelief. If it be, faith is what it ought to be, 
wholly unmixed with sin. 

But did not one say to our Lord, " Lord, I believe, help thou my un- 
belief ;" thus implying, that he was in the exercise both of faith and 
unbelief at the same time ? I answer yes, but — 

1. This was not inspiration. 

2. It is not certain that he had any faith at all. 

3. If he had, and prayed understanding^, he meant nothing more 
than to ask for an increase of faith, or for such a degree of light as to 
remove his doubts in respect to the divine power of Christ. 

Again, it is objected that this philosophy contradicts Christian ex- 
perience. To this I reply, 

That it is absurd to appeal from reason and the Bible to empirical 
consciousness which must be the appeal in this case. Eeason and the 
Bible plainly attest the truth of the theory here advocated. What ex- 
perience is then to be appealed to, to set their testimony aside ? Why, 
Christian experience, it is replied. But what is Christian experience ? 
How shall we learn what it is ? Why surely by appealing to reason and 
the Bible. But these declare that if a man offend in one point, he does 
and must, for the time being, violate the spirit of the whole law. Noth- 
ing is or can be more express than is the testimony of both reason and 
revelation upon this subject. Here, then, we have the unequivocal 
decision of the only court of competent jurisdiction in the case ; and shall 
we befool ourselves by appealing from this tribunal to the court of em- 
pirical consciousness ? Of what does that take cognizance ? Why, of 
what actually passes in the mind ; that is, of its mental states. These 
we are conscious of as facts. But we call these states Christian experi- 
ence. How do we ascertain that they are in accordance with the law and 
gospel of God ? Why only by an appeal to reason and the Bible. Here, 
then, we are driven back to the court from which we had before appealed, 
whose judgment is always the same. 

Obj. But it is said, this theory seems to be true in philosophy, that 
is, the intelligence seems to affirm it, but it is not true in fact. 

Answer. If the intelligence affirms it, it must be true, or reason de- 



UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. 113 

ceives us. But if the reason deceives in this, it may also in other things. 
If it fails us here, it fails us on the most important of all questions. If 
reason gives false testimony, we can never know truth from error upon 
any moral subject. We certainly can never know what religion is or is 
not, if the testimony of reason can be set aside. If the reason cannot be 
safely appealed to, how are we to know what the Bible means ? for it is 
the faculty by which we get at the truth of the oracles of God. 

These are the principal objections to the philosophical view I have 
taken of the simplicity of moral action, that occur to my mind. I will 
now briefly advert to the consistency of this philosophy with the scrip- 
tures. 

1. The Bible every where seems to assume the simplicity of moral 
action. Christ expressly informed his disciples, that they could not serve 
God and mammon. Now by this he did not mean, that a man could not 
serve God at one time and mammon at another ; but that he could not 
serve both at the same time. The philosophy that makes it possible for 
persons to be partly holy and partly sinful at the same time, does make 
it possible to serve God and mammon at the same time, and thus flatly 
contradicts the assertion of our Saviour. 

2. James has expressly settled this philosophy, by saying, that " Who- 
soever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty 
of all." Here he must mean to assert, that one sin involves a breach of 
the whole spirit of the law, and is, therefore, inconsistent with any de- 
gree of holiness existing with it. Also, " Doth a fountain send forth at 
the same place sweet water and bitter ? Can the fig-tree, my brethren, 
bear olive-berries ? either a vine, figs ? So can no fountain both yield 
salt-water and fresh," James iii. 11, 12. In this passage he clearly 
affirms the simplicity of moral action ; for by the " the same place " he 
evidently means, the same time, and what he says is equivalent to say- 
ing, that a man cannot be holy and sinful at the same time. 

3. Christ has expressly taught, that nothing is regeneration, or virtue, 
but entire obedience, or the renunciation of all selfishness. " Except a 
man forsake all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple." 

4. The manner in which the precepts and threatenings of the Bible 
are usually given, shows that nothing is regarded as obedience, or virtue, 
but doing exactly that which God commands. 

I might go to great lengths in the examination of scripture testi- 
mony, but it cannot be necessary, or in these lectures expedient. I must 
close this lecture with a few inferences and remarks. 

1. It has been supposed by some, that the simplicity of moral action 
has been resorted to as a theory, by the advocates of entire sanctification 
in this life, as the only consistent method of carrying out their principle. 
To this I reply : — 



H4 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(1.) That this theory is held in common, both by those who hold 
and those who deny the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life. 

(2.) The truth of the doctrine of entire sanctification does not depend 
at all upon this philosophical theory for its support ; but may be estab- 
lished by Bible testimony, whatever the philosophy of holiness may be. 

2. Growth in grace consists in two things : — 

(1.) In the stability or permanency of holy, ultimate intention. 
(2.) In intensity or strength. As knowledge increases, Christians 
will naturally grow in grace, in both these respects. 

3. The theory of the mixed character of moral actions, is an emi- 
nently dangerous theory, as it leads its advocates to suppose, that in 
their acts of rebellion there is something holy, or, more strictly, there 
is some holiness in them, while they are in the known commission of sin. 

It is dangerous, because it leads its advocates to place the standard 
of conversion, or regeneration, exceedingly low — to make regeneration, 
repentance, true love to God, faith, etc., consistent with the known or 
conscious commission of present sin. This must be a highly dangerous 
philosophy. The fact is, regeneration, or holiness, under any form, is 
quite another thing than it is supposed to be, by those who maintain the 
philosophy of the mixed character of moral action. There can scarcely 
be a more dangerous error than to say, that while we are conscious of 
present sin, we are or can be in a state of acceptance with God. 

4. The false philosophy of many leads them to adopt a phraseology 
inconsistent with truth ; and to speak as if they were guilty of present 
sin, when in fact they are not, but are in a state of acceptance with God. 

5. It is erroneous to say that Christians sin in their most holy exer- 
cises, and it is as injurious and dangerous as it is false. The fact is, 
holiness is holiness, and it is really nonsense to speak of a holiness that 
consists with sin. 

6. The tendency of this philosophy is to quiet in their delusions 
those whose consciences accuse them of present sin, as if this could be 
true, and they, notwithstanding, in a state of acceptance with God. 

7. The only sense in which obedience to moral law can be partial is, 
that obedience may be intermittent. That is, the subject may some- 
times obey, and at other times disobey. He may at one time be selfish, 
or will his own gratification, because it is his own, and without regard 
to the well-being of God and his neighbor, and at another time will the 
highest well-being of God and the universe, as an end, and his own good 
in proportion to its relative value. These are opposite choices, or ulti- 
mate intentions. The one is holy ; the other is sinful. One is obedience, 
entire obedience, to the law of God ; the other is disobedience, entire dis- 
obedience, to that law. These, for aught we can see, may succeed each 
other an indefinite number of times, but co-exist they plainly cannot. 



OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. 115 

LECTURE X. 

OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. 

The government of God accepts nothing as virtue hut obedience to the 
law of God. 

But it may be asked, Why state this proposition ? Was this truth 
ever called in question ? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, 
though apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may reason- 
ably excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine- 
tenths of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments 
that are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. 
They maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that 
there is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God ; that all 
Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not 
one on earth obeys the moral law of God ; in short,- that God accepts as 
virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to his law. 
And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith, that obedience 
to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of heart. With 
this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic, or as a hypo- 
crite, any one who professes to obey the law ; and maintain that men 
may be, and are pious, and eminently so, who do not obey the law of 
God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be generally held by 
those who are styled orthodox Christians, must assume that there is some 
rule of right, or of duty, besides the moral law ; or that virtue, or true 
religion, does not imply obedience to any law. In this discussion I 
shall, — 

1. Attempt to shoiv that there can be no rule of right or duty but the 
moral laiu ; and, 

2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this 
law, and that the government of God acknoiuledges nothing else as virtue 
or true religion. 

1. There can be no rule of duty but the moral lata.* 

Upon this proposition I remark, — 

(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the 
law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will 
of God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes 
the course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and 
relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature 

* See ante, p. 5.— Exclusiveness. 



116 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. 
But if this is right, nothing else can be right. If this course is obliga- 
tory upon us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can 
possibly be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature 
and relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can 
be right. If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such 
truths. 

(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should he 
do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in 
his arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can he alter it, or introduce 
any other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything 
else right than to love him with all the heart, and our neighbor as our- 
selves ? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of faith 
has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is not 
made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from its 
very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law ; and love 
or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been said on 
a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can be, 
obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his 
nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. 
Nor can any being render anything more than this obligatory. Indeed, 
there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law. 
There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions, and 
in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us 
to the consideration of the second proposition, namely, — 

2. That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the 
moral law. 

That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law, 
will appear, if we consider, — 

(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion: 

(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than 
the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law : 

(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the 
law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God. 
"Therefore love is the fullilling of the law." " Though I speak with 
the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (love), I am 
become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the 
gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge ; and 
though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not 
charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the 
poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity 
(love), it profiteth me nothing." (1 Cor. xiii.) 

Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible, not only as constituting true 



OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. 117 

religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every form of true religion 
is only a form of love or benevolence. 

Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of 
selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to obedi- 
ence to it. 

Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth 
and the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and 
Christ. Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when 
we come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God 
is love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, 
or the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of him and of 
us. Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings. 
Justice, truthfulness, and every moral atttribute, is only benevolence 
viewed in particular relations. 

Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. 
That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense, 
virtue. 

A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to 
God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's account, 
is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of full or 
entire obedience at any moment ; that the gospel has somehow brought 
men, that is. Christians, into such relations, that God really accepts 
from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what his law re- 
quires ; that Christians are accepted and justified while they render at 
best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less at every 
moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as can well 
be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct in- 
quiries : — 

(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to dis- 
obey, the moral law at the same time ? 

(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present 
and full obedience to the moral law ? 

The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding 
lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral 
law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey, and 
partly disobey, at the same time. 

We will now attend to the second question, namely, — 

Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and 
full obedience to the moral law ? Or, in other words, Can he accept 
anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full 
obedience, or all that the law requires ? 

The term justification is used in two senses : 

(a) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless : 



118 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(i) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has 
sinned, as if he had not sinned. 

It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that 
Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted, 
and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short 
of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do not 
pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at 
every moment condemns them for present sin ; but that they are justified 
by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and personally right- 
eous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts, and in this sense justi- 
fies them when they are in the present commission of an indefinite amount 
of sin ; that grace accounts them righteous while, in fact, they are con- 
tinually sinning ; that they are fully pardoned and acquitted, while at the 
same moment committing sin, by coming entirely and perpetually short 
of the obedience which, under the circumstances the law of God requires. 
"While voluntarily withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is 
accepted, and the sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God 
accepts what the sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he volun- 
tarily withholds. This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, 
precisely what many hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose 
for discussion the following inquiries, as of fundamental importance. 

1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every 
moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be 
accepted and justified ? 

This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully 
withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how great a 
part may we withhold ? If we may love God with less than all our 
hearts,, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted, how much 
less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbor, will be 
accepted ? 

Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our 
neighbor will be accepted ? But what is true love to God and our 
neighbor ? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not 
what is required ? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted, 
then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be accepted. 
We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be in a state 
of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our neighbor a 
little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our neighbors, and 
yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God must be loved 
supremely ? But what is intended by this ? Is supreme love a loving 
with all the heart ? But this is full and not partial obedience ; yet 
the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or is supreme 
love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree of love than 






OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. 119 

we exercise toward any other being ? But how much greater must it be ? 
Barely a little ? How are we to measure it ? In what scale are we to 
weigh, or by what standard are we to measure, our love, so as to know 
whether we love God a little more than any other being ? But how much 
are we to love our neighbor, in order to our being accepted ? If we may 
love him a little less than ourselves, how much less, and still be justified ? 
These are certainly questions of vital importance. But such questions 
look like trifling. Yet why should they ? If the theory I am examin- 
ing be true, these questions must not only be asked, but they must admit 
of a satisfactory answer. The advocates of the theory in question are 
bound to answer them. And if they cannot, it is only because their 
theory is false. Is it possible that their theory should be true, and yet 
no one be able to answer such vital questions as these just proposed ? 
If a partial obedience can be accepted, it is a momentous question, how 
partial, or how complete must that obedience be ? I say again, that this 
is a question of agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in 
the dark here. But again, 

2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that 
which would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which 
we do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin 
for which we are forgiven ? 

The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this 
world, yield a full obedience to the divine law ; that they always with- 
hold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very act 
of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God and their 
neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services, fully forgives 
and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and pertina- 
cious rebellion ! Eeceiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch ! Forgiving 
a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in ! Yes, this must be, if 
•it be true that Christians are justified without present full obedience. 
That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents God as receiv- 
ing to favor a rebel who has one hand filled with weapons against his 
throne. 

3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the uni- 
verse, by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul ? Can God 
be honored by such a proceeding ? Will the holy universe respect, fear, 
and honor God for such a proceeding ? Does it, can it, commend itself 
to the intelligence of the universe ? Will pardon and justification save 
the sinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his 
heart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins ? Can heaven 
be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such a method 
of justification ? 

4. But again : Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of ; 



120 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a 
question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire : Has 
God, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily ? Is there not some 
course of conduct which is suitable to him ? Has he not given us intelli- 
gence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the propriety 
of his public acts ? Does he not invite and require scrutiny ? Why has 
he required an atonement for sin, and why has he required repentance 
at all ? Who does not know that no executive magistrate has a right to 
pardon sin unrepented of ? The lowest terms upon which any ruler can 
exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same thing, a return to 
obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a rebel's being par- 
doned, while he only renounced a part of his rebellion ? To pardon him 
while any part of his rebellion is persevered in, were to sanction hy a 
public act that which is lacking in his repentance. It were to pronounce 
a public justification of his refusal to render full obedience. 

5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the 
sin of withholding a part of our hearts from him ? 

God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire him to 
forgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness. 
While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we cannot profess 
penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And shall God 
forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even profess repentance ? 
To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease from sin, is a gross 
insult to God. 

6. But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while 
unrepented of ? Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is rep- 
resented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully for- 
saken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this always 
stands revealed, expressly or impliedly, on every page of divine inspiration. 

7. Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin ? W T here 
is such a passage to be found ? Does not the law condemn sin, in every 
degree of it ? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose 
heart the vile abomination is found ? If a soul can sin, and yet not be 
condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely, if 
the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most 
unequivocally teaches this : " If any man keep the whole law, and yet 
offend in one point, he is guilty of all." What is this but asserting, 
that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be unavailing, since 
the law would condemn for any degree of sin ; that partial obedience, 
did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable obedience at all ? The 
doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense that the law is not at any 
time fully obeyed, is accepted of God, is sheer antinomianism. What ! 
a sinner justified while indulging in rebellion against God ! 



OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. 121 

•But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must 
intend fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification ; that, in his 
purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin ; that nothing short 
of perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is 
intended by this language ? We have seen in former lectures, that moral 
character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then, perfection of 
intention be an indispensable condition of justification, what is this, but 
an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a condition of 
justification ? But this is what we hold, and they deny. What then 
can they mean ? It is of importance to ascertain what is intended by 
the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a sinner can- 
not be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes and intends to 
abandon all sin, and to live without sin ; unless he seriously intends 
to render full obedience to all the commands of God. Intends to obey 
the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why, love, good- 
willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is intending to 
intend, willing to will, choosing to choose ! This is absurd. 

What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition 
of justification ? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only 
an intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be in- 
tended, to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. 
Unless he intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full obe- 
dience to the law ; that he intends to live without sin. The supposition 
is, that he is now sinning ; that is, for nothing else is sin, voluntarily 
"withholding from God and man their due. He chooses, wills, and 
intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same time he 
chooses, wills, intends, fully to obey the law. What is this but the 
ridiculous assertion, that he at the same time intends full obedience to 
the law, and intends not fully to obey, but only to obey in part, volun- 
tarily withholding from God and man their dues. 

But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in 
him ? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless 
the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while there 
is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can he 
be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense, while 
sin, any degree of sin, remains in him ? Certainly not. For the law, 
unless it be repealed, continues to condemn him while there is any 
degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both be 
pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the time 
coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which the 
law is not uttering its curses against him. " Cursed is every one that 
continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do 
them." The fact is, there never has been, and there never can be, any 



122 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

such thing as sin without condemnation. "Beloved, if our heart con- 
demn us, God is greater than our heart ;" that is, he much more 
condemns us. " But if our heart condemn us not, then have we confi- 
dence towards God." God cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in 
his arbitrary will. It is as unalterable and unrepealable as his own 
nature. God can never repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ's sake, 
dispense with the execution of the penalty, when the subject has 
returned to full present obedience to the precept, but in no other case, 
and upon no other possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is to 
affirm that God can alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral 
law and moral government. 

8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial repent- 
ance of sin ? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to 
present full obedience to the law of God ? 

To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to 
choose a new end, — to begin a new life, — to turn from self seeking to 
seeking the highest good of being, — to turn from selfishness to disinter- 
ested benevolence, — from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience. 
Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply 
a thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart 
consists in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a 
former lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist, at the 
same time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite 
ends. These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of 
partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to overlook 
the very nature of repentance. What ! a man both turn away from, and 
hold on to sin at the same time ! Serve God and mammon at one 
and the same time ! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed both 
by reason and by Christ. But perhaps it will be objected, that the sin 
of those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God pardons 
and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the inquiry : — 

9. Can there be any other than voluntary sin ? 

What is sin ? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires 
benevolence, good-willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing, 
but consists in willing self -gratification. It is a willing contrary to the 
commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in choosing, 
willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary ; that is, it must be intelligent 
and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that 
sin is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary 
sin. Benevolence is willing the good of being in general, as an end, and, 
of course, implies the rejection of self-gratification, as an end. So sin is 
the choice of self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the 
rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness, 



OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. 123 

naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal oppositcs 
and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of the other in 
the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be 
no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice. 

10. Must not present sin be sin unrepented of ? 

Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that 
present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking 
both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin is selfish will- 
ing ; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These 
two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly co-exist. Who- 
ever, then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of God, 
is voluntarily sinning against God, and is impenitent. It is nonsense to 
say, that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent ; that he is penitent 
so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he disobeys. This really 
seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man can be partly penitent, 
and partly impenitent at the same time. This idea, doubtless, is founded 
on the mistake, that repentance consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phe- 
nomenon of the sensibility. But repentance consists in a change of 
ultimate intention — a change in the choice of an end — a turning from 
selfishness to supreme disinterested benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly 
impossible for one to be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the 
same time ; inasmuch as penitence and impenitence consist in supreme 
opposite choices. 

So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the gov- 
ernment of God, but present full obedience to his law. 

REMARKS. 

1. If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen 
into a great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present 
sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this life. 
If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very beginning 
of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin 
ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must that 
error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in conscious 
sin ; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in this world ; 
that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning, even for an hour 
or a moment, in this world ; and yet to hope for heaven ! 

2. How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated 
upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer ; that one may 
be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of 
more or less sin ! This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the 
universalism that ever cursed the world. 

3. We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die 



121 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

in his sin, he must sink to hell. Whenever a Christian sins he comes 
under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be lost. 



LECTURE XL 

OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW. 

We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in 
the single word, love; that this word is synonymous with benevolence ; 
that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of God 
and of the universe, as an end, or for its own sake ; that this choice is an 
ultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good- will to being in 
general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question before us is, 
what is not implied in this good-will, or in this benevolent ultimate in- 
tention ? 

Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and 
the only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and 
what is, implied in entire sanctification, is to be decided, it is of funda- 
mental importance, that we understand what is, and what is not, implied 
in entire obedience to this law. Our judgment of our own state, or of 
the state of others, can never be relied upon, till these inquiries are 
settled. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were the notions of the 
Jews, in regard to what constituted perfection, that they thought him 
possessed with a devil, instead of being holy, as he claimed to be. I will 
state then, what is not implied in entire obedience to the moral law, as I 
understand it. The law, as epitomized by Christ, " Thou shalt love the 
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy 
mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself," — I un- 
derstand to lay down the whole duty of man to God, and to his fellow 
creatures. Now, the questions are, what is not, and what is, implied in 
perfect obedience to this law ? 

1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of 
the soul or body, for this the law does not require ; and it would not be 
obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent with 
natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the entire 
consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not imply any 
change in them, but simply the right use of them. 

2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of 
character, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is noth- 
ing, certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional traits 



OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. 125 

to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly directed in 
their exercise. 

3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional 
appetites or- susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that the 
constitutional appetites and susceptibilities are in themselves sinful, and 
that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies their entire 
annihilation. I have been not»a little surprised to find, that some per- 
sons who, I had supposed, were far enough from embracing the doctrine 
of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to this assumption, 
in order to set aside the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life. But 
let us appeal to the law. Does the law anywhere, expressly or impliedly, 
condemn the constitution of man, or require the annihilation of any 
thing that is properly a part of the :onstitution itself ? Does it require 
the annihilation of the appetite for food, or is it satisfied merely with 
regulating its indulgence ? In short, does the law of God any where 
require any thing more than the consecration of all the powers, appetites, 
and susceptibilities of body and mind to the service of God ? 

4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural affec- 
tion, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that certain 
persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to have had a 
natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean, that, from 
the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to injustice or ill- 
treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge ourselves is 
consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to the law of God 
does not imply that we should have no sense of injury and injustice, 
when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have it, and so has 
every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself, does not imply, 
that if he injure you, you should feel no sense of the injury or injustice, 
but that you should love him and do him good, notwithstanding his 
injurious treatment. 

5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind. 
Moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical law. 
God's laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral law 
cannot require such a state of constant mental excitement as will destroy 
the physical constitution. It cannot require any more mental excite- 
ment than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and circumstances 
of both soul and body. It does not imply that any organ or faculty is 
to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its capacity. This would 
soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ of the body. Whatever 
may be true of the mind, when separated from the body, it is certain, 
while it acts through a material organ, that a constant state of excite- 
ment is impossible. When the mind is strongly excited, there is of 
necessity a great determination of blood to the brain, A high degree of 



126 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

excitement cannot long continue, without producing inflammation of the 
brain, and consequent insanity. And the law of God does not require 
any degree of emotion, or mental excitement, inconsistent with life and 
health. Oar Lord Jesus Christ does not appear to have been in a state 
of continual mental excitement. When he and his disciples had been 
in a great excitement for a time, they would turn aside, "and rest a 
while." 

Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that 
the high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in revivals 
of religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must become 
deranged ? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a high degree 
of excitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public and individual 
attention, and draw off people from other pursuits, to attend to the con- 
cerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high degree of excite- 
ment is either necessary or desirable, or possible to be long continued, 
they have not well considered the matter. And here is one grand mis- 
take of the church. They have supposed that the revival consists mostly 
in this state of excited emotion, rather than in conformity of the human 
will to the law of God. Hence, when the reasons for much excitement 
have ceased, and the public mind begins to grow more calm, they begin 
immediately to say, that the revival is on the decline ; when, in fact, 
with much less excited emotion, there may be vastly more real religion 
in the community. Excitement is often important and indispensable, 
but the vigorous actings of the will are infinitely more important. And 
this state of mind may exist in the absence of highly excited emotions. 

Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or intel- 
lectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not need the same 
strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they are not pro- 
duced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth as strong 
.a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames of a burning 
house ? Should a mother, watching over her sleeping nursling, when all 
is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful volitions, as might be required 
to snatch it from the devouring flames ? Now, suppose that she were 
equally devoted to God, in watching her sleeping babe, and in rescuing 
it from the jaws of death. Her holiness would not consist in the fact, 
that she exercised equally strong volitions, in both cases ; but that in 
both cases the volition was equal to the accomplishment of the thing re- 
quired to be done. So that persons may be entirely holy, and yet con- 
tinually varying in the strength of their affections, emotions, or volitions, 
according to their circumstances, the state of their physical system, and 
the business in which they are engaged. 

All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and dis- 
posal of God. Just so much of physical., intellectual, and moral energy 



OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. 127 

are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature and the 
circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from the 
truth than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of emo- 
tion and mental action, on any and every subject alike. 

6. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the 
direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible in 
the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to think of 
or love our neighbor as ourselves. 

The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is 
meant that the mind's supreme preference should be of God — that God 
should be the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of mind 
is perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary business 
of life — giving to that business that attention, and exercising about it all 
those affections and emotions, which its nature and importance demand. 

If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the pro- 
motion of his glory, if his eye be single, his affections and conduct, so 
far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy when necessarily 
engaged in the right transaction of his business, although, for the time 
being, neither his thoughts nor affections are upon God ; just as a man, 
who is intensely devoted to his family, may be acting consistently with 
his supreme affection, and rendering them the most important and per- 
fect service, while he does not think of them at all. The moral heart is 
the mind's supreme preference. The natural heart propels the blood 
through all the physical system. Now there is a striking analogy be- 
tween this and the moral heart. And the analogy consists in this, that 
as the natural heart, by its pulsations, diffuses life through the physical 
system, so the moral heart, or the supreme governing preference,, or ulti- 
mate intention of the mind, is that which gives life and character to 
man's moral actions. For example, suppose that I am engaged in teach- 
ing mathematics ; in this, my ultimate intention is to glorify God in this 
particular calling. Now in demonstrating some of its intricate proposi- 
tions, I am obliged, for hours together, to give the entire attention of my 
mind to that object. While my mind is thus intensely employed in 
one particular business, it is impossible that I should have any thoughts 
about God, or should exercise any direct affections, or emotions, or voli- 
tions, towards him. Yet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is 
excluded, and my supreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a 
state of entire obedience, even though, for the time being, I do not 
think of God. 

It should be understood, that while the supreme preference or inten- 
tion of the mind has such efficiency as to exclude all selfishness, and to 
call fortli just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and emotion, 
that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty to which the mind 



12S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

may be called, the heart is in a right state. By a suitable degree of 
thought and feeling, to the right discharge of duty, I mean just that in- 
tensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature and importance 
of the particular dut} r , to which, for the time being, I am called, demand, 
in my houest estimation. 

In making this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain 
together with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that the 
requisite amount of thought, feeling, etc., are possible. If the physical 
constitution be in such a state of exhaustion, as to be unable to put forth 
that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might otherwise 
demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far below the im- 
portance of the subject, would be all that the law of God requires. 
"Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire obedience implies a 
state of entire abstraction of mind from everything but God, labors under 
a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as inconsistent with duty, 
as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh. 

The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have been and 
generally are, grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what they 
never did, or can, mean, consistently with natural justice. Many a 
mind has been thrown open to the assaults of Satan, and kept in a state 
of continual bondage and condemnation, because God was not, at all 
times, the direct object of thought, affection, and emotion ; and because 
the mind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and excited to the 
utmost at every moment. 

7. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ 
was not in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of his mind was 
never broken up, but the surface or emotions of his mind were often m 
a state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of great calm- 
ness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have his history in tK 
Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken. For example^ 
Christ had all the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities of human 
nature. Had it been otherwise, he could not have been " tempted in all 
points like as we are ;" nor could he have been tempted in any point as 
we are, any further than he possessed a constitution similar to our own. 
Christ also manifested natural affection for his mother and for other 
friends. He also showed that he had a sense of injury and injustice, and 
exercised a suitable resentment when he was injured and persecuted. 
He was not always in a state of great excitement. He appears to have 
had his seasons of excitement and of calm — of labor and rest— of joy and 
sorrow, like other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obe- 
dience to the law, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, 
and as if every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of 
love to God, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often mani- 



OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. 129 

fested a great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. 
In short, his history would lead to the conclusion that his calmness and 
excitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case. 
And although he was sometimes so pointed and severe in his reproof, as 
to be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet his emotions and feelings 
were only those that were called for, and suited to the occasion. 

8. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without 
any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners. Anger at sin is only a 
modification of love to being in general. A sense of justice, or a dis- 
position to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the government, 
is only another of the modifications of love. And such dispositions are 
essential to the existence of love, where the circumstances call for their 
exercise. It is said of Christ, that he was angry. He often manifested 
anger and holy indignation. " God is angry with the wicked everyday." 
And holiness, or a state of obedience, instead of being inconsistent with, 
always implies, the existence of anger, whenever circumstances occur 
which demand its exercise. 

9. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no 
sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love. 
Justice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is 
another of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings,, exer- 
cise all those dispositions that constitute the different modifications of 
love, under every possible circumstance. 

10. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike, irre- 
spective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being may 
have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more importance 
to the universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of love require 
us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all beings and things 
according to their nature, relations, circumstances, and value. 

11. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations. Such 
an interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to 
yield obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in us 
the possession of the attribute of omniscience ; for certainly there is not 
a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation. And 
a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite knowledge. It 
is plain that the law of God cannot require any such thing as this. 

12. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject what- 
ever. It is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to 
every man perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt 
him from any mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but 
w r ould merely say, the law does not expressly or impliedly require infalli- 
bility of judgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use we 
can of all the light we have. 



130 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

13. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge we might have 
possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The law 
cannot require us to love God or man, as well as we might have been able 
to love the::', had we always improved all our time in obtaining all the 
knowledge we could, in regard to their nature, character, and interests. 
If this were implied in the requisition of the law, there is not a saint on 
earth or in heaven that does, or ever can, perfectly obey. What is lost in 
this respect is lost, and past neglect can never be so remedied, that we 
shall ever be able to make up in our acquisitions of knowledge what we 
have lost. It will no doubt be true to all eternity, that we shall have 
less knowledge than we might have possessed, had we filled up all our 
time in its acquisition. We do not, cannot, nor shall we ever be able 
to, love God as well as we might have loved him, had we always applied 
our minds to the acquisition of knowledge respecting him. And if en- 
tire obedience is to be understood as implying that we love God as much 
as we should, had we all the knowledge we might have had, then I re- 
peat it, there is not a saint on earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that 
is entirely obedient. 

14. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have 
rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or sup- 
pose, that our powers are in a perfect state ; that our strength of body 
or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. Bat it sim- 
ply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of the 
law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demand only to the full 
amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral be- 
ing, however great or small. 

The most perfect development and improvement of our powers, 
must depend upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure 
from their perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development, 
and a curtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and 
best manner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and 
curtailing the powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so 
much, incapable of performing the service they might otherwise have 
rendered. 

To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught 
an opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed his feet with 
her tears, when he said, " To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth 
much." But can it be that Christ intended to be understood as teach- 
ing, that the more we sin the greater will be our love, and our ultimate 
virtue ? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that the more 
sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If our virtue is 
really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would not be good 
economy, both for God and man, to sin as much as we can while in this 



OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. 131 

world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such principle as this. 
He undoubtedly meant to teach that a person who was truly sensible 
of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the love of gratitude 
than would be exercised by one who had a less affecting sense of ill-desert. 

15. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that 
might have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin. We 
cannot believe anything about God of which we have neither evidence 
nor knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intel- 
lectual perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation 
to believe in Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have 
no knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith 
than in a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more 
and greater faith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would 
imply much greater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows 
more of God than man does. Let it be always understood, that entire 
obedience to God never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is 
naturally impossible for us to believe that of which we have no knowledge. 
Entire obedience implies, in this respect, nothing more than the heart's 
faith or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by the intellect. 

16. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our 
prayers. It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience implies 
the offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. To this 
I reply, — Then Christ did not obey, for he offered no such prayer. The 
law of God makes no such demands, either expressly or impliedly. We 
have no right to believe that all men will be converted in answer to our 
prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise to that effect. As, 
therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no obligation to offer 
such a prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the world imply, that 
there are no saints in the world who fully obey God's law. 

It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an 
express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas was 
not converted in answer to Christ's prayer, does not prove that Christ 
did not fully obey. 

Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or im- 
pliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers ; or, in other 
words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant of the 
existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect love 
implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly speak- 
ing can be duty, of which the mind has no knowledge. It cannot, 
therefore, be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely 
ignorant, or the application of which to any specific object we do not 
understand. 

If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the soul 



132 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be 
understood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the 
neglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is 
inconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth ; for such neg- 
lect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that of which 
we have no knowledge. James says, " He that knoweth to do good and 
doeth it not, to him it is sin." " If ye were blind," says Christ, "ye should 
have no sin, but because ye say, We see, therefore your sin remaineth." 

17. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others 
will of course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely 
conformed to the law. 

It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ 
was possessed of a wicked instead of a holy spirit. Such were their 
notions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed him to be actuated by any 
other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on account 
of his opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the ungodliness of the 
religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not see, that when the 
church is, in a great measure, conformed to the world, a spirit of holi- 
ness in any man would certainly lead him to aim the sharpest rebukes at 
the spirit and life of those in this state, whether in high or low places ? 
And who does not see, that this would naturally result in his being 
accused of possessing a wicked spirit ? And who does not know, that 
where a religious teacher finds himself under the necessity of attacking 
a false orthodoxy, he will certainly be hunted, almost as a beast of prey, 
by the religious teachers of his day, whose authority, influence, and 
orthodoxy are thus assailed ? 

18. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering. 
It was not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for 
our own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and 
vigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had sinned 
less ; or sorrow for those around us — sorrow in view of human sinfulness, 
or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of joyful love to God 
and man, and indeed are the natural results of it. 

19. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society — with 
mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as some 
have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of papists in 
retiring to monasteries, and convents— in taking the veil, and, as they 
say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state of voluntary 
exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent with any degree 
of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love to our neighbor. 

20. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing 
is further from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom, 
perhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that " he was so cheerful as 



OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. 133 

often to be accused of being gay." Cheerfulness is certainly the result 
of holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this 
world than it does in heaven. 

In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian holi- 
ness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry : What does obedi- 
ence to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply ? Instead of 
bringing everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. On the 
one hand, they include things that the law of God never required of man 
in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block and a snare for 
the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage, supposing that this is the 
way to keep them humble, to place the standard entirely above their 
reach. Or, on the other hand, they really abrogate the law, so as to 
make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter away what is really im- 
plied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements, but a sickly, whimsi- 
cal, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism, which in its manifesta- 
tions and results, appears to me to be anything but that which the law 
of God requires. 

21. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do 
our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or ever, 
terminates on duty as an ultimate end. It is our duty to aim at or in- 
tend the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, 
or for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end at which we are 
at all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this. While we aim at this, 
we do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing duty. 

Nor does it imply that we always think, at the time, of its being duty, 
or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation 
is a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral 
agent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral 
agency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to the 
moral law, that moral obligation should at all times be present to the 
thoughts as an object of attention. 

Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of benevo- 
lence is, at all times, the object of the mind's attention. We may intend 
the glory of God and the good of our neighbor, without at all times think- 
ing of the moral character of this intention. But the intention is not 
the less virtuous on this account. The mind unconsciously, but neces- 
sarily, assumes the rightness of benevolence, or of willing the good of 
being, just as it assumes other first truths, without being distinctly con- 
scious of the assumption. It is not therefore, at all essential to obedi- 
ence to the law of God, that we should at all times have before our minds 
the virtuousness or moral character of benevolence. 

22. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself 
should be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind's attention. 



134: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in the form of 
an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which every moral 
agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a rule of duty, 
is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in the mind of 
every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily takes along 
with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to himself. Never- 
theless, this law or idea, is not always the object of the mind's attention 
and thought. A moral agent may exercise good-will or love to G-od and 
man, without at the time being conscious of thinking, that this love is 
required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I am not mistaken, the 
benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so spontaneously, as not, 
for much of the time, even to think that this love to God is required of 
him. But this state of mind is not the less virtuous on this account. 
If the infinite value of God's well-being and of his infinite goodness 
constrains me to love him with all my heart, can any one suppose that 
this is regarded by him as the less virtuous, because I did not wait 
to reflect, that God commanded me to love him, and that it was my duty 
to do so ? 

The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is 
the good of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I 
will that end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether 
the law be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may 
will that end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not 
virtue ; that unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend obe- 
dience to moral law, or to God, it is not virtue ; I answer, that the 
objection involves an absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the 
good of God and of being, as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The 
reason of the choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I will 
the good of being as an ultimate end, I will it for the right reason. 

It is impossible to will God's good as an end, out of regard to his 
authority. This is to make his authority the end chosen, for the reason 
of a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will any- 
thing for the reason that God requires it, is to will God's requirement 
as an ultimate end. I cannot, therefore, love God with any acceptable 
love, primarily, because he commands it. God never expected to in- 
duce his creatures to love him, or to will his good, by commanding 
them to do so. 

23. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should 
practically treat all interests that are of equal value according to their 
value. For example, the precept, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," can- 
not mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul, and the soul of 
every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does it mean that 
I should take the same care and oversight of my own, and of all the 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 135 

families of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of property, 
or time, or talent I have, equally among all mankind. This were — 
1.) Impossible. 

(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the 
universe by each individual's giving his attention particularly to the pro- 
motion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so under 
his influence that he possesses particular advantages for promoting 
them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its relative value ; 
but our efforts to promote particular interests should depend upon our 
relations and capacity to promote them. Some interests of great value 
we may be under no obligation to promote, for the reason that we have 
no ability to promote them, while we may be under obligation to promote 
interests of vastly less value, for the reason, that we are able to promote 
them. We are to aim at promoting those interests that we can most 
surely and extensively promote, but always in a manner that shall not in- 
terfere with others promoting other interests, according to their relative 
value. Every man is bound to promote his own, and the salvation of his 
family, not because they belong to self, but because they are valuable in 
themselves, and because they are particularly committed to him, as being 
directly within his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the 
government of God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we 
proceed in our investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent misap- 
prehension, and, on the other, avoid the necessity of circumlocution, 
when we wish to express the same idea ; the true intent and meaning of 
the moral law, no doubt, is, that every interest or good known to a moral 
being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic value, and that, in our 
efforts to promote good, we are to aim at securing the greatest practica- 
ble amount, and to bestow our efforts where, as it appears from our 
circumstances and relations, we can accomplish the greatest good. This 
ordinarily can be done, beyond all question, only by each one attending 
to the promotion of those particular interests which are most within the 
reach of his influence. 



LECTURE XII. 

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 



It has been shown that the sum and spirit of the whole law is prop- 
erly expressed in one word — love. It has also been shown, that this love *•* 
is benevolence or good willing ; that it consists in choosing the highest 
good of God and of universal being, for its own intrinsic value, in a spirit 



136 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of entire consecration to this as the ultimate end of existence. Although 
the whole law is fulfilled in one word — love, yet there are many things 
implied in the state of mind expressed by this term. It is, therefore, in- 
dispensable to a right understanding of this subject, that we inquire into 
the characteristics or attributes of this love. We must keep steadily in 
mind certain truths of mental philosophy. I will, therefore — 

I. Gall attention to certain facts in mental philosophy as they are re- 
vealed in consciousness. 

1. Moral agents possess intellect, or the faculty of knowledge. 

2 They also possess sensibility, and sensitivity, or in other words, the 
faculty or susceptibility of feeling. 

3. They also possess will, or the power of choosing or refusing in 
every case of moral obligation. 

These primary faculties are so correlated to each other, that the in- 
tellect or the sensibility may control the will, or the will may, in a cer- 
tain sense, control them. That is, the mind is free to choose in accord- 
ance with the demands of the intellect, which is the law-giving faculty, 
or with the desires and impulses of the sensibility, or to control and 
direct them both. The will can directly control the attention of the in- 
tellect, and consequently its perceptions, thoughts, etc. It can indi- 
rectly control the states of the sensibility, or feeling faculty, by control- 
ling the perceptions and thoughts of the intellect. We also know from 
consciousness, as was shown in a former lecture, that the voluntary 
muscles of the body are directly controlled by the will, and that the law 
which obliges the attention, the feelings, and the actions of the body to 
obey the decisions of the will, is physical law, or the law of necessity. 
The attention of the intellect and the outward actions are controlled 
directly, and the feelings indirectly, by the decisions of the will. The 
will can either command or obey. It can suffer itself to be enslaved by 
the impulses of the sensibility, or it can assert its sovereignty and control 
them. The will is not influenced by either the intellect or the sensi- 
bility, by the law of necessity or force ; so that the will can always re- 
sist either the demands of the intelligence, or the impulses of the sensi- 
bility. But while they cannot lord it over the will, through the agency 
of any law of force, the will has the aid of the law of necessity or force 
by which to control them. 

Again : We are conscious of affirming to ourselves our obligation to 
obey the law of the intellect rather than the impulses of the sensibility ; 
that to act virtuously we must act rationally, or intelligently, and not 
give ourselves up to the blind impulses of our feelings. 

Now, inasmuch as the love required by the moral law consists in 
choice, willing, intention, as before repeatedly shown ; and inasmuch as 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 137 

choice, willing, intending, controls the states of the intellect and the out- 
ward actions directly, by a law of necessity, and by the same law controls 
the feelings or states of the sensibility indirectly, it follows that certain 
states of the intellect and of the sensibility, and also certain outward ac- 
tions, must be implied in the existence of the love which the law of God 
requires. I say, implied in it, not as making a part of it, but as neces- 
sarily resulting from it. The thoughts, opinions, judgments, feelings, 
and outward actions must be moulded and modified by the state of the 
heart or will. 

Here it is important to remark, that, in common language, the same 
word is often used to express either an action or attitude of the will, or a 
state of the sensibility, or both. This is true of all the terms that repre- 
sent what are called the Christian graces or virtues, or those various 
modifications of virtue of which Christians are conscious, and which 
appear in their life and temper. Of this truth we shall be constantly 
reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for we shall find illustra- 
tions of it at every step of our progress. 

Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is im- 
portant to remark, that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy 
beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that 
comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. This term ex- 
presses comprehensively God's whole moral character. This love, as we 
have repeatedly seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good-willing, or 
the choice of the highest good of God and the universe, as an end. But 
from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it be, we are apt to 
receive very inadequate conceptions of what really belongs to, as implied 
in, benevolence. To say that love is the fulfilling of the whole law ; that 
benevolence is the whole of true religion ; that the whole duty of man 
to God and his neighbor, is expressed in one word, love — these state- 
ments, though true, are so comprehensive as to need with all minds much 
amplification and explanation. Many things are implied in love or benev- 
olence. By this is intended, that benevolence needs to be viewed under 
various aspects and in various relations, and its nature considered in the 
various relations in which it is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate 
intention, or the choice of an ultimate end. But if we suppose that this 
is all that is implied in benevolence, we shall egregiously err. Unless we 
inquire into the nature of the end which benevolence chooses, and the 
means by which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but 
little of the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many at- 
tributes or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selection of 
its end, and in its efforts to realize it. By this is intended that benevolence 
is not a blind, but the most intelligent, choice. It is the choice of the best 
possible end in obedience to the demand of the reason and of God, and 



138 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

implies the choice of the best possible means to secure this end. Both 
the end and the means are chosen in obedience to the law of God, and of 
reason. An attribute is a permanent quality of a thing. The attributes 
of benevolence are those permanent qualities which belong to its very 
nature. Benevolence is not blind, but intelligent, choice. It is the 
choice of the highest well-being of moral agents. It seeks this end by 
means suited to the nature of moral agents. Hence wisdom, justice, 
mercy, truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as we shall see, are 
essential elements, or attributes, of benevolence. To understand what 
true benevolence is, we must inquire into its attributes. Not every- 
thing that is called love has at all the nature of benevolence. Nor has 
all that is called benevolence any title to that appellation. There are 
various kinds of love. Natural affection is called love. Our preference 
of certain kinds of diet is called love. Hence we say we love fruit, vege- 
tables, meat, milk, etc. Benevolence is also called love, and is the kind 
of love, beyond all question, required by the law of God. But there is 
more than one state of mind that is called benevolence. There is a con- 
stitutional or phrenological benevolence, which is often mistaken for, 
and confounded with, the benevolence which constitutes virtue. This 
so called benevolence is in truth only an imposing form of selfishness ; 
nevertheless it is called benevolence. Many of its manifestations are like 
those of true benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken, in giving 
religious instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevo- 
lence, let it be remembered, is the obedience of the will, to the law of 
reason and of God. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and 
not to gratify self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to 
the impulses of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The 
will seeks to gratify the desires and propensities, for the pleasure of the 
gratification. Self-gratification is sought as an end, and as the supreme 
end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of being. Phreno- 
logical, or constitutional benevolence, is only obedience to the impulse 
of the sensibility — a yielding to a feeling of compassion. It is only an 
effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really selfishness, as is an 
effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever. 

It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the 
divine law, and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the 
various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon 
this discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the enu- 
meration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to 
remark that the moral attributes of God, as revealed in his works, provi- 
dence, and word, throw much light upon the subject before us. Also 
the many precepts of the Bible, and the developments of benevolence 
therein revealed, will assist us much, as we proceed in our inquiries upon 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 139 

this important subject. As the Bible expressly affirms that love com- 
prehends the whole character of Grod — that it is the whole that the 
law requires of man — that the end of the commandment is charity or 
love — we may be assured that every form of true virtue is only a modifi- 
cation of love or benevolence ; that is, that every state of mind required 
by the Bible, and recognized as virtue, is, in its last analysis, resolvable 
into love or benevolence. In other words, every virtue is only benevo- 
lence viewed under certain aspects, or in certain relations. In other 
words still, it is only one of the elements, peculiarities, characteristics, or 
attributes of benevolence. This is true of God's moral attributes. They 
are, as has been said, only attributes of benevolence. They are only the 
essential qualities that belong to the very nature of benevolence, which 
are manifested and brought into activity wherever benevolence is brought 
into certain circumstances and relations. Benevolence is just, merciful, 
etc. Such is its nature, that in appropriate circumstances these quali- 
ties, together with many others, will manifest themselves in executive 
acts.* This is and must be true of every holy being. 

II. / will noiv proceed to point out the attributes of that love which 
constitutes obedience to the law of God. 

As I proceed I will call attention to the states of the intellect and of 
the sensibility, and also to the course of outward conduct implied in the 
existence of this love in any mind — implied in its existence as necessarily 
resulting from it by the law of cause and effect. These attributes are — 

1. Voluntariness. That is to say, it is a phenomenon of the will. 
There is a state of the sensibility often expressed by the term love- 
Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a 
mere feeling or emotion. The term is often used to express the emotion 
of fondness or attachment, as distinct from a voluntary state of mind, or 
a choice of the will. This emotion or feeling, as we are all aware, is 

* A recent writer has spoken contemptuously of " being," as he calls it, " sophis 
ticated into believing, or rather saying, that faith is love, justice is love, humility is 
love." I would earnestly recommend to that and kindred writers, the study of the 
thirteenth chapter of the first Corinthians. They will there find a specimen of what 
they please to call sophistry. If it is " sophistry," or " excessive generalization," as 
other writers seem to regard it, to represent love as possessing the attributes which 
comprise the various forms of virtue, it surely is the "generalization " and " sophis- 
try " of inspiration. Generalization was the great peculiarity of Christ's preaching. 
His epitomizing all the commandments of God, and resolving the whole of obedience 
into love, is an illustration of this, and in no other way could he have exposed the 
delusion of those who obeyed the letter, but overlooked and outraged the spirit of 
the divine commandments. The same was true of the apostles, and so it is of every 
preacher of the gospel. Every outward act is only the expression of an inward vol- 
untary state of mind. To understand ourselves or others, we must conceive clearly 
of the true spirit of moral law, and of heart-obedience to it. 



140 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a phenomenon of the 
sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind, it has in itself no moral 
character. The law of God requires voluntary love or good-will, as has 
been repeatedly shown. This love consists in choice, intention. It is 
choosing the highest well-being of God and the universe of sentient beings 
as an end. Of course voluntariness must be one of its characteristics. The 
word benevolence expresses this idea. 

If it consists in choice, if it be a phenomenon of the will, it must 
control the thoughts and states of the sensibility, as well as the outward 
action. This love, then, not only consists in a state of consecration to 
God and the universe, but also implies deep emotions of love to God and 
man. Though a phenomenon of the will, it implies the existence of all 
those feelings of love and affection to God and man, that necessarily 
result from the consecration of the heart or will to their highest well- 
being. It also implies all that outward course of life that necessarily 
flows from a state of will consecrated to this end. Let it be borne in 
mind, that where these feelings do not arise in the sensibility, and where 
this course of life is not, there the true love or voluntary consecration to 
God and the universe required by the law, is not. Those follow from this 
by a law of necessity. Those, that is, feelings or emotions of love, and a 
correct outward life, may exist without this voluntary love, as I shall 
have occasion to show in its proper place ; but this love cannot exist 
without those, as they follow from it by a law of necessity. These 
emotions will vary in their strength, as constitution and circumstances 
vary, but exist they must, in some sensible degree, whenever the will is 
in a benevolent attitude. 

2. Liberty is an attribute of this love. The mind is free and spon- 
taneous in its exercise. It makes this choice when it has the power 
at every moment to choose self-gratification as an end. Of this every 
moral agent is conscious. It is a free, and therefore a responsible, choice. 

3. Intelligence. That is, the mind makes choice of this end intelli- 
gently. It not only knows what it chooses, and why it chooses, but also that 
it chooses in accordance with the dictates of the intellect, and the law of 
God ; that the end is worthy of being chosen, and that for this reason 
the intellect demands that it should be chosen, and also, that for its 
own intrinsic value it is chosen. 

Because voluntariness, liberty, and intelligence are natural attributes 
of this love, therefore, the following are its moral attributes. 

4. Virtue is an attribute of it. Virtue is a term that expresses the 
moral character of benevolence ; it is moral Tightness. Moral Tightness 
is moral perfection, righteousness, or uprightness. The term marks or 
designates its relation to moral law, and expresses its conformity to it. 

In the exercise of this love or choice, the mind is conscious of upright- 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 141 

ness, or of being conformed to moral law or moral obligation. In other 
words, it is conscious of being virtuous or holy, of being like God, of 
loving what ought to be loved, and of consecration to the right end. 

Because this choice is in accordance with the demands of the intellect, 
therefore the mind, in its exercise, is conscious of the approbation of that 
power of the intellect which we call conscience. The conscience must 
approve this love, choice, or intention. 

Again : Because the conscience approves of this choice, therefore, 
there is and must be in the sensibility a feeling of happiness or satisfac- 
tion, a feeling of complacency or delight in the love that is in the heart 
or will. This love, then, always produces self-approbation in the con- 
science, and a felt satisfaction in the sensibility ; and these feelings are 
often very acute and joyous, insomuch that the soul, in the exercise 
of this love of the heart, is sometimes led to rejoice with joy unspeakable 
and full of glory. This state of mind does not always and necessarily 
amount to joy. Much depends in this respect on the clearness of the 
intellectual views, upon the state of the sensibility, and upon the mani- 
festation of Divine approbation to the soul. But where peace, or 
approbation of conscience, and consequently a peaceful state of the 
sensibility are not, this love is not. They are connected with it by 
a law of necessity, and must of course appear on the field of conscious- 
ness where this love exists. These, then, are implied in the love that 
constitutes obedience to the law of God. Conscious peace of mind, and 
conscious joy in God must be where true love to God exists. 

5. Disinterestedness is another attribute of this love. By disinter- 
estedness, it is not intended that the mind takes no interest in the object 
loved, for it does take a supreme interest in it. But this term expresses 
the mind's choice of an end for its own sake, and not merely upon con- 
dition that the good belongs to self. This love is disinterested in the 
sense that the highest well-being of God and the universe is chosen, not 
upon condition of its relation to self, but for its own intrinsic and infi- 
nite value. It is this attribute particularly that distinguishes this love 
from selfish love. Selfish love makes the relation of good to self the con- 
dition of choosing it. The good of God and of the universe, if chosen 
at all, is only chosen as a means or condition of promoting the highest 
good of self. But this love does not make good to self its end ; but 
good to God and being in general, is its end. 

As disinterestedness is an attribute of this love, it does not seek its 
own, but the good of others. " Charity (love) seeketh not her own." 
It grasps in its comprehensive embrace the good of being in general, and 
of course, of necessity, secures a corresponding outward life and inward 
feeling. The intellect will be employed in devising ways and means for 
the promotion of its end. The sensibility will be tremblingly alive to 



142 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the good of all and of each ; will rejoice in the good of others as in its 
own, and will grieve at the misery of others as in its own. It "will re- 
joice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep." There 
will not, cannot be envy at the prosperity of others, but unfeigned joy, 
joy as real and often as exquisite as in its own prosperity. Benevolence 
enjoys everybody's good things, while selfishness is too envious at the 
good things of others even to enjoy its own. There is a Divine economy 
in benevolence. Each benevolent soul not only enjoys his own good 

things, but also enjoys the good things of all others so far as he knows 

their happiness. He drinks at the river of God's pleasure. He not only 
rejoices in doing good to others, but also in beholding their enjoyment 
of good things. He joys in God's joy, and in the joy of angels and of 
saints. He also rejoices in the good things of all sentient existences. 
He is happy in beholding the pleasure of the beasts of the field, the fowls 
of the air, and the fishes of the sea. He sympathizes with all joy and all 
suffering known to him ; nor is his sympathy with the sufferings of others 
a feeling of unmingled pain. It is a real luxury to sympathize in the 
woes of others. He would not be without this sympathy. It so accords 
with his sense of propriety and fitness, that, mingled with the painful 
emotion, there is a sweet feeling of self-approbation ; so that a benevo- 
lent sympathy with the woes of others is by no means inconsistent with 
happiness, and with perfect happiness. God has this sympathy. He 
often expresses and otherwise manifests it. There is, indeed, a myste- 
rious and an exquisite luxury in sharing the woes of others. God and 
angels and all holy beings know what it is. Where this result of love is 
not manifested, there love itself is not. Envy at the prosperity, in- 
fluence, or good of others, the absence of sensible joy in view of the 
good enjoyed by others, and of sympathy with the sufferings of others, 
prove conclusively that this love does not exist. There is an expansiveness, 
an ampleness of embrace, a universality, and a divine disinterestedness 
in this love, that necessarily manifests itself in the liberal devising of 
liberal things for Zion, and in the copious outpourings of the floods of 
sympathetic feeling, both in joys and sorrows, when suitable occasions 
present themselves before the mind. 

6. Impartiality is another attribute of this love. By this term is not 
intended, that the mind is indifferent to the character of him who is 
happy or miserable ; that it would be as well pleased to see the wicked as 
the righteous eternally and perfectly blessed. But it is intended that, 
other things being equal, it is the intrinsic value of their well-being 
which is alone regarded by the mind. Other things being equal, it 
matters not to whom the good belongs. It is no respecter of persons. 
The good of being is its end, and it seeks to promote every interest 
according to its relative value. Selfish love is partial. It seeks to 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 143 

promote self-interest first, and secondarily those interests that sustain 
such a relation to self as will at least indirectly promote the gratification 
of self. Selfish love has its favorites, its prejudices, unreasonable and 
ridiculous. Color, family, nation, and many other things of like nature, 
modify it. But benevolence knows neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond 
nor free, white nor black, Barbarian, Scythian, European, Asiatic, 
African, nor American, but accounts all men as men, and, by virtue of 
their common manhood, calls every man a brother, and seeks the 
interests of all and of each. Impartiality, being an attribute of this 
love, will of course manifest itself in the outward life, and in the temper 
and spirit of its subject. This love can have no fellowship with those 
absurd and ridiculous prejudices that are so often rife among nominal 
Christians. Nor will it cherish them for a moment in the sensibility of him 
who exercises it. Benevolence recognizes no privileged classes on the one 
hand, nor proscribed classes on the other. It secures in the sensibility 
an utter loathing of those discriminations, so odiously manifested and 
boasted of, and which are founded exclusively in a selfish state of the will. 
The fact that a man is a man, and not that he is of our party, of our 
complexion, or of our town, state, or nation — that he is a creature of 
God, that he is capable of virtue and happiness, these are the con- 
siderations that are seized upon by this divinely impartial love. It is the 
intrinsic value of his interests, and not that they are the interests of one 
connected with self, that the benevolent mind regards. 

But here it is important to repeat the remark, that the economy of 
benevolence demands, that where two interests are, in themselves con- 
sidered, of equal value, in order to secure the greatest amount of good, 
each one should bestow his efforts where they can be bestowed to the 
greatest advantage. For example : every man sustains such relations 
that he can accomplish more good by seeking to promote the interest 
and happiness of certain persons rather than of others ; his family, his 
kindred, his companions, his immediate neighbors, and those to whom, 
in the providence of God, he sustains such relations as to give him 
access to them, and influence over them. It is not unreasonable, it 
is not partial, but reasonable and impartial, to bestow our efforts more 
directly upon them. Therefore, while benevolence regards every interest 
according to its relative value, it reasonably puts forth its efforts in the 
direction where there is a prospect of accomplishing the most good. 
This, I say, is not partiality, but impartiality ; for, be it understood, it 
is not the particular persons to whom good can be done, but the amount 
of good that can be accomplished, that directs the efforts of benevolence. 
It is not because my family is my own, nor because their well-being 
is, of course, more valuable in itself than that of my neighbors' families, 
but because my relations afford me higher facilities for doing them good, 



144 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

I am under particular obligation to aim first at promoting their good. 
Hence the apostle says : " If any man provide not for his own, especially 
for those of his own household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse 
than an infidel." Strictly speaking, benevolence esteems every known 
good according to its intrinsic and relative value ; but practically treats 
every interest according to the perceived probability of securing on the 
whole the highest amount of good. This is a truth of great practical 
importance. It is developed in the experience and observation of every 
day and hour. It is manifest in the conduct of God and of Christ, 
of apostles and martyrs. It is everywhere assumed in the precepts 
of the Bible, and everywhere manifested in the history of benevolent 
effort. Let it be understood, then, that impartiality, as an attribute of 
benevolence, does not imply that its effort to do good will be modified by 
relations and circumstances. But, on the contrary, this attribute implies, 
that the efforts to secure the great end of benevolence, to wit, the greatest 
amount of good to God and the universe, will be modified by those rela- 
tions and circumstances that afford the highest advantages for doing good. 

The impartiality of benevolence causes it always to lay supreme stress 
upon God's interests, because his well-being is of infinite value, and of 
course benevolence must be supreme to him. Benevolence, being impar- 
tial love, of course accounts God's interests and well-being, as of infinitely 
greater value than the aggregate of all other interests. Benevolence re- 
gards our neighbor's interests as our own, simply because they are in their 
intrinsic value as our own. Benevolence, therefore, is always supreme 
to God and equal to man. 

7. Universality is another attribute of this love. Benevolence chooses 
the highest good of being in general. It excludes none from its regard ; 
but on the contrary embosoms all in its ample embrace. But by this it is 
not intended, that it practically seeks to promote the good of every indi- 
vidual. It would if it could ; but it seeks the highest practicable amount 
of good. The interest of every individual is estimated according to its 
intrinsic value, whatever the circumstances or character of each may be. 
But character and relations may and must modify the manifestations of 
benevolence, or its efforts in seeking to promote this end. A wicked 
character, and governmental relations and considerations, may forbid 
benevolence to seek the good of some. Nay, they may demand that posi- 
tive misery shall be inflicted on some, as a warning to others to beware 
of their destructive ways. By universality, as an attribute of benevo- 
lence, is intended, that good-will is truly exercised towards all sentient 
beings, whatever their character and relations may be ; and that, when 
the higher good of the greater number does not forbid it, the happiness 
of all and of each will be pursued with a degree of stress equal to their 
relative value, and the prospect of securing each interest. Enemies as 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 145 

well as friends, strangers and foreigners as well as relations and immedi- 
ate neighbors, will be enfolded in its sweet embrace. It is the state of 
mind required by Christ in the truly divine precept, " I say unto you, 
Love your enemies, pray for them that hate you, and do good unto them 
that despitef ally use and persecute you." This attribute of benevolence 
is gloriously conspicuous in the character of God. His love to sinners 
alone accounts for their being to-day out of perdition. His aiming to 
secure the highest good of the greatest number, is illustrated by the dis- 
play of his glorious justice in the punishment of the wicked. His uni- 
versal care for all ranks and conditions of sentient beings, manifested in 
his works and providence, beautifully and gloriously illustrates the truth, 
that " his tender mercies are over all his works." 

It is easy to see that universality must be a modification or attribute 
of true benevolence. It consists in good-willing, that is, in choosing the 
highest good of being as such, and for its own sake. Of course it must, 
to be consistent with itself, seek the good of all and of each, so far as the 
good of each is consistent with the greatest good upon the whole. Be- 
nevolence not only wills and seeks the good of moral beings, but also the 
good of every sentient existence, from the minutest animalcule to the 
highest order of beings. It of course produces a state of the sensibility 
tremblingly alive to all happiness and to all pain. It is pained at the 
agony of an insect, and rejoices in its joy. God does this, and all holy 
beings do this. Where this sympathy with the joys and sorrows of 
universal being is not, there benevolence is not. Observe, good is its 
end ; where this is promoted by the proper means, the feelings are grati- 
fied. Where evil is witnessed, the benevolent spirit deeply and neces- 
sarily sympathizes. 



LECTURE XIII. 

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 



8. Efficiency is another attribute or characteristic of benevolence. 
Benevolence consists in choice, intention. Now we know from con- 
sciousness that choice or intention constitutes the mind's deepest source 
or power of action. If I honestly intend a thing, I cannot but make 
efforts to accomplish that which I intend, provided that I believe the 
thing possible. If I choose an end, this choice must and will energize 
to secure its end. When benevolence is the supreme choice, preference, 
or intention of the soul, it is plainly impossible that it should not pro- 



146 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

duce efforts to secure its end. It must cease to exist, or manifest itself 
in exertions to secure its end, as soon as, and whenever the intelligence 
deems it wise to do so. If the will has yielded to the intelligence in the 
choice of an end, it will certainly obey the intelligence in pursuit of that 
end. Choice, intention, is the cause of all the outward activity of moral 
agents. They have all chosen some end, either their own gratification, 
or the highest good of being ; and all the busy bustle of this world's 
teeming population, is nothing else than choice or intention seeking to 
compass its end. 

Efficiency, therefore, is an attribute of benevolent intention. It 
must, it will, it does energize in God, in angels, in saints on earth and in 
heaven. It was this attribute of benevolence, that led God to give his 
only begotten Son, and that led the Son to give himself, "that whoso- 
ever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." 

If love is efficient in producing outward action, and efficient in pro- 
ducing inward feelings ; it is efficient to wake up the intellect, and set 
the world of thought in action to devise ways and means for realizing its 
end. It wields all the infinite natural attributes of God. It is the main- 
spring that moves all heaven. It is the mighty power that is heaving 
the mass of mind, and rocking the world like a smothered volcano. 
Look to the heavens above. It was benevolence that hung them out. It 
is benevolence that sustains those mighty rolling orbs in their courses. 
It was good- will endeavoring to realize its end that at first put forth 
creative power. The same power, for the same reason, still energizes, and 
will continue to energize for the realization of its end, so long as God is 
benevolent. And ! what a glorious thought, that infinite benevolence 
is wielding, and will forever wield, infinite natural attributes for the pn> 
motion of good ! No mind but an infinite one can begin to conceive of 
the amount of good that Jehovah will secure. blessed, glorious 
thought ! But it is, it must be a reality, as surely as God and the uni- 
verse exist. It is no vain imagination ; it is one of the most certain, as 
well as the most glorious, truths in the universe. Mountains of granite 
are but vapor in comparison with it. But the truly benevolent on earth 
and in heaven will sympathize with God. The power that energizes in 
him, energizes in them. One principle animates and moves them all, 
and that principle is love, good- will to universal being. Well may our 
souls cry out, Amen, go on, God-speed the work ; let this mighty power 
heave and wield universal mind, until all the ills of earth shall be put 
away, and until all that can be made holy are clothed in the garments 
of everlasting gladness. 

Since benevolence is necessarily, from its very nature, active and 
efficient in putting forth efforts to secure its end, and since its end is the 
highest good of being, it follows that all who are truly religious will, and 



ATTRIBUTES OP LOVE. 147 

must, from the very nature of true religion, be active in endeavoring to 
promote the good of being. While effort is possible to a Christian, it is 
as natural to him as his breath. He ha3 within him the very main-spring 
of activity, a heart set on the promotion of the highest good of universal 
being. While he has life and activity at all, it will, and it must, be di- 
rected to this end. Let this never be forgotten. An idle, an inactive, 
inefficient Christian is a misnomer. Keligion is an essentially active 
principle, and when and while it exists, it must exercise and manifest 
itself. It is not merely good desire, but it is good-willing. Men may 
have desires, and hope and live on them, without making efforts to real- 
ize their desires. They may desire without action. If their will is active, 
their life must be. If they really choose an ultimate end, this choice 
must manifest itself. The sinner does and must manifest his selfish 
choice, and so likewise must the saint manifest his benevolence. 

9. Complacency in holiness or moral excellence, is another attribute 
of benevolence. This consists in benevolence contemplated in its rela- 
tions to holy beings. 

This term also expresses both a state of the intelligence and of the 
sensibility. Moral agents are so constituted, that they necessarily ap- 
prove of moral worth or excellence ; and when even sinners behold right 
character, or moral goodness, they are compelled to respect and approve 
it, by a law of their intelligence. This they not unfrequently regard as 
evidence of goodness in themselves. But this is doubtless just as com- 
mon in hell as it is on earth. The veriest sinners on earth or in hell, 
have, by the unajterable constitution of their nature, the necessity im- 
posed upon them, of paying intellectual homage to moral excellence. 
When a moral agent is intensely contemplating moral excellence, and 
his intellectual approbation is emphatically pronounced, the natural, and 
often the necessary result, is a corresponding feeling of complacency or 
delight in the sensibility. But this being altogether an involuntary state 
of mind, has no moral character. Complacency, as a phenomenon of 
will, consists in willing the highest actual blessedness of the holy being 
in particular, as a good in itself, and upon condition of his moral excel- 
lence. 

This attribute of benevolence is the cause of a complacent state of the 
sensibility. It is true, that feelings of complacency may exist, when 
complacency of will does not exist. But complacency of feeling surely 
will exist, when complacency of will exists. Complacency of will im- 
plies complacency of conscience, or the approbation of the intelligence. 
When there is a complacency of intelligence and of will, there must fol- 
low, of course, complacency of the sensibility. 

It is highly worthy of observation here, that this complacency of 
feeling is that which is generally termed love to God and to the saints, 



148 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

in the common language of Christians, and often in the popular language 
of the Bible. It is a vivid and pleasant state of the sensibility, and very 
noticeable by consciousness, of course. Indeed, it is perhaps the general 
usage now to call this phenomenon of the sensibility, love ; and, for want 
of just discrimination, to speak of it as constituting religion. Many 
seem to suppose that this feeling of delight in, and fondness for, God, is the 
love required by the moral law. They are conscious of not being volun- 
tary in it, as well they may be. They judge of their religious state, not 
by the end for which they live, that is, by their choice or intention, but 
by their emotions. If they find themselves strongly exercised with 
emotions of love to God, they look upon themselves as in a state well- 
pleasing to God. But if their feelings or emotions of love are not active, 
they of course judge themselves to have little or no religion. It is 
remarkable to what extent religion is regarded as a phenomenon of the 
sensibility, and as consisting in mere feelings. So common is it, indeed, 
that almost uniformly, when professed Christians speak of their religion, 
they speak of their feelings, or the state of their sensibility, instead of 
speaking of their conscious consecration to God, and the good of being. 

It is also somewhat common for them to speak of their views of 
Christ, and of truth, in a manner that shows, that they regard the states 
of the intellect as constituting a part, at least, of their religion. It is of 
great importance that just views should prevail among Christians upon 
this momentous subject. Virtue, or religion, as has been repeatedly 
said, must be a phenomenon of the will. The attribute of benevolence 
which we are considering, that is, complacency of will in Gocl, is the 
most common light in which the scriptures present it, and also the most 
common form in which it lies revealed on the field of consciousness. 
The scriptures often assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving 
him, and Christians are conscious of having much regard to his goodness 
in their love to him ; I mean in their good-will to him. They will good 
to him, and ascribe all praise and glory to him, upon the condition that 
he deserves it. Of this they are conscious. Now, as was shown in a 
former lecture, in their love or good will to God, they do not regard his 
goodness as the fundamental reason for willing good to him. Although 
his goodness is that, which, at the time, most strongly impresses their 
minds, yet it must be that the intrinsic value of his well-being is as- 
sumed, and had in view by them, or they would no sooner will good 
than evil to him. In willing his good they must assume its intrinsic 
value to him, as the fundamental reason for willing it ; and his goodness 
as a secondary reason or condition ; but they are conscious of being 
much influenced in willing his good in particular, by a regard to his 
goodness. Should you ask the Christian why he loved God, or why he 
exercised good-will to him, he would probably reply, it is because God is 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 149 

good. But, suppose he should be further asked, why he willed good 
rather than evil to God ; he would say, because good is good or valuable 
to him. Or, if he returned the same answer as before, to wit, because 
God is good, he would give this answer, only because he would think it 
impossible for any one not to assume and to know, that good is willed 
instead of evil, because of its intrinsic value. The fact is, the intrinsic 
value of well-being is necessarily taken along with the mind, and always 
assumed by it, as a first truth. When a virtuous being is perceived, this 
first truth being spontaneously and necessarily assumed, the mind thinks 
only of the secondary reason or condition, or the virtue of the being, in 
willing good to him. 

Before I dismiss this subject, I must advert again to the subject of 
complacent love, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and also as a phe- 
nomenon of the intellect. If I mistake not, there are sad mistakes, and 
gross and ruinous delusions, entertained by many upon this subject. 
The intellect, of necessity, perfectly approves of the character of God 
where it is apprehended. The intellect is so correlated to the sensibility, 
that, where it perceives in a strong light the divine excellence, or the 
excellence of the divine law, the sensibility is affected by the perception 
of the intellect, as a thing of course and of necessity ; so that emotions 
of complacency and delight in the law, and in the divine character, may 
and often do glow and burn in the sensibility, while the will or heart is 
unaffected. The will remains in a selfish choice, while the intellect and 
the sensibility are strongly impressed with the perception of the Divine 
excellence. This state of the intellect and the sensibility is, no doubt, 
often mistaken for true religion. We have undoubted illustrations of 
this in the Bible, and similar cases of it in common life. " Yet they 
seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did right- 
eousness, and forsook not the ordinance of their God : they ask of me 
the ordinances of justice, they take delight in approaching to God." 
Isaiah lviii. 2. " And, lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of 
one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument : for 
they hear thy words, but they do them not." Ezek. xxxiii. 32. 

Nothing is of greater importance, than forever to understand, that 
religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will ; that it 
always and necessarily produces outward action and inward feeling ; that, 
on account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility, almost any 
and every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as produced by the 
perceptions of the intellect, whatever the state of the will may be ; that 
unless we are conscious of good-will, or of consecration to God and the 
good of being — unless we are conscious of living for this end, it avails us- 
nothing, whatever our views and feelings may be. 

And also it behooves us to consider that, although these views and 



150 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

feelings may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist when 
the heart is right ; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling, when 
the heart is in a selfish attitude, yet, that there will and must be deep 
emotion and strenuous action, when the heart is right. Let it be re- 
membered, that complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is always a 
striking characteristic of true love to God ; that the mind is affected and 
consciously influenced, in willing the actual and infinite blessedness of 
God, by a regard to his goodness. The goodness of God is not, as has 
been repeatedly shown, the fundamental reason for the good will, but it 
is one reason or a condition, both of the possibility of willing, and of the 
obligation to will, his blessedness in particular. It assigns to itself, and 
to others, his goodness as the reason for willing his good, rather than the 
intrinsic value of good ; because this last is so universally, and so neces- 
sarily assumed, that it thinks not of mentioning it, taking it always for 
granted, that this will and must be understood. 

10. Opposition to si?i is another attribute or characteristic of true 
love to God. 

This attribute certainly is implied in. the very essence and nature of 
benevolence. Benevolence is good-willing, or willing the highest good 
of being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more destruc- 
tive of this good than sin. Benevolence cannot do otherwise than be for- 
ever opposed to sin, as that abominable thing which it necessarily hates. 
It is absurd and a contradiction to affirm, that benevolence is not op- 
posed to sin. God is love or benevolence. He must, therefore, be the 
unalterable opponent of sin — of all sin, in every form and degree. 

But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that 
is often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. Opposition to all 
sin is, and must be, a phenomenon of the will, and on that ground alone 
it becomes virtue. But it often exists also as a phenomenon of the in- 
tellect, and likewise of the sensibility. The intellect cafmot contemplate 
sin without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often mistaken for 
opposition of heart, or of will. When the intellect strongly disapproves 
of, and denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily a corresponding 
feeling of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion of loathing, of 
hatred, of abhorrence. This is often mistaken for opposition of the will, 
or heart. This is manifest from the fact, that often the most notorious 
sinners manifest strong indignation in view of oppression, injustice, 
falsehood, and many other forms of sin. This phenomenon of the sensi- 
bility and of the intellect, as I said, is often mistaken for a virtuous 
opposition to sin, which it cannot be unless it involve an act of the will. 

But let it be remembered, that virtuous opposition to sin is a char- 
acteristic of love to God and man, or of benevolence. This opposition 
to sin cannot possibly co-exist with any degree of sin in the heart. That 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 151 

is, this opposition cannot co-exist with a sinful choice. The will cannot 
at the same time, be opposed to sin and commit sin. This is impossible, 
and the supposition involves a contradiction. Opposition to sin as a 
phenomenon of the intellect, or of the sensibility, may exist ; in other 
words, the intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the sensibility 
may feel strongly opposed to certain forms of it, while at the same time, 
the will may cleave to self-indulgence in other forms. This fact, no 
doubt, accounts for the common mistake, that we can, at the same time, 
exercise a virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to commit it. 

Many are, no doubt, laboring under this fatal delusion. They are 
conscious, not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin in certain 
forms, but also, at times, of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet 
they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore con- 
clude, that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a principle 
of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful at the same time. Their 
opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a holy opposition, 
when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even more so than it is 
on earth, for the reason that sin is more naked there than it generally 
is here. 

But now the inquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and 
the sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in ? What 
reason can the mind have for a sinful choice, when urged to it neither 
by the intellect nor the sensibility ? The philosophy of this phenom- 
enon needs explanation. Let us attend to it. 

I am a moral agent. My intellect necessarily disapproves of sin. 
My sensibility is so correlated to my intellect, that it sympathizes with 
it, or is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate 
sin. I necessarily disapprove of it, and condemn it. This affects my 
sensibility. I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how 
is this to be accounted for ? The usual method is by ascribing it to a 
depravity in the will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so 
that it perversely chooses sin for its own sake. . Although disapproved 
by the intellect, and loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the 
inherent depravity of the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin not- 
withstanding, and will continue to do so, until that faculty is renewed 
by the Holy Spirit, and a holy bias or inclination is imjJressed upon the 
will itself. 

But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this 
subject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is. 

It is admitted on all hands, that selfishness is sin. Comparatively 
few seem to understand that selfishness is the whole of sin, and that 
every form of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of 
virtue may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to 



152 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

show that selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present 
to take the admission, that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness ? 
It is the choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our 
own gratification to the highest good of universal being. Self-gratifica- 
tion is the supreme end of selfishness. This choice is sinful. That is, 
the moral of this selfish choice is sin. Now, in no case, is or can sin be 
chosen for its own sake, or as an end. Whenever anything is chosen to 
gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is sinful, but notwith- 
standing it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the choice upon which 
the choice fixes, as an end, or for its own sake, but it is the gratification 
to be afforded by the thing chosen. For example, theft is sinful. But 
the will, in an act of theft, does not aim at and terminate on the sinful- 
ness of theft, but upon the gain or gratification expected from the stolen 
object. Drunkenness is sinful, but the inebriate does not intend or 
choose the sinfulness for its own sake, or as an end. He does not choose 
strong drink because the choice is sinful, but notwithstanding it is so, 
We choose the gratification, but not the sin, as an end. To choose the 
gratification as an end is sinful, but it is not the sin that is the object of 
choice. Our mother Eve ate the forbidden fruit. This eating was sin- 
ful. But the thing that she chose or intended, was not the sinfulness of 
eating, but the gratification expected from the fruit. It is not, it cannot 
in any case be true, that sin is chosen as an end, or for its own sake. 
Sin is only the quality of selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of 
sin as an end, or for its own sake, but of self -gratification ; and this 
choice of self -gratification as an end is sinful. That is, the moral quality 
of the choice is sin. To say that sin is, or can be, chosen for its own 
sake, is untrue and absurd. It is the same as saying that a choice can 
terminate on an element, quality, or attribute, of itself ; that the thing 
chosen is really an element of the choice itself. 

But it is said, that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin for 
its own sake, or because it is sin ; that they possess such a malicious 
state of mind, that they love sin for its own sake ; that they " roll sin 
as a sweet morsel under their tongue ;" that "they eat up the sins 
of God's people as they eat bread ;" that is, that they love their own 
sins and the sins of others, as they do their necessary food, and choose it 
for that reason] or just as they do their food ; that they not only sin 
themselves with greediness, but also have pleasure in them that do the 
same. Now all this may be true, yet it does not at all disprove the posi- 
tion which I have taken, namely, that sin never is, and never can be 
chosen as an end, or for its own sake. Sin may be sought and loved 
as a means, but never as an end. The choice of food will illustrate this. 
Food is never chosen as an ultimate end ; it never can be so chosen. It 
is always as a means. It is the gratification, or the utility of it, in some 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 153 

point of '.view, that constitutes the reason for choosing it. Gratification 
is always the end for which a selfish man eats. It may not be merely 
the present pleasure of eating which he alone or principally seeks. But, 
nevertheless, if a selfish man, he has his own gratification in view as an 
end. It may be that it is not so much a present, as a remote gratification 
he has in view. Thus he may choose food to give him health and strength 
to pursue some distant gratification, the acquisition of wealth, or some- 
thing else that will gratify him. 

It may happen that a sinner may get into a state of rebellion against 
God and the universe, of so frightful a character, that he shall take 
pleasure in willing, and in doing, and saying, things that are sinful, just 
because they are sinful and displeasing to God and to holy beings. But, 
even in this case, sin is not chosen as an end, but as a means of gratify- 
ing this malicious feeling. It is, after all, self-gratification that is chosen as 
an end, and not sin. Sin is the means, and self-gratification is the end. 

Now we are prepared to understand how it is that both the intellect 
and sensibility can often be opposed to sin, and yet the will cleave to the 
indulgence. An inebriate is contemplating the moral character of 
drunkenness. He instantly and necessarily condemns the abomination. 
His sensibility sympathizes with the intellect. He loathes the sinfulness 
of drinking strong drink, and himself on account of it. He is ashamed, 
and were it possible, he would spit in his own face. Now, in this state, 
it would surely be absurd to suppose that he could choose sin, the sin of 
drinking, as an end, or for its own sake. This would be choosing it for 
an impossible reason, and not for no reason. But still he may choose to 
continue his drink, not because it is sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. 
For while the intellect condemns the sin of drinking strong drink, and 
the sensibility loathes the sinfulness of the indulgence, nevertheless there 
still exists so strong an appetite, not for the sin, but for the liquor, that 
the will seeks the gratification, notwithstanding the sinfulness of it. So 
it is, and so it must be, in every case where sin is committed in the face 
of the remonstrances of the intellect and the loathing of the sensibility. 
The sensibility loathes the sinfulness, but more strongly desires the thing 
the choice of which is sinful. The will in a selfish being yields to the 
strongest impulse of the sensibility, and the end chosen is, in no case, 
the sinfulness of the act, but the self-gratification. Those who suppose 
this opposition of the intellect, or of the sensibility, to be a holy princi- 
ple, are fatally deluded. It is this kind of opposition to sin, that often 
manifests itself among wicked men, and that leads them to take credit 
for goodness or virtue, not an atom of which do they possess. They will 
not believe themselves to be morally and totally depraved, while they 
are conscious of so much hostility to sin within them. But they should 
understand, that this opposition is not of the will, or they could not go 



154 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

on in sin ; that it is purely an involuntary state of mind, and has no 
moral character whatever. Let it be ever remembered, then, that a vir- 
tuous opposition to sin is always and necessarily an attribute of benevo- 
lence, a phenomenon of the will ; and that it is naturally impossible, that 
this opposition of will should co-exist with the commission of sin. 

As this opposition to sin is plainly implied in, and is an essential at- 
tribute of, benevolence, or true love to God, it follows, that obedience to 
the law of God cannot be partial, in the sense that we both love God and 
sin at the same time. 

11. Compassion for the miserable is also an attribute of benevolence, 
or of pure love to God and man. This is benevolence viewed in its rela- 
tions to misery and to guilt. 

There is a compassion also which is a phenomenon of the sensibility. 
It may, and does often, exist in the form of an emotion. But this emotion 
being involuntary, has no moral character in itself. The compassion 
which is a virtue, and which is required of us as a duty, is a phenomenon 
of the will, and is of course an attribute of benevolence. Benevolence, 
as has been often said, is good- willing, or willing the highest happiness 
and well-being of God and the universe for its own sake, or as an end. 
It is impossible, therefore, from its own nature, that compassion for the 
miserable should not be one of its attributes. Compassion of will to 
misery is the choice or wish that it might not exist. Benevolence wills 
that happiness should exist for its own sake. It must, therefore, wish 
that misery might not exist. This attribute or peculiarity of benevolence 
consists in wishing the happiness of the miserable. Benevolence, simply 
considered, is willing the good or happiness of being in general. Com- 
passion of will is a willing particularly that the miserable should be 
happy. 

Compassion of sensibility is simply a feeling of pity in view of misery. 
As has been said, it is not a virtue. It is only a desire, but not will- 
ing ; consequently does not benefit its object. It is the state of mind 
of which James speaks : — James ii. 15, 16 : " If a brother or sister be 
naked, and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart 
in peace, be ye warmed and filled ; notwithstanding ye give them not 
those things which are needful to the body, what doth it profit ? " This 
kind of compassion may evidently co-exist with selfishness. But compas- 
sion of heart or will cannot ; for it consists in willing the happiness of the 
miserable for its own sake, and of course impartially. It will, and from 
its very nature must, deny self to promote its end, whenever it wisely 
can, that is, when it is seen to be demanded by the highest general good. 
Circumstances may exist that render it unwise to express this compas- 
sion by actually extending relief to the miserable. Such circumstances 
forbid that God should extend relief to the lost in hell. But for their 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 155 

character and governmental relations, God's compassion would no doubt 
make immediate efforts for their relief. 

Many circumstances may exist in which, although compassion would 
hasten to the relief of its object, yet, on the whole, the misery that exists 
is regarded as the less of two evils, and therefore, the wisdom of benevo- 
lence forbids it to put forth exertions to save its object. 

But it is of the last importance to distinguish carefully between com- 
passion, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as a mere feeling, and 
compassion considered as a phenomenon of the will. This, be it remem- 
bered, is the only form of virtuous compassion. Many, who, from the 
laws of their mental constitution, feel quickly and deeply, often take 
credit to themselves for being compassionate, while they seldom do much 
for the downtrodden and the miserable. Their compassion is a mere 
feeling. It says, "Be ye warmed and filled," but does not that for 
them which is needful. It is this particular attribute of benevolence 
that was so conspicuous in the life of Howard, Wilberforce, and many 
other Christian philanthropists. 

It should be said, before I leave the consideration of this attribute, 
that the will is often influenced by the feeling of compassion. In this 
case, the mind is no less selfish in seeking to promote the relief and hap- 
piness of its object than it is in any other form of selfishness. In such 
cases, self-gratification is the end sought, and the relief of the suffering 
is only a means. Pity is stirred, and the sensibility is deeply pained and 
excited by the contemplation of misery. The will is influenced by this 
feeling, and makes efforts to relieve the painful emotion on the one hand, 
and to gratify the desire to see the sufferer happy on the other. This is 
only an imposing form of selfishness. We, no doubt, often witness dis- 
plays of this kind of self-gratification. The happiness of the miserable 
is not in this case sought as an end, or for its own sake, but as a means 
of gratifying our own feelings. This is not obedience of will to the law 
of the intellect, but obedience to the impulse of the sensibility. It is 
not a natural and intelligent compassion, but just such compassion as 
we often see mere animals exercise. They will risk, and even lay down, 
their lives, to give relief to one of their number, or to a man who is in 
misery. In them this has no moral character. Having no reason, it is 
not sin for them to obey their sensibility; nay, this is a law of their being. 
This they cannot but do. For them, then, to seek their own gratifica- 
tion as an end is not sin. But man has reason ; he is bound to obey it. 
He should will and seek the relief and the happiness of the miserable, 
for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value. When he seeks it for no 
higher reason than to gratify his feelings, he denies his humanity. He- 
seeks it, not out of regard to the sufferer, but in self-defence, or to re- 
lieve his own pain, and to gratify his own desires. This in him is sin. 



156 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Many, therefore, who take to themselves much credit for benevolence, 
are, after all, only in the exercise of this imposing form of selfishness. 
They take credit for holiness, when their holiness is only sin. What is 
especially worthy of notice here, is, that this class of persons appear to 
themselves and others, to be all the more virtuous, by how much more 
manifestly and exclusively they are led on by the impulse of feeling. 
They are conscious of feeling deeply, of being more sincere and earnest 
in obeying their feelings. Every body who knows them can also see, 
that they feel deeply, and are influenced by the strength of their feel- 
ings, rather than by their intellect. Now, so gross is the darkness of 
most persons upon this subject, that they award praise to themselves 
and to others, just in proportion as they are sure that they are actuated 
by the depth of their feelings, rather than by their sober judgment. 

But I must not leave this subject without observing, that when com- 
passion exists as a phenomenon of the will, it will certainly also exist as 
a feeling of the sensibility. A man of a compassionate heart will also be 
a man of compassionate sensibility. He will feel and he will act. 
Nevertheless, his actions will not be the effect of his feelings, but will be 
the result of his sober judgment. Three classes of persons suppose 
themselves, and are generally supposed by others, to be truly compas- 
sionate. The one class exhibit much feeling of compassion ; but their 
compassion does not influence their will, hence they do not act for the 
relief of suffering. These content themselves with mere desires and 
tears. They say, Be ye warmed and clothed, but give not the needed 
relief. Another class feel deeply, and give up to their feelings. Of 
course they are active and energetic in the relief of suffering. But 
being governed by feeling, instead of being influenced by their intellect, 
they are not virtuous, but selfish. Their compassion is only an imposing 
form of selfishness. A third class feel deeply, but are not governed by 
blind impulses of feeling. They take a rational view of the subject, act 
wisely and energetically. They obey their reason. Their feelings do 
not lead them, neither do they seek to gratify their feelings. But these 
last are truly virtuous, and altogether the most happy of the three. 
Their feelings are all the more gratified by how much less they aim at 
the gratification. They obey their intellect, and, therefore, have the 
double satisfaction of the applause of conscience, while their feelings are 
also fully gratified by seeing their compassionate desire accomplished. 



ATTRIBUTES OP LOVE. 157 

LECTURE XIV. 

ATTRIBUTES OP LOVE. 

12. Mercy is also an attribute of benevolence. This term expresses 
a state of feeling, and represents a phenomenon of the sensibility. 
Mercy is often understood to be synonymous with compassion, but then 
it is not rightly understood. 

Mercy, considered as a phenomenon of the will, is a disposition to 
pardon crime. Such is the nature of benevolence, that it will seek the 
good even of those who deserve evil, when this can be wisely done. It 
is " ready to forgive," to seek the good of the evil and unthankful, and 
to pardon when there is repentance. It is good-will viewed in relation 
to one who deserves punishment. Mercy, considered as a feeling or phe- 
nomenon of the sensibility, is a desire for the pardon or good of one who 
deserves punishment. It is only a feeling, a desire ; of course it is in- 
voluntary, and has, in itself, no moral character. 

Mercy will, of course, manifest itself in action, and in effort to par- 
don, or to procure a pardon, unless the attribute of wisdom prevent. It 
may be unwise to pardon, or to seek the pardon of a guilty one. In 
such cases, as all the attributes of benevolence must necessarily harmo- 
nize, no effort will be made to realize its end. It was this attribute of 
benevolence, modified and limited in its exercise by wisdom and justice, 
that energized in providing the means, and in opening the way, for the 
pardon of our guilty race. 

As wisdom and justice are also attributes of benevolence, mercy can 
never manifest itself by efforts to secure its end, except in a manner and 
upon conditions that do not set aside justice and wisdom.^ No one attri- 
bute of benevolence is or can be exercised at the expense of another, or 
in opposition to it. The moral attributes of God, as has been said, are 
only attributes of benevolence, for benevolence comprehends and ex- 
presses the whole of them. From the term benevolence we learn, that 
the end upon which it fixes is good. And we must infer, too, from the 
term itself, that the means are unobjectionable ; because it is absurd to 
suppose that good would be chosen because it is good, and yet that the 
mind that makes this choice should not hesitate to use objectionable and 
injurious means to obtain its end. This would be a contradiction, to 
will good for its own sake, or out of regard to its intrinsic value, and 
then choose injurious means to accomplish this end. This cannot be. 
The mind that can fix upon the highest well-being of God and the uni- 
verse as an end, can never consent to use efforts for the accomplishment 



15S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of this end that are seen to be inconsistent with it, that is, that tend to 
prevent the highest good of being. 

Mercy, I have said, is the readiness of benevolence to pardon the 
guilty. But this attribute cannot go out in exercise, but upon conditions 
that consist with the other attributes of benevolence. Mercy as a mere 
feeling would pardon without repentance or condition ; would pardon 
without reference to public justice. But viewed in connection with the 
other attributes of benevolence, we learn that, although a real attribute 
of benevolence, yet it is not and cannot be exercised, without the fulfil- 
ment of those conditions that will secure the consent of all the other at- 
tributes of benevolence. This truth is beautifully taught and illustrated 
in the doctrine and fact of atonement, as we shall see. Indeed, without 
consideration of the various attributes of benevolence, we are necessarily 
all in the dark, and in confusion, in respect to the character and govern- 
ment of God, the spirit and meaning of his law, the spirit and mean- 
ing of the gospel, our own spiritual state, and the developments of 
character around us. Without an acquaintance with the attributes of 
love or benevolence, we shall not fail to be perplexed— to find apparent 
discrepancies in the Bible and in the divine administration — and in the 
manifestation of Christian character, both as revealed in the Bible, and 
as exhibited in common life. For example : how universalists have 
stumbled for want of consideration upon this subject ! God is love ! 
Well, without considering the attributes of this love, they infer that if 
God is love, he cannot hate sin and sinners. If he is merciful, he cannot 
punish sinners in hell, etc. Unitarians have stumbled in the same way. 
God is merciful ; that is, disposed to pardon sin. Well, then, what need 
of an atonement ? If merciful he can and will pardon upon repentance 
without atonement. But we may inquire, if he is merciful, why not par- 
don without repentance ? If his mercy alone is to be taken into view, 
that is, simply a disposition to pardon, that by itself would not wait for 
repentance. But if repentance is, and must be, a condition of the exer- 
cise of mercy, may there not be, nay, must there not be, other conditions 
of its exercise ? If wisdom and public justice are also attributes of be- 
nevolence, and conditionate the exercise of mercy, and forbid that it 
should be exercised but upon condition of repentance, why may they not, 
nay, why must they not, equally conditionate its exercise upon such a 
satisfaction of public justice, as would secure as full and as deep a respect 
for the law, as the execution of its penalty would do ? In other words, 
if wisdom and justice be attributes of benevolence, and conditionate the 
exercise of mercy upon repentance, why may and .must they not also 
conditionate its exercise upon the fact of an atonement ? As mercy is 
an attribute of benevolence, it will naturally and inevitably direct the at- 
tention of the intellect to devising ways and means to render the exer- 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 159 

cise of mercy consistent with the other attributes of benevolence. It 
will employ the intelligence in devising means to secure the repentance 
of the sinner, and to remove all the obstacles out of the way of its free 
and full exercise. It will also secure the state of feeling which is also 
called mercy, or compassion. Hence it is certain, that mercy will secure 
efforts to procure the repentance and pardon of sinners. It will secure 
a deep yearning in the sensibility over them, and energetic action to ac- 
complish its end, that is, to secure their repentance and pardon. This 
attribute of benevolence led the Father to give his only-begotten and 
well-beloved Son, and it led the Son to give himself to die, to secure the 
repentance and pardon of sinners. It is this attribute of benevolence 
that leads the Holy Spirit to make such mighty and protracted efforts to 
secure the repentance of sinners. It is also this attribute that energized 
in prophets, and apostles, and martyrs, and saints of every age, to secure 
the conversion of the lost in sin. It is an amiable attribute. All its 
sympathies are sweet, and tender, and kind as heaven. 

13. Justice is an attribute of benevolence. 

This term also expresses a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. 
As an attribute of benevolence, it is the opposite of mercy, when viewed 
in its relations to crime. It consists in a disposition to treat every moral 
agent according to his intrinsic desert or merit. In its relations to crime, 
the criminal, and the public, it consists in a tendency to punish accord- 
ing to law. Mercy would pardon — justice would punish for the public 
good. 

Justice, as a feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, is a feeling that 
the guilty deserves punishment, and a desire that he may be punished. 
This is an involuntary feeling, and has no moral character. It is often 
strongly excited, and is frequently the cause of mobs and popular com- 
motions. When it takes the control of the will, as it often does with 
sinners, it leads to what is popularly called lynching, and a resort to 
those summary methods of executing vengeance which are so appalling. 

I have said that the mere desire has no moral character. But when 
the will is governed by this desire, and yields itself up to seek its grati- 
fication, this state of will is selfishness under one of its most odious and 
frightful forms. Under the providence of God, however, this form of 
selfishness, like every other in its turn, is overruled for good, like earth- 
quakes, tornadoes, pestilence, and war, to purify the moral elements of 
society, and scourge away those moral nuisances with which communi- 
ties are sometimes infested. Even war itself is often but an instance and 
an illustration of this. 

Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is virtue, and exhibits itself 
in the execution of the penalties of the law, and in support of public 
order, and in various other ways for the well-being of mankind. There 



160 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

are several modifications of this attribute. That is, it may and must be 
viewed under various aspects, and in various relations. One of these is 
public justice. This is a regard to the public interests, and secures a 
due administration of law for the public good. It will in no case suffer 
the execution of the penalty to be set aside, unless something be done to 
support the authority of the law and of the lawgiver. It also secures 
the due administration of rewards, and looks narrowly after the public 
interests, always insisting that the greater interest shall prevail over the 
lesser ; that private interest shall never set aside or prejudice a public 
one of greater value. Public justice is modified in its exercise by the 
attribute of mercy. It conditionates the exercise of mercy, and mercy 
conditionates its exercise. Mercy cannot, consistently with this attri- 
bute, extend a pardon but upon conditions of repentance, and an equiva- 
lent being rendered to the government. So, on the other hand, justice 
is conditionated by mercy, and cannot, consistently with that attribute, 
proceed to take vengeance when the highest good does not require it, 
when punishment can be dispensed with without public loss. Thus these 
attributes mutually limit each other's exercise, and render the whole 
character of benevolence perfect, symmetrical, and heavenly. 

Justice is reckoned among the sterner attributes of benevolence ; but 
it is indispensable to the filling up of the entire circle of moral perfec- 
tions. Although solemn and awful, and sometimes inexpressibly ter- 
rific in its exercise, it is nevertheless one of the glorious modifications 
and manifestations of benevolence. Benevolence without justice would 
be anything but morally lovely and perfect. Nay, it could not be 
benevolence. This attribute of benevolence appears conspicuous in the 
character of God as revealed in his law, in his gospel, and sometimes as 
indicated most impressively by his providence. 

It is also conspicuous in the history of inspired men. The Psalms 
abound with expressions of this attribute. We find many prayers 
for the punishment of the wicked. Samuel hewed Agag in pieces ; 
and David's writings abound in expressions that show, that this attri- 
bute was strongly developed in his mind ; and the circumstances under 
which he was placed, often rendered it proper to express and manifest 
in various ways the spirit of this attribute. Many have stumbled at 
such prayers, expressions, and manifestations as are here alluded to. 
But this is for want of due consideration. They have supposed that 
such exhibitions were inconsistent with a right spirit. Oh, they say, 
how unevangelical ! How un-Christ-iike ! How inconsistent with the 
sweet and heavenly spirit of Christ and of the gospel ! But this is all a 
mistake. These prayers were dictated by the Spirit of Christ. Such, 
exhibitions are only the manifestations of one of the essential attributes 
of benevolence. Those sinners deserved to die. It was for the greatest 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 161 

good that they should be made a public example. This the Spirit of 
inspiration knew, and such prayers, under such circumstances, are only 
an expression of the mind and will of God. They are truly the spirit 
of justice pronouncing sentence upon them. These prayers and such- 
like things found in the Bible, are no vindication of the spirit of fanati- 
cism and denunciation that so often have taken shelter under them. 
As well might fanatics burn cities and lay waste countries, and seek 
to justify themselves by an appeal to the destruction of the old world by 
flood, and the destruction of the cities of the plain by fire and brimstone. 

Ketributive justice is another modification of this attribute. This 
consists in a disposition to visit the offender with that punishment 
which he deserves, because it is fit and proper that a moral agent should 
be dealt with according to his deeds. In a future lecture I shall enlarge 
upon this modification of justice. 

Another modification of this attribute is commercial justice. This 
consists in willing exact equivalents, and uprightness in business and all 
secular transactions. There are some other modifications of this attri- 
bute, but the foregoing may suffice to illustrate sufficiently the various 
departments over which this attribute presides. 

This attribute, though stern in its spirit and manifestations, is 
nevertheless one of prime importance in all governments by moral 
agents, whether human or divine. Indeed, without it government 
could not exist. It is vain for certain philosophers to think to disparage 
this attribute, and to dispense with it altogether in the administration 
of government. They will, if they try the experiment, find to their cost 
and confusion, that no one attribute of benevolence can say to another, 
"I have no need of thee." In short, let any one attribute of benevo- 
lence be destroyed or overlooked, and you have destroyed its perfection, 
its beauty, its harmony, its propriety, its glory. You have, in fact, 
destroyed benevolence ; it is no longer benevolence, but a sickly, and 
inefficient, and limping sentimentalism, that has no God, no virtue, no 
beauty, nor form, nor comeliness in it, that when we see it we should 
desire it. 

This attribute stands by, nay, it executes law. It aims to secure 
commercial honesty. It aims to secure public and private integrity 
and tranquillity. It says to violence, disorder, and injustice, Peace, be 
still, and there must be a great calm. We see the evidences and the 
illustrations of this attribute in the thunderings of Sinai, and in the 
agony of Calvary. We hear it in the wail of a world when the fountains 
of the great deep were broken up, and when the windows of heaven 
were opened, and the floods descended, and the population of a globe 
was swallowed up. We see its manifestations in the descending tor- 
rent that swept over the cities of the plain ; and lastly, we shall for- 
11 



162 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ever see its bright, but awful and glorious displays, in the dark and 
curling folds of that pillar of smoke of the torment of the damned, that 
ascends up before God forever and ever. 

Many seem to be afraid to contemplate justice as an attribute of 
benevolence. Any manifestation of it among men, causes them to re- 
coil and shudder as if they saw a demon. But let it have its place in 
the glorious circle of moral attributes ; it must have — it will have — it 
cannot be otherwise. Whenever any policy of government is adopted, in 
family or state, that excludes the exercise of this attribute, all must be 
failure, defeat, and ruin. 

Again : Justice being an attribute of benevolence, will prevent the 
punishment of the finally impenitent from diminishing the happiness of 
God and of holy beings. They will never delight in misery for its own 
sake ; but they will take pleasure in the administration of justice. So 
that when the smoke of the torment of the damned comes up in the sight 
of heaven, they will, as they are represented, shout " Alleluia ! the Lord 
God Omnipotent reigneth;" "Just and righteous are thy ways, thou 
King of saints ! " 

Before I pass from the consideration of this topic, I must not omit to 
insist, that where true benevolence is, there must be exact commercial 
justice, or business honesty and integrity. This is as certain as that 
benevolence exists. The rendering of exact equivalents, or the intention 
to do so, must be a characteristic of a truly benevolent mind. Impul- 
sive benevolence may exist ; that is, phrenological or constitutional 
benevolence, falsely so called, may exist to any extent, and yet justice 
not exist. The mind may be much and very often carried away by the 
impulse of feeling, so that a man may at times have the appearance of 
true benevolence, while the same individual is selfish in business, and 
overreaching in all his commercial relations. This has been a wonder 
and au enigma to mauy, but the case is a plain one. The difficulty is, 
the man is not just, that is, not truly benevolent. His benevolence is 
only an imposing species of selfishness. " He that hath an ear to hear, 
let him hear." His benevolence results from feeling, and is not true 
benevolence. 

Again : Where benevolence is, the golden rule will surely be observed: 
" Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to 
them." The justice of benevolence cannot fail to secure conformity to 
this rule. Benevolence is a just state of the will. It is a willing justly. 
It must then, by a law of necessity, secure just conduct. If the heart is 
just, the life must be. 

This attribute of benevolence must secure its possessor against every 
species and degree of injustice ; he cannot be unjust to his neighbor's 
reputation, his person, his property, his soul, his body, nor indeed be 



ATTRIBUTES OP LOVE. 1G3 

unjust in any respect to man or God. It will and must secure confession 
and restitution, in every case of remembered wrong, so far as this is 
practicable. It should be distinctly understood, that a benevolent or a 
truly religious man cannot be unjust. He may indeed appear to be so 
to others ; but he cannot be truly religious or benevolent, and unjust at 
the same time. If he appears to be so in any instance, he is not and 
cannot be really so, if he is at the time in a benevolent state of mind. 
The attributes of selfishness, as we shall see in the proper place, are the 
direct opposite of those of benevolence. The two states of mind are as 
contrary as heaven and hell, and can no more co-exist in the same mind, 
than a thing can be and not be at the same time. I said, that if a man, 
truly in the exercise of benevolence, appears to be unjust in any thing, 
he is only so in appearance, and not in fact. Observe, I am speaking 
of one who is really at the time in a benevolent state of mind. He may 
mistake, and do that which would be unjust, did he see it differently 
and intend differently. Justice and injustice belong to the intention. 
No outward act can in itself be either just or unjust. To say that a 
man, in the exercise of a truly benevolent intention, can at the same 
time be unjust, is the same absurdity as to say, that he can intend justly 
and unjustly at the same time, and in regard to the same thing ; which 
is a contradiction. It must all along be borne in mind, that benevolence 
is one identical thing, to wit, good-will, willing for its own sake the 
highest good of being and every known good according to its relative 
value. Consequently, it is impossible that justice should not be an at- 
tribute of such a choice. Justice consists in regarding arid treating, or 
rather in willing, every thing just agreeably to its nature, or intrinsic 
and relative value and relations. To say, therefore, that present benevo- 
lence admits of any degree of present injustice, is to affirm a palpable 
contradiction. A just man is a sanctified man, is a perfect man, in the 
sense that he is at present in an upright state. 

14. Veracity is another attribute of benevolence. 

Veracity, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that adheres 
to truth. In the very act of becoming benevolent, the mind embraces 
truth, or the reality of things. Then veracity must be one of the quali- 
ties of benevolence. Veracity is truthfulness. It is the conformity of 
the will to the reality of things. Truth in statement is conformity of 
statement to the reality of things. Truth in action is action conformed 
to the nature and relations of things. Truthfulness is a disposition to 
conform to the reality of things. It is willing in accordance with the 
reality of things. It is willing the right end by the right means. It is 
willing the intrinsically valuable as an end, and the relatively valuable 
as a means. In short, it is the willing of every thing according to the 
reality or facts in the case. 



161 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Veracity, then, must be an attribute of benevolence. It is, like all 
the attributes, only benevolence viewed in a certain aspect or relation. It 
can not be distinguished from benevolence, for it is not distinct from it, 
but only a phase or form of benevolence. The universe is so constituted 
that if every thing proceeded and were conducted, and willed according 
to its nature and relations, the highest possible good must result. Vera- 
city seeks the good as an end, and truth as a means to secure this end. 
It wills the good, and that it shall be secured only by means of truth. 
It wills truth in the end, and trnth in the means. The end is truly 
valuable, and chosen for that reason. The means are truth, and truth 
is the only appropriate or possible means. 

Truthfulness of heart begets, of course, a state of the sensibility which 
we call the love of truth. It is a feeling of pleasure that spontaneously 
arises in the sensibility of one whose heart is truthful, in contemplating 
truth; this feeling is not virtue, it is rather apart of the reward of 
truthfulness of heart. 

Veracity, as a phenomenon of the will, is also often called, and prop- 
erly called, a love of the truth. It is a willing in accordance with object- 
ive truth. This is virtue, and is an attribute of benevolence. Veracity, 
as an attribute of the divine benevolence, is the condition of confidence 
in God as a moral governor. Both the physical and moral laws of the 
universe evince, and are instances and illustrations of the truthfulness of 
God. Falsehood, in the sense of lying, is naturally regarded by a moral 
agent with disapprobation, disgust, and abhorrence. Veracity is as 
necessarily regarded by him with approbation, and, if the will be benevo- 
lent, with pleasure. We necessarily take pleasure in contemplating ob- 
jective truth, as it lies in idea on the field of consciousness. We also take 
pleasure in the perception and contemplation of truthfulness, in the con- 
crete realization of the idea of truth. Veracity is morally beautiful. 
We are pleased with it just as we are with natural beauty, by a law of 
necessity, when the necessary conditions are fulfilled. This attribute of 
benevolence secures it against every attempt to promote the ultimate good 
of being by means of falsehood. True benevolence will no more, can no 
more, resort to falsehood as a means of promoting good, than it can con- 
tradict or deny itself. The intelligence affirms, that the highest ultimate 
good can be secured only by a strict adherence to truth. The mind cannot 
be satisfied with anything else. Indeed, to suppose the contrary is to 
suppose a contradiction. It is the same absurdity as to suppose, that the 
highest good could be secured only by the violation and setting aside of 
the nature and relations of things. Since the intellect affirms this un- 
alterable relation of truth to the highest ultimate good, benevolence, or 
that attribute of benevolence which we denominate veracity or love of 
the truth, can no more consent to falsehood, than it can consent to re- 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 165 

linquish the highest good of being as an end. Therefore, every resort to 
falsehood, every pious fraud, falsely so called, presents only a specious 
but real instance of selfishness. A moral agent cannot lie for God ; that 
is, he cannot tell a sinful falsehood, thinking and intending thereby to 
please God. He knows, by intuition, that God cannot be pleased or 
truly served by a resort to lying. There is a great difference between 
concealing or withholding the truth for benevolent purposes, and telling 
a wilful falsehood. An innocent persecuted and pursued man, has taken, 
shelter under my roof from one who pursued him to shed his blood. 
His pursuer comes and inquires after him. I am not under obligation 
to declare to him the fact that he is in my house. I may, and indeed 
ought to withhold the truth in this instance, for the wretch has no right 
to know it. The public and highest good demands that he should not 
know it. He only desires to know it for selfish and bloody purposes. 
But in this case I should not feel or judge myself at liberty to state a 
known falsehood. I could not think that this would ultimately conduce 
to the highest good. The person might go away deceived, or under the 
impression that his victim was not there. But he could not accuse me 
of telling him a lie. He might have drawn his own inference from my 
refusing to give the desired information. But even to secure my own 
life or the life of my friend, I am not at liberty to tell a lie. If it be 
said that lying implies telling a falsehood for selfish purposes, and that, 
therefore, it is not lying to tell a falsehood for benevolent purposes, I 
reply, that our nature is such that we can no more state a wilful false- 
hood with a benevolent intention, .than we can commit a sin with a 
benevolent intention. We necessarily regard falsehood as inconsistent 
with the highest good of being, just as we regard sin as inconsistent with 
the highest good of being, or just as we regard holiness and truthful- 
ness as the indispensable condition of the highest good of being. The 
correlation of the will and the intellect forbids the mistake that wilful 
falsehood is, or can be, the means or condition of the highest good. 
Universal veracity, then, will always characterize a truly benevolent 
man. While he is truly benevolent, he is, he must be, faithful, truth- 
ful. So far as his knowledge goes, his statements may be depended 
upon with as much safety as the statements of an angel. Veracity is 
necessarily an attribute of benevolence in all beings. No liar has, or 
can have, a particle of true virtue or benevolence in him. 



166 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XV. 

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 

15. Patience is another attribute of benevolence. 

This term is frequently used to express a phenomenon of the sensi- 
bility. When thus used, it designates a calm and unruffled state of the 
sensibility or feelings, under circumstances that tend to excite anger or 
impatience of feeling. The calmness of the sensibility, or patience as a 
phenomenon of the sensibility, is purely an involuntary state of mind, 
and although it is a pleasing and amiable manifestation, yet it is not 
properly virtue. It may be, and often is, an effect of patience as a phe- 
nomenon of the will, and therefore an effect of virtue. But it is not 
itself virtue. This amiable temper may, and often does, proceed from 
constitutional temperament, and from circumstances and habits. 

Patience as a virtue must be a voluntary state of mind. It must be 
an attribute of love or benevolence ; for all virtue, as we have seen, and 
as the Bible teaches, is resolvable into love or benevolence. The Greek 
term, upomone, so often rendered patience in the New Testament, means 
perseverance under trials, continuance, bearing up under affliction, or 
privations, steadfastness of purpose in despite of obstacles. The word 
may be used in a good or in a bad sense. Thus a selfish man may patient- 
ly, that is perseveringly , pursue his end, and may bear up under much 
opposition to his course. This is patience as an attribute of selfishness, 
and patience in a bad sense of the term. Patience in the good sense, or' 
in the sense in which I am considering it, is an attribute of benevolence. 
It is the quality of constancy, a fixedness, a bearing up under trials, 
afflictions, crosses, persecutions, or discouragements. This must be an 
attribute of benevolence. Whenever patience ceases, when it holds out 
no longer, when discouragement prevails, and the will relinquishes its 
end, benevolence ceases, as a matter of course. 

Patience as a phenomenon of the will, tends to patience as a phenome- 
non of the sensibility. That is, the quality of fixedness and steadfast- 
ness in the intention naturally tends to keep down and allay impatience 
of temper. As, however, the states of the sensibility are not directly 
under the control of the will, there may be irritable or impatient feel- 
ings, when the heart remains steadfast. Facts or falsehoods may be 
suggested to the mind which may, in despite of the will, produce a 
ruffling of the sensibility, even when the heart remains patient. The 
only way in which a temptation, for it is only a temptation while the 
will abides firm to its purpose. I say the only way in which a temptation 
of this kind can be disposed of, is by diverting the attention from that 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 167 

view of the subject that creates the disturbance in the sensibility. I 
should have said before, that although the will controls the feelings 
by a law of necessity, yet, as it does not do so directly, but indirectly, 
it may, and does often happen, that feelings corresponding to the state 
of the will do not exist in the sensibility. Nay, for a time, a state 
of the sensibility may exist which is the opposite of the state of the will. 
From this source arise many, and indeed most, of our temptations. 
We could never be properly tried or tempted at all, if the feelings must 
always, by a law of necessity, correspond with the state of the will. 
Sin consists in willing to gratify our feelings or constitutional impulses, 
in opposition to the law of our reason. But if these desires and im- 
pulses could never exist in opposition to the law of the reason, and, 
consequently, in opposition to a present holy choice, then a holy being 
could not be tempted. He could have no motive or occasion to sin. If 
our mother Eve could have had no feelings of desire in opposition to 
the state of her will, she never could have desired the forbidden fruit, 
and of course would not have sinned. I wish now, to state distinctly 
what I should have said before, that the state or choice of the will 
does not necessarily so control the feelings, desires, or emotions, that 
these may never be strongly excited by Satan or by circumstances, 
in opposition to the will, and thus become powerful temptations to seek 
their gratification, instead of seeking the highest good of being. Feel- 
ings, the gratification of which would be opposed to every attribute 
of benevolence, may at times co-exist with benevolence, and be a tempta- 
tion to selfishness ; but opposing acts of will cannot co-exist with benevo- 
lence. All that can be truly said is, that as the will has an indirect 
control of the feelings, desires, appetites, passions, etc., it can suppress 
any class of feelings when they arise, by diverting the attention from 
their causes, or by taking into consideration such views and facts as will 
calm or change the state of the sensibility. Irritable feelings, or what 
is commonly called impatience, may be directly caused by ill health, 
irritable nerves, and by many things over which the will has no direct 
control. But this is not impatience in the sense of sin. If these feel- 
ings are not suffered to influence the will ; if the will abides in patience ; 
if such feelings are not cherished, and are not suffered to shake the 
integrity of the will ; they are not sin. That is, the will does not con- 
sent to them, but the contrary. They are only temptations. If they 
are allowed to control the will, to break forth in words and actions, 
then there is sin ; but the sin does not consist in the feelings, but in 
the consent of the will to gratify them. Thus, the apostle says, "Be ye 
angry, and sin not : let not the sun go down upon your wrath." That 
is, if anger arise in the feelings and sensibility, do not sin by suffering it 
to control your will. Do not cherish the feeling, and let not the sun 



168 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

go down upon it. For this cherishing it is sin. When it is cherished, 
the will consents and broods over the cause of it ; this is sin. But if it 
be not cherished, it is not sin. 

That the outward actions will correspond with the states and actions 
of the will, provided no physical obstacle be opposed to them, is a uni- 
versal truth. But that feelings and desires cannot exist contrary to the 
states or decisions of the will, is not true. If this were a universal 
truth, temptation, as I have said, could not exist. The outward actions 
will be as the will is, always ; the feelings, generally. Feelings corre- 
sponding to the choice of the will, will be the rule, and opposing feelings 
the exception. But these exceptions may and do exist in perfectly holy 
beings. They existed in Eve before she consented to sin, and had she 
resisted them she had not sinned. They doubtless existed in Christ, or 
he could not have been tempted in all points like as we are. If there be 
no desires or impulses of the sensibility contrary to the state of the will, 
there is not properly any temptation. The desire or impulse must 
appear on the field of consciousness, before it is a motive to action, and 
of course before it is a temptation to self-indulgence. Just as certainly 
then as a holy being may be tempted, and not sin, just so certain it is 
that emotions of any kind, or of any strength, may exist in the sensibil- 
ity without sin. If they are not indulged, if the will does not consent 
to them, and to their indulgence or gratification, the soul is not the less 
virtuous for their presence. Patience as a phenomenon of the will must 
strengthen and gird itself under such circumstances, so that patience of 
will may be, and if it exist at all, must be, in exact proportion to the 
impatience of the sensibility. The more impatience of sensibility there 
is, the more patience of will there must be, or virtue will cease alto- 
gether. So that it is not always true, that virtue is strongest when the 
sensibility is most calm, placid, and patient. When Christ passed 
through his greatest conflicts, his virtue as a man was undoubtedly 
most intense. When in his agony in the garden, so great was the an- 
guish of his sensibility, that he sweat as it were great drops of blood. 
This, he says, was the hour of the prince of darkness. This was his 
great trial. But did he sin ? No, indeed. But why ? Was he calm 
and placid as a summer's evening ? As far from it as possible. 

Patience, then, as an attribute of benevolence, consists, not in placid 
feeling, but in perseverance under trials and states of the sensibility 
that tend to selfishness. This is only benevolence viewed in a certain 
aspect. It is benevolence under circumstances of discouragement, of 
trial, or temptation. " This is the patience of the saints." 

Before dismissing the subject of patience as an emotion, I would 
observe that, the steadfastness of the heart tends so strongly to secure 
patience, that if an opposite state of the sensibility is more than of mo- 



ATTRIBUTES OP LOVE. 169 

men tary duration, there is strong presumption that the heart is not stead- 
fast in love. The first risings of it will produce an immediate effort to 
suppress it. If it continues, this is evidence that the attention is allowed 
to dwell upon the cause of it. This shows that the will is in some sense 
indulging it. 

If it so far influences the will as to manifest itself in impatient words 
and actions, there must be a yielding of the will. Patience, as an attri- 
bute of benevolence, is overcome. If the sensibility were perfectly and 
directly under the control of the will, the least degree of impatience 
would imply sin. But as it is not directly, but indirectly under the con- 
trol of the will, momentary impatience of feeling, when it does not at 
all influence the will, and when it is not at all indulged, is not sure evi- 
dence of a sinful state of the will. It should always be borne in mind, 
that neither patience nor impatience, in the form of mere feeling, exist- 
ing for any length of time, and in any degree, is in itself either holy on 
the one hand, or sinful on the other. All that can be said of these 
states of the sensibility is, that they indicate, as a general thing, the at- 
titude of the will. When the will is for a long time steadfast in its 
patience, the result is great equanimity of temper, and great patience of 
feeling. This comes to be a law of the sensibility, insomuch that very 
advanced saints may, and doubtless do, experience the most entire pa- 
tience of feeling for many years together. This does not constitute their 
holiness, but is a sweet fruit of it. It is to be regarded rather in the 
light of a reward of holiness, than as holiness itself. 

16. Another attribute of benevolence is Meekness. 

Meekness, considered as a virtue, is a phenomenon of the will. This 
term also expresses a state of the sensibility. When used to designate a 
phenomenon of the sensibility, it is nearly synonymous with patience. 
It designates a sweet and forbearing temper under provocation. Meek- 
ness, a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of benevolence, is 
the opposite both of resistance to injury and retaliation. It is properly 
and strictly forbearance under injurious treatment. This certainly is an 
attribute of God, as our existence and our being out of hell plainly 
demonstrate. Christ said of himself that he was " meek and lowly in 
heart ;" and this surely was no vain boast. How admirably, and how 
incessantly did this attribute of his love manifest itself ! The fifty- third 
chapter of Isaiah is a prophecy exhibiting this attribute in a most affect- 
ing light. Indeed, scarcely any feature of the character of God and of 
Christ is more strikingly exhibited than this. It must evidently be an 
attribute of benevolence. Benevolence is good-will to all beings. We 
are naturally forbearing toward those whose good we honestly and dili- 
gently seek. If our hearts are set upon doing them good, we shall natu- 
rally exercise great forbearance toward them. God has greatly com- 



170 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

mended his forbearance to us, in that, while we were yet his enemies, he 
forbore to punish us, and gave his Son to die for us. Forbearance is a 
sweet and amiable attribute. How affectingly it displayed itself in the 
hall of Pilate, and on the cross. " He is led as a lamb to the slaughter, 
and as a sheep before its shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth." 

This attribute has in this world abundant opportunity to develop 
and display itself in the saints. There are daily occasions for the exer- 
cise of this form of virtue. Indeed, all the attributes of benevolence are 
called into frequent exercise in this school of discipline. This is indeed 
a suitable world in which to train God's children, to develop and 
strengthen every modification of holiness. This attribute must always 
appear where benevolence exists, and wherever there is an occasion for 
its exercise. 

It is delightful to contemplate the perfection and glory of that love 
which constitutes obedience to the law of God. As occasions arise, we 
behold it developing one attribute after another, and there may be many 
of its attributes and modifications of which we have as yet no idea what- 
ever. Circumstances will call them into exercise. It is probable, if not 
certain, that the attributes of benevolence were very imperfectly known 
in heaven previous to the existence of sin in the universe, and that but 
for sin many of these attributes would never have been manifested in ex- 
ercise. But the existence of sin, great as the evil is, has afforded an op- 
portunity for benevolence to manifest its beautiful phases, and to de- 
velop its sweet attributes in a most enchanting manner. Thus the 
divine economy of benevolence brings good out of so great an evil. 

A hasty and unforbearing spirit is always demonstrative evidence of a 
want of benevolence, or of true religion. Meekness is, and must be, a 
peculiar characteristic of the saints in this world, where there is so much 
provocation. Christ frequently and strongly enforced the obligation to 
forbearance. " But I say unto you that ye resist not evil ; but whoso- 
ever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. 
And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him 
have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go 
with him twain." How beautiful ! 

17. Humility is another modification or attribute of love. 

This term seems often to be used to express a sense of unworthiness, 
of guilt, of ignorance, and of nothingness, to express a feeling of ill- 
desert. It seems to be used in common language to express sometimes 
a state of the intelligence, when it seems to indicate a clear perception of 
our guilt. When used to designate a state of the sensibility, it represents 
those feelings of shame and unworthiness, of ignorance, and of nothing- 
ness, of which those are most deeply conscious who have been enlight- 
ened by the Holy Spirit, in respect to their true character. 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 171 

But as a phenomenon of the will, and as an attribute of love, it 
consists in a willingness to be known and appreciated according to our 
real character. Humility, as a phenomenon either of the sensibility or 
of the intelligence, may co-exist with great pride of heart. Pride is 
a disposition to exalt self, to get above others, to hide our defects, and 
to pass for more than we are. Deep conviction of sin, and deep feelings of 
shame, of ignorance, and of desert of hell, may co-exist with a great un- 
willingness to confess and be known just as we are, and to be appreciated 
just according to what our real character has been and is. There is no 
virtue in such humility. But humility, considered as a virtue, consists in 
the consent of the will to be known, to confess, and to take our proper 
place in the scale of being. It is that peculiarity of love that wills the 
good of being so disinterestedly, as to will to pass for no other than 
we really are. This is an honest, a sweet, and amiable feature of love. 
It must, perhaps, be peculiar to those who have sinned. It is only love 
acting under or in a certain relation, or in reference to a peculiar set of 
circumstances. It would, under the same circumstances, develop and 
manifest itself in all truly benevolent minds. This attribute will render 
confession of sin to God and man natural, and even make it a luxury. 
It is easy to see that, but for this attribute, the saints could not be 
happy in heaven. God has promised to bring into judgment every work 
and every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil. Now 
while pride exists, it would greatly pain the soul to have all the charac- 
ter known ; so that, unless this attribute really belongs to the saints, 
they would be ashamed at the judgment, and filled with confusion even 
in heaven itself. But this sweet attribute will secure them against that 
shame and confusion of face that would otherwise render heaven itself a 
hell to them. They will be perfectly willing and happy to be known 
and estimated according to their characters. This attribute will secure 
in all the saints on earth that confession of faults one to another, which 
is so often enjoined in the Bible. By this it is not intended, that Chris- 
tians always think it wise and necessary to make confession of all their 
secret sins to man. But it is intended, that they will confess to those 
whom they have injured, and to all to whom benevolence demands that 
they should confess. This attribute secures its possessor against spiritual 
pride, against ambition to get above others. It is a modest and unas- 
suming state of mind. 

18. Self-denial is another attribute of love. 

If we love any being better than ourselves, we of course deny ourselves . 
when our own interests come in competition with his. Love is good-will. 
If I will good to others more than to myself, it is absurd to say that I\ 
shall not deny myself when my own inclinations conflict with their good. 
Now the love required by the law of God, we have repeatedly seen to be 



172 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

good will, or willing the highest good of being for its own sake, or as an 
end. As the interests of self are not at all regarded because they belong to 
self, but only according to their relative value, it must be certain, that 
self-denial for the sake of promoting the higher interests of God and of 
the universe, is and must be a peculiarity or attribute of love. 

But again : the very idea of disinterested benevolence, and there is 
no other true benevolence, implies the abandonment of the spirit of self- 
seeking, or of selfishness. It is impossible to become benevolent, with- 
out ceasing to be selfish. In other words, perfect self-denial is implied 
in beginning to be benevolent. Self-indulgence ceases where benevolence 
begins. This must be. Benevolence is the consecration of our powers 
to the highest good of being in general as an end. This is utterly incon- 
sistent with consecration to self-interest or self-gratification. Selfishness 
jnakes good to self the end of every choice. Benevolence makes good to 
being in general the end of every choice. Benevolence, then, implies 
complete self-denial. That is, it implies that nothing is chosen merely 
because it belongs to self, but only because of its relative value, and in 
proportion to it. 

I said there was no true benevolence, but disinterested benevolence ; 
no true love, but disinterested love. There is such a thing as interested 
love or benevolence. That is, the good of others is willed, though not as 
an end, or for its intrinsic value to them, but as a means of our own 
happiness, or because of its relative value to us. Thus a man might will 
the good of his family, or of his neighborhood, or country, or of anybody, 
or anything that sustained such relations to self as to involve his own in- 
terests. When the ultimate reason of his willing good to others is, that 
his own may be promoted, this is selfishness. It is making good to self 
his end. This a sinner may do toward God, toward the church, and to- 
ward the interests of religion in general. This is what I call interested 
benevolence. It is willing good as an end only to self, and to all others 
only as a means of promoting our own good. 

But again : when the will is governed by mere feeling in willing the 
good of others, this is only the spirit of self-indulgence, and is only in- 
terested benevolence. For example : the feeling of compassion is strongly 
excited by the presence of misery. The feeling is intense, and consti- 
tutes, like all the feelings, a strong impulse or motive to the will to con- 
sent to its gratification. For the time being, this impulse is stronger 
than the feeling of avarice, or any other feeling. I yield to it, and then 
give all the money I have to relieve the sufferer. I even take my clothes 
from my back, and give them to him. Now in this case, I am just as 
selfish as if I had sold my clothes to gratify my appetite for strong 
drink. The gratification of my feelings was my end. This is one of the 
most specious and most delusive forms of selfishness. 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 173 

Again : when one makes his own salvation the end of prayer, of alms- 
giving, and of all his religious duties, this is only selfishness and not true 
religion, however much he may abound in them. This is only inter- 
ested benevolence, or benevolence to self. 

Again : from the very nature of true benevolence, it is impossible that 
every interest should not be regarded according to its relative value. 
When another interest is seen by me to be more valuable in itself, or of 
more value to God and the universe than my own, and when I see that, by 
denying myself, I can promote it, it is certain, if I am benevolent, that 
I shall do it. I cannot fail to do it, without failing to be benevolent. 
Benevolence is an honest and disinterested consecration of the whole be- 
ing to the highest good of God and of the universe. The benevolent 
man will, therefore, and must, honestly weigh each interest as it is per- 
ceived in the balance of his own best judgment, and will always give the 
preference to the higher interest, provided he believes, that he can by 
endeavor, and by self-denial, secure it. 

That self-denial is an attribute of the divine love, is manifested most 
gloriously and affectingly in God's gift of his Son to die for men. This 
attribute was also most conspicuously manifested by Christ, in denying 
himself, and taking up his cross, and suffering for his enemies. Observe, 
it was not for friends that Christ gave himself. It was not unfortunate 
nor innocent sufferers for whom God gave his Son, or for whom he gave 
himself. It was for enemies. It was not that he might make slaves of 
them that he gave his Son, nor from any selfish consideration whatever, 
but because he foresaw that, by making this sacrifice himself, he could 
secure to the universe a greater good than he should sacrifice. It was 
this attribute of benevolence that caused him to give his Son to suffer so 
much. It was disinterested benevolence alone that led him to deny 
himself, for the sake of a greater good to the universe. Now observe, 
this sacrifice would not have been made, unless it had been regarded by 
God as the less of two natural evils. That is, the sufferings of Christ, 
great and overwhelming as they were, were considered as an evil of less 
magnitude than the eternal sufferings of sinners. This induced him to 
make the sacrifice, although for his enemies. It mattered not whether 
for friends or for enemies, if so be he could, by making a less sacrifice 
secure a greater good to them. 

Let it be understood, that a self-indulgent spirit is never, and can never 
be, consistent with benevolence. No form of self-indulgence, properly 
so called, can exist where true benevolence exists. The fact is, self-denial 
must be, and universally is, wherever benevolence reigns. Christ has ex- 
pressly made whole-hearted self-denial a condition of discipleship ; which 
is the same thing as to affirm, that it is an essential attribute of holiness 
or love ; that there cannot be the beginning of true virtue without it. 



174: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Again : much that passes for self-denial is only a specious form of 
self-indulgence. The penances and self-mortifications, as they are falsely 
called, of the superstitious, what are they after all but a self-indulgent 
spirit ? A popish priest abstains from marriage to obtain the honor, and 
emoluments, and the influence of the priestly office here, and eternal 
glory hereafter. A nun takes the veil and a monk immures himself in 
a monastery ; a hermit forsakes human society, and shuts himself up in 
a cave ; a devotee makes a pilgrimage to Mecca, and a martyr goes to 
the stake. Now if these things are done with an ultimate reference to 
their own glory and happiness, although apparently instances of great 
self-denial, yet they are, in fact, only a spirit of self-indulgence and self- 
seeking. They are only following the strongest desire of good to self. 

There are many mistakes upon this subject. For example : it is com- 
mon for persons to deny self in one form, for the sake of gratifying self 
in another form. In. one man avarice is the ruling passion. He will 
labor hard, rise early, and sit up late, eat the bread of carefulness and 
deny himself even the necessaries of life, for the sake of accumulating 
wealth. Every one can see, that this is denying self in one form merely 
for the sake of gratifying self in another form. Yet this man will com- 
plain bitterly of the self-indulgent spirit manifested by others, their ex- 
travagance and want of piety. One man will deny all his bodily appe- 
tites and passions, for the sake of a reputation with men. This is also 
an instance of the same kind. Another will give the fruit of his body 
for the sin of his soul — will sacrifice everything else to obtain an eternal 
inheritance, and be just as selfish as the man who sacrifices to the things 
of time, his soul and all the riches of eternity. 

But it should be remarked, that this attribute of benevolence does 
and must secure the subjugation of all the propensities. It must, either 
suddenly or gradually, so far subdue and quiet them, that their impe- 
rious clamor must cease. They will, as it were, be slain, either suddenly 
or gradually, so that the sensibility will become, in a great measure, dead 
to those objects that so often and so easily excited it. It is a law of the 
sensibility — of all the desires and passions, that their indulgence de- 
velops and strengthens them, and their denial suppresses them. Be- 
nevolence consists in a refusal to gratify the sensibility, and in obeying 
the reason. Therefore it must be true, that this denial of the propensi- 
ties will greatly suppress them ; while the indulgence of the intellect 
and of the conscience will greatly develop them. Thus selfishness tends 
to stultify, while benevolence tends greatly to strengthen the intellect. 

19. Condescension is another attribute of love. 

This attribute consists in a tendency to descend to the poor, the igno- 
rant, or the vile, for the purpose of securing their good. It is a ten- 
dency to seek the good of those whom Providence has placed in any re- 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 175 

spect below us, by stooping, descending, coming down to them for this 
purpose. It is a peculiar form of self-denial. God the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit, manifest infinite condescension in efforts to secure 
the well-being of sinners, even the most vile and degraded. This attri- 
bute is called by Christ lowliness of heart. God is said to humble him- 
self, that is, to condescend, when he beholds the things that are done in 
heaven. This is true, for every creature is, and must forever be, infi- 
nitely below Him in every respect. But how much greater must that 
condescension be, that comes down to earth, and even to the lowest and 
most degraded of earth's inhabitants, for purposes of benevolence ! This 
is a lovely modification of benevolence. It seems to be entirely above 
the gross conceptions of infidelity. Condescension seems to be regarded 
by most people, and especially by infidels, as rather a weakness than a 
virtue. Sceptics clothe their imaginary God with attributes in many re- 
spects the opposite of true virtue. They think it entirely beneath the 
dignity of God to come down even to notice, and much more to interfere 
with, the concerns of men. But hear the word of the Lord : "Thus 
saith the High and Lofty One, who inhabiteth eternity, whose name is 
Holy : I dwell in the high and holy place ; with him also that is of a' 
contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to 
revive the heart of the contrite ones." And again, " Thus saith the 
Lord, the heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool, where is 
the house that ye build unto me ? and where is the place of my rest ? 
For all those things hath my hand made, and all those thing* have been, 
saith the Lord. But to this man will I look, even to him that is poor 
and of a contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my word." Thus the 
Bible represents God as clothed with condescension as with a cloak. 

This is manifestly an attribute both of benevolence and of true great- 
ness. The natural perfections of God appear all the more wonderful, 
when we consider, that he can and does know and contemplate and con- 
trol, not only the highest, but the lowest of all his creatures ; that he is 
just as able to attend to every want and every creature, as if this were 
the sole object of attention with him. So his moral attributes appear all 
the more lovely and engaging when we consider that his " tender mer- 
cies are over all his works," "that not a sparrow falleth to the ground 
without him ; " that he condescends to number the very hairs of the 
heads of his servants, and that not one of them can fall without him. 
When we consider that no creature is too low, too filthy, or too degraded 
for him to condescend to, — this places his character in a most ravishing 
light. Benevolence is good-will to all beings. Of course one of its 
characteristics must be condescension to those who are below us. This 
in God is manifestly infinite. He is infinitely above all creatures. For 
him to hold communion with them is infinite condescension. 



176 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

This is an attribute essentially belonging to benevolence or love in all 
benevolent beings. With the lowest of moral beings it may have no 
other development, than in its relations to sentient existences below the 
rank of moral agents, for the reason, that there are no moral agents 
below them to whom they can stoop. God's condescension stoops to all 
ranks of sentient existences. This is also true with every benevolent 
mind, as to all inferiors. It seeks the good of being in general, and 
never thinks any being too low to have his interests attended to and 
cared for, according to their relative value. Benevolence cannot possi- 
bly retain its own essential nature, and yet be above any degree of con- 
descension that can effect the greatest good. Benevolence does not-, can- 
not know anything of that loftiness of spirit that considers it too de- 
grading to stoop anywhere, or to any being whose interests need to be, 
and can be, promoted by such condescension. Benevolence has its end, 
and it cannot but seek this, and it does not, cannot think anything 
below it that is demanded to secure that end. the shame, the infinite 
folly and madness of pride, and every form of selfishness ! How infi- 
nitely unlike God it is ! Christ could condescend to be born in a 
manger ; to be brought up in humble life ; to be poorer than the fox of 
the desert, or the fowls of heaven ; to associate with fishermen ; to 
mingle with and seek the good of all classes ; to be despised in life, and 
die between two thieves on the cross. His benevolence " endured the 
cross and despised the shame." He was "meek and lowly in heart." 
The Lord of heaven and earth is as much more lowly in heart than any 
of his creatures, as he is above them in his infinity. He can stoop to 
anything but to commit sin. He can stoop infinitely low. 

20. Stability is another attribute of benevolence. This love is not a 
mere feeling or emotion, that eifervesces for a moment, and then cools 
down and disappears. But it is choice, not a mere volition which 
accomplishes its object, and then rests. It is the choice of an end, a 
supreme end. It is an intelligent choice — the most intelligent choice 
that can be made. It is considerate choice — none so much so ; a delib- 
erate choice, a reasonable choice, which will always commend itself to 
the highest perceptions and intuitions of the intellect. It is intelligent 
and impartial, and universal consecration to an end, above all others the 
most important and captivating in its influence. Now, stability must be 
a characteristic of such a choice as this. By stability, it is not intended 
that the choice may not be changed. Nor that it never is changed ; but 
that when the attributes of the choice are considered, it appears as if 
stability, as opposed to instability, must be an attribute of this choice. 
It is a new birth, a new nature, a new creature, a new heart, a new life. 
These and such like are the representations of scripture. Are these 
representations of an evanescent state ? The beginning of benevolence 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 177 

in the soul — this choice is represented as the death of sin, as a burial, a 
being planted, a crucifixion of the old man, and many such like things. 
Are these representations of what we so often see among professed 
Christians ? Nay, verily. The nature of the change itself would seem 
to be a guarantee of its stability. We might reasonably suppose, that 
any other choice would be relinquished sooner than this ; that any other 
state of mind would fail sooner than benevolence. It is vain to reply to 
this, that facts prove the contrary to be true. I answer what facts ? 
Who can prove them to be facts ? Shall we appeal to the apparent facts 
in the instability of many professors of religion ; or shall we appeal 
to the very nature of the choice, and to the scriptures ? To these 
doubtless. So far as philosophy can go, we might defy the world to 
produce an instance of choice which has so many chances for stability. 
The representations of scripture are such as I have mentioned above. 
What then shall we conclude of those effervescing professors of religion, 
who are soon hot and soon cold ; whose religion is a spasm ; " whose 
goodness is as the morning cloud and the early dew, which goeth away ? " 
Why, we must conclude, that they never had the root of the matter 
in them. That they are not dead to sin and to the world, we see. That 
they are not new creatures, that they have not the spirit of Christ, that 
they do not keep his commandments, we see. What then shall we con- 
clude, but this, that they are stony-ground hearers ? 

21. Holiness is another attribute of benevolence. This term is used 
in the Bible, as synonymous with moral purity. In a ceremonial sense 
it is applied to both persons and things ; to make holy and to sanctify 
are the same thing. To sanctify and to consecrate, or set apart to a 
sacred use, are identical. Many things were, in this sense, sanctified, 
or made holy, under the Jewish economy. The term holiness may, in a 
general sense, be applied to anything whatever which is set apart to a 
sacred use. ' It may be applied to the whole being of a moral agent, who 
is set apart to the service of God. 

As an attribute of benevolence, it denotes that quality which leads it 
to seek to promote the happiness of moral agents, by means of conform- 
ity to moral law. 

As a moral attribute of God, it is that peculiarity of his benevolence 
which secures it against all efforts to obtain its end by other means than 
those that are morally and perfectly pure. His benevolence aims to se- 
cure the happiness of the universe of moral agents, by means of moral 
law and moral government, and of conformity to his own subjective idea 
of right. In other words, holiness in God is that quality of his love that 
secures its universal conformity, in all its efforts and manifestations, to 
the Divine idea of right, as it lies in eternal development in the Infinite 
Reason. This idea is moral law. It is sometimes used to express the 
12 



178 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

moral quality, or character of his benevolence generally, or to express the 
moral character of the Godhead. It sometimes seems to designate an at- 
tribute, and sometimes a quality of his moral attributes. Holiness is, 
doubtless, a characteristic, or quality of each and all of his moral attrib- 
utes. They will harmonize in this, that no one of them can consent to 
do otherwise than conform to the law of moral purity, as developed and 
revealed in the Divine Reason. 

That holiness is an attribute of God is everywhere assumed, and fre- 
quently asserted in the Bible. If an attribute of God, it must be an at- 
tribute of love ; for God is love. This attribute is celebrated in heaven 
as one of those aspects of the divine character that give ineffable delight. 
Isaiah saw the seraphim standing around the throne of Jehovah, and 
crying one to another, " Holy ! holy ! holy ! " John also had a vision of 
the worship of heaven, and says " They rest not day nor night, saying, 
Holy ! holy ! holy ! Lord God Almighty." When Isaiah beheld the 
holiness of Jehovah, he cried out " Woe is me ! I am undone. I am a 
man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips ; 
for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts ! " God's holiness 
is infinite, and it is no wonder that a perception of it should thus affect ■ 
the prophet. 

Finite holiness must forever feel itself awed in the presence of infinite 
holiness. Job says, " I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but 
now mine eye seeth thee : wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust 
and ashes." There is no comparing finite with infinite. The time will 
never come when creatures can with open face contemplate the infinite 
holiness of Jehovah, without being like persons overcome with a harmony 
too intensely delightful to be calmly borne. Heaven seems not able to 
endure it without breaking forth into strains of inexpressible rapture. 

The expressions of Isaiah and Job do not necessarily imply that at the 
time they were in a sinful state, but their expressions no doubt related 
to whatever of sin they had at any time been guilty of. In the light of 
Jehovah's holiness they saw the comparative pollution of their character 
taken as a whole. This view will always, doubtless, much affect the 
saints. This must be ; and yet in another sense they may be, and are, as 
holy, in their measure as he is. They may be as perfectly conformed to 
what light or truth they have, as he is. This is doubtless what Christ 
intended when he said, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in 
heaven is perfect." The meaning is, that they should live to the same 
end, and be as entirely consecrated to it as he is. This they must be, to 
be truly virtuous or holy in any degree. But when they are so, a full 
view of the holiness of God would confound and overwhelm them. If any 
one doubts this, he has not considered the matter in a proper light. 
He has not lifted up his thoughts, as he needs to do, to the contempla- 



ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE. 179 

tion of infinite holiness. No creature, however benevolent, can witness 
the divine benevolence without being overwhelmed with a clear vision of 
it. This is no doubt true of every attribute of the divine love. How- 
ever perfect creature-virtue may be, it is finite, and, brought into the 
light of the attributes of infinite virtue, it will appear like the dimmest 
star in the presence of the sun, lost in the blaze of his glory. Let the 
most just man on earth or in heaven witness, and have a clear apprehen- 
sion of, the infinite justice of Jehovah, and it would no doubt fill him 
with unutterable awe. So, could the most merciful saint on earth, or in 
heaven, have a clear perception of the divine mercy in its fulness, it 
would swallow up all thought and imagination, and, no doubt, overwhelm 
him. And so also of every attribute of God. Oh ! when we speak of 
the attributes of Jehovah, we often do not know what we say. Should 
God unveil himself to us, our bodies would instantly perish. "No 
man," says he, "can see my face and live." When Moses prayed, 
" Show me thy glory," God condescendingly hid him in the cleft of a 
rock, and covering him with his hand, he passed by, and let Moses see 
only his back parts, informing him that he could not behold his face, 
that is, his unveiled glories, and live. 

Holiness, or moral harmony of character is, then, an essential attrib- 
ute of disinterested love. It must be so from the laws of our being, and 
from the very nature of benevolence. In man it manifests itself in great 
purity of conversation and deportment, in a great loathing of all impurity 
of flesh and spirit. Let no man profess piety who has not this attribute 
developed. The love required by the law of God is pure love. It seeks 
to make its object happy only by making him holy. It manifests the 
greatest abhorrence of sin and all uncleanness. In creatures it pants, 
and doubtless ever will pant and struggle, toward infinite purity or holi- 
ness. It will never find a resting place in such a sense as to desire to 
ascend no higher. As it perceives more and more of the fulness and in- 
finity of God's holiness, it will no doubt pant and struggle to ascend the 
eternal heights where God sits in light too intense for the strongest vision 
of the highest cherub. 

Holiness of heart or of will, produces a desire or feeling of purity in 
the sensibility. The feelings become exceedingly alive to the beauty of 
holiness and to the hatefulness and deformity of all spiritual, and even 
physical impurity. This is called the love of holiness. The sensibility 
becomes ravished with the great loveliness of holiness, and unutterably 
disgusted with the opposite. The least impurity of conversation or of 
action exceedingly shocks one who is holy. Impure thoughts, if sug- 
gested to the mind of a holy being, are instantly felt to be exceedingly 
offensive and painful. The soul heaves and struggles to cast them out as 
the most loathsome abominations. 



180 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XVI. 

WHAT CONSTITUTES DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW? 

In" discussing this question, I will, 

I. Show in what disobedience to moral law cannot consist. 

1. It cannot consist in malevolence, or in the choice of evil or misery 
as an ultimate end. This will appear, if we consider, that the choice 
of an end implies the choice of it, not for no reason, but for a reason, 
and for its own intrinsic value, or because the mind prizes it on its own 
account. But moral agents are so constituted, that they cannot regard 
misery as intrinsically valuable. They cannot, therefore, choose it as an 
ultimate end, nor prize it on its own account. 

2. Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in the constitution of 
soul or body. The law does not command us to have a certain constitu- 
tion, nor forbid us to have the constitution with which we came into being. 

3. It cannot consist in any unavoidable state, either of the sensibility 
or of the intelligence ; for these, as we have seen, are involuntary, and 
are dependent upon the actings of the will. 

4. It cannot consist in outward actions, independent of the design 
with which they are put forth ; for these, we have seen, are controlled by 
the actions of the will, and, therefore, can have no moral character in 
themselves. 

5. It cannot consist in inaction ; for total inaction is to a moral 
agent impossible. Moral agents are necessarily active. That is, they 
cannot exist as moral agents without choice. They must, by a law of 
necessity, choose either in accordance with, or in opposition to, the law 
of God. They are free to choose in either direction, but they are not 
free to abstain from choice altogether. Choose they must. The posses- 
sion of free-will, and the perception of opposing objects of choice, either 
exciting desire, or developing the rational affirmation of obligation to 
choose, render choice one way or the other inevitable. The law directs 
how they ought to choose. If they do not choose thus, it must be 
because they choose otherwise, and not because they do not choose at all. 

6. It cannot consist in the choice of moral evil, or sin, as an ultimate 
end. Sin is but an element or attribute of choice or intention, or it is 
intention itself. If it be intention itself, then to make sin an end of 
intention, would be to make intention or choice terminate on itself, and 
the sinner must choose his own choice, or intend his own intention as an 
end : this is absurd. 

7. Disobedience to moral law cannot consist in self-love. Self-love is 



DISOBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. 181 

simply the constitutional desire of happiness. It is altogether an in- 
voluntary state. It has, as a desire, no moral character, any more than 
has the desire of food. It is no more sinful to desire happiness, and 
properly to seek it, than it is wrong to desire food, and properly to 
seek that. 

II. What disobedience to moral law must consist in. 

Disobedience to God's law must consist in the choice of self -gratifica- 
tion as an end. In other words, it must consist essentially in commit- 
ting the will, and through the will committing the whole being, to the 
indulgence of self-love, as the supreme and ultimate end of life. This 
is selfishness. In other words, it is seeking to gratify the desire of per- 
sonal good, in a manner prohibited by the law of God. 

It consists in choosing self-gratification as an end, or for its own 
sake, instead of choosing, in accordance with the law of the reason and 
of God, the highest well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate 
end. In other words still, sin or disobedience to the moral law, consists 
in the consecration of the heart and life to the gratification of the consti- 
tutional and artificial desires, rather than in obedience to the law of the 
intelligence. Or, once more, sin consists in being governed by impulses 
of the sensibility, instead of being governed by the law of God, as it lies 
revealed in the reason. 

That this is sin, and the whole of sin viewed in its germinating prin- 
ciples, will appear, if we consider : — 

1. That this state of mind, or this choice, is the " carnal mind," or 
the minding of the flesh, which the apostle affirms to be " enmity against 
God." It is the universal representation of scripture, that sin consists 
in the spirit of self-seeking. This spirit of self-seeking is always in the 
Bible represented as the contrast or opposite of disinterested benevolence, 
or the love which the law requires. " Ephraim bringeth forth fruit to 
himself," is the sum of God's charges against sinners. 

2. When we come to the consideration of the attributes of selfishness, 
it will be seen that every form of sin, not only may, but must resolve 
itself into selfishness, just as we have seen that every form of virtue does 
and must resolve itself into love or benevolence. 

3. From the laws of its constitution, the mind is shut up to the 
necessity of choosing that, as an ultimate end, which is regarded by the 
mind as intrinsically good or valuable in itself. This is the very idea of 
choosing an end, to wit, something chosen for its own sake, or for what 
it is in and of itself, or, because it is regarded by the mind as intrinsi- 
cally valuable to self, or to being in general, or to both. 

4. Moral agents are, therefore, shut up to the necessity of willing the 
good of being, either partially or impartially, either good to self, or good 



1S2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, 

to being in general. Nothing else can possibly be chosen as an end or 
for its own sake. Willing the good of being impartially, we have seen, 
is virtue. To will it partially is to will it, not for its own sake, except 
upon condition of its relation to self. That is, it is to wdll good to self. 
In other words, it is to will the gratification of self as an end, in opposi- 
tion to willing the good of universal being as an end, and every good, or 
the good of every being, according to its intrinsic value. 

5. But may not one will the good of a part of being as an end, or for 
the sake of the intrinsic value of their good ? This would not be benev- 
olence ; for that, as we have seen, must consist in willing good for its 
own sake, and implies the willing of every good, and of the highest good 
of universal being. It would not be selfishness, as it would not be willing 
good to, or the gratification of, self. It w T ould be sin, for it would be 
the partial love or choice of good. It would be loving some of my neigh- 
bors, but not all of them. It would, therefore, be sin, but not selfish- 
ness. If this can be, then there is such a thing possible, whether actual 
or not, as sin that does not consist in selfishness. But let -us examine 
whether this supposition would not resolve itself into selfishness. 

To say that I choose good for its own sake, or because it is valuable 
to being, that is, in obedience to the laAV of my reason, and of God, im- 
plies that I choose all possible good, and every good according to its rel- 
ative value. If, then, a being chooses his own good, or the good of any 
being as an ultimate end, in obedience to the law of reason, it must be 
that he chooses, for the same reason, the highest possible good of all sen- 
tient being. 

The partial choice of good implies the choice of it, not merely for its 
own sake, but upon condition of its relations to self, or to certain par- 
ticular persons. Its relations conditionate the choice. When its rela- 
tions to self conditionate the choice, so that it is chosen, not for its in- 
trinsic value, irrespective of its relations, but for its relations to self, 
this is selfishness. It is the partial choice of good. If I choose the good 
of others besides myself, and choose good because of its relations to 
them, it must be either — 

(1.) Because I love their persons with the love of fondness, and will 
their good for that reason, that is, to gratify my affection for them, 
which is selfishness ; or — 

(2.) Because of their relations to me, so that good to them is in some 
way a good to me, which also is selfishness ; or — 

(3.) Upon condition that they are worthy, which is benevolence ; for 
if I will good to a being upon condition that he is worthy, I must value the 
good for its own sake, and will it particularly to him, because he deserves 
it. This is benevolence, and not the partial choice of good, because it is 
obeying the law of my reason. 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 183 

Again : If I will the good of any number of beings. I must do it in 
obedience to the law either of my intelligence and of God, or of my sen- 
sibility. But, if I will in obedience to the law of my intelligence, it 
must be the choice of the highest good of universal being. But if I will 
in obedience to the law or impulse of my sensibility, it must be to gratify 
my feelings or desires. This is selfishness. 

Again : As the will must either follow the law of the reason and of 
God, or the impulses of the sensibility, it follows that moral agents are 
shut up to the necessity of being selfish or benevolent, and that there is 
no third way, because there is no third medium, through which any 
object of choice can be presented. The mind can absolutely know 
nothing as an object of choice, that is not recommended by one of these 
faculties. Selfishness, then, and benevolence, are the only two alter- 
natives. 

Let it be remembered, then, that sin is a unit, and always and neces- 
sarily consists in selfish ultimate intention, and in nothing else. This 
intention is sin ; and thus w T e see that every phase of sin resolves itself 
into selfishness. This will appear more and more, as we proceed to un- 
fold the subject of moral depravity. 



LECTURE XVII. 

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 

Formerly we considered the attributes of benevolence, and also what 
states of the sensibility and of the intellect, and also what outward 
actions, were implied in it, as necessarily resulting from it. We are now 
to take the same course with selfishness : and — 

1. Voluntariness is an attribute of selfishness. 

Selfishness has often been confounded with mere desire. But these 
things are by no means identical. Desire is constitutional. It is a 
phenomenon of the sensibility. It is a purely involuntary state of mind, 
and can in itself produce no action, nor can it, in itself, have moral 
character. Selfishness is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in 
committing the will to the gratification of the desires. The desire itself 
is not selfishness, but submitting, the will to be governed by the desire, 
is selfishness. It should be understood, that no kind of mere desires, 
and no strength of mere desire, constitutes selfishness. Selfishness 
commences when the will yields to the desire, and seeks to obey it, in 
opposition to the law of the intelligence. It matters not what kind of 



184: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

desire it is ; if it is the desire that governs the will, this is selfishness. It 
must be the will in. a state of committal to the gratification of the desire. 

2. Liberty is another attribute of selfishness. 

That is, the choice of self- gratification is not necessitated by desire. 
But the will is always free to choose in opposition to desire. This every 
moral agent is as conscious of as of his own existence. The desire is not 
free, but the choice to gratify it is and must be free. There is a sense, as 
I shall have occasion to show, in which slavery is an attribute of selfish- 
ness, but not in the sense that the will chooses, by a law of necessity, to 
gratify desire. Liberty, in the sense of ability to make an opposite 
choice, must ever remain an attribute of selfishness, while selfishness 
continues to be a sin, or while it continues to sustain any relation to 
moral law. 

3. Intelligence is another attribute of selfishness. 

By this it is not intended that intelligence is an attribute or phe- 
nomenon of will, nor that the choice of self-gratification is in accordance 
with the demands of the intellect. But it is intended that the choice is 
made with the knowledge of the moral character that will be involved in 
it. The mind knows its obligation to make an opposite choice. It is 
not a mistake. It is not a choice made in ignorance of moral obligation 
to choose the highest good of being, as an end, in opposition to self- 
gratification. It is an intelligent choice in the sense, that it is a known 
resistance of the demands of the intellect. It is a known rejection of its 
claims. It is a known setting up of self-gratification, and preferring it 
to all higher interests. 

4. Unreaso?iableness is another attribute of selfishness. 

By this it is intended, that the selfish choice is in direct opposition to 
the demands of the reason. The reason was given to rule, that is, to affirm 
obligation, and thus announce the law of God. It affirms law and moral 
obligation. Obedience to moral law, as it is revealed in the reason, is vir- 
tue. Obedience to the sensibility in opposition to the reason, is sin. 
Selfishness consists in this. It is a dethroning of reason from the seat of 
government, and an enthroning of blind desire in opposition to it. 
Selfishness is always and necessarily unreasonable. It is a denial of 
that divine attribute that allies man to God, makes him capable of vir- 
tue, and is a sinking him to the level of a brute. It is a denial of his 
manhood, of his rational nature. It is a contempt of the voice of God 
within him, and a deliberate trampling down the sovereignty of his own 
intellect. Shame on selfishness ! It dethrones human reason, and would 
dethrone the divine, and place mere blind lust upon the throne of the 
universe. 

The very definition of selfishness implies that unreasonableness is one 
of its attributes. Selfishness consists in the will's yielding itself to the 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 185 

impulses of the sensibility, in opposition to the demands of the intelligence. 
Therefore, every act or choice of the will is necessarily altogether unreason- 
able. Sinners, while they continue such, never say nor do one thing that is 
in accordance with right reason. Hence the Bible says, that " madness 
is in their heart while they live." They have made an unreasonable 
choice of an end, and all their choices of means to secure their end are 
only a carrying out of their ultimate choice. They are, every one of 
them, put forth to secure an end contrary to reason. Therefore, no 
sinner, who has never been converted, has, even in a single instance, 
chosen otherwise than in direct opposition to reason. They are not 
merely sometimes unreasonable, but uniformly, and, while they remain 
selfish, necessarily so. The very first time that a sinner acts or wills 
reasonably, is when he turns to God, or repents and becomes a Christian. 
This is the first instance in which he practically acknowledges that he 
has reason. All previous to this, every one of the actions of his will 
and of his life, is a practical denial of his manhood, of his rational 
nature, of his obligation to God or his neighbor. We sometimes hear 
impenitent sinners spoken of as being unreasonable, and in such a 
manner as to imply that all sinners are not so. But this only favors the 
delusion of sinners by leaving them to suppose that they are not all of 
them, at all times, altogether unreasonable. But the fact is, that there is 
not, and there never can be, in earth or hell, one impenitent sinner 
who, in any instance, acts otherwise than in direct and palpable opposi- 
tion to his reason. It had, therefore, been infinitely better for sinners 
if they had never been endowed with reason. They do not merely act 
without consulting their reason, but in stout and determined opposition 
to it. 

Again : They act as directly in opposition to it as they possibly 
can. They not only oppose it, but they oppose it as much, and in as 
aggravated a manner, as possible. What can be more directly and 
aggravatedly opposed to reason than the choice which the sinner makes 
of an end ? Eeason was given him to direct him in regard to the choice 
of the great end of life. It gives him the idea of the eternal and the 
infinite. It spreads out before him the interests of God and of the 
universe as of absolutely infinite value. It affirms their value, and the 
infinite obligation of the sinner to consecrate himself to these interests ; 
and it promises him endless rewards if he will do so. On the contrary, 
it lays before him the consequences of refusal. It thunders in his ear 
the terrible sanctions of the law. It points him to the coming doom 
that awaits his refusal to comply with its demands. But behold, in the 
face of all this, the sinner, unhesitatingly, in the face of these affirma- 
tions, demands, and threatenings, turns away and consecrates himself to 
the gratification of his desires with the certainty that he could not do 



186 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

greater despite to his own nature than in this most mad, most preposter- 
ous, most blasphemous choice. Why do not sinners consider that it is 
impossible for them to offer a greater insult to God, who gave them 
reason, or more truly and deeply to shame and degrade themselves, than 
they do in their beastly selfishness ? Total, universal, and shameless 
unreasonableness, is the universal characteristic of every selfish mind. 
5. Ititerestedness is another attribute of selfishness. 
By interestedness is meant self-interestedness. It is not the disinter- 
ested choice of good, that is, it is not the choice of the good of being in 
general as an end, but it is the choice of self-good, of good to self. Its 
relation to self is the condition of the choice of this good. But for its 
being the good of self, it would not be chosen. The fundamental rea- 
son, or that which should induce choice, to wit, the intrinsic value of 
good, is rejected as insufficient ; and the secondary reason, namely, its 
relation to self, is the condition of determining the will in this direction. 
This is really making self-good the supreme end. In other words, it is 
making self-gratification the end. Nothing is practically regarded as 
worthy of choice, except as it sustains to self the relation of a means of 
self -gratification. 

This attribute of selfishness secures a corresponding state of the sen- 
sibility. The sensibility, under this indulgence, attains to a monstrous 
development, either generally, or in some particular directions. Selfish- 
ness is the committal of the will to the indulgence of the propensities. 
But from this it by no means follows, that all of the propensities will be 
indiscriminately indulged, and thereby greatly developed. Sometimes 
one propensity, and sometimes another, has the greatest natural strength, 
and thereby gains the ascendancy in the control of the will. Sometimes 
circumstances tend more strongly to the development of one appetite or 
passion than another. Whatever propensity is most indulged, will gain 
the greatest development. The propensities cannot all be indulged at 
once, for they are often opposed to each other. But they may all be in- 
dulged and developed in their turn. For example, the licentious pro- 
pensities, and various other propensities, cannot be indulged consistently 
with the simultaneous indulgence of the avaricious propensities, the de- 
sire of reputation and of ultimate happiness. Each of these, and even 
all the propensities, may come in for a share, and in some instances may 
gain so equal a share of indulgence, as upon the whole to be about equally 
developed. But in general, either from constitutional temperament, or 
from circumstances, some one or more of the propensities will gain so 
uniform a control of the will, as to occasion its monstrous development. 
It may be the love of reputation ; and then there will be at least a pub- 
lic decent exterior, more or less strict, according to the state of morals in 
the society in which the individual dwells. If it be amativeness that 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 187 

gains the ascendancy over the other propensities, licentiousness will be 
the result. If it be alimentiveness, then gluttony and Epicurism will be 
the result. The result of selfishness must be, to develop in general, or 
in particular, the propensities of the sensibility, and to beget a corre- 
sponding exterior. If avarice take the control of the will, we have the 
haggard and ragged miser. All the other propensities wither under the 
reign of this detestable one. Where the love of knowledge prevails, we 
have the scholar, the philosopher, the man of learning. This is one of 
the most decent and respectable forms of selfishness, bat is nevertheless 
as absolutely selfishness as any other form. When compassion, as a feel- 
ing, prevails, we have, as a result, the philanthropist, and often the re- 
former ; not the reformer in a virtuous sense, but the selfish reformer. 
Where love of kindred prevails, we often have the kind husband, the 
affectionate father, mother, brother, sister, and so on. These are the 
amiable sinners, especially among their own kindred. W'hen the love of 
country prevails, we have the patriot, the statesman, and the soldier. 
The picture might be drawn at full length, but with these traits I must 
leave you to fill up the outline. I would only add, that several of these 
forms of selfishness so nearly resemble certain forms of virtue, as often 
to be confounded with them, and mistaken for them. Indeed, so far as 
the outward life is concerned, they are right, in the letter, but as they 
do not proceed from disinterestedly benevolent intention, they are only 
specious forms of selfishness. 

6. Partiality is another attribute of selfishness. It consists in giv- 
ing the preference to certain interests, on account of their being either 
directly the interests of self, or so connected with self-interest as to be 
preferred on that account. It matters not, whether the interest to which 
the preference is given be of greater or of less value, if so be it is pre- 
ferred, not for the reason of its greater value, but because of its relation to 
self. In some instances the practical preference may justly be given to 
a less interest, on account of its sustaining such, a relation to us that we 
can secure it, when the greater interest could not be secured by us. If 
the reason of the preference, in such case, be, not that it is self-interest, 
but an interest that can be secured while the greater cannot, the prefer- 
ence is a just one, and not partiality. My family, for example, sustain 
such relations to me, that I can more readily and surely secure their in- 
terests, than I can those of my neighbor, or of a stranger. For this rea- 
son I am under obligation to give the practical preference to the interests 
of my own family, not because they are my own, nor because their inter- 
ests sustain such a relation to my own, but because I can more readily 
secure their interests than those of any other family. 

The question in such a case turns upon the amount I am able to se* 
cure, and not on the intrinsic value merely* It is a general truth, that 



188 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

we can secure more readily and certainly the interests of those to whom, 
we sustain certain relations ; and therefore, God and reason point out 
these interests as particular objects of our attention and effort. This is 
not partiality but impartiality. It is treating interests as they should be 
treated. 

But selfishness is always partial. If it gives any interest whatever, 
the preference, it is because of its relation to self. It always, and, con- 
tinuing to be selfishness, necessarily, lays the greatest stress upon, and 
gives the preference to, those interests the promotion of which will 
gratify self. 

Here care should be taken to avoid delusion. Oftentimes selfishness 
appears to be very disinterested and very impartial. For example : here 
is a man whose compassion, as a mere feeling or state of the sensibility, 
is greatly developed. He meets a beggar, an object that strongly excites 
his ruling passion. He empties his pockets, and even takes off his coat 
and gives it to him, and in his paroxysm he will divide his all with him, 
or even give him all. Now this would generally pass for most undoubted 
virtue, as a rare and impressive instance of moral goodness. But there 
is no virtue, no benevolence in it. It is a mere yielding of the will to 
the control of feeling, and has nothing in it of the nature of virtue. In- 
numerable examples of this might be adduced, as illustrations of this 
truth. It is only an instance and an illustration of selfishness. It is 
the will seeking to gratify the feeling of compassion, which for the time 
is the strongest desire. 

We constitutionally desire not only our own happiness, but also that 
of men in general, when their happiness in no way conflicts with our 
own. Hence selfish men will often manifest a deep interest in the wel- 
fare of those, whose welfare will not interfere with their own. Now, 
should the will be yielded up to the gratification of this desire, this 
would often be regarded as virtue. For example : a few years since much 
interest and feeling were excited in this country by the cause and suffer- 
ings of the Greeks, in their struggle for liberty ; and since in the cause 
of the Poles. A spirit of enthusiasm appeared, and many were ready to 
give and do almost anything for the cause of liberty. They gave up 
their will to the gratification of this excited state of feeling. This, they 
may have supposed, was virtue ; but it was not, nor was there a semblance 
of virtue about it, when it is once understood, that virtue consists in 
yielding the will to the law of the intelligence, and not to the impulse of 
excited feelings. 

Some writers have fallen into the strange mistake of making virtue to 
consist in seeking the gratification of certain desires, because, as they 
say, these desires are virtuous. They make some of the desires selfish, 
and some benevolent. To yield the will to the control of the selfish pro- 



ATTRIBUTES OP SELFISHNESS. 189 

pensities is sin ; to yield to the control of the benevolent desires, such as 
the desire of my neighbor's happiness and of the public happiness, is vir- 
tue, because these are good desires, while the selfish desires are evil. 
Now this is, and has been, a very common view of virtue and vice. But 
it is fundamentally erroneous. None of the constitutional desires are 
good or evil in themselves ; they are alike involuntary, and all alike ter- 
minate on their correlated objects. To yield the will to the control of 
any one of them, no matter which, is sin ; it is following a blind feeling, 
desire, or impulse of the sensibility, instead of yielding to the demands 
of the intelligence, as the law affirming power. To will the good of my 
neighbor, or of my country, and of God, because of the intrinsic value 
of those interests, that is to will them as an end, and in obedience to the 
law of the reason, is virtue ; but to will them to gratify a constitutional 
but blind desire, is selfishness and sin. The desires terminate on their 
respective objects ; but the will, in this case, seeks the objects, not for 
their own sake, but because they are desired, that is, to gratify the de- 
sires. This is choosing them, not as an end, but as a means of self-grati- 
fication. This is making self-gratification the end after all. This must 
be a universal truth, when a thing is chosen merely in obedience to de- 
sire. The benevolence of these writers is sheer selfishness, and their vir- 
tue is vice. 

The choice of any thing whatever, because it is desired, irrespective 
of the demands of the reason, is selfishness and sin. It matters not what 
it is. The very statement, that I choose a thing because I desire it, is 
only another form of saying, that I choose it for my own sake, or for the 
sake of appeasing the desire, and not on account of its own intrinsic 
value. All such choice is always and necessarily partial. It is giving 
one interest the preference over another, not because of its perceived in- 
trinsic and superior value, but because it is an object of desire. If I 
yield to mere desire in any case, it must be to gratify the desire. This 
is, and in the case supposed must be, the end for which the choice is 
made. To deny this is to deny that the will seeks the object because it 
is desired. Partiality consists in giving one thing the preference of an- 
other for no good reason. That is, not because the intelligence demands 
this preference, but because the sensibility demands it. Partiality is 
therefore always and necessarily an attribute of selfishness. 

7. Efficiency is another attribute of selfishness. Desire never pro- 
duces action until it influences the will. It has no efficiency or causality 
in itself. It cannot, without the concurrence of the will, command the 
attention of the intellect, or move a muscle of the body. The whole 
causality of the mind resides in the will. In it resides the power of ac- 
complishment. 

Again : the whole efficiency of the mind,, as it. respects accomplish- 



100 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ment, resides in the choice of an end, or in the ultimate intention. All 
action of the will, or all willing, must consist in choosing either an end, 
or the means of accomplishing an end. If there is choice, something is 
chosen. That something is chosen for some reason. To deny this is a 
denial that any thing is chosen. The ultimate reason for the choice and 
the thing chosen, are identical. This we have repeatedly seen. 

Again : we have seen that the means cannot be chosen until the end 
is chosen. The choice of the end is distinct from the volitions or en- 
deavors of the mind to secure the end. But although the choice of an 
end is not identical with the subordinate choices and volitions to secure 
the end, yet it necessitates them. The choice once made, secures or 
necessitates the executive volitions to secure the end. By this it is not 
intended that the mind is not free to relinquish its end, and of course to 
relinquish the use of the means to accomplish it ; but only that, while 
the choice or intention remains, the choice of the end by the will is effi- 
cient in producing volitions to realize the end. This is true both of be- 
nevolence and selfishness. They are both choices of an end, and are 
necessarily efficient in producing the use of the means to realize this end. 
They are choices of opposite ends, and, of course, will produce their re- 
spective results. 

The Bible represents sinners as having eyes full of adultery, and that 
cannot cease from sin ; that while the will is committed to the indul- 
gence of the propensities, they cannot cease from the indulgence. There 
is no way, therefore, for the sinner to escape from the commission of sin, 
but to cease to be selfish. While selfishness continues, you may change 
the form of outward manifestation, you may deny one appetite or desire 
for the sake of indulging another ; but it is and must be sin still. The 
desire to escape hell, and to obtain heaven may become the strongest, in 
which case, selfishness will take on a most sanctimonious type. But if 
the will is following desire, it is selfishness still ; and all your religious 
duties, as you call them, are only selfishness robed in the stolen habili- 
ments of loving obedience to God. 

Be it remembered, then, that selfishness is, and must be, efficient in 
producing its effects. It is cause ; the effect must follow. The whole 
life and activity of sinners is founded in it. It constitutes their life, or 
rather their spiritual death. They are dead in trespasses and in sins. 
It is in vain for them to dream of doing anything good, until they relin- 
quish their selfishness. While this continues, they cannot act at all, 
except as they use the means to accomplish a selfish end. It is impossi- 
ble, while the will remains committed to a selfish end, or to the promo- 
tion of self-interest or self-gratification, that it should use the means to 
promote a benevolent end. The first thing is to change the end, and 
then the sinner can cease from outward sin. Indeed, if the end be 



ATTRIBUTES OP SELFISHNESS. 191 

changed, many of the same acts which were before sinful will become 
holy. While the selfish end continues, whatever a sinner does, is selfish. 
Whether he eats, or drinks, or labors, or preaches, or, in short, whatever 
he does, is to promote some form of self-interest. The end being wrong, 
all is, and must be, wrong. 

This is the philosophy of Christ. " Either make the tree good, and 
his fruit good ; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt : for 
the tree is known by his fruit. A good man out of the good treasure of 
the heart bringeth forth good things : and an evil man out of the evil 
treasure bringeth forth evil things." Matt, xii, 33, 35. "Doth a 
fountain send forth at the same place sweet water and bitter ? Can the 
fig-tree, my brethren, bear olive berries ? either a vine figs ? So can no 
fountain both yield salt water and fresh." James iii. 11, 12. " For a 
good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit ; nether doth a corrupt tree 
bring forth good fruit. For every tree is known by his own fruit : for 
of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they 
grapes. A good man out of the good treasure of his heart, bringeth 
forth that which is good ; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his 
heart, bringeth forth that which is evil ; for out of the abundance of the 
heart his mouth speaketh." Luke vi. 43-45. 

8. Opposition to benevolence or to virtue, or to holiness and true 
religion, is one of the attributes of selfishness. 

Selfishness is not, in its relations to benevolence, a mere negation. It 
cannot be. It is the choice of self-gratification as the supreme and 
ultimate end of life. While the will is committed to this end, and 
benevolence, or a mind committed to an opposite end, is contemplated, 
the will cannot remain in a state of indifference to benevolence. It must 
either yield its preference of self-indulgence, or resist the benevolence 
which the intellect perceives. The will cannot remain in the exercise of 
this selfish choice, without as it were bracing and girding itself against 
that virtue, which it does not imitate. If it does not imitate it, it must 
be because it refuses to do so. The intellect does, and must, strongly 
urge the will to imitate benevolence, and to seek the same end. The 
will must yield or resist, and the resistance must be more or less resolute 
and determined, as the demands of the intellect are more or less emphatic. 
This resistance to benevolence or to the demands of the intellect in view 
of it, is what the Bible calls, hardening the heart. It is obstinacy of 
will, under the light and the presence of true religion, and the admitted 
claims of benevolence. 

This opposition to benevolence or true religion, must be developed in 
specific action, whenever the mind apprehends true religion, or selfishness 
must be abandoned. Not only must this opposition be developed, or self- 
ishness abandoned, under such circumstances, but it must be increased 



192 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

as true religion displays more and more of its loveliness. As the light 
from the radiant sun of benevolence is poured more and more upon the 
darkness of selfishness, the opposition of this principle of action must of 
necessity manifest itself in the same proportion, or selfishness must be 
abandoned. Thus selfishness remaining under light, must manifest 
more and more opposition, just in proportion as light increases, and the 
soul has less the color of an apology for its opposition. 

This peculiarity of selfishness has always been manifested just in pro- 
portion as it has been brought into the light of true religion. This 
accounts for all the opposition that has been made to true religion since 
the world began. It also proves that where there are impenitent sinners, 
and they retain their impenitence, and manifest no hostility to the reli- 
gion which they witness, that there is something defective in the pro- 
fessed piety which they behold ; or at least they do not contemplate all 
the attributes of true piety. It also proves, that persecution will always 
exist where much true religion is manifested to those who hold fast 
their selfishness. 

It is indeed true, that selfishness and benevolence are just as much 
opposed to each other, and just as much and as necessarily at war with 
each other, as God and Satan, as heaven and hell. There can never be 
a truce between them ; they are essential and eternal opposites. They 
are not merely opposites, but they are opposite efficient causes. They 
are essential activities. They are the two, and the only two, great an- 
tagonistic principles in the universe of mind. Each is heaving and 
energizing like an earthquake to realize its end. A war of mutual and 
uncompromising extermination necessarily exists between them. Neither 
can be in the presence of the other, without repulsion and opposition. 
Each puts forth all its energy to subdue and overcome the other ; and 
already selfishness has shed an ocean of the blood of saints, as well as the 
precious blood of the Prince of life. There is not a more gross and inju- 
rious mistake, than to suppose that selfishness ever, under any circum- 
stances, becomes reconciled to benevolence. The supposition is absurd 
and contradictory ; since for selfishness to become reconciled to benevo- 
lence, were the same thing as for selfishness to become benevolence. 
Selfishness may change the mode of attack or of its opposition, but its 
real opposition it can never change, while it retains its own nature and 
continues to be selfishness. 

This opposition of the heart to benevolence often begets deep opposi- 
tion of feeling. The opposition of the will engages the intellect in fab- 
ricating excuses, and cavils, and lies, and refuges, and often greatly per- 
verts the thoughts, and excites the most bitter feelings imaginable 
toward God and toward the saints. Selfishness will strive to justify its 
opposition, and to shield itself against the reproaches of conscience, and 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 193 

will resort to every possible expedient to cover up its real hostility to 
holiness. It will pretend that it is not holiness, but sin that it opposes. 
But the fact is, it is not sin but holiness to which it stands forever op- 
posed. The opposition of feeling is only developed when the heart is 
brought into a strong light, and makes deep and strong resistance. In 
such cases, the sensibility sometimes boils over with feelings of bitter op- 
position to God, and Christ, and all good. 

The question is often asked, May not this opposition exist in the sen- 
sibility, and those feelings of hostility to God exist, when the heart is in 
a truly benevolent state ? To this inquiry, I would reply : If it can, it 
must be produced by infernal or some other influence that misrepresents 
God, and places his character before the mind in a false light. Blasphe- 
mous thoughts may be suggested, and, as it were, injected into the mind. 
These thoughts may have their natural effect in the sensibility, and 
feelings of bitterness and hostility may exist without the consent of the 
will. The will may all the while be endeavoring to repel these sugges- 
tions, and divert the attention from such thoughts, yet Satan may con- 
tinue to hurl his fiery darts, and the soul may be racked with torture 
under the poison of hell, which seems to be taking effect in the sensi- 
bility. The mind, at such times, seems to itself to be filled, so far as 
feeling is concerned, with all the bitterness of hell. And so it is, and 
yet it may be, that in all this there is no selfishness. If the will holds 
fast its integrity ; if it holds out in the struggle, and where God is 
maligned and misrepresented by the infernal suggestions, it says with 
Job, " Although he slay me, yet will I trust in him," however sharp 
the conflict in such cases, we can look back and say, " We are more than 
conquerors through him that loved us." In such cases it is the selfish- 
ness of Satan, and not our own selfishness, that kindled up those fires of 
hell in our sensibility. " Blessed is the man that endureth temptation ; 
for when he is tried he shall receive the crown of life." 

9. Cruelty is another attribute of selfishness. 

This term is often used to designate a state of the sensibility. It 
then represents that state of feeling which has a barbarous or savage 
pleasure in the misery of others. 

Cruelty, as a phenomenon of the will or as an attribute of selfishness, 
consists, first, in a reckless disregard of the well-being of God and the 
universe, and secondly, in persevering in a course that must ruin the 
souls of the subjects of it, and, so far as they have influence, ruin the 
souls of others. What should we think of a man who was so intent on 
securing some petty gratification, that he would not give the alarm if a 
city were on fire, and the sleeping citizens in imminent danger of perish- 
ing in the flames ? Suppose that sooner than deny himself some mo- 
mentary gratification, he would jeopard many lives. Should we not call 
13 



194 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

this cruelty ? Now there are many forms of cruelty. Because sinners are 
not always brought into circumstances where they exercise certain forms 
of it, they flatter themselves that they are not cruel. But selfishness is 
always and necessarily cruel — cruel to the soul and highest interests of 
the subject of it ; cruel to the souls of others, in neglecting to care and 
act for their salvation ; cruel to God, in abusing him in ten thousand 
ways : cruel to the whole universe. If we should be shocked at the 
cruelty of him who should see his neighbor's house on fire, and the 
family asleep, and neglect to give them warning, because too self-indul- 
gent to rise from his bed, what shall we say of the cruelty of one, who 
shall see his neighbor's soul in peril of eternal death, and yet neglect to 
give him warning ? 

Sinners are apt to possess very good dispositions, as they express it. 
They suppose they are the reverse of being cruel. They possess tender 
feelings, are often very compassionate in their feelings toward those who 
are sick and in distress, and who are in circumstances of any affliction. 
They are ready to do many things for them. Such persons would be 
shocked, should they be called cruel. And many professors would take 
their part, and consider them abused. Whatever else, it would be said, 
is an attribute of their character, surely cruelty is not. Now, it is true 
that there are certain forms of cruelty with which such persons are not 
chargeable. But this is only because God has so moulded their consti- 
tution, that they are not delighted with the misery of their fellow men. 
However, there is no virtue in their not being gratified at the sight of 
suffering, nor in their painstaking to prevent it while they continue self- 
ish. They follow the impulses of their feelings, and if their tempera- 
ment were such that it would gratify them to inflict misery on others — 
if this were the strongest tendency of their sensibility, their selfishness 
would instantly take on that type. But though cruelty, in all its forms, 
is not common to all selfish persons, it is still true that some form of 
cruelty is practiced by every sinner. God says, " The tender mercies of 
the wicked are cruel." The fact that they live in sin, that they set an 
example of selfishness, that they do nothing for their own souls, nor for 
the souls of others ; these are really most atrocious forms of cruelty, and 
infinitely exceed all those comparatively petty forms that relate to the 
miseries of men in this life. 

10. Injustice is another attribute of selfishness. 

Justice, as an attribute of benevolence, is that quality that disposes 
it to regard and treat every being and interest with exact .equity. 

Injustice is the opposite of this. It is that quality of selfishness 
which disposes it to treat the persons and interests of others inequitably, 
and a disposition to give the preference to self-interest, regardless of the 
relative value of the interests. The nature of selfishness demonstrates, 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 195 

that injustice is always and necessarily one of its attributes, and one that 
is universally and constantly manifested. 

There is the utmost injustice in the end chosen. It is the practical 
preference of a petty self-interest over infinite interests. This is injus- 
tice as great as possible. This is universal injustice to God and man. 
It is the most palpable and most flagrant piece of injustice possible to 
every being in the universe. Not one known by him to exist who has 
not reason to bring against him the charge of most flagrant and shock- 
ing injustice. This injustice extends to every act and to every moment 
of life. He is never, in the least degree, just to any being in the uni- 
verse. Nay, he is perfectly unjust. He cares nothing for the rights of 
others as such ; and never, even in appearance, regards them except for 
selfish reasons. This, then, is, and can be, only the appearance of re- 
garding them, while in fact, no right of any being in the universe is, or 
can be. respected by a selfish mind, any further than in appearance. 
To deny this is to deny his selfishness. He performs no act whatever 
but for one reason, that is, to promote his own gratification. This is his 
end. For the realization of this end every effort is made, and every in- 
dividual act and volition put forth. Remaining selfish, it is impos- 
sible that he should act at all, but with reference directly or indirectly 
to this end. But this end has been chosen, and must be pursued, 
if pursued at all, in the most palpable and outrageous violation of the 
rights of God and of every creature in the universe. Justice de- 
mands that he should devote himself to the promotion of the highest 
good of God and the universe, that he should love God with all his heart, 
and his neighbor as himself. Every sinner is openly, and universally, 
and as perfectly, unjust as possible, at every moment of his impenitence. 

It should, therefore, always be understood, that no sinner at any time 
is at all just to any being in the universe. All his paying of his debts, 
and all his apparent fairness and justice, are only a specious form of self- 
ishness. He has, an$, if a sinner, it is impossible that he should not have, 
some selfish reason for all he does, is, says, or omits. His entire activity 
is selfishness, and while he remains impenitent, it is impossible for him 
to think, or act, or will, or do, or be, or say, anything more or less than 
he judges expedient to promote his own interests. He is not just. He 
cannot be just, nor begin in any instance, or in the least degree, to be 
truly just, either to God or man, until he begins life anew, gives God his 
heart, and consecrates his entire being to promotion of the good of uni- 
versal being. This, all this, justice demands. There is no beginning to 
be just, unless the sinner begins here. Begin and be just in the choice 
of the great end of life, and then you cannot but be just in the use of 
means. But be unjust in the choice of an end, and it is impossible for 
you, in any instance, to be otherwise than totally unjust in the use of 



196 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

means. In this case your entire activity is, and can be, nothing else than 
a tissue of the most abominable injustice. 

The only reason why every sinner does not openly and daily practice 
every species of outward commercial injustice is, that he is so circum- 
stanced that, upon the whole, he judges it not for his interest to prac- 
tice this injustice. This is the reason universally, and no thanks to any 
sinner for abstaining, in any instance, from any kind or degree of injus- 
tice in practice, for he is only restrained and kept from it by selfish consid- 
erations. That is, he is too selfish to do it. His selfishness, and not the 
love of God or man, prevents. He may be prevented by a constitutional 
or phrenological conscientiousness, or sense of justice. But this is only 
a feeling of the sensibility, and, if restrained only by this, he is just as 
absolutely selfish as if he had stolen a horse in obedience to acquisitive- 
ness. God so tempers the constitution as to restrain men, that is, 
that one form of selfishness shall prevail over and curb another. Ap- 
probativeness is, in most persons, so large, that a desire to be applauded 
by their fellow-men so modifies the developments of their selfishness, that 
it takes on a type of outward decency and appearance of justice. But 
this is no less selfishness than if it took on altogether a different type. 



LECTURE XVIII. 

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 

11. Falsehood, or lying, is another attribute of selfishness. 

Falsehood may be objective or subjective. Objective falsehood is 
that which stands opposed to truth. Subjective falsehood is a heart 
conformed to error and to objective falsehood. Subjective falsehood is a 
state of mind, or an attribute of selfishness. It is the will in the attitude 
of resisting truth, and embracing error and lies. This is always and 
necessarily an attribute of selfishness. 

Selfishness consists in the choice of an end opposed to all truth, and 
cannot but proceed to the realization of that end, in conformity with 
error or falsehood instead of truth. If at any time it seize upon objective 
truth, as it often does, it is with a false intention. It is with an intention 
at war with the truth, the nature, and the relations of things. 

If any sinner, at any time, and under any circumstances, tell the truth, 
it is for a selfish reason ; it is to compass a false end. He has a lie in his 
heart, and a lie in his right hand. He stands upon falsehood. He lives 
for it, and if he does not uniformly and openly falsify the truth, it is 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 197 

because objective truth is consistent with subjective falsehood. His 
heart is false, as false as it can be. It has embraced and sold itself to 
the greatest lie in the universe. The selfish man has practically pro- 
claimed that his good is the supreme good ; nay, that there is no other 
good but his own ; that there are no other rights but his own, that all are 
bound to serve him, and that all interests are to yield to his. Now all 
this, as I said, is the greatest falsehood that ever was or can be. Yet 
this is the solemn practical declaration of every sinner. His choice 
affirms that God has no rights, that he ought not to be loved and obeyed, 
that he has no right to govern the universe, but that God and all beings 
ought to obey and serve the sinner. Can there be a greater, a more 
shameless falsehood than all this ? And shall such an one pretend 
to regard the truth ? Nay, verily. The very pretence is only an in- 
stance and an illustration of the truth, that falsehood is an essential 
element of his character. 

If every sinner on earth does not openly and at all times falsify the 
truth, it is not because of the truthfulness of his heart, but for some 
purely selfish reason. This must be. His heart is utterly false. It is 
impossible that, remaining a sinner, he should have any true regard to 
the truth. He is a liar in his heart ; this is an essential and an eternal 
attribute of his character. It is true that his intellect condemns false- 
hood and justifies truth, and that oftentimes through the intellect, a 
deep impression is or may be made on his sensibility, in favor of the 
truth ; but if the heart is unchanged, it holds on to lies, and perseveres 
in the practical proclamation of the greatest lies in the universe, to wit, 
that God ought not to be trusted ; that Christ is not worthy of confi- 
dence ; that one's own interest is the supreme good ; and that all inter- 
ests ought to be accounted of less value than one's own. 

12. Pride is another attribute of selfishness. 

Pride is a disposition to exalt self above others, to get out of one's 
proper place in the scale of being, and to climb up over the heads of our 
equals or superiors. Pride is a species of injustice, on the one* hand, 
and is nearly allied to ambition on the other. It is not a term of so ex- 
tensive an import as either injustice or ambition. It sustains to each of 
them a near relation., but is not identical with either. It is a kind of 
self-praise, self -worship, self- flattery, self-adulation, a spirit of self-con- 
sequence, of self-importance. It is a tendency to exalt, not merely one's 
own interest, but one's person above others, and above God, and above 
all other beings. A proud being supremely regards himself. He wor- 
ships and can worship no one but self. He does not, and remaining 
selfish, he cannot, practically admit that there is any one so good and 
worthy as himself. He aims at conferring supreme favor upon himself, 
and practically, admits no claim of any being in the universe to any good 



198 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

or interest, that will interfere with his own. He can stoop to give 
preference to the interest, the reputation, the authority of no one, no, 
not of God himself, except outwardly and in appearance. His inward 
language is, " Who is Jehovah, that I should bow down to him ? " It 
is impossible that a selfish soul should be humble. Sinners are repre- 
sented in the Bible as proud, as "flattering themselves in their own 
eyes." 

Pride is not a vice distinct from selfishness, but is only a modifica- 
tion of selfishness. Selfishness is the root, or stock, in which every form 
of sin inheres. This it is important to show. Selfishness has been 
scarcely regarded by many as a vice, much less as constituting the whole 
of vice ; consequently, when selfishness has been most apparent, it has 
been supposed and assumed that there might be along with it many forms 
of virtue. It is for this reason that I make this attempt to show what 
are the essential elements of selfishness. It has been supposed that self- 
ishness might exist in any heart without implying every form of sin ; 
that a man might be selfish and yet not proud. In short, it has been 
overlooked, that, where selfishness is, there must be every form of sin ; 
that where there is one form of selfishness manifested, it is virtually a 
breach of every commandment of God, and implies, in fact, the real ex- 
istence of every possible form of sin and abomination in the heart. My 
object is fully to develop the great truth that where selfishness is, there 
must be, in a state either of development or of undevelopment, every 
form of sin that exists in earth or hell ; that all sin is a unit, and con- 
sists of some form of selfishness ; and that where this is, all sin virtually 
is and must be. 

The only reason that pride, as a form of selfishness, does not appear 
in all sinners, in the most disgusting forms, is only this, that their con- 
stitutional temperament, and providential circumstances, are such as to 
give a more prominent development to some other attribute of selfish- 
ness. It is important to remark, that where any one form of unqualified 
sin exists, there selfishness must exist, and there of course every form of 
sin must exist, at least in embryo, and waiting only for circumstances to 
develop it. When therefore, you see any form of sin, know assuredly 
that selfishness, the root, is there ; and expect nothing else, if selfishness 
continues, than to see developed, one after another, every form of sin as 
the occasion shall present itself. Selfishness is a volcano, sometimes 
smothered, but which must have vent. The providence of God cannot 
but present occasions upon which its lava-tides will burst forth and carry 
desolation before them. 

That all these forms of sin exist, has been known and admitted. But 
it does not appear to me, that the philosophy of sin has been duly con- 
sidered by many. It is important that we should get at the fundamen- 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 199 

tal or generic form of sin, that form which includes and implies all 
others, or, more properly, which constitutes the whole of sin. Such is 
selfishness. "Let it be written with the point of a diamond and en- 
graved in the rock forever," that it may be known, that where selfishness 
is, there every precept of the law is violated, there is the whole of sin. 
Its guilt and ill desert must depend upon the light with which the self- 
ish mind is surrounded. But sin, the whole of sin, is there. Such is 
the very nature of selfishness that it only needs the providential occa- 
sions, and to be left without restraint, and it will show itself to have em- 
bodied, in embryo, every form of iniquity. 

13. Enmity against God is also an attribute of selfishness. 

Enmity is hatred. Hatred may exist either as a phenomenon of the 
sensibility, or as a state or attitude of the will. Of course I am now to 
speak of enmity of heart or will. It is selfishness viewed in its relations 
to God. That selfishness is enmity against God will appear — 

(1.) From the Bible. The apostle Paul expressly says that "the 
carnal mind (minding the flesh) is enmity against God." It is fully evi- 
dent that the apostle, by the carnal mind, means obeying the propensi- 
ties or gratifying the desires. But this, as I have defined it, is selfish- 
ness. 

(2.) Selfishness is directly opposed to the will of God as expressed in 
his law. That requires benevolence. Selfishness is its opposite, and 
therefore enmity against the Lawgiver. 

(3.) Selfishness is as hostile to God's government as it can be. It is 
directly opposed to every law, and principle, and measure of his govern- 
ment. 

(4.) Selfishness is opposition to God's existence. Opposition to a 
government, is opposition to the will of the governor. It is opposition to 
his existence in that capacity. It is, and must be, enmity against the 
existence of the ruler, as such. Selfishness must be enmity against the 
existence of God's government, and as he does and must sustain the re- 
lation of Sovereign Kuler, selfishness must be enmity against his being. 
Selfishness will brook no restraint in respect to securing its end. There 
is nothing in the universe it will not sacrifice to self. This is true, or it 
is not selfishness. If then God's happiness, or government, or being, 
come into competition with it, they must be sacrificed, were it possible 
for selfishness to effect it. But God is the uncompromising enemy of 
selfishness. It is the abominable thing his soul hateth. He is more in 
the way of selfishness than all other beings. The opposition of selfish- 
ness to him is, and must be, supreme and perfect. 

That selfishness is mortal enmity against God, is not left to conjec- 
ture, nor to a mere deduction or inference. God once took to himself 
human nature, and brought Divine benevolence into conflict with human 



200 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

selfishness. Men could not brook his presence upon earth, and they 
rested not until they had murdered him. 

Enmity against any body or thing besides God, can be overcome more 
easily than against him. All earthly enmities can be overcome by kind- 
ness, and change of circumstances ; but what kindness, what change of 
circumstances, can change the human heart, can overcome the selfishness 
or enmity to God that reigns there ? Selfishness offers all manner and 
every possible degree of resistance to God. It disregards God's com- 
mands. It contemns his authority. It spurns his mercy. It outrages 
his feelings. It provokes his forbearance. Selfishness, in short, is the 
universal antagonist and adversary of God. It can no more be recon- 
ciled to his law, than it can cease to be selfish. 

14. Intemperance is also a form or attribute of selfishness. 

Selfishness is self-indulgence not sanctioned by the reason. It con- 
sists in the committal of the will to the indulgence of the propensities. 
Of course some one, or more, of the propensities must have taken the 
control of the will. Generally, there is some ruling passion or propen- 
sity, the influence of which becomes overshadowing, and overrules the 
will for its own gratification. Sometimes it is acquisitiveness or avarice, 
the love of gain ; sometimes alimentiveness or Epicureanism ; sometimes 
it is amativeness or sexual love ; sometimes philoprogenitiveness or the 
love of our own children ; sometimes self-esteem or a feeling of confi- 
dence in self ; sometimes one and sometimes another of the great variety 
of the propensities, is so largely developed, as to be the ruling tyrant, 
that lords it over the will and over all the other propensities. It matters 
not which of the propensities, or whether their united influence gains 
the mastery of the will : whenever the will is subject to them, this is 
selfishness. It is the carnal mind. 

Intemperance consists in the undue or unlawful indulgence of any 
propensity. It is, therefore, an essential element or attribute of selfish- 
ness. All selfishness is intemperance : of course it is an unlawful indul- 
gence of the propensities. Intemperance has as many forms as there are 
constitutional and artificial appetites to gratify. A selfish mind cannot 
be temperate. If one or more of the propensities is restrained, it is only 
restrained for the sake of the undue and unlawful indulgence of another. 
Sometimes the tendencies are intellectual, and the bodily appetites are 
denied, for the sake of gratifying the love of study. But this is no less 
intemperance and selfishness, than the gratification of amativeness or 
alimentiveness. Selfishness is always, and necessarily, intemperate. It 
does not always or generally develop every form of intemperance in the 
outward life, but a spirit of self-indulgence must manifest itself in the 
intemperate gratification of some one or more of the propensities. 

Some develop self-indulgence most prominently in the form of intern- 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 201 

perance in eating ; others in sleeping ; others in lounging and idleness ; 
others are gossippers ; others love exercise, and indulge that propensity ; 
others study and impair health, and induce derangement, or seriously 
impair the nervous system. Indeed, there is no end to the forms which 
intemperance assumes, arising from the fact of the great number of 
propensities, natural and artificial, that in their turn seek and obtain 
indulgence. 

It should be always borne in mind, that any form of self-indulgence, 
properly so called, is equally an instance of selfishness and wholly incon- 
sistent with any degree of virtue in the heart. But it may be asked, are 
we to have no regard whatever to our tastes, appetites and propensities ? 
I answer, we are to have no such regard to them, as to make their grati- 
fication the end for which we live, even for a moment. But there is a 
kind of regard to them which is lawful, and therefore, a virtue. For 
example : I am on a journey for the service and glory of God. Two 
ways are before me. One affords nothing to regale the senses ; the 
other conducts me through variegated scenery, sublime mountain passes, 
deep ravines ; beside bubbling brooks, and meandering rivulets ; through 
beds of gayest flowers and woods of richest foliage ; through aromatic 
groves and forests vocal with feathered songsters. The two paths are 
equal in distance, and in all respects that have a bearing upon the 
business I have in hand. Now, reason dictates and demands, that I 
should take the path that is most agreeable and suggestive of useful 
thoughts. But this is not being governed by the propensities, but by 
the reason. It is its voice which I hear and to which I listen, when I 
take the sunny path. The delights of this path are a real good. As 
such they are not to be despised or neglected. But if taking this path 
would embarrass and hinder the end of my journey, I am not to sacrifice 
the greater public good for a less one of my own. I must not be guided 
by my feelings, but by my reason and honest judgment in this and in 
every case of duty. God has not given us propensities to be our masters 
and to rule us, but to be our servants and to minister to our enjoyment, 
when we obey the biddings of reason and of God. They are given to 
render duty pleasant, and as a reward of virtue ; to make the ways of 
wisdom pleasurable. The propensities are not, therefore, to be despised, 
nor is their annihilation to be desired. Nor is it true that their gratifi- 
cation is always selfish, but when their gratification is sanctioned and 
demanded by the intellect, as in the case just supposed, and in myriads 
of other cases that occur, the gratification is not a sin but a virtue. It 
is not selfishness but benevolence. But let it be remembered that the 
indulgence must not be sought in obedience to the propensity itself, but 
in obedience to the law of reason and of God. When reason and the will of 
God are not only not consulted, but even violated, it must be selfishness. 



202 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Intemperance, as a sin, does not consist in the outward act of indul- 
gence, but in the inward disposition. A dyspeptic who can eat but just 
enough to sustain life, may be an enormous glutton at heart. He may 
have a disposition, that is, he may not only desire, but he may be willing, to 
eat all before him, but for the pain indulgence occasions him. But this 
is only the spirit of self-indulgence. He denies himself the amount of 
food he craves in order to gratify a stronger propensity, to wit, the dread 
of pain. So a man who was never intoxicated in his life, may be guilty 
of the crime of drunkenness every day. He may be prevented from 
drinking to inebriation only by a regard to reputation or health, or by 
an avaricious disposition. It is only because he is prevented by the 
greater power of some other propensity. If a man is in such a state of 
mind that he would indulge all his propensities without restraint, were 
it not that it is impossible, on account of the indulgence of some being 
inconsistent with the indulgence of the others, he is just as guilty as if 
he did indulge them all. For example : he has a disposition, that is a 
will, to accumulate property. He is avaricious in heart. He also has a 
strong tendency to luxury, to licentiousness, and prodigality. The in- 
dulgence of these propensities is inconsistent with the indulgence of ava- 
rice. But for this contrariety, he would in his state of mind indulge them 
all. He wishes to do so, but it is impossible. Now he is really guilty of 
all those forms of vice, and just as blameworthy as if he indulged in them. 

Intemperance, as a crime, is a state of mind. It is the attitude of 
the will. It is an attribute of selfishness. It consists in the choice or 
disposition to gratify the propensities, regardless of the law of benevo- 
lence. This is intemperance ; and so far as the mind is considered, it is 
the whole of it. Now, inasmuch as the will is committed to self-indul- 
gence, and nothing but the contrariety there is between the propensities 
prevents the unlimited indulgence of them all, it follows, that every self- 
ish person, or in other words every sinner, is chargeable in the sight of 
God with every species of intemperance, actual or conceivable. His lusts 
have the reign. They conduct him whithersoever they list. He has sold 
himself to self-indulgence. If there is any form of self-indulgence that 
is not actually developed in him, no thanks to him. The providence of 
God has restrained the outward indulgence, while there has been in him 
a readiness to perpetrate any sin and every sin, from which he was not 
deterred by some overpowering fear of consequences. 

15. Total moral depravity is implied in selfishness as one of its at- 
tributes. By this I intend that every selfish being is at every moment as 
wicked and as blameworthy as with his knowledge he can be. 

It is affirmed, both by reason and revelation, that there are degrees of 
guilt ; that some are more guilty than others ; and that the same indi- 
vidual may be more guilty at one time than at another. 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 200- 

The same is true of virtue. One person may be more virtuous than 
another, when both are truly virtuous. And also the same person may 
be more virtuous at one time than at another, although he may be virtu- 
ous at all times. In other words, it is affirmed, both by reason and rev- 
elation, that there is such a thing as growth, both in virtue and vice. 

It is matter of general belief, also, that the same individual, with 
the same degree of light or knowledge, is more or less praise or blame- 
worthy, as he shall do one thing or another ; or, in other words, as he 
shall pursue one course or another, to accomplish the end he has in view ; 
or, which is the same thing, that the same individual, with the same 
knowledge or light, is more or less virtuous or vicious, according to the 
course of outward life which he shall pursue. This I shall attempt to 
show is human prejudice, and a serious and most injurious error. 

It is also generally held that two or more individuals, having pre- 
cisely the same degree of light or knowledge, and being both equally 
benevolent or selfish, may, nevertheless, differ in their degree of virtue 
or vice, according as they pursue different courses of outward conduct. 
This also, I shall attempt to show, is fundamental error. 

We can arrive at the truth upon this subject only by clearly under- 
standing how to measure moral obligation, and of course how to ascer- 
tain the degree of virtue and sin. The amount or degree of virtue or 
vice, or of praise-worthiness or blame-worthiness, is and must be decided 
by reference to the degree of obligation. 

And here I would remind you — 

(1.) That moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of the. 
highest well-being of God and the universe : and — 

(2.) That the conditions of the obligation are the possession of the 
powers of moral agency and light, or the knowledge of the end to be 
chosen. 

(3.) Hence it follows that the obligation is to be measured by the 
mind's honest apprehension or judgment of the intrinsic value of the end 
to be chosen. That this, and nothing else, is the rule or standard by 
which the obligation, and, consequently, the guilt of violating it, is to be 
measured, will appear if we consider — 

(1.) That the obligation cannot be measured by the infinity of God, 
apart from the knowledge of the infinite value of his interests. He is 
an infinite being, and his well-being must be of intrinsic and of infinite 
value. But unless this be known to a moral agent, he cannot be under 
obligation to will it as an ultimate end. If he knows it to be of some 
value, he is bound to choose it for that reason. But the measure of his 
obligation must be just equal to the clearness of his apprehension of its 
intrinsic value. 

Besides, if the infinity of God were alone, or without reference to the 



204 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

knowledge of the agent, the rule by which moral obligation is to be 
measured, it would follow, that obligation is in all cases the same, and 
of course that the guilt of disobedience would also in all cases be the 
same. But this, as has been said, contradicts both reason and revela- 
tion. Thus it appears, that moral obligation, and of course guilt, can- 
not be measured by the infinity of God, without reference to the knowl- 
edge of the agent. 

(2.) It cannot be measured by the infinity of his authority, without 
reference to the knowledge of the agent, for the same reasons as above. 

(3.) It cannot be measured by the infinity of his moral excellence, 
without reference, both to the infinite value of his interests, and of the 
knowledge of the agent ; for his interests are to be chosen as an end, or 
for their own value, and without knowledge of their value there can be 
no obligation ; nor can obligation exceed knowledge. 

(4.) If, again, the infinite excellence of God were alone, or without 
reference to the knowledge of the agent, to be the rule by which moral 
obligation is to be measured, it would follow, that guilt in all cases of 
disobedience, is and must be equal. This we have seen cannot be. 

(5.) It cannot be measured by the intrinsic value of the good, or well- 
being of God and the universe, without reference to the knowledge of 
the agent, for the same reason as above. 

(6.) It cannot be measured by the particular course of life pursued 
iby the agent. This will appear, if we consider that moral obligation 
has directly nothing to do with the outward life. It directly respects 
the ultimate intention only, and that decides the course of outward ac- 
tion or life. The guilt of any outward action cannot be decided by refer- 
ence to the kind of action, without regard to the intention ; for the moral 
character of the act must be found in the intention, and not in the out- 
ward act or life. This leads me to remark that — 

(7.) The degree of moral obligation, and of course the degree of the 
guilt of disobedience, cannot be properly estimated by reference to the 
nature of the intention, without respect to the degree of the knowledge 
of the agent. Selfish intention is, as we have seen, a unit, always the 
same ; and if this were the standard by which the degree of guilt is to 
be measured, it would follow that it is always the same. 

(8.) Nor can obligation, nor the degree of guilt, be measured by the 
tendency of sin. All sin tends to infinite evil, to ruin the sinner and 
from its contagious nature, to spread and ruin the universe. Nor can 
any finite mind know what the ultimate results of any sin may be, nor 
to what particular evil it may tend. As all sin tends to universal and 
eternal evil, if this were the criterion by which the guilt is to be esti- 
mated, all sin would be equally guilty, which cannot be. 

Again : That the guilt of sin cannot be measured by the tendency of 



ATTRIBUTES OP SELFISHNESS. 205 

sin, is manifest from the fact, that moral obligation is not founded in 
the tendency of action or intention, but in the intrinsic value of the end 
to be intended. Estimating moral obligation, or measuring sin or holi- 
ness, by the mere tendency of actions, is the utilitarian philosophy, which 
we have shown to be false. Moral obligation respects the choice of an 
end, and is founded upon the intrinsic value of the end, and is not so 
much as conditionated upon the tendency of the ultimate choice to 
secure its end. Therefore, tendency can never be the rule by which ob- 
ligation can be measured, nor, of course, the rule by which guilt can be 
estimated. 

(9.) Nor can moral obligation be estimated by the results of a moral 
action or course of action. Moral obligation respects intention and re- 
spects results no further than they were intended. Much good may 
result, as from the death of Christ, without any virtue in Judas, but 
with much guilt. So, much evil may result, as from the creation of the 
world, without guilt in the Creator, but with great virtue. If moral ob- 
ligation is not founded or conditionated on results, it follows that guilt 
cannot be duly estimated by results, without reference to knowledge and 
intention. 

(10.) What has been said has, I trust, rendered it evident, that moral 
obligation is to be measured by the mind's honest apprehension or judg- 
ment of the intrinsic value of the end to be chosen, to wit, the highest 
well-being of God and the universe. 

It should be distinctly understood, that selfishness involves the rejec- 
tion of the interests of God and of the universe, for the sake of one's 
own. It refuses to will good, but upon condition that it belongs to self. 
It spurns God's interests and those of the universe, and seeks only self-,, 
interest as an ultimate end. It must follow, then, that the selfish man's 
guilt is just equal to his knowledge of the intrinsic value of those inter- 
ests that he rejects. This is undeniably the doctrine of the Bible. 

Acts xvii. 30, affords a plain instance. The apostle alludes to those 
past ages when the heathen nations had no written revelation from God, 
and remarks that "those times of ignorance God winked at." This does 
not mean that God did not regard their conduct as criminal in any de- 
gree, but it does mean that he regarded it as a sin of far less aggravation, 
than that which men would now commit, if they turned away when God 
commanded them all to repent. True, sin is never absolutely a light 
thing ; but some sins incur small guilt, when compared with the great 
guilt of other sins. This is implied in the text quoted above. 

James iv. 17. — " To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, 
to him it is sin." This plainly implies that knowledge is indispensablo 
to moral obligation ; and even more than this is implied, namely, that 
the guilt of any sinner is always equal to the amount of his knowledge 



206 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

on the subject. It always corresponds to the mind's perception of the 
value of the end which should have been chosen, but is rejected. If a 
man knows he ought, in any given case, to do good, and yet does not do 
it, to him this is sin — the sin plainly lying in the fact of not doing good 
when he knew that he could do it, and being measured as to its guilt by 
the degree of that knowledge. 

John ix. 41. — " Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind, ye should 
have no sin : but now ye say, We see ; therefore, your sin remaineth." 
Here Christ asserts that men without knowledge would be without sin ; 
and that men who have knowledge, and sin notwithstanding, are held 
guilty. This plainly affirms, that the presence of light or knowledge is 
requisite to the existence of sin, and obviously implies that the amount 
of knowledge possessed is the measure of the guilt of sin. 

It is remarkable that the Bible everywhere assumes first truths. It 
does not stop to prove them, or even assert them — but seems to assume, 
that every one knows and will admit them. As I have been recently 
writing on moral government, and studying the Bible as to its teachings 
on this class of subjects, I have been often struck with this remarkable 
fact. 

Luke xii. 47,48. — "And that servant which knew his lord's will, and 
prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten 
with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things 
worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomso- 
ever much is given, of him shall be much required ; and to whom men 
have committed much, of him will they ask the more." Here we have 
the doctrine laid down and the truth assumed, that men shall be pun- 
ished according to knowledge. To whom much light is given, of him 
shall much obedience be required. This is precisely the principle, that 
God requires of men according to the light they have. 

Selfishness is the rejection of all obligation. It is the violation of all 
obligation. The sin of selfishness is then complete ; that is, the guilt of 
selfishness is as great as with its present light it can be. What can 
make it greater with present light ? Can the course that it takes to 
realize its end mitigate its guilt ? No ; for whatever course it takes, it 
is for a selfish reason, and, therefore, it can in nowise lessen the guilt of 
the intention. Can the course it takes to realize its end without more 
light, increase the guilt of the sin ? No ; for the sin lies exclusively in 
having the selfish intention, and the guilt can be measured only by the 
degree of illumination or knowledge under which the intention is formed 
and maintained. The intention necessitates the use of the means ; and 
whatever means the selfish person uses, it is for one and the same reason, 
to gratify himself. As I said in a former lecture, if the selfish man 
were to preach the gospel, it would be only because, upon the whole, it 



ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS. 207 

was most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the sake of 
the good of being, as an end. If he should become a pirate, it would be 
for exactly the same reason, to wit, that this course is, upon the whole, 
most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the reason that 
that course is evil in itself. Whichever course he takes, he takes it for 
precisely the same ultimate reason ; and with the same degree of light it 
must involve the same degree of guilt. If light increase, his guilt must 
increase, but not otherwise. The proposition is, that every selfish being 
is, at every moment, as blame- worthy as with his present knowledge he 
can be. Which of these courses may tend ultimately to the most evil, 
no finite being can say, nor which shall result in the greatest evil. Guilt 
is not to be measured by unknown tendencies or results, but belongs to 
the intention ; and its degree is to be measured alone by the mind's ap- 
prehension of the reason of the obligation violated, namely, the intrinsic 
value of the good of God and the universe, which selfishness rejects. 
Now, it should be remembered, that whichever course the sinner takes to 
realize his end, it is the end at which he aims. He intends the end. If 
he become a preacher of the gospel for a selfish reason, he has no right 
regard to the good of being. If he regards it at all, it is only as a means 
of his own good. So, if he becomes a pirate, it is not from malice, or a 
disposition to do evil for its own sake, but only to gratify himself. If he 
has any regard at all to the evil he may do, it is only to gratify himself 
that he regards it. Whether, therefore, he preach or pray, or rob and 
plunder upon the high seas, he does it only for one end, that is, for pre- 
cisely the same ultimate reason ; and of course his sinfulness is complete, 
in the sense that it can be varied only by varying light. This I know is 
contrary to common opinion, but it is the truth, and must be known ; 
and it is of the highest importance that these fundamental truths of 
morality and of immorality should be held up to the minds of all. 

Should the sinner abstain from any course of vice because it is 
wicked, it cannot be because he is benevolent, for this would contradict 
the supposition that he is selfish, or that he is a sinner. If, in considera- 
tion that an act or course is wicked, he abstains from it, it must be for a 
selfish reason. It may be in obedience to phrenological conscientiousness, 
or it may be from fear of hell, or of disgrace, or from remorse ; at all 
events, it cannot but be for some selfish reason. 

Total moral depravity is an attribute of selfishness, in the sense, that 
every selfish person is at all times just as wicked and blameworthy as 
with his present light he can be. 



208 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XIX. 

SANCTIONS OF MORAL LAW, NATURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL. 

L$" the discussion of this subject, I shall show — 

I. What constitute the sanctions of law. 

1. The sanctions of law are the motives to obedience, the natural and 
the governmental consequences or results of obedience and of disobedi- 
ence. 

2. They are remuneratory, tliat is, they promise reward to obedience. 

3. They are vindicatory, that is, they threaten the disobedient with 
punishment. 

4. They are natural, that is, happiness is to some extent naturally 
connected with, and the necessary consequence of, obedience to moral 
law, and misery is naturally and necessarily connected with, and results 
from, disobedience to moral law, or from acting contrary to the nature 
and relations of moral beings. 

5. Sanctions are governmental. By governmental sanctions are in- 
tended : 

(1.) The favor of the government as due to obedience. 

(2.) A positive reward bestowed upon the obedient by government. 

(3.) The displeasure of government towards the disobedient. 

(4.) Direct punishment inflicted by the government as due to disobe- 
dience. 

All happiness and misery resulting from obedience or disobedience, 
either natural, or from the favor, or frown of government, are to be re- 
garded as constituting the sanctions of law. 

II. In what light sanctions are to he regarded. 

1. Sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the benevolent 
regard of the lawgiver for his subjects : the motives which he exhibits to 
induce in the subjects the course of conduct that will secure their high- 
est well-being. 

2. They are to be regarded as an expression of his estimation of the 
justice, necessity, and value of the precept to the subjects of his govern- 
ment. 

3. They are to be regarded as an expression of the amount or strength 
of his desire to secure the happiness of his subjects. 

4. They are to be regarded as an expression of his opinion in respect 
to the desert of disobedience. 



SANCTIONS OF THE LAW. 209 

The natural sanctions are to be regarded as a demonstration of the 
justice, necessity and perfection of the precept. 

III. By what rule sanctions ought to le graduated. 

1. We have seen that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic 
value of the well-being of God and of the universe, and conditionated 
upon the perception of its value ; and, 

2. That guilt is always to be measured by the perceived value of the 
end which moral beings ought to choose. 

3. The sanctions of law should be graduated by the intrinsic merit 
and demerit of holiness and sin. 

IV. God's laiv has sanctions. 

1. That sin, or disobedience to the moral law, is attended with, and 
results in, misery, is a matter of consciousness. 

2. That virtue or holiness is attended with, and results in happiness, 
is also attested by consciousness. 

3. Therefore that God's law has natural sanctions, both remuneratory 
and vindicatory, is a matter of fact. 

4. That there are governmental sanctions added to the natural, must 
be true, or God, in fact, has no government but that of natural conse- 
quences. 

5. The Bible expressly, and in every variety of form, teaches that 
God will reward the righteous and punish the wicked. 

V. The perfection and duration of the remuneratory sanctions of the 
law of God. 

1. The perfection of the natural reward is, and must be, proportioned 
to the perfection of virtue. 

2. The duration of the remuneratory sanction must be equal to the 
duration of obedience. This cannot possibly be otherwise. 

3. If the existence and virtue of man are immortal, his happiness 
must be endless. 

4. The Bible most unequivocally asserts the immortality both of 
the existence and virtue of the righteous, and also that their happiness 
shall be endless. 

5. The very design and end of government make it necessary that 
governmental reward should be as perfect and unending as virtue. 

VI. Penal inflictions under the government of God must be endless. 

Here the inquiry is, what kind of death is intended, where death is 
denounced against the transgressor, as the penalty of the law of God ? 
1. It is not merely natural death, for — 
14 



210 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(1.) This would, in reality, be no penalty at all. But it would be 
offering a reward to sin. If natural death is all that is intended, and if 
persons, as soon as they are naturally dead, have suffered the penalty of 
the law, and their souls go immediately to heaven, the case stands thus : 
if your obedience is perfect and perpetual, you shall live in this world 
forever ; but if you sin, you shall die and go immediately to heaven. 
" This would be hire and salary," and not punishment. 

(2.) If natural death be the penalty of God's law, the righteous, who 
are forgiven, should not die a natural death. 

(3.) If natural death be the penalty of God's law, there is no such 
thing as forgiveness, but all must actually endure the penalty. 

(4.) If natural death be the penalty, then infants and animals suffer 
this penalty, as well as the most abandoned transgressors. 

(5.) If natural death be the penalty, and the only penalty, it sustains 
no proportion whatever to the guilt of sin. 

(6.) Natural death would be no adequate expression of the importance 
of the precept. 

2. The penalty of God's law is not spiritual death. 

(1. ) Because spiritual death is a state of entire sinfulness. 

(2. ) To make a state of entire sinfulness the penalty of the law of God, 
would be to make the penalty and the breach of the precept identical. 

(3.) It would be making God the author of sin, and would represent 
him as compelling the sinner to commit one sin as the punishment for 
another, — as forcing him into a state of total and perpetual rebellion, as 
the reward of his first transgression. 

3. But the penal sanction of the law of God is endless death, or that 
state of endless suffering which is the natural and governmental result of 
sin or of spiritual death. 

Before I proceed to the proof of this, I will notice an objection 
which is often urged against the doctrine of endless punishment. The 
objection is one, but it is stated in three different forms. This, and 
every other objection to the doctrine of endless punishment, with which 
I am acquainted, is levelled against the justice of such a governmental 
infliction. 

(1.) It is said that endless punishment is unjust, because life is so 
short, that men do not live long enough in this world to commit so great 
•a number of sins as to deserve endless punishment. To this I answer 
that it is founded in ignorance or disregard of a universal principle 
of government, viz., that one breach of the precept always incurs the 
penalty of the law, whatever that penalty is. The length of time 
employed in committing a sin, has nothing to do with its blameworthi- 
ness or guilt. It is the design which constitutes the moral character 
of the action, and not the length of the time required for its accom- 



SANCTIONS OF THE LAW. 211 

plishment. This objection takes for granted, that it is the number 
of sins, and not the intrinsic guilt of sin, that constitutes its blame- 
worthiness, whereas it is the intrinsic desert or guilt of sin, as we shall 
soon see, that renders it deserving of endless punishment. 

(2.) Another form of the objection is, that a finite creature cannot 
commit an infinite sin. But none but an infinite sin can deserve endless 
punishment : therefore endless punishments are unjust. 

This objection takes for granted that man is so diminutive a creature, 
so much less than the Creator, that he cannot deserve his endless frown. 
Which is the greater crime, for a child to insult his playfellow, or his 
parent ? Which would involve the most gnilt, for a man to smite his 
neighbor and his equal, or his lawful sovereign ? The higher the ruler 
is exalted above the subject in his nature, character, and rightful author- 
ity, the greater is the obligation of the subject to will his good, to render 
to him obedience, and the greater is the guilt of the transgression in the 
subject. Therefore, the fact that man is so infinitely below his Maker, 
does but enhance the guilt of his rebellion, and render him all the more 
worthy of his endless frown. 

(3.) A third form of the objection is, that sin is not an infinite evil ; 
and therefore, does not deserve endless punishment. 

This objection may mean either, that sin would not produce infinite 
mischief if unrestrained, or that it does not involve infinite guilt. It 
cannot mean the first, for it is agreed on all hands, that misery must 
continue as long as sin does, and therefore, that sin unrestrained would 
produce endless evil. The objection, therefore, must mean, that sin 
does not involve infinite guilt. Observe, then, the point at issue is, 
what is the intrinsic demerit or guilt of sin ? What does all sin in its 
own nature deserve ? They who deny the justice of endless punishment, 
manifestly consider the guilt of sin as a mere trifle. They who main- 
tain the justice of endless punishment, consider sin as an evil of immeas- 
urable magnitude, and, in its own nature, deserving of endless punish- 
ment. Proof : — 

Should a moral agent refuse to choose that as an ultimate end which 
is of no intrinsic value, he would thereby contract no guilt, because 
he would violate no obligation. But should he refuse to will the good of 
God and of his neighbor, he would violate an obligation, and of course 
contract guilt. This shows that guilt attaches to the violation of obliga- 
tion, and that a thing is blameworthy because it is the violation of an 
obligation. 

We have seen that sin is selfishness, that it consists in preferring self- 
gratification to the infinite interests of God and of the universe. We 
have also seen that obligation is founded in the intrinsic value of that 
good which moral agents ought to will to God and to the universe, 



212 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and is equal to the affirmed value of that good. We have also seen that 
every moral agent, by a law of his own reason, necessarily affirms that 
God is infinite, and that the endless happiness and well-being of God 
and of the universe, is of infinite value. Hence it follows, that refusal 
to will this good is a violation of infinite or unlimited obligation, and, 
consequently involves unlimited guilt. It is as certain that the guilt of 
any sin is unlimited, as that obligation to will the good of God and 
of the universe is unlimited. To deny consistently that the guilt of 
sin is unlimited, it must be shown, that obligation to will good to God is 
unlimited. To maintain consistently this last, it must be shown, that 
moral agents have not the idea that God is infinite. Indeed, to deny 
that the guilt of sin is in any instance less than boundless, is as absurd 
as to deny the guilt of sin altogether. 

Having shown that moral obligation is founded in the intrinsic value 
of the highest well-being of God and of the universe, that it is always 
equal to the soul's knowledge of the value of those interests, and having 
shown also, that every moral agent necessarily has the idea more or less 
clearly developed, that the value of those interests is infinite, it follows 
that the law is infinitely unjust, if its penal sanctions are not endless. 
Law must be just in two respects : the precept must be in accordance 
with the law of nature, and the penalty must be equal to the importance 
of the precept. That which has not these two peculiarities is not just, 
and therefore, is not and cannot be law. Either, then, God has no law, 
or its penal sanctions are endless. That the penal sanctions of the law 
of God are endless, is evident from the fact, that a less penalty would 
not exhibit as high motives as the nature of the case admits, to restrain 
sin and promote virtue. Natural justice demands that God should ex- 
hibit as high motives to secure obedience as the value of the law 
demands and the nature of the case admits. 

The tendency of sin to perpetuate and aggravate itself, affords an- 
other strong inference, that the sinfulness and misery of the wicked will 
be eternal. 

The fact, that punishment has no tendency to originate disinterested 
love in a selfish mind towards him who inflicts the punishment, also 
affords a strong presumption, that future punishment will be eternal. 

But let us examine this question in the light of revelation. 

The Bible, in a great many ways, represents the future punishment 
of the wicked as eternal, and never once represents it otherwise. It ex- 
presses the duration of the future punishment of the wicked by the same 
terms, and, in every way, as forcibly as it expresses the duration of the 
future happiness of the righteous. 

I will here introduce, without comment, some passages of scripture 



SANCTIONS OF THE LAW. 21? 

confirmatory of this last remark. " The hope of the righteous shall be 
gladness : but the expectation of the wicked shall perish." — Pro v. x. 28. 
(i When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish ; and the hope 
of unjust men perisheth." — Prov. xi. 7. "And many of them that 
sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake ; some to everlasting life, and 
some to shame and everlasting contempt." — Dan. xii. 2. " Then shall 
he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into 
everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels : for I was an hun- 
gered, and ye gave me no meat : I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink. 
And these shall go away into everlasting punishment : but the righteous 
into life eternal."— Matt. xxv. 41, 42, 46. "And if thy hand offend 
thee, cut, it off : it is better for thee to enter into life maimed than hav- 
ing two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched ; 
where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." — Mark ix. 
43, 44. "Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his 
floor ; and will gather the wheat into his garner ; but the chaff he will 
burn with fire unquenchable." — Luke iii. 17. "And besides all this, 
between us and you there is a great gulf fixed : so that they which would 
pass from hence to you, cannot ; neither can they pass to us, that would 
come from thence." — Luke xvi. 26. "He that believeth on the Son 
hath everlasting life : and he that believeth not the Son shall not see 
life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." — John iii. 36. "And to 
you who are troubled, rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be re- 
vealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking ven- 
geance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our 
Lord Jesus Christ ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction 
from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." — 2 
Thess. i. 7-9. "And the angels which kept not their first estate, but 
left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains, under 
darkness, unto the judgment of the great day. Even as Sodom and Go- 
morrah, and the cities about them, in like manner, giving themselves 
over to fornication, and going after strange flesh, are set forth for an 
example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire. Eaging waves of the 
sea, foaming out their own shame ; wandering stars, to whom is reserved 
the blackness of darkness forever." — Jude 6, 7, 13. " And the third 
angel followed them, saying with a loud voice, If any man worship the 
beast and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead, or in his 
hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God which is 
poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation ; and he 
shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy 
angels, and in the presence of the Lamb : and the smoke of their tor- 
ment ascendeth up forever and ever : and they have no rest day nor 
night, who worship the beast and his image, and whosoever receive th 



214: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the mark of his name." — Eev. xiv. 9-11. "And the devil that deceived 
them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and 
the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night forever and 
ever." — Rev. xx. 10. But there is scarcely any end to the multitude of 
passages that teach directly, or by inference, both the fact and the end- 
lessness of the future punishment of the wicked. 



LECTURE XX. 

HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 
Human governments a part of the moral government of God. 
In the discussion of this subject I will, — 

I. Inquire into the ultimate end of God in creation. 

We have seen in former lectures, that God is a moral agent, the self- 
existent and supreme ; and is therefore himself, as ruler of all, subject 
to, and observant of, moral law in all his conduct. That is, his own in- 
finite intelligence must affirm that a certain course of willing is suitable, 
fit, and right in him. This idea, or affirmation, is law to him ; and to 
this his will must be conformed, or he is not good. This is moral law, a 
law founded in the eternal and self-existent nature of God. This law 
does, and must, demand benevolence in God. Benevolence is good-wil- 
ling. God's intelligence must affirm that he ought to will good for its 
own intrinsic value. It must affirm his obligation to choose the highest 
possible good as the great end of his being. If God is good, the highest 
good of himself, and of the universe, must have been the end which he 
had in view in the work of creation. This is of infinite value, and ought 
to be willed by God. If God is good, this must have been his end. We 
have also seen, — 

II. That providential and moral governments are indispensable means 
of securing the highest good of the universe. 

The highest good of moral agents is conditionated upon their holi- 
ness. Holiness consists in conformity to moral law. Moral law implies 
moral government. Moral government is a government of moral law 
and of motives. Motives are presented by providential government ; and 
providential government is, therefore, a means of moral government. 
Providential and moral government must be indispensable to securing 
the highest good of the universe. 



HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 215 

III. Civil and family governments are indispensable to the securing 
of this end, and are, therefore, really a part of the providential and moral 
government of God. 

In the discussion of this question I remark, 

1. Human beings will not agree in opinion on any subject without 
similar degrees of knowledge. No human community exists, or ever will 
exist, the members of which will agree in opinion on all subjects. This 
ereates a necessity for human legislation and adjudication, to apply the 
great principles of moral law to all human affairs. There are multitudes 
of human wants and necessities that cannot properly be met, except 
through the instrumentality of human governments. 

2. This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this 
world. This is as certain as that the human body will always need sus- 
tenance and clothing ; and that the human soul will always need instruc- 
tion ; and that the means of instruction will not come spontaneously, with- 
out expense and labor. It is as certain as that men of all ages and cir- 
cumstances will never possess equal talents and degrees of information on 
all subjects. If all men were perfectly holy and disposed to do right, 
the necessity for human governments would not be set aside, because this 
necessity is founded in the ignorance of mankind, though greatly ag* 
gravated by their wickedness. The decisions of legislators and judges 
must be authoritative, so as to settle questions of disagreement in opin- 
ion, and at once to bind and protect all parties. 

The Bible presents human governments not only as existing, but as 
deriving their authority and right to punish evil-doers, and to protect 
the righteous, from God. But — 

3. Human governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part 
of the moral government of God. 

Dan. ii. 21. " He changeth the times and the seasons ; he removeth 
kings, and setteth up kings : he giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowl- 
edge to them that know understanding. " Dan. iv. 17, 25. "This mat- 
ter is by the degree of the watchers, and the demand by the word of the 
holy ones ; to the intent that the living may know that the Most High 
ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and 
setteth up over it the basest of men." " They shall drive thee from men, 
and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall 
make thee to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of 
heaven, and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the 
Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever 
he will." Dan. v. 21. " He was driven from the sons of men ; and his 
heart was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses : 
they fed him with grass like oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of 



216 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

heaven till he knew that the Most High God ruleth in the kingdom of 
men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will." Rom. xiii. 1-7. 
"Let eA r ery soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no 
power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever 
therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God : and they 
that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a 
terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the 
power ? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: 
for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that 
which is evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain ; for he is 
the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth 
evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath but also 
for conscience' sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also : for they are 
God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render, 
therefore, to all their dues ; tribute to whom tribute is due ; custom to 
whom custom ; fear to whom fear ; honor to whom honor." Titus iii. 1. 
"Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey 
magistrates, to be ready to every good work." 1 Peter ii. 13, 14. "Submit 
yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake : whether it be to 
the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him 
for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well." 
These passages prove conclusively, that God establishes human gov- 
ernment, as parts of moral government. 

4. It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support 
of human government. 

As the great law of benevolence, or universal good-willing, demands 
the existence of human governments, all men are under a perpetual and 
unalterable moral obligation to aid in their establishment and support. 
In popular or elective governments, every man having a right to vote, 
every human being who has moral influence, is bound to exert that influ- 
ence in the promotion of virtue and happiness. And as human govern- 
ments are plainly indispensable to the highest good of man, they are 
bound to exert their influence to secure a legislation that is in accordance 
with the law of God. The obligation of human beings to support and 
obey human governments, while they legislate upon the principles of the 
moral law, is as unalterable as the moral law itself. 

5. I will answer objections. 

Obj. 1. The kingdom of God is represented in the Bible as subvert- 
ing all other kingdoms. 

Ans. This is true, but all that can be meant by it is, that the time 
shall come when God shall be regarded as the supreme and universal 
sovereign of the universe, when his law shall be regarded as universally 
obligatory ; when all kings, legislators, and judges shall act as his ser- 



HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 217 

vants, declaring, applying, and administering the great principles of his 
law to all the affairs of human beings. Thus God will be the supreme 
sovereign, and earthly rulers will be governors, kings, and judges under 
him, and acting by his authority as revealed in the Bible. 

Obj. 2. It is alleged that God only providentially establishes human 
governments, and that he does not approve of their selfish and wicked 
administration ; that he only uses them providentially, as he does Satan, 
for the promotion of his own designs. 

Ans. God nowhere commands mankind to obey Satan, but he does 
command them to obey magistrates and rulers. Eom. xiii. 1. "Let 
every soul be subject unto the higher powers ; for there is no power but 
of God : the powers that be are ordained of God." 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14. 
" Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake : 
whether it be to the king as supreme ; or unto governors, as unto them 
that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise 
of them that do well." 

He nowhere recognizes Satan as his servant, sent and set by him to 
administer justice and execute wrath upon the wicked ; but he does this 
in respect to human governments. Eom. xiii. 2-6. "Whosoever there- 
fore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God ; and they that 
resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror 
to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the 
power ? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. 
For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that 
which is evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain : for he is 
the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth 
evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also 
for conscience' sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also ; for they 
are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing." 

It is true indeed that God approves of nothing that is ungodly and 
selfish in human governments. Neither did he approve of what was 
ungodly and selfish in the scribes and Pharisees ; and yet Christ said to 
his disciples, "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat. Therefore, 
whatsoever things they command you, that observe and do ; but do ye 
not after their works, for they say, and do not." Here the plain 
common-sense principle is recognized, that we are to obey when the 
requirement is not inconsistent with the moral law, whatever may be the 
character or the motive of the ruler. We are always to obey heartily as 
unto the Lord, and not unto men, and render obedience to magistrates 
for the honor and glory of God, and as doing service to him. 

Obj. 3. It is said that Christians should leave human governments to 
the management of the ungodly, and not be diverted from the work of 
saving souls, to intermeddle with human governments. 



218 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Ans. To uphold and assist good government is not being diverted 
from the work of saving souls. The promotion of public and private 
order and happiness is one of the indispensable means of doing good and 
saving souls. It is nonsense to admit that Christians are under an ob- 
ligation to obey human government, and still have nothing to do with 
the choice of those who shall govern. 

Obj. 4. It is affirmed that we are commanded not to avenge our- 
selves, that " Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord." It 
is said, that if I may not avenge or redress my own wrongs in my own 
person, I may not do it through the instrumentality of human govern- 
ment. 

Ans. It does not follow, that because you may not take it upon your- 
self to redress your own wrongs by a summary and personal infliction of 
punishment upon the transgressor, that therefore human governments 
may not punish them. All private wrongs are a public injury ; and 
irrespective of any particular regard to your personal interest, magistrates 
are bound to punish crime for the public good. While God has expressly 
forbidden you to redress your own wrongs, by administering personal 
and private chastisement, he has expressly recognized the right, and 
made it the duty of public magistrates to punish crimes. 
^ Obj. 5. It is alleged, that love is so much better than law, that where 
love reigns in the heart, law can be universally dispensed with. 

Ans. This supposes that, if there is only love, there need be no rule 
of duty ; no revelation, directing love in its efforts to secure the end 
upon which it terminates. But this is as untrue as possible. The ob- 
jection overlooks the fact, that law is in all worlds the rule of duty, and 
that legal sanctions make up an indispensable part of that circle of 
motives that are suited to the nature, relations, and government of 
i moral beings. 

Obj. 6. It is asserted, that Christians have something else to do be- 
sides meddling with politics. 

Ans. In a popular government, politics are an important part of re- 
ligion. No man can possibly be benevolent or religious, to the full ex- 
tent of his obligations, without concerning himself, to a greater or less 
extent, with the affairs of human government. It is true, that Chris- 
tians have something else to do than to go with a party to do evil, or to 
meddle with politics in a selfish or ungodly manner. But they are bound 
to meddle with politics in popular governments, because they are bound 
to seek the universal good of all men ; and this is one department of 
/human interests, materially affecting all their higher interests. 

Obj. 7. It is said that human governments are nowhere expressly 
authorized in the Bible. 

Ans. This is a mistake. Both their existence and lawfulness are as 






HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 219 

expressly recognized in the above quoted scriptures as they can be. But 
if God did not expressly authorize them, it would still be both the right 
and the duty of mankind to institute human governments, because they 
are plainly demanded by the necessities of human nature. It is a first 
truth, that whatever is essential to the highest good of moral beings in 
any world, they have a right to pursue, and are bound to pursue accord- 
ing to the best dictates of reason and experience. So far, therefore, are 
men from needing any express authority to establish human governments, 
that no inference from the silence of scripture could avail to render their 
establishment unlawful. It has been shown, in these lectures on moral 
government, that moral law is a unit— that it is that rule of action which 
is in accordance with the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral 
beings— that whatever is in accordance with, and demanded by the na- 
ture, relations, and circumstances of moral beings, is obligatory on them. 
It is moral law, and no power in the universe can set it aside. There- 
fore, were the scriptures entirely silent (which they are not) on the sub- 
ject of human governments, and on the subject of family government, 
as they actually are on a great many important subjects, this would be 
no objection to the lawfulness and expediency, necessity and duty of es- 
tablishing human governments. 

Obj. 8. It is said that human governments are founded in and sus- 
tained by force, and that this is inconsistent with the spirit of the gospel. 

Ans. There cannot be a difference between the spirit of the Old and 
the New Testament, or between the spirit of the law and the gospel, unless 
God has changed, and unless Christ has undertaken to make void the 
law through faith, which cannot be. Rom. iii. 32. " Do we then make 
void the law through faith ? God forbid : yea, we establish the law." 
Just human governments, and such governments only are contended for, 
will not exercise force, unless it is demanded to promote the highest pub- 
lic good. If it be necessary to this end, it can never be wrong. Nay, 
it must be the duty of human governments to inflict penalties, when their 
infliction is demanded by the public interest. 

Obj. 9. It has been said by some persons, that church government is 
sufficient to meet the necessities of the world, without secular or state 
governments. 

Ans. What ! Church governments regulate commerce, make internal 
arrangements, such as roads, bridges, and taxation, and undertake to 
manage all the business affairs of the world ! Preposterous and impossi- 
ble ! Church government was never established for any such end ; but 
simply to regulate the spiritual, in distinction from the secular concerns 
of men — to try offenders and inflict spiritual chastisement, and never to 
perplex and embarrass itself with managing the business and commercial 
interests of the world. 



220 SYSTEMATIC ^THEOLOGY. 

Obj. 10. It is said, that were all the world holy, legal penalties would 
not be needed. 

Ans. Were all men perfectly holy, the execution of penalties would 
not be needed ; but still, if there were law, there must be penalties ; and 
it would be both the right and the duty of magistrates to inflict them, 
whenever the needful occasion should call for their execution. But the 
state of the world supposed is not at hand, and while the world is what 
it is, laws must remain, and be enforced. 

Obj. 11. It is asserted, that family government is the only form of 
government approved of God. 

Ans. This is a ridiculous assertion, because God as expressly com- 
mands obedience to magistrates as to parents. He makes it as absolutely 
the duty of magistrates to punish crime, as of parents to punish their 
own disobedient children. The right of family government, though 
commanded by God, is not founded in the arbitrary will of God, but in 
the highest good of human beings ; so that family government would be 
both necessary and obligatory, had God not commanded it. So the right 
of human government has not its foundation in the arbitrary will of God, 
but in the necessities of human beings. The larger the community the 
more absolute the necessity of government. If in the small circle of the 
family, laws and penalties are needed, how much more in the larger com- 
munities of states and nations. Now, neither the ruler of a family, nor 
any other human ruler, has a right to legislate arbitrarily, or enact, or 
enforce any other laws, than those that are demanded by the nature, re- 
lations, and circumstances of human beings. Nothing can be obligatory 
on moral beings, but that which is consistent with their nature, relations, 
and circumstances. But human beings are bound to establish family 
governments, state governments, national governments, and in short, 
whatever government may be requisite for the universal instruction, gov- 
ernment, virtue, and happiness of the world, or any portion of it. 

Christians therefore have something else to do than to confound the 
right of government with the abuse of this right by the ungodly. Instead 
of destroying human governments, Christians are bound to reform and 
uphold them. To attempt to destroy, rather than reform human govern- 
ments, is the same in principle as is often aimed at, by those who are 
attempting to destroy, rather than to reform, the church. There are 
those who, disgusted with the abuses of Christianity practiced in the 
church, seem bent on destroying the church altogether, as the means of 
saving the world. But what mad policy is this ! 

It is admitted that selfish men need, and must feel the restraints of 
law ; but yet it is contended that Christians should have no part in 
restraining them by law. But suppose the wicked should agree among 
themselves to have no law, and therefore should not attempt to restrain 



HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 221 

themselves, nor each other by law ; would it be neither the right nor the 
duty of Christians to attempt their restraint, through the influence 
of wholesome government ? It would be strange, that selfish men 
should need the restraints of law, and yet that Christians should have 
no right to meet this necessity, by supporting governments that will 
restrain them. It is right and best that there should be law. It is even 
absolutely necessary that there should be law. Universal benevolence 
demands it ; can it then be wrong in Christians to have anything to do 
with it ? 

IV. Point out the limits or boundaries of the right of government. 

Observe, the end of government is the highest good of human beings, 
as a part of universal good. All valid human legislation must propose 
this as its end, and no legislation can have any authority that has not 
the highest good of the whole for its end. No being can arbitrarily create 
law. All law for the government of moral agents must be moral law : 
that is, it must be that rule of action best suited to their natures and 
relations. All valid human legislation must be only declaratory of this 
one only law. Nothing else than this can by any possibility be law. 
God puts forth no enactments, but such as are declaratory of the com- 
mon law of the universe ; and should he do otherwise, they would not be 
obligatory. Arbitrary legislation can never be really obligatory. 

The right of human government is founded in the intrinsic value 
of the good of being, and is conditionated upon its necessity, as a means 
to that end. So far as legislation and control are indispensable to this 
end, so far and no farther does the right to govern extend. All legisla- 
tion and all constitutions not founded upon this basis, and not recogniz- 
ing the moral law as the only law of the universe, are null and void, and 
all attempts to establish and enforce them are odious tyranny and usur- 
pation. Human beings may form constitutions, establish governments, 
and enact statutes for the purpose of promoting the highest virtue and 
happiness of the world, and for the declaration and enforcement of 
moral law ; and just so far human governments are essential to this end, 
but absolutely no farther. 

It follows, that no government is lawful or innocent that does not 
recognize the moral law as the only universal law, and God as the Su- 
preme Lawgiver and Judge, to whom nations in their national capacity, 
as well as all individuals, are amenable. The moral law of God is the 
only law of individuals and of nations, and nothing can be rightful 
government but such as is established and administered with a view to; 
its support. 



222 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XXL 

HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 

V. I propose now to make several remarks respecting forms of govern- 
ment, the right and duty of revolution, etc. 

1. The particular forms of state government must, and will, depend 
upon the virtue and intelligence of the people. 

, When virtue and intelligence are nearly universal, democratic forms 
of government are well suited to promote the public good. In such a 
state of society, democracy is greatly conducive to the general diffusion 
of knowledge on governmental subjects ; and although, in some respects 
less convenient, yet in a suitable state of society, a democracy is in many 

t respects the most desirable form of government. 

, God has always providentially given to mankind those forms of 
government that were suited to the degrees of virtue and intelligence 
among them. If they have been extremely ignorant and vicious, he has 
restrained them by the iron rod of human despotism. If more intelli- 
gent and virtuous, he has given them the milder form of limited mon- 
archies. If still more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them still 
more liberty, and providentially established republics for their govern- 
ment. Whenever the general state of intelligence has permitted it, he 
has put them to the test of self-government and self-restraint, by estab- 
lishing democracies. 

If the world ever becomes perfectly virtuous, governments will be 
proportionally modified, and employed in expounding and applying the 

( great principles of moral law. 

2. That form of government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet 
the necessities of the people. 

This follows as a self-evident truth, from the consideration, that 
necessity is the condition of the right of human government. To meet 
this necessity is the object of government ; and that government is obli- 
gatory and best which is demanded by the circumstances, intelligence, 
and morals of the people. 

Consequently, in certain states of society, it would be a Christian's 
duty to pray for and sustain even a military despotism ; in a certain other 
state of society, to pray for and sustain a monarchy ; and in other states, 
to pray for and sustain a republic ; and in a still more advanced stage of 
virtue and intelligence, to pray for and sustain a democracy ; if indeed 
a democracy is the most wholesome form of self government, which may 
admit of doubt. It is ridiculous to set up the claim of a Divine right 



HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 223 

foT any given form of government. That form of government which is 
demanded by the state of society, and the virtue and intelligence of the 
people, has of necessity the Divine right and sanction, and none other 
has or can have. 

3. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue and 
intelligence, or the vice and ignorance, of the people, demand them. 

This is a thing of course. When one form of government fails to 
meet any longer the necessities of the people, it is the duty of the people 
to revolutionize. In such cases, it is vain to oppose revolution ; for in 
some way the benevolence of God will bring it about. Upon this prin- 
ciple alone, can what is generally termed the American Revolution be 
justified. The intelligence and virtue of our Puritan forefathers ren- 
dered a monarchy an unnecessary burden, and a republican form of gov- 
ernment both appropriate and necessary ; and God always allows his chil- 
dren as much liberty as they are prepared to enjoy. 

The stability of our republican institutions must depend upon the 
progress of general intelligence and virtue. If in these respects the 
nation falls, if general intelligence, public and private virtue, sink to 
that point below which self-control becomes practicably impossible, we 
must fall back into monarchy, limited or absolute ; or into civil or mili- 
tary despotism ; just according to the national standard of intelligence 
and virtue. This is just as certain as that God governs the world, or 
that causes produce their effects. 

Therefore, it is the maddest conceivable policy, for Christians to 
attempt to uproot human governments, while they ought to be engaged 
in sustaining them upon the great principles of the moral law. It is cer- 
tainly the grossest folly, if not abominable wickedness, to overlook either 
in theory or pratice, these plain, common sense and universal truths. 

4. In what cases are we bound to disobey human governments ? 

(1.) We may yield obedience, when the thing required does not in- 
volve a violation of moral obligation. 

(2.) We are bound to obey when the thing required has no moral 
character in itself ; upon the principle, that obedience in this case is a 
less evil than resistance and revolution. But — 

(3.) We are bound in all cases to disobey, when human legislation 
contravenes moral law, or invades the rights of conscience. 

VI. Apply the foregoing principles to the rights and duties of govern- 
ments and subjects in relation to the execution of the necessary penalties 
of law : — the suppression of mods, insurrections, rebellion ; and also in 
relation to war, slavery, Sabbath desecration, etc. 

1. It is plain that the right and duty to govern for the security and 
promotion of the public interests, implies the right and duty to use any 



224: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

means necessary to this result. It is absurd to say that the ruler has the 
right to govern, and yet that he has not a right to use the necessary 
means. Some have taken the ground of the inviolability of human life, 
and have insisted that to take life is wrong per se, and of course that 
governments are to be sustained without taking life. Others have gone 
so far as to assert, that governments have no right to resort to physical 
force to sustain the authority of law. But this is a most absurd philos- 
ophy, and amounts just to this : — The ruler has a right to govern while 
the subject is pleased to obey ; but if the subject refuse obedience, why 
then the right to govern ceases : for it is impossible that the right to 
govern should exist when the right to enforce obedience does not exist. 
This philosophy is, in fact, a denial of the right to use the necessary 
means for the promotion of the great end for which all moral agents 
ought to live. And yet, strange to tell, this philosophy professes to deny 
the right to use force, and to take life in support of government, on the 
ground of benevolence, that is, that benevolence forbids it. What is this 
but maintaining that the law of benevolence demands that we should 
love others too much to use the indispensable means to secure their good? 
Or that we should love the whole too much to execute the law upon those 
who would destroy all good ? Shame on such philosophy ! It overlooks 
the foundation of moral obligation, and of all morality and religion. 
Just as if an enlightened benevolence could forbid the due, wholesome, 
and necessary execution of law. This philosophy impertinently urges 
the commandment, " Thou shalt not kill," as prohibiting all taking of 
human life. But it may be asked, why say human life ? The com- 
mandment, so far as the letter is concerned, as fully prohibits the kill- 
ing of animals or vegetables as it does of men. The question is, what 
kind of killing does this commandment prohibit ? Certainly not all kill- 
ing of human beings, for in the next chapter the Jews were commanded 
to kill human beings for certain crimes. The ten commandments are 
precepts, and the Lawgiver, after laying down the precepts, goes on to 
specify the penalties that are to be inflicted by men for a violation of 
these precepts. Some of these penalties are death, and the penalty for 
the violation of the precept under consideration is death. It is certain 
that this precept was not intended to prohibit the taking of life for mur- 
der. A consideration of the law in its tenor and spirit renders it most 
evident that the precept in question prohibits murder, and the penalty 
of death is added by the lawgiver to the violation of this precept. Now 
how absurd and impertinent it is, to quote this precept in prohibition of 
taking life under the circumstances included in the precept ! 

Men have an undoubted right to do whatever is plainly indispensable 
to the highest good of man ; and, therefore, nothing can, by any possi- 
bility be law, that should prohibit the taking of human life, when it be- 



HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 225 

comes indispensable to the great end of government. This right is every 
where recognized in the Bible, and if it were not, still the right would 
exist. This philosophy that I am opposing, assumes that the will of God 
creates law, and that we have no right to take life, without an express 
warrant from him. But the facts are, that God did give to the Jews, at 
least, an express warrant and injunction to take life for certain crimes ; 
and, if he had not, it would have been duty to do so whenever the pub- 
lic good required it. Let it be remembered, that the moral law is the 
law of nature, and that everything is lawful and right that is plainly de- 
manded for the promotion of the highest good of being. 

The philosophy of which I am speaking lays much stress upon what 
it calls inalienable rights. It assumes that man has a title or right to 
life, in such a sense, that he cannot forfeit it by crime. But the fact is, 
there are no rights inalienable in this sense. There can be no such rights. 
Whenever any individual by the commission of crime comes into such a 
relation to the public interest, that his death is a necessary means of se- 
curing the highest public good, his life is forfeited, and to take the for- 
feiture at his hands is the duty of the government. 

2. It will be seen, that the same principles are equally applicable to 
insurrections, rebellions, etc. While government is right, it is duty, and 
while it is right and duty, because necessary as a means to the great end 
upon which benevolence terminates, it must be both the right and the 
duty of government, and of all the subjects, to use any indispensable 
means for the suppression of insurrections, rebellion, etc., as also for the 
due administration of justice in the execution of law. 

3. These principles will guide us in ascertaining the right, and of 
course the duty of governments in relation to war. 

Observe, war to be in any case a virtue, or to be less than a crime of 
infinite magnitude, must not only be honestly believed, by those who en- 
gage in it, to be demanded by the law of benevolence, but it must also 
be engaged in by them with an eye single to the glory of God, r.nd the 
highest good of being. That war has been in some instances demanded 
by the spirit of the moral law, there can be no reasonable doubt, since 
God has sometimes commanded it, which he could not have done had it 
not been demanded by the highest good of the universe. In such cases, 
if those who were commanded to engage in war, had benevolent inten- 
tions in prosecuting it, as God had in commanding it, it is absurd to say 
that they sinned. Rulers are represented as God's ministers to execute 
wrath upon the guilty. If, in the providence of God, he should find it 
duty to destroy or to rebuke a nation for his own glory, and the highest 
good of being, he may beyond question command that they should be 
chastised by the hand of man. But in no case is war anything else than 
a most horrible crime, unless it is plainly the will of God that it should 
15 



226 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

exist, and unless it be actually undertaken in obedience to his will. This 
is true of all, both of rulers and of subjects, who engage in war. Selfish 
war is wholesale murder. For a nation to declare war, or for persons to 
enlist, or in any way designedly to aid or abet, in the declaration or pros- 
ecution of war, upon any other conditions than those just specified, in- 
volves the guilt of murder. 

There can scarcely be conceived a more abominable and fiendish 
'maxim than " our country right or wrong." Eecently this maxim seems 
to have been adopted and avowed in relation to the war of the United 
States with Mexico. It seems to be supposed by some, that it is the duty 
of good subjects to sympathize with, and support government in the 
prosecution of a war in which they have unjustly engaged, and to which 
they have committed themselves, upon the ground that since it is com- 
menced it must be prosecuted as the less of two evils. The same class 
of men seem to have adopted the same philosophy in respect to slavery. 
Slavery, as it exists in this country, they acknowledge to be indefensible 
jon the ground of right. It is a great evil and a great sin, but it must be 
let alone as the less of two evils. It exists, say they, and it cannot be 
abolished without disturbing the friendly relations and federal union of 
the States, therefore the institution must be sustained. The philosophy 
is this : war and slavery as they exist in this nation are unjust, but they 
exist, and to sustain them is duty, because their existence, under the cir- 
cumstances, is the less of two evils. 

Nothing can sanctify any crime but that which renders it no crime, 
but a virtue. But the philosophers, whose views I am examining, must, 
if consistent, take the ground, that since war and slavery exist, although 
their commencement was unjust and sinful, yet since they exist, it is no 
crime but a virtue to sustain them, as the least of two natural evils. But 
I would ask, to whom are they the least of two evils ? To ourselves or to 
being in general ? The least of two present, or of two ultimate evils ? 
Our duty is not to calculate the evils in respect merely to ourselves, or to 
this nation and those immediately oppressed and injured, but to look 
abroad upon the world and the universe, and inquire what are the evils 
resulting, and likely to result, to the world, to the church, and to the 
universe, from the declaration and prosecution of such a war, and from 
the support of slavery by a nation professing what we profess — a nation 
boasting of liberty ; who have drawn the sword and bathed it in blood in 
defence of the principle, that all men have an inalienable right to liberty ; 
that they are born free and equal. Such a nation proclaiming such a 
principle, and fighting in the defence of it, standing with its proud foot 
on the neck of three millions of crushed and prostrate slaves ! horri- 
ble ! This a less evil to the world than emancipation, or even than the 
dismemberment of our hypocritical union ! " shame, where is thy 



HUMAN GOVERNMENT. 227 

blush ! " The prosecution of a war, unjustly engaged in, a less evil than 
repentance and restitution ! It is impossible. Honesty is always and 
necessarily the best policy. Nations are bound by the same law as indi- 
viduals. If they have done wrong, it is always duty, and honorable for 
them to repent, confess and make restitution. To adopt the maxim, 
" Our country right or wrong," and to sympathize with the government, 
in the prosecution of a war unrighteously waged, must involve the guilt 
of murder. To adopt the maxim, " Our union, even with perpetual 
slavery," is an abomination so execrable, as not to be named by a just 
mind without indignation. 

4. The same principles apply to governmental sabbath desecration. 
The sabbath is plainly a divine institution, founded in the necessities of 
human beings. The letter of the law of the sabbath forbids all labor of 
every kind, and under all circumstances on that day. But, as has been 
said in a former lecture, the spirit of the law of the sabbath, being 
identical with the law of benevolence, sometimes requires the violation 
of the letter of the law. Both governments and individuals may do, and 
it is their duty to do, on the sabbath whatever is plainly required by the 
great law of benevolence. But nothing more, absolutely. No human 
legislature can nullify the moral law. No human legislation can make 
it right or lawful to violate any command of God. All human enact- 
ments requiring or sanctioning the violation of any command of God, 
are not only null and void, but they are a blasphemous usurpation and 
invasion of the prerogative of God. 

5. The same principles apply to slavery. No human constitution or 
enactment can, by any possibility, be law, that recognizes the right of one 
human being to enslave another, in a sense that implies selfishness on the 
part of the slaveholder. Selfishness is wrong per se. It is, therefore, 
always and unalterably wrong. No enactment, human or divine, can 
legalize selfishness and make it right, under any conceivable circum- 
stances. Slavery or any other evil, to be a crime, must imply selfishness. 
It must imply a violation of the command, " Thou shalt love thy neigh- 
bor as thyself." If it implies a breach of this, it is wrong invariably 
and necessarily, and no legislation, or any thing else, can make it right. 
God cannot authorize it. The Bible cannot sanction it, and if both 
God and the Bible were to sanction it, it could not be lawful. God's 
arbitrary will is not law. The moral law, as we have seen, is as inde- 
pendent of his will, as his own necessary existence is. He cannot alter 
or repeal it. He could not sanctify selfishness and make it right. Nor 
can any book be received as of divine authority that sanctions selfishness. 
God and the Bible quoted to sustain and sanctify slaveholding in a sense 
implying selfishness ! 'Tis blasphemous ! That slaveholding, as it exists 
in this country, implies selfishness, at least in almost all instances, is too 



228 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

plain to need proof. The sinfulness of slaveholding and war, in almost 
all cases, and in every case where the terms slaveholding and war are 
used in their popular signification, will appear irresistibly, if we consider 
that sin is selfishness, and that all selfishness is necessarily sinful. 
Deprive a human being of liberty who has been guilty of no crime ; 
rob him of himself — his body — his soul — his time, and his earnings, to 
promote the interest of his master, and attempt to justify this on the 
principles of moral law ! It is the greatest absurdity, and the most 
revolting wickedness. 



LECTUKE XXII. 

MORAL DEPRAVITY. 



Ik discussing the subject of human depravity, I shall, — 

I. Define the term depravity. 

The word is derived from the Latin de and pravus. Pravus means 
" crooked." De is intensive. Depravatus literally and primarily means 
" very crooked," not in the sense of original or constitutional crooked- 
ness, but in the sense of having become crooked. The term does not 
imply original mal-conformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed from 
right or straight. It always implies deterioration, or fall from a 
former state of moral or physical perfection. 

Depravity always implies a departure from a state of original integ- 
rity, or from conformity to the laws of the being who is the subject 
of depravity. Thus we should not consider that being depraved, who 
remained in a state of conformity to the original laws of his being, phys- 
ical and moral. But we justly call a being depraved, who has departed 
from conformity to those laws, whether those laws be physical or moral. 

II. Point out the distinction between physical and moral depravity. 

Physical depravity, as the word denotes, is the depravity of constitu- 
tion, or substance, as distinguished from depravity of free moral action. 
It may be predicated of body or of mind. Physical depravity, when 
predicated of the body, is commonly and rightly called disease. It con- 
sists in a physical departure from the laws of health ; a lapsed, or fallen 
state, in which healthy organic action is not sustained. 

When physical depravity is predicated of mind, it is intended that the 
powers of the mind, either in substance, or in consequence of their 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 229 

connection with, and dependence upon, the body, are in a diseased, 
lapsed, fallen, degenerate state, so that the healthy action of those 
powers is not sustained. 

Physical depravity, being depravity of substance as opposed to de- 
pravity of the actions of free-will, can have no moral character. It may 
as we shall see, be caused by moral depravity ; and a moral agent may 
be blameworthy for having rendered himself physically depraved, either 
in body or mind. But physical depravity, whether of body or of mind, 
can have no moral character in itself, for the plain reason that it is in- 
voluntary, and in its nature is disease, and not sin. Let this be re- 
membered. 

Moral depravity is the depravity of free-will, not of the faculty itself, 
but of its free action. It consists in a violation of moral law. Depravity 
of the will, as a faculty, is, or would be, physical, and not moral de- 
pravity. It would be depravity of substance, and not of free, responsible 
choice. Moral depravity is depravity of choice. It is a choice at variance 
with moral law, moral right. It is synonymous with sin or sinfulness. 
It is moral depravity, because it consists in a violation of moral law, and 
because it has moral character. 

III. Of what physical depravity can be predicated. 

1. It can be predicated of any organized substance. That is, every 
organized substance is liable to become depraved. Depravity is a possi- 
ble state of every organized body or substance in existence. 

2. Physical depravity may be predicated of mind, as has already been 
said, especially in its connection with an organized body. As mind, in 
connection with body, manifests itself through it, acts by means of it, 
and is dependent upon it, it is plain that if the body become diseased, or 
physically depraved, the mind cannot but be affected by this state of the 
body, through and by means of which it acts. The normal manifesta- 
tions of mind cannot, in such case, be reasonably expected. Physical 
depravity may be predicated of all the involuntary states of the intellect, 
and of the sensibility. That is, the actings and states of the intellect 
may become disordered, depraved, deranged, or fallen from the state of 
integrity and healthiness. This every one knows, as it is matter of daily 
experience and observation. Whether this in all cases is, and must be, 
caused by the state of the bodily organization, that is, whether it is 
always and necessarily to be ascribed to the depraved state of the brain 
and nervous system, it is impossible for us to know. It may, for aught 
we know, in some instances at least, be a depravity or derangement of 
the substance of the mind itself. 

The sensibility, or feeling department of the mind, may be sadly and 
physically depraved. This is a matter of common experience. The 



230 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

appetites and passions, the desires and cravings, the antipathies and 
repellencies of the feelings fall into great disorder and anarchy. Numer- 
ous artificial appetites are generated, and the whole sensibility becomes 
a wilderness, a chaos of conflicting and clamorous desires, emotions and 
passions. That this state of the sensibility is often, and perhaps in some 
measure always, owing to the state of the nervous system with which it 
is connected, through and by which it manifests itself, there can be but 
little room to doubt. But whether this is always and necessarily so, no 
one can tell. We know that the sensibility manifests great physical de- 
pravity. Whether this depravity belong exclusively to the body, or to 
the mind, or to both in conjunction, I will not venture to affirm. In the 
present state of our knowledge, or of my knowledge, I dare not hazard 
an affirmation upon the subject. The human body is certainly in a state 
of physical depravity. The human mind also certainly manifests physi- 
cal depravity. But observe, physical depravity has in no case any moral 
character, because it is involuntary. 

IV. Of what moral depravity can be predicated. 

1. Not of substance ; for over involuntary substance the moral law 
does not directly legislate. 

2. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any involuntary acts or 
states of mind. These surely cannot be violations of moral law apart 
from the ultimate intention ; for moral law legislates directly only over 
free, intelligent choices. 

3. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any unintelligent act of 
will, that is, of acts of will that are put forth in a state of idiocy, of 
intellectual derangement, or of sleep. Moral depravity implies moral 
obligation ; moral obligation implies moral agency ; and moral agency 
implies intelligence, or knowledge of moral relations. Moral agency im- 
plies moral law, or the development of the idea of duty, and a knowl- 
edge of what duty is. 

4. Moral depravity can only be predicated of violations of moral law, 
and of the free volitions by which those violations are perpetrated. 
Moral law, as we have seen, requires love, and only love, to God and 
man, or to God and the universe. This love, as we have seen, is good- 
will, choice, the choice of an end, the choice of the highest well-being of 
God, and of the universe of sentient existences. 

Moral depravity is sin. Sin is a violation of moral law. We have 
seen that sin must consist in choice, in the choice of self-indulgence or 
self -gratification as an end. 

5. Moral depravity cannot consist in any attribute of nature or con- 
stitution, nor in any lapsed and fallen state of nature ; for this is physical 
and not moral depravity. 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 231 

6. It cannot consist in anything that is an original and essential part 
of mind, or of body ; nor in any involuntary action or state of either 
mind or body. 

7. It cannot consist in anything back of choice, and that sustains to 
choice the relation of a cause. Whatever is back of choice, is without 
the pale of legislation. The law of God, as has been said, requires good- 
willing only ; and sure it is, that nothing but acts of will can constitute a 
violation of moral law. Outward actions, and involuntary thoughts and 
feelings, may be said in a certain sense to possess moral character 
because they are produced by the will. But, strictly speaking, moral 
character belongs only to choice, or intention. 

It was shown in a former lecture, that sin does not, and cannot con- 
sist in malevolence, properly speaking, or in the choice of sin or misery 
as an end, or for its own sake. It was also shown, that all sin consists, 
and must consist in selfishness, or in the choice of self -gratification as a 
final end. Moral depravity then, strictly speaking, can only be predicated 
of selfish ultimate intention. 

Moral depravity, as I use the term, does not consist in, nor imply a 
sinful nature, in the sense that the substance of the human soul is sinful *^ 
in itself. It is not a constitutional sinfulness. It is not an involuntary 
sinfulness. Moral depravity, as I use the term, consists in selfishness ; 
in a state of voluntary committal of the will to self-gratification. It is a 
spirit of self-seeking, a voluntary and entire consecration to the gratifica- 
tion of self. It is selfish ultimate intention ; it is the choice of a wrong 
end of life ; it is moral depravity, because it is a violation of moral law. 
It is a refusal to consecrate the whole being to the highest well-being of 
God and of the universe, and obedience to the moral law, and consecrat- 
ing it to the gratification of self. Moral depravity sustains to the out- 
ward life, the relation of a cause. This selfish intention, or the will in 
this committed state, of course, makes efforts to secure its end, and these 
efforts make up the outward life of the selfish man. Moral depravity is 
sinfulness, not of nature but of voluntary state. It is a sinfully com- 
mitted state of the will to self-indulgence. It is not a sinful nature but 
a sinful heart. It is a sinful ultimate aim, or intention. The Greek 
term amartia, rendered sin in our English Bible, signifies to miss the 
mark, to aim at the wrong end. Sin is a wrong aim, or intention. It is 
aiming at, or intending self-gratification as the ultimate and supreme end 
of life, instead of aiming, as the moral law requires, at the highest good 
of universal being, as the end of life. 

V. Mankind are botJi physically and morally depraved, 

1. There is, in all probability, no perfect health of body among all 
the ranks and classes of human beings that inhabit this world. The 



232 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

physical organization of the whole race has become impaired, and beyond 
all doubt has been becoming more and more so since intemperance of any 
kind was first introduced into our world. This is illustrated and con- 
firmed by the comparative shortness of human life. This is a physiolo- 
gical fact. 

2. As the human mind in this state of existence is dependent upon 
the body for all its manifestations, and as the human body is universally 
in a state of greater or less physical depravity or disease, it follows that 
the manifestations of mind thus dependent on a physically depraved or- 
ganization, will be physically depraved manifestations. Especially is this 
true of the human sensibility. The appetites, passions, and propensities 
are in a state of most unhealthy development. This is too evident, and 
too much a matter of universal notoriety, to need proof or illustration. 
Every person of reflection has observed, that the human mind is greatly 
out of balance, in consequence of the monstrous development of the sen- 
sibility. The appetites, passions, and propensities have been indulged, 
and the intelligence and conscience stultified by selfishness. Selfishness, 
be it remembered, consists in a disposition or choice to gratify the pro- 
pensities, desires, and feelings. This of course, and of necessity, pro- 
duces just the unhealthy and monstrous developments which we daily 
see : sometimes one ruling passion or appetite lording it, not only over 
the intelligence and over the will, but over all the other appetites and 
passions, crushing and sacrificing them all upon the altar of its own grat- 
ification. See that bloated wretch, the inebriate ! His appetite for 
strong drink has played the despot. His whole mind and body, reputa- 
tion, family, friends, health, time, eternity, all, all are laid by him upon 
its filthy altar. There is the debauchee, the glutton, the gambler, the 
miser, and a host of others, each in his turn giving striking and melan- 
choly proof of the monstrous development and physical depravity of the 
human sensibility. 

3. That men are morally depraved is one of the most notorious facts 
of human experience, observation and history. Indeed, I am not aware 
that it has ever been doubted, when moral depravity has been understood 
to consist in selfishness. 

The moral depravity of the human race is everywhere assumed and 
declared in the Bible, and so universal and notorious is the fact of human 
selfishness, that should any man practically call it in question — should he, 
in his business transactions, and in his intercourse with men, assume the 
contrary, he would justly subject himself to the charge of insanity. There 
is not a fact in the world more notorious and undeniable than this. Hu- 
man moral depravity is as palpably evident as human existence. It is a 
fact everywhere assumed in all governments, in all the arrangements of 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 233 

society, and it has impressed its image, and written its name, upon every 
thing human. 

VI. Subsequent to the commencement of moral agency, and previous to 
regeneration, the moral depravity of mankind is universal. 

By this it is not intended to deny that, in some instances, the Spirit 
of God may, from the first moment of moral agency, have so enlightened 
the mind as to have secured conformity to moral law, as the first moral 
act. This may or may not be true. It is not my present purpose to 
affirm or to deny this, as a possibility, or as a fact. 

But by this is intended, that every moral agent of our race is, from 
the dawn of moral agency to the moment of regeneration by the Holy 
Spirit, morally depraved, unless we except those possible cases just alluded 
to. The Bible exhibits proof of it — 

1. In those passages that represent all the unregenerate as possessing 
one common wicked heart or character. " And God saw that the wick- 
edness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the 
thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. " — Gen. vi. 5. " This is 
an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one 
event unto all : yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and 
madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the 
dead." — Eccl. ix. 3. "The heart is deceitful above all things and des- 
perately wicked : who can know it ? " — Jer. xvii. 9. " Because the car- 
nal mind is enmity against God : for it is not subject to the law of God, 
neither indeed can be." — Kom. viii. 7. 

2. In those passages that declare the universal necessity of regenera- 
tion. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto 
thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of 
God."— John iii. 3. 

3. Passages that expressly assert the universal moral depravity of all 
unregenerate moral agents of our race. 'VWhat then ? are we better 
than they ? No, in no wise : for we have before proved both Jews and 
Gentiles, that they are all under sin ; as it is written, There is none 
righteous, no, not one. There is none that understandeth, there is none 
that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are to- 
gether become unprofitable ; there is none that doeth good, no not one. 
Their throat is an open sepulchre ; with their tongues they have used 
deceit ; the poison of asps is under their lips : whose mouth is full of 
cursing and bitterness : their feet are swift to shed blood : destruction 
and misery are in their ways : and the way of peace have they not known: 
there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know that what things 
soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law : that every 
mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. 



234: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his 
sight ; for by the law is the knowledge of sin." — Eom. iii. 9 — 20. 

4. Universal history proves it. What is this world's history but the 
shameless chronicle of human wickedness ? 

5. Universal observation attests it. Who ever saw one unregenerate 
human being that was not selfish, that did not obey his feelings rather 
than the law of his intelligence, that was not under some form, or in 
some way, living to please self ? Such an unregenerate human being, 1 
may safely affirm, was never seen since the fall of Adam. 

6. I may also appeal to the universal consciousness of the unregener- 
ate. They know themselves to be selfish, to be aiming to please them- 
selves, and they cannot honestly deny it. 

VII. The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race, 
is total. 

By this is intended, that the moral depravity of the unregenerate is 
without any mixture of moral goodness or virtue, that while they remain 
unregenerate, they never in any instance, nor in any degree, exercise 
true love to God and to man. It is not intended, that they may not per- 
form many outward actions, and have many inward feelings, that are 
such as the regenerate perform and experience : and such too as are ac- 
counted virtue by those who place virtue in the outward action. But it 
is intended, that virtue does not consist either in involuntary feelings or 
in outward actions, and that it consists alone in entire consecration of 
heart and life to God and the good of being, and that no unregenerate 
sinner previous to regeneration, is or can be, for one moment, in this 
state. 

When virtue is clearly seen to consist in the heart's entire consecra- 
tion to God and the good of being, it must be seen, that the unregenerate 
are not for one moment in this state. It is amazing, that some philoso- 
phers and theologians have admitted and maintained, that the unregen- 
erate do sometimes do that which is truly virtuous. But in these admis- 
sions they necessarily assume a false philosophy, and overlook that in 
which all virtue does and must consist, namely, supreme ultimate inten- 
tion. They speak of virtuous actions and of virtuous feelings, as if vir- 
tue consisted in them, and not in the intention. 

Henry P. Tappan, for example, for the most part an able, truthful, 
and beautiful writer, assumes, or rather affirms, that volitions may be 
put forth inconsistent with, and contrary to the present choice of an end, 
and that consequently, unregenerate sinners, whom he admits to be in 
the exercise of a selfish choice of an end, may and do sometimes put 
forth right volitions, and perform right actions, that is, right in the 
sense of virtuous actions. But let us examine this subject. We have 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 235 

seen that all choice and all volition must respect either an end or means, 
that is, that everything willed or chosen, is willed or chosen for some 
reason. To deny this, is the same as to deny that anything is willed or 
chosen, because the ultimate reason for a choice and the thing chosen 
are identical. Therefore, it is plain, as was shown in a former lecture, 
that the will cannot embrace at the same time, two opposite ends ; 
and that while but one end is chosen, the will cannot put forth volitions 
to secure some other end, which end is not yet chosen. In other words, 
it certainly is absurd to say, that the will, while maintaining the choice 
of one end, can use means for the accomplishment of another and op- 
posite end. 

"When an end is chosen, that choice confines all volition to securing 
its accomplishment, and for the time being, and until another end is 
chosen, and this one relinquished, it is impossible for the will to put 
forth any volition inconsistent with the present choice. It therefore 
follows, that while sinners are selfish, or unregenerate, it is impossible 
for them to put forth a holy volition. They are under the necessity of 
first changing their hearts, or their choice of an end, before they can put 
forth any volitions to secure any other than a selfish end. And this is 
plainly the everywhere assumed philosophy of the Bible. That uniformly 
represents the unregenerate as totally depraved, and calls upon them to 
repent, to make to themselves a new heart ; and never admits directly, 
or by way of implication, that they can do anything good or acceptable 
to God, while in the exercise of a wicked or selfish heart. 



LECTURE XXIII. 

MORAL DEPRAVITY. 



VIII. Let us consider the proper method of accounting for the univer- 
sal and total moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race.. 

In the discussion of this subject, I will — 
1. Endeavor to show how it is not to be accounted for. 
In examining this part of the subject, it is necessary to have distinctly 
in view that which constitutes moral depravity. All the error that has* 
existed upon this subject, has been founded in false assumptions in, 
regard to the nature or essence of moral depravity. It has been almost 
universally true, that no distinction has been made between moral and 
physical depravity ; and consequently, physical depravity has been con- 



236 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

founded with and treated of, as moral depravity. This of course has led 
to vast confusion and nonsense upon this subject. Let the following 
fact, which has been shown in former lectures, be distinctly borne in 
mind. 

That moral depravity consists in selfishness, or in the choice of self- 
interest, self-gratification, or self-indulgence, as an end. 

Consequently it cannot consist, 

(1.) In a sinful constitution, or in a constitutional appetency or crav- 
ing for sin. This has been shown in a former lecture, on what is not 
implied in disobedience to the moral law. 

(2.) Moral depravity is sin itself, and not the cause of sin. It is not 
something prior to sin, that sustains to it the relation of a cause, but it 
is the essence and the whole of sin. 

(3.) It cannot be an attribute of human nature, considered simply as 
such, for this would be physical, and not moral depravity. 

(4.) Moral depravity is not then to be accounted for by ascribing it 
to a nature or constitution sinful in itself. To talk of a sinful nature, 
or sinful constitution, in the sense of physical sinfulness, is to ascribe 
sinfulness to the Creator, who is the author of nature. It is to overlook 
the essential nature of sin, and to make sin a physical virus, instead of a 
voluntary and responsible choice. Both sound philosophy and the Bible, 
make sin to consist in obeying the flesh, or in the spirit of self -pleasing, 
or self-indulgence, or, which is the same thing, in selfishness— in a car- 
nal mind, or in minding the flesh. But writers on moral depravity have 
assumed, that moral depravity was distinct from, and the cause of sin, 
that is, of actual transgression. They call it original sin, indwelling sin, 
a sinful nature, an appetite for sin, an attribute of human nature, and 
the like. We shall presently see what has led to this view of the subject. 

I will, in the next place, notice a modern, and perhaps the most 
popular view of this subject, which has been taken by any late writer, 
who has fallen into the error of confounding physical and moral deprav- 
ity. I refer to the prize essay of Dr. Woods, of Andover, Mass. He 
defines moral depravity to be the same as " sinfulness." He also, in one 
part of his essay, holds and maintains, that it is always and necessarily, 
voluntary. Still, his great effort is to prove that sinfulness or moral 
depravity, is an attribute of human nature. It is no part of my design 
to expose the inconsistency of holding moral depravity to be a voluntary 
state of mind, and yet a natural attribute, but only to examine the 
philosophy, the logic, and theory of his main argument. The following 
quotation will show the sense in which he holds moral depravity to belong 
to the nature of man. At page 54 he says : — 

" The word depravity, relating as it here does to man's moral char- 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 237 

acter, means the same as sinfulness, being the opposite of moral purity, 
or holiness. In this use of the word there is a general agreement. But 
what is the meaning of native, or natural ? Among the variety of mean- 
ings specified by Johnson, Webster, and others, I refer to the following, 
as relating particularly to the subject before us. 

" Native. Produced by nature. Natural, or such as is according to 
nature ; belonging by birth ; original. Natural has substantially the 
same meaning : * produced by nature ; not acquired.' — So Crabbe : 'Of 
a person we say, his worth is native, to designate it as some valuable 
property born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon him ; but 
we say of his disposition, that it is natural, as opposed to that which is 
acquired by habit.' And Johnson defines nature to be ' the native state 
or properties of any thing, by which it is discriminated from others. ' 
He quotes the definition of Boyle : ' Nature sometimes means what be- 
longs to a living creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth, as 
when we say a man is noble by nature, or a child is naturally froward." 
i This,' he says, 'may be expressed by saying, the man was born so.' 

"After these brief definitions, Which come to nearly the same thing, 
I proceed to inquire, what are the marks or evidences which show any- 
thing in man to be natural, or native ; and how far these marks are found 
in relation to depravity." 

Again, page 66, he says : — 

"The evil, then, cannot be supposed to originate in any unfavorable 
external circumstances, such as corrupting examples, or insinuating and 
strong temptations ; for if we suppose these entirely removed, all human 
beings would still be sinners. With such a moral nature as they now 
have, they would not wait for strong temptations to sin. Nay, they 
would be sinners in opposition to the strongest motives to the contrary. 
Indeed, we know that human beings will turn those very motives which 
most powerfully urge to holiness, into occasions of sin. Now, does not 
the confidence and certainty with which we foretell the commission of sin, 
and of sin unmixed with moral purity, presuppose a full conviction in. 
us, and a conviction resting upon what we regard as satisfactory evi- 
dence, that sin, in all its visible actings, arises from that which is within 
the mind itself, and which belongs to our very nature as moral beings ? 
Have we not as much evidence that this is the case with moral evil as 
with any of our natural affections or bodily appetites ? " 

This quotation, together with the whole argument, shows that he 
considers moral depravity to be an attribute of human nature, in the 
same sense that the appetites and passions are. 

Before I proceed directly to the examination of his argument, that 
sinfulness, or moral depravity, is an " attribute of human nature," I 
would premise, that an argument, or fact, that may equally well consist 



238 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

with either of two opposing theories, can prove neither. The author in 
question presents the following facts and considerations in support of his 
great position, that moral depravity, or sinfulness, is an attribute of 
human nature ; and three presidents of colleges indorse the soundness 
and conclusiveness of the argument. 

He proves his position — first from the "universality of moral de- 
pravity." To this I answer, that this argument proves nothing to the 
purpose, unless it be true, and assumed as a major premise, that what- 
ever is universal among mankind, must be a natural attribute of man as 
^ such ; that whatever is common to all men, must be an attribute of 
human nature. But this assumption is a begging of the question. Sin 
may be the result of temptation ; temptation may be universal, and of 
such a nature as uniformly, not necessarily, to result in sin, unless a con- 
trary result be secured by a Divine moral suasion. This I shall endeavor 
to show is the fact. This argument assumes, that there is but one 
method of accounting for the universality of human sinfulness. But 
this is the question in debate, and is not to be thus assumed as true. 

Again : Selfishness is common to all unregenerate men. Is selfish- 
ness a natural attribute ? We have seen, in a former lecture, that it 
consists in choice. Can choice be an attribute of human nature ? 

Again : This argument is just as consistent with the opposite theory, 
to wit, that moral depravity is selfishness. The universality of selfish- 
ness is just what might be expected, if selfishness consists in the com- 
mittal of the will to the gratification of self. This will be a thing of 
course, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, greatly to enlighten the intel- 
lect, and break up the force of habit, and change the attitude of the will, 
already, at the first dawn of reason, committed to the impulses of the 
sensibility. If moral depravity is to be accounted for, as I shall hereafter 
more fully show, by ascribing it to the influence of temptation, or to a 
physically depraved constitution, surrounded by the circumstances in 
which mankind first form their moral character, or put forth their first 
moral choices, universality might of course be expected to be one of its 
characteristics. This argument, then, agreeing equally well with either 
theory, proves neither. 

His second argument is, that "■ Moral depravity developes itself in 
early life." Answer : — 

This is just what might be expected upon the opposite theory. If 
moral depravity consist in the choice of self-gratification, it would of 
course appear in early life. So this argument agrees quite as well with 
the opposing theory, and therefore proves nothing. But — this argument 
is good for nothing, unless the following be assumed as a major premise, 
and unless the fact assumed be indeed a truth, namely, " Whatever is 
developed in early life, must be an attribute of human nature." But 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 239 

this again is assuming the truth of the point in debate. This argument 
is based upon the assumption that a course of action common to all men, 
and commencing at the earliest moment of their moral agency, can be 
accounted for only by ascribing it to an attribute of nature, having the 
same moral character as that which belongs to the actions themselves. 
But this is not true. There may be more than one way of accounting 
for the universal sinfulness of human actions from the dawn of moral 
agency. It may be ascribed to the universality and peculiar nature of 
temptation, as has been said. 

His third argument is, that "Moral depravity is not owing to any 
change that occurs subsequent to birth." Answer : — 

No, the circumstances of temptation are sufficient to account for it 
without supposing the nature to be changed. This argument proves 
nothing, unless it be true, that the peculiar circumstances of temptation 
under which moral agents act, from the dawn of moral agency, cannot 
sufficiently account for their conduct, without supposing a change of 
nature subsequent to birth. "What then, does this arguing prove ?" 

Again, this argument is just as consistent with the opposing theory, 
and therefore proves neither. 

His fourth argument is, " That moral depravity acts freely and spon- 
taneously." Answer : — 

"The moral agent acts freely, and acts selfishly, that is, wickedly. 
This argument assumes, that if a moral agent acts freely and wickedly, 
moral depravity, or sin, must be an attribute of his nature. Or more 
fairly, if mankind universally, in the exercise of their liberty, act sin- 
fully, sinfulness must be an attribute of human nature." But what is 
sin ? Why sin is a voluntary transgression of law, Dr. Woods being 
judge. Can a voluntary transgression of law be denominated an attri- 
bute of human nature ? 

But again, this argument alleges nothing but what is equally consist- 
ent with the opposite theory. If moral depravity consist in the choice 
of self-gratification as an end, it would of course freely and spontaneously 
manifest itself. This argument then, is good for nothing. 

His fifth argument is, " That moral depravity is hard to overcome, 
and therefore it must be an attribute of human nature." Answer : — 

If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome at 
all, without a change of the human constitution. It is hard to overcome, 
just as selfishness naturally would be, in beings of a physically depraved 
constitution, and in the presence of so many temptations to self- 
indulgence. If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be 
overcome without a change of personal identity. But the fact that it 
can be overcome without destroying the consciousness of personal iden- 
tity, proves that it is not an attribute of human nature. 



240 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

His sixth argument is, that " We can predict with certainty, that in 
due time it will act itself out." Answer : — 

Just as might be expected. If moral depravity consists in selfishness, 
we can predict with certainty, that the spirit of self -pleasing will, in due 
time, and at all times, act itself out. We can also predict, without the 
gift of prophecy, that with a constitution physically depraved, and sur- 
rounded with objects to awaken appetite, and with all the circumstances 
in which human beings first form their moral character, they will seek 
universally to gratify themselves, unless prevented by the illuminations 
of the Holy Spirit. This argument is just as consistent with the oppo- 
site theory, and therefore proves neither. 

It is unnecessary to occupy any more time with the treatise of Dr. 
Woods. I will now quote the standards of the Presbyterian church, 
which will put you in possession of their views upon this subject. At 
pp. 30, 31, of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, we have the follow- 
ing : "By this sin, they (Adam and Eve) fell from their original right- 
eousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and 
wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They 
being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the 
same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, 
descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original cor- 
ruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite 
to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual trans- 
gressions." 

Again, pp. 152-154, Shorter Catechism. "Question 22. Did all 
mankind fall in that first transgression ? Ans. The covenant being 
made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his 
posterity ; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, 
sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression. 

" Question 23. Into what estate did the fall bring mankind ? Ans. 
The fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery. 

" Question 24. What is sin ? Ans. Sin is any want of conformity 
unto, or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the reasona- 
ble creature. 

" Question 25. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate where- 
into man fell ? Ans. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, 
consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of that righteousness 
wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is 
utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritu- 
ally good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually, which is 
commonly called original sin, and from which do proceed all actual 
transgressions. 

Question 26. How is original sin conveyed from our first parents 



Si 



MORAL DEPRAVITY". 241 

unto their posterity ? Ans. Original sin is conveyed from our first 
parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed 
from them in that way, are conceived and born in sin." 

These extracts show, that the framers and defenders of this confes- 
sion of faith, account for the moral depravity of mankind by making it 
to consist in a sinful nature, inherited by natural generation from Adam. 
They regard the constitution inherited from Adam, as in itself sinful, 
and the cause of all actual transgression. They make no distinction 
between physical and moral depravity. They also distinguish between 
original and actual sin. Original sin is the sinfulness of the constitution, 
in which Adam's posterity have no other hand than to inherit it by nat- 
ural generation, or by birth. This original sin, or sinful nature, renders 
mankind utterly disabled from all that is spiritually good, and wholly 
inclined to all that is evil. This is their account of moral depravity. 
This, it will be seen, is substantially the ground of Dr. Woods. 

It has been common with those who confound physical with moral 
depravity, and who maintain that human nature is itself sinful, to quote 
certain passages of Scripture to sustain their position. An examination 
of these proof texts, must, in the next place, occupy our attention. But 
before I enter upon this examination, I must first call your attention to 
certain well settled rules of biblical interpretation. 

(1.) Different passages must be so interpreted, if they can be, as not 
to contradict each other. 

(2.) Language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter of 
discourse. 

(3.) Respect is always to be had to the general scope and design of 
the speaker or writer. 

(4.) Texts that are consistent with either theory, prove neither. 

(5.) Language is to be so interpreted, if it can be, as not to conflict 
with sound philosophy, matters of fact, the nature of things, or immu- 
table justice. 

Let us now, remembering and applying these plain rules of sound 
interpretation, proceed to the examination of those passages that are sup- 
posed to establish the theory of depravity I am examining. 

Gen. v. 3. — " Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a 
son in his own likeness and after his own image, and called his name 
Seth." It is not very easy to see, why this text should be pressed into 
the service of those who hold that human nature is in itself sinful. Why 
should it be assumed that the likeness and image here spoken of was a 
moral likeness or image ? But unless this be assumed, the text has 
nothing to do with the subject. 

Again : it is generally admitted, that in all probability Adam was a 
regenerate man at the time and before the birth of Seth. Is it intended 
16 



r 



242 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

that Adam begat a saint or a sinner ? If, as is supposed, Adam was a 
saint of God, if this text is anything to the purpose, it affirms that Adam 
begat a saint. But this is the opposite of that in proof of which the 
text is quoted. 

Another text is, Job xiv. 4. — "Who can bring a clean thing out of 
an unclean ? Not one." This text is quoted in support of the position 
of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, that children inherit from their 
parents, by natural generation, a sinful nature. Upon this text, I re- 
mark, that all that can be made of it, even if we read it without regard 
to the translation or the context, is, that a physically depraved parent 
will produce a physically depraved offspring. That this is its real mean- 
ing, is quite evident, when we look into the context. Job is treating of 
the frail and dying state of man, and manifestly has in the text and con- 
text his eye wholly on the physical state, and not on the moral character 
of man. What he intends is ; who can bring other than a frail, dying 
offspring from a frail dying parent ? Not one. This is substantially the 
view that Professor Stuart takes of this text. The utmost that can be 
made of it is, that as he belonged to a race of sinners, nothing else could 
be expected than that he should be a sinner, without meaning to affirm 
anything in regard to the quo modo of this result. 

Again : Job xv. 14. — " What is man that he should be clean, and 
he that is born of a woman that he should be righteous." 

These are the words of Eliphaz, and it is improper to quote them as 
inspired truth. For God himself testifies that Job's friends did not hold 
the truth. But, suppose we receive the text as true, what is its import ? 
Why, it simply asserts, or rather implies, the righteousness or sinfulness 
of the whole human race. It expresses the universality of human de- 
pravity, in the very common way of including all that are born of woman. 
This certainly says nothing, and implies nothing, respecting a sinful con- 
stitution. It is just as plain, and just as warrantable, to understand this 
passage as implying that mankind have become so physically depraved, 
that this fact, together with the circumstances under which they come 
into being, and begin their moral career, will certainly, (not necessarily,) 
result in moral depravity. I might use just such language as that found 
in this text, and, naturally enough, express by it my own views of moral 
depravity, to wit, that it results from a physically depraved constitution ; 
and the circumstances of temptation under which children come into 
this world, and begin and prosecute their moral career ; certainly this is 
the most that can be made of this text. 

Again : Psalm li. 5. — " Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin 
did my mother conceive me." 

Upon this I remark, that it would seem, if this text is to be under- 
stood literally, that the Psalmist intended to affirm the sinful state of his 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 243 

mother, at the time of his conception, and during gestation. But, to 
interpret these passages as teaching the constitutional sinfulness of man, 
is to contradict God's own definition of sin, and the only definition that 
human reason or common sense can receive, to wit, that " sin is a trans- 
gression of the law." This is, no doubt, the only correct definition of sin. 
But we have seen that the law does not legislate over substance, requir- 
ing men to have a certain nature, but over voluntary action only. If the 
Psalmist really intended to affirm, that the substance of his body was 
sinful from its conception, then he not only arrays himself against God's 
own definition of sin, but he also affirms sheer nonsense. The substance 
of an unborn child sinful ! It is impossible ! But what did the Psalm- 
ist mean ? I answer : This verse is found in David's penitential psalm. 
He was deeply convinced of sin, and was, as he had good reason to be, 
much excited, and expressed himself, as we all do in similar circum~ 
stances, in strong language. His eye, as was natural and is common in 
such cases, had been directed back along the pathway of life up to the 
days of his earliest recollection. He remembered sins among the earli- 
est acts of his recollected life. He broke out in the language of this text 
to express, not the anti-scriptural and nonsensical dogma of a sinful con- 
stitution, but to affirm in his strong, poetic language, that he had been a 
sinner from the commencement of his moral existence, or from the earli- 
est moment of his capability of being a sinner. This is the strong language 
of poetry. 

Some suppose that, in the passage in question, the Psalmist referred 
to, and meant to acknowledge and assert, his low and despicable origin, 
and to say, I was always a sinner, and my mother that conceived me was 
a sinner, and I am but the degenerate plant of a strange vine, without 
intending to affirm anything in respect to the absolute sinfulness of 
his nature. 

Again, Ps. lviii. 3. " The wicked are estranged from the womb ; 
they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." 

Upon this text I remark that it has been quoted at one time to 
establish the doctrine of a sinful nature, and at another to prove that 
infants commit actual sin from the very day and hour of their birth. 
But certainly no such use can be legitimately made of this text. It does 
not affirm anything of a sinful nature, but this has been inferred from 
what it does affirm, that the wicked are estranged from their birth. 
But does this mean, that they are really and literally estranged from the 
day and hour of their birth, and that they really go astray the very day 
they are born, speaking lies ? This every one knows to be contrary to 
fact. The text cannot then be pressed to the letter. What then does it 
mean ? It must mean, like the text last examined, that the wicked are 
estranged and go astray from the commencement of their moral agency. 



244 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

If it means more than this, it would contradict other plain passages of 
scripture. It affirms, in strong, graphic, and poetic language, the fact, 
that the first moral conduct and character of children is sinful. This is 
all that in truth it can assert ; and it doubtless dates the beginning of 
their moral depravity at a very early period, and expresses it in very 
strong language, as if it were literally from the hour of birth. But 
when it adds, that they go astray, speaking lies, we know that this is not, 
and cannot be, literally taken, for, as every one knows, children do not 
speak at all from their birth. Should we understand the Psalmist 
as affirming, that children go astray as soon as they go at all, and speak 
lies as soon as they speak at all, this would not prove that their nature 
was in itself sinful, but might well consist with the theory that their 
physical depravity, together with their circumstances of temptation, led 
them into selfishness, from the very first moment of their moral existence. 

Again, John iii. 6. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and 
that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." 

Upon this I remark that it may, if literally taken, mean nothing 
more than this, that the body which is born of flesh is flesh, and that 
that which is born of the Spirit is spirit ; that is, that this birth of which 
he was speaking was of the soul, and not of the body. But it may be 
understood to mean, that that which results from the influence of the 
flesh is flesh, in the sense of sin ; for this is a common sense of the term 
flesh in the New Testament, and that which results from the Spirit, is 
spirit or spiritual, in the sense of holy. This I understand to be the 
true sense. The text when thus understood, does not at all support the 
dogma of a sinful nature or constitution, but only this, that the flesh 
tends to sin, that the appetites and passions are temptations to sin, so 
that when the will obeys them it sins. Whatever is born of the pro- 
pensities, in the sense that the will yields to their control, is sinful. And, 
on the other hand, whatever is born of the Spirit, that is, whatever 
results from the agency of the Holy Spirit, in the sense that the will 
yields to Him, is holy. 

Again, Eph. ii. 3. :i By nature the children of wrath, even as others." 

Upon this text I remark that it cannot, consistently with natural 
justice, be understood to mean, that we are exposed to the wrath of God 
on account of our nature. It is a monstrous and blasphemous dogma, 
that a holy God is angry with any creature for possessing a nature with 
which he was sent into being without his knowledge or consent. The 
Bible represents God as angry with men for their wicked deeds, and not 
for their nature. 

It is common and proper to speak of the first state in which men 
universally are, as a natural state. Thus we speak of sinners before 
regeneration, as in a state of nature, as opposed to a changed state, 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 245 

a regenerate state, and a state of grace. By this we do not necessarily 
mean, that they have a nature sinful in itself, but merely that before 
regeneration they are universally and morally depraved, that this is 
their natural, as opposed to their regenerate state. Total moral deprav- 
ity is the state that follows, and results from their first birth, and is 
in this sense natural, and in this sense alone, can it truly be said, that 
they are "by nature children of wrath." Against the use that is made 
of this text, and all this class of texts, may be arrayed the whole scope 
of scripture, that represents man as to blame, and to be judged and 
punished only for his deeds. The subject matter of discourse in these 
texts is such as to demand that we should understand them as not 
implying, or asserting, that sin is an essential part of our nature. 



LECTURE XXIV. 

MORAL DEPRAVITY. 



Further examination oe the arguments adduced in support oe 
the position, that human nature is in itsele sineul. 

The defenders of the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, or moral 
depravity, urge as an additional argument : — 

That sin is a universal effect of human nature, and therefore human 
nature must be itself sinful. Answer : — 

This is a non sequitur. Sin may be, and must be, an abuse of free 
agency ; and this may be accounted for, as we shall see, by ascribing it 
to the universality of temptation, and does not at all imply a sinful con- 
stitution. But if sin necessarily implies a sinful nature, how did Adam 
and Eve sin ? Had they a sinful nature to account for, and to cause 
their first sin ? How did angels sin ? Had they also a sinful nature ? 
Either sin does not imply a sinful nature, or a nature in itself sinful, or 
Adam and angels must have had sinful natures before their fall. 

Again : Suppose we regard sin as an event or effect. An effect only 
implies an adequate cause. Free, responsible will is an adequate cause 
in the presence of temptation, without the supposition of a sinful consti- 
tution, as has been demonstrated in the case of Adam and of angels. 
When we have found an adequate cause, it is unphilosophical to look for 
and assign another. 

Again : it is said that no motive to sin could be a motive or a tempta- 
tion, if there were not a sinful taste, relish, or appetite, inherent in the 



24:6 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

constitution, to which the temptation or motive is addressed. For ex- 
ample, the presence of food, it is said, would be no temptation to eat, 
were there not a constitutional appetency terminating on food, So the 
presence of any object could be no inducement to sin, were there not a 
constitutional appetency or craving for sin. So that, in fact, sin in 
action were impossible, unless there were sin in the nature. To this I 
reply,— 

Suppose this objection be applied to the sin of Adam and of angels. 
Can we not account for Eve's eating the forbidden fruit without suppos- 
ing that she had a craving for sin ? The Bible informs us that her crav- 
ing was for the fruit, for knowledge, and not for sin. The words are,— 
'*" And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it 
was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she 
took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave also unto her husband 
with her, and he did eat." Here is nothing of a craving for sin. Eating 
this fruit was indeed sinful ; but the sin consisted in consenting to 
gratify, in a prohibited manner, the appetites, not for sin, but for food 
and knowledge. But the advocates of this theory say that there must be 
an adaptedness in the constitution, a something within answering to the 
outward motive or temptation, otherwise sin were impossible. This is 
true. But the question is, What is that something within, which re- 
sponds to the outward motive ? Is it a craving for sin ? We have just 
seen what it was in the case of Adam and Eve. It was simply the cor- 
relation that existed between the fruit and their constitution, its presence 
exciting the desires for food and knowledge. This led to prohibited in- 
dulgence. But all men sin in precisely the same w T ay. They consent to 
gratify, not a craving for sin, but a craving for other things, and the 
consent to make self-gratification an end, is the whole of sin. 

The theologians whose views we are canvassing, maintain that the 
appetites, passions, desires, and propensities, which are constitutional 
and entirely involuntary, are in themselves sinful. To this I reply, that 
Adam and Eve possessed them before they fell. Christ possessed them, 
or he was not a man, nor, in any proper sense, a human being. No, 
these appetites, passions, and propensities, are not sinful, though they 
are the occasions of sin. They are a temptation to the will to seek their 
unlawful indulgence. When these lusts or appetites are spoken of as the 
"passions of sin," or as " sinful lusts or passions," it is not because they 
are sinful in themselves, but because they are the occasions of sin. It 
has been asked, Why are not the appetites and propensities to be re- 
garded as sinful, since they are the prevalent temptations to sin ? I 
reply,— 

They are involuntary, and moral character can no more be predicated 
of them, on account of their being temptations, than it could of the fruit 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 247 

that was a temptation to Eve. They have no design to tempt. They 
are constitutional, unintelligent, involuntary ; and it is impossible that 
moral character should be predicable of them. A moral agent is respon- 
sible for his emotions, desires, etc., so far as they are under the direct or 
indirect control of his will, and no further. He is always responsible for 
the manner in which he gratifies them. If he indulges them in accor- 
dance with the law of God, he does right. If he makes their gratifica- 
tion his end, he sins. 

Again : the death and suffering of infants previous to actual trans- 
gression, is adduced as an argument to prove, that infants have a sinful 
nature. To this I reply, — 

That this argument must assume, that there must be sin wherever 
there is suffering and death. But this assumption proves too much, 
as it would prove that mere animals have a sinful nature, or have 
committed actual sin. An argument that proves too much proves 
nothing. 

Physical sufferings prove only physical, and not moral, depravity. 
Previous to moral agency, infants are no more subjects of moral govern- 
ment than brutes are ; therefore, their sufferings and death are to be ac- 
counted for as are those of brutes, namely, by ascribing them to physical 
interference with the laws of life and health. 

Another argument for a sinful constitution is, that unless infants have 
a sinful nature, they do not need sanctification to fit them for heaven. 
Answer : — 

This argument assumes, that, if they are not sinful, they must be 
holy ; whereas they are neither sinful or holy, until they are moral agents, 
and render themselves so by obedience or disobedience to the moral law. 
If they are to go to heaven, they must be made holy or must be sancti- 
fied. This objection assumes, that previous sinfulness is a condition of 
the necessity of being holy. This is contrary to fact. Were Adam and 
angels first sinful before they were sanctified ? But it is assumed that 
unless moral agents are at first sinners, they do not need the Holy Spirit 
to induce them to be holy. That is, unless their nature is sinful, they 
would become holy without the Holy Spirit. But where do we ascertain 
this ? Suppose that they have no moral character, and that their nature 
is neither holy nor sinful. Will they become holy without being enlight- 
ened by the Holy Spirit ? Who will assert that they will ? 

That infants have a sinful nature has been inferred from the institu- 
tion of circumcision so early as the eighth day after birth. Circumcision, 
it is truly urged, was designed to teach the necessity of regeneration, and 
by way of implication, the doctrine of moral depravity. It is claimed, 
that its being enjoined as obligatory upon the eighth day after birth, was 
requiring it at the earliest period at which it could be safely performed. 



u- 



24S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

From this if* is inferred, that infants are to be regarded as morally de- 
praved from their birth. 

In answer to this I would say, that infant circumcision was doubtless 
designed to teach the necessity of their being saved by the Holy Spirit 
from the dominion of the flesh ; that the influence of the flesh must be 
restrained, and the flesh circumcised, or the soul would be lost. This 
truth needed to be impressed on the parents, from the birth of their 
children. This very significant, and bloody, and painful rite, was well 
calculated to impress this truth upon parents, and to lead them from 
their birth to watch over the development and indulgence of their propen- 
sities, and to pray for their sanctification. Eequiring it at so early a day 
was no doubt designed to indicate, that they are from the first under the 
dominion of their flesh, without however affording any inference in favor 
of the idea, that their flesh was in itself sinful, or that the action of their 
will at that early age was sinful. If reason was not developed, the sub- 
jection of the will to appetite could not be sinful. But whether this 
subjection of the will to the gratification of the appetite was sinful or 
not, the child must be delivered from it, or it could never be fitted for 
heaven, any more than a mere brute can be fitted for heaven. The fact, 
that circumcision was required on the eighth day, and not before, seems 
to indicate, not that they are sinners absolutely from birth, but that they 
very early become so, even from the commencement of moral agency. 

Again : the rite must be performed at some time. Unless a partic- 
ular day were appointed, it would be very apt to be deferred, and finally 
not performed at all. It is probable, that God commanded that it should 
be done at the earliest period at which it could be safely done, not only 
for the reasons already assigned, but to prevent its being neglected too 
long, and perhaps altogether : and perhaps, also, because it would be less 
painful and dangerous at that early age, when the infant slept most of 
the time. The longer it was neglected the greater would be the tempta- 
tion to neglect it altogether. So painful a rite needed to be enjoined by 
positive statute, at some particular time ; and it was desirable on all 
accounts that it should be done as early as it safely could be. This argu- 
ment, then, for native constitutional moral depravity amounts really to 
nothing. 

Again : it is urged, that unless infants have a sinful nature, should 
they die in infancy, they could not be saved by the grace of Christ. 

To this I answer, that, in this case they would not, and could not as 
a matter of course, be sent to the place of punishment for sinners ; be- 
cause that were to confound the innocent with the guilty, a thing morally 
impossible with God. 

But what grace could there be in saving them from a sinful consti- 
tution, that is not exercised in saving them from circumstances that 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 2±9 

would certainly result in their becoming sinners, if not snatched from 
them ? In neither case do they need pardon for sin. Grace is unearned 
favor — a gratuity. If the child has a sinful nature, it is his misfortune, 
and not his crime. To save him from this nature is to save him from those 
circumstances that will certainly result in actual transgression, unless he 
is rescued by death and by the Holy Spirit. So if his nature is not sin- 
ful, yet it is certain that his nature and circumstances are such, that he 
will surely sin unless rescued by death or by the Holy Spirit, before he is 
capable of sinning. It certainly must be an infinite favor to be rescued 
from such circumstances, and especially to have eternal life conferred as 
a mere gratuity. This surely is grace. And as infants belong to a race 
of sinners who are all, as it were, turned over into the hands of Christ, 
they doubtless will ascribe their salvation to the infinite grace of Christ. 

Again : is it not grace that saves us from sinning ? What then is it 
but grace that saves infants from sinning, by snatching them away from 
circumstances of temptation ? In what way does grace save adults from 
sinning, but by keeping them from temptation, or by giving them grace 
to overcome it ? And is there no grace in rescuing infants from cir- 
cumstances that are certain, if they are left in them, to lead them into 
sin? 

All that can be justly said in either case is, that if infants are saved 
at all, which I suppose they are, they are rescued by the benevolence of 
God from circumstances that would result in certain and eternal death, 
and are by grace made heirs of eternal life. But after all, it is useless 
to speculate about the character and destiny of those who are confessedly 
not moral agents. The benevolence of God will take care of them. It 
is nonsensical to insist upon their moral depravity before they are moral 
agents, and it is frivolous to assert, that they must be morally depraved, 
as a condition of their being saved by grace. 

We deny that the human constitution is morally depraved, because 
it is impossible that sin should be a quality of the substance of soul or 
body. It is, and must be, a quality of choice or intention, and not of 
substance. To make sin an attribute or quality of substance is contrary 
to God's definition of sin. "Sin," says the apostle, "is anomia," a 
"transgression of, or a want of conformity to, the moral law." That is, 
it consists in a refusal to love God and our neighbor, or, which is the 
same thing, in loving ourselves supremely. 

To represent the constitution as sinful, is to represent God, who is 
the author of the constitution, as the author of sin. To say that God is 
not the direct former of the constitution, but that sin is conveyed by 
natural generation from Adam, who made himself sinful, is only to re- 
move the objection one step farther back, but not to obviate it ; for God 
established the physical laws that of necessity bring about this result. 



250 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

But how came Adam by a sinful nature ? Did his first sin change 
his nature ? or did God change it as a penalty for sin ? "What ground is 
there for the assertion that Adam's nature became in itself sinful by the 
fall ? This is a groundless, not to say ridiculous, assumption, and an 
absurdity. Sin an attribute of nature ! A sinful substance ! Sin a 
substance ! Is it a solid, a fluid, a material, or a spiritual substance ? 

I have received from a brother the following note on this subject : — 

" The orthodox creeds are in some cases careful to say that original 
sin consists in the substance of neither soul nor body. Thus Bretschnei- 
der, who is reckoned among the rationalists in Germany, says : ' The 
symbolical books very rightly maintained that original sin is not in any 
sense the substance of man, his body or soul, as Flacius taught, — but that 
it has been infused into human nature by Satan, and mixed with it, as 
poison and wine are mixed.' 

" They rather expressly guard against the idea that they mean by the 
phrase * man's nature,' his substance, but somewhat which is fixed in the 
substance. They explain original sin, therefore, not as an essential at- 
tribute of man, that is, a necessary and essential part of his being, but as 
an accident, that is, somewhat which does not subsist in itself, but as 
something accidental, which has come into human nature. He quotes 
the Formula Concordantiae as saying : ( Nature does not denote the sub- 
stance itself of man, but something which inheres fixed in the nature or 
substance.' Accident is defined, 'what does not subsist by itself, but is 
in some substance and can be distinguished from it.'" 

Here, it seems, is sin by itself, and yet not a substance or subsistence 
— not a part or attribute of soul or body. What can it be ? Does it 
consist in wrong action ? No, not in action, but is an accident which 
inheres fixed in the nature of substance. But what can it be ? Not sub- 
stance, nor yet action. But if it be anything, it must be either substance 
or action. If it be a state of substance, what is this but substance in a 
particular state ? Do these writers think by this subtlety and refinement 
to relieve their doctrine of constitutional moral depravity of its intrinsic 
absurdity ? 

I object to the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, that it makes all 
sin, original and actual, a mere calamity, and not a crime. For those 
who hold that sin is an essential and inseparable part of our nature, to 
call it a crime, is to talk nonsense. What ! a sinful nature the crime of 
him upon whom it is entailed, without his knowledge or consent ? If 
/ the nature is sinful, in such a sense that action must necessarily be sinful, 
which is the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, then sin in action must 
be a calamity, and can be no crime. It is the necessary effect' of a sinful 
nature. This cannot be a crime, since the will has nothing to do with it. 

Of course it must render repentance, either with or without the grace 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 251 

of God, impossible, unless grace sets aside our reason. If repentance 
implies self-condemnation, we can never repent in the exercise of our 
reason. Constituted as we are, it is impossible that we should condemn 
ourselves for a sinful nature, or for actions that are unavoidable. The 
doctrine of original sin, or of a sinful constitution, and of necessary sinful 
actions, represents the whole moral government of God, the plan of sal- 
vation by Christ, and indeed every doctrine of the gospel, as a mere farce. 
Upon this supposition the law is tyranny, and the gospel an insult to the 
unfortunate. 

It is difficult, and, indeed, impossible for those who really believe 
this doctrine to urge immediate repentance and submission on the 
sinner, feeling that he is infinitely to blame unless he instantly com- 
ply. It is a contradiction to affirm, that a man can heartily believe in 
the doctrine in question, and yet truly and heartily blame sinners for 
not doing what is naturally impossible to them. The secret conviction 
must be in the mind of such an one, that the sinner is not really to 
blame for being a sinner. For in fact, if this doctrine is true, he is u 
not to blame for being a sinner, any more than he is to blame for being 
a human being. This the advocate of this doctrine must know. It 
is vain for him to set up the pretence that he truly blames sinners for 
their nature, or for their conduct that was unavoidable. He can no 
more do it, than he can honestly deny the necessary affirmations of 
his own reason. Therefore the advocates of this theory must merely 
hold it as a theory, without believing it, or otherwise they must in their 
secret conviction excuse the sinner. 

This doctrine naturally and necessarily leads its advocates, secretly l/ - 
at least, to ascribe the atonement of Christ rather to justice than to 
grace — to regard it rather as an expedient to relieve the unfortunate, 
than to render the forgivenesss of the inexcusable sinner possible. The 
advocates of the theory cannot but regard the case of the sinner as 
rather a hard one, and God as under an obligation to provide a way 
for him to escape a sinful nature, entailed upon him in spite of himself, 
and from actual transgressions which result from his nature by a law of 
necessity. If all this is true, the sinner's case is infinitely hard, and God 
would appear the most unreasonable and cruel of beings, if he did not 
provide for their escape. These convictions will, and must, lodge in the 
mind of him who really believes the dogma of a sinful nature. This, 
in substance, is sometimes affirmed by the defenders of the doctrine of 
original sin. 

The fact that Christ died in the stead and behalf of sinners, proves- 
that God regarded them not as unfortunate, but as criminal and alto- 
gether without excuse. Surely Christ need not have died to atone- 
for the misfortunes of men. Plis death was to atone for their guilt r V 



252 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and not for their misfortunes. But if they are without excuse for sin, 
they must be without a sinful nature that renders sin unavoidable. If 
men are without excuse for sin, as the whole law and gospel assume 
and teach, it cannot possibly be that their nature is sinful, for a sinful 
nature would be the best of all excuses for sin. 

This doctrine is a stumbling-block both to the church and the world, 
infinitely dishonorable to God, and an abomination alike to God and the 
human intellect, and should be banished from every pulpit, and from 
every formula of doctrine, and from the world. It is a relic of heathen 
philosophy, and was foisted in among the doctrines of Christianity 
by Augustine, as every one may know who will take the trouble to 
examine for himself. This view of moral depravity that I am opposing, 
has long been the stronghold of Universalism. From it, the Universalists 
inveigh with resistless force against the idea that sinners should be sent 
to an eternal hell. Assuming the long-defended doctrine of original or 
constitutional sinfulness, they proceeded to show, that it would be in- 
finitely unreasonable and unjust in God to send them to hell. What ! 
create them with a sinful nature, from which proceed, by a law of neces- 
sity, actual transgressions, and then send them to an eternal hell for 
having this nature, and for transgressions that are unavoidable ! Im- 
possible ! they say ; and the human intellect responds, Amen. 

From the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution also, has naturally 
and irresistibly flowed the doctrine of inability to repent, and the 
necessity of a physical regeneration. These too have been a sad stum- 
bling-block to Universalists, as every one knows who is at all acquainted 
with the history of Universalism. They infer the salvation of all men, 
from the fact of God's benevolence and physical omnipotence ! God is 
almighty, and he is love. Men are constitutionally depraved, and 
are unable to repent. God will not, cannot send them to hell. They do 
not deserve it. Sin is a calamity, and God can save them, and he ought 
to do so. This is the substance of their argument. And assuming the 
truth of their premises, there is no evading their conclusion. But 
the whole argument is built on "such stuff as dreams are made of." 
Strike out the erroneous dogma of a sinful nature, and the whole edifice 
of Universalism comes to the ground in a moment. We come now 
to consider — 

2. The proper method of accounting for moral depravity. 

We have more than once seen that the Bible has given us the history 
of the introduction of sin into our world ; and that from the narrative, 
it is plain, that the first sin consisted in selfishness, or in consenting to 
indulge the excited constitutional propensities in a prohibited manner. 
In other words, it consisted in yielding the will to the impulses of the 
sensibility, instead of abiding by the law of God, as revealed in the intel- 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 253 

ligence. Thus the Bible ascribes the first sin of our race to the influence 
of temptation. 

The Bible once, and only once, incidentally intimates that Adam's 
first sin has in some way been the occasion, not the necessary physical 
cause, of all the sins of men. Eom. v. 12-19. It neither says nor in- 
timates anything in relation to the manner in which Adam's sin has oc- 
casioned this result. It only incidentally recognizes the fact, and then 
leaves it, just as if the quo modo was too obvious to need explanation. In 
other parts of the Bible we are informed how we are to account for the 
existence of sin among men. James says, that a man is tempted when 
he is drawn aside of his own lusts, (eirtdv/uw " desires ") and enticed. That 
is, his lusts, or the impulses of his sensibility, are his tempters. "When 
he or his will is overcome of these, he sins. Paul and other inspired 
writers represent sin as consisting in a carnal or fleshly mind, in the mind 
of the flesh, or in minding the flesh. It is plain that by the term flesh \y 
they mean what we understand by the sensibility, as distinguished from 
intellect, and that they represent sin as consisting in obeying, minding, 
the impulses of the sensibility. They represent the world, and the flesh, 
and Satan, as the three great sources of temptation. It is plain that the 
world and Satan tempt by appeals to the flesh, or to the sensibility. 
Hence, the apostles have much to say of the necessity of the destruction 
of the flesh, of the members, of putting off the old man with his deeds, 
etc. Now, it is worthy of remark, that all this painstaking, on the part 
of Inspiration, to intimate the source from whence our sin proceeds, and 
to apprise us of the proper method of accounting for it, and also of 
avoiding it, has probably been the occasion of leading certain philoso- 
phers and theologians who have not carefully examined the whole sub- 
ject, to take a view of it which is directly opposed to the truth intended 
by the inspired writers. Because so much is said of the influence of the 
flesh over the mind, they have inferred that the nature and physical con- 
stitution of man is itself sinful. But the representations of Scripture V 
are, that the body is the occasion of sin. The law in his members, that 
warred against the law of his mind, of which Paul speaks, is manifestly 
the impulse of the sensibility opposed to the law of the reason. This 
law, that is, the impulse of his sensibility, brings him into captivity, that 
is, influences his will, in spite of all his convictions to the contrary. 

Moral depravity consists, remember, in the committal of the will to 
the gratification or indulgence of self — in the will's following, or sub- 
mitting itself to be governed by, the impulses and desires of the sensi- 
bility, instead of submitting itself to the law of God revealed in the reason. 
This definition of the thing shows how it is to be accounted for, 
namely : the sensibility acts as a powerful impulse to the will, from the 
moment of birth, and secures the consent and activity of the will to pro- 



254: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

cure its gratification, before the reason is at all developed. The will is 
thus committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite, when first 
the idea of moral obligation is developed. This committed state of the 
will is not moral depravity, and has no moral character, until the idea of 
moral obligation is developed. The moment this idea is developed, this 
committal of the will to self-indulgence must be abandoned, or it becomes 
selfishness, or moral depravity. But, as the will is already in a state of 
committal, and has to some extent already formed the habit of seeking 
to gratify feeling, and as the idea of moral obligation is at first but feebly 
developed, unless the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light on the soul, 
the will, as might be expected, retains its hold on self-gratification. 
Here alone moral character commences, and must commence. Ko one 
can conceive of its commencing earlier. 

This selfish choice is the wicked heart — the propensity to sin — that 
causes what is generally termed actual transgression. This sinful choice 
is properly enough called indwelling sin. It is the latent, standing, con- 
trolling preference of the mind, and the cause of all the outward and 
active life. It is not the choice of sin itself, distinctly conceived of, or 
chosen as sin, but the choice of self-gratification, which choice is sin. 

Again : It should be remembered, that the physical depravity of our 
race has much to do with our moral depravity. A diseased physical sys- 
tem renders the appetites, passions, tempers, and propensities more clam- 
orous and despotic in their demands, and of course constantly urging to 
selfishness, confirms and strengthens it. It should be distinctly remem- 
bered that physical depravity has no moral character in itself. But yet 
it is a source of fierce temptation to selfishness. The human sensibility 
is, manifestly, deeply physically depraved ; and as sin, or moral depravity, 
consists in committing the will to the gratification of the sensibility, its 
physical depravity will mightily strengthen moral depravity. Moral de- 
pravity is then universally owing to temptation. That is, the soul is 
tempted to self-indulgence, and yields to the temptation, and this yield- 
ing, and not the temptation, is sin or moral depravity. This is mani- 
festly the way in which Adam and Eve became morally depraved. They 
were tempted, even by undepraved appetite, to prohibited indulgence, 
and were overcome. The sin did not lie in the constitutional desire of 
food, or of knowledge, nor in the excited state of these appetites or de- 
sires, but in the consent of the will to prohibited indulgence. Just in 
the same way all sinners become such, that is, they become morally de- 
praved, by yielding to temptation to self-gratification under some form. 
Indeed, it is impossible that they should become morally depraved in any 
other way. To deny this were to overlook the very nature of moral 
depravity. 

To sum up the truth upon this subject in few words, I would say : — 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 255 

1. Moral depravity in our first parents was induced by temptation ) 
addressed to the unperverted susceptibilities of their nature. When 
these susceptibilities became strongly excited, they overcame the will ; 
that is, the human pair were over-persuaded, and fell under the tempta- 
tion. This has been repeatedly said, but needs repetition in a sum- 
ming up. 

2. All moral depravity commences in substantially tlie same way. 
Proof : — 

(1.) The impulses of the sensibility are developed, gradually, com- 
mencing from the birth, and depending on physical development and 
growth. 

(2.) The first acts of will are in obedience to these. 

(3.) Self -gratification is the rule of action previous to the development 
of reason. 

(4.) No resistance is offered to the will's indulgence of appetite, until 
a habit of self-indulgence is formed. 

(5.) When reason affirms moral obligation, it finds the will in a state 
of habitual and constant committal to the impulses of the sensibility. 

(6.) The demands of the sensibility have become more and more des- 
potic every hour of indulgence. 

(7.) In this state of things, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, the idea 
of moral obligation will be but dimly developed. 

(8.) The will of course rejects the bidding of reason, and cleaves to 
self-indulgence. 

(9.) This is the settling of a fundamental question. It is deciding in 
favor of appetite, against the claims of conscience and of God. 

(10.) Light once rejected, can be afterwards more easily resisted, un- 
til it is nearly excluded altogether. 

(11.) Selfishness confirms, and strengthens, and perpetuates itself by 
a natural process. It grows with the sinner's growth, and strengthens 
with his strength ; and will do so for ever, unless overcome by the Holy 
Spirit through the truth. 

REMARKS. 

1. Adam, being the natural head of the race, would naturally, by the 
wisest constitution of things, greatly affect for good or evil his whole 
posterity. 

2. His sin in many ways exposed his posterity to aggravated tempta- 
tion. Not only the physical constitution of all men, but all the in- 
fluences under which they first form their moral character, are widely 
different from what they would have been, if sin had never been intro- 
duced. 

3. When selfishness is understood to be the whole of moral depravity, 



256 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

its quo modOy or in what way it comes to exist, is manifest. Clear con- 
ceptions of the thing will instantly reveal the occasion and manner. 

4. The only difficulty in accounting for it, has been the false assump- 
tion, that there must be, and is, something lying back of the free actions 
of the will, which sustains to those actions the relation of a cause, that 
is itself' sinful. 

5. If holy Adam, and holy an gels could fall under temptations ad- 
dressed to their undepraved sensibility, how absurd it is to conclude, that 
sin in those who are born with a physically depraved constitution, cannot 
be accounted for, without ascribing it to original sin, or to a nature that 
is in itself sinful. 

6. Without divine illumination, the moral character will of course be 
formed under the influence of the flesh. That is, the lower propensities 
will of course influence the will, unless the reason be developed by the 
Holy Spirit. 

7. The dogma of constitutional moral depravity, is a part and parcel 
of the doctrine of a necessitated will. It is a branch of a grossly false and 
heathenish philosophy. How infinitely absurd, dangerous, and unjust, 
then, to embody it in a standard of Christian doctrine, to give it the 
place of an indispensable article of faith, and denounce all who will not 
swallow its absurdities, as heretics ! 

8. We are unable to say precisely at what age infants become moral 
agents, and of course how early they become sinners. Doubtless there is. 
much difference among children in this respect. Eeason is developed in 
one earlier than in another, according to the constitution and circum- 
stances. 

A thorough consideration of the subject, will doubtless lead to the 
conviction, that children become moral agents much earlier than is 
generally supposed. The conditions of moral agency are, as has been 
repeatedly said in former lectures, the possession of the powers of moral 
agency, together with the development of the ideas of the good or valua- 
ble, of moral obligation or oughtness — of right and wrong — of praise and 
blameworthiness. I have endeavored to show, in former lectures, that 
mental satisfaction, blessedness or happiness, is the ultimate good. Sat- 
isfaction arising from the gratification of the appetites, is one of the 
earliest experiences of human beings. This no doubt suggests or devel- 
opes, at a very early period, the idea of the good or the valuable. The 
idea is doubtless developed, long before the word that expresses it is 
understood. The child knows that happiness is good, and seeks it in 
the form of self-gratification, long before the terms that designate this 
state of mind are at all understood. It knows that its own enjoyment is 
worth seeking, and doubtless very early has the idea, that the enjoy- 
ment of others is worth seeking, and affirms to itself, not in words, but 



MORAL DEPRAVITY. 257 

in idea, that it ought to please its parents and those around it. It 
knows, in fact, though language is as yet unknown, that it loves to 
be gratified, and to be happy, that it loves and seeks enjoyment for 
itself, and doubtless has the idea that it ought not to displease and dis- 
tress those around it, but that it ought to endeavor to please and gratify 
them. This is probably among the first ideas, if not the very first idea, 
of the pure reason that is developed, that is, the idea of the good, the 
valuable, the desirable ; and the next must be that of oughtness, or 
of moral obligation, or of right and wrong, etc. I say again, these ideas 
are, and must be developed, before the signs or words that express them 
are at all understood, and the words would never be understood except 
the idea were first developed. We always find, at the earliest period at 
which children can understand words, that they have the idea of obliga- 
tion, of right and wrong. As soon as these words are understood by 
them, they recognize them as expressing ideas already in their own 
minds, and which ideas they have had further back than they can 
remember. Some, and indeed most persons, seem to have the idea, "that 
children affirm themselves to be under moral obligation, before they 
have the idea of the good ; that they affirm their obligation to obey 
their parents before they know, or have the idea of the good or of 
the valuable. But this is, and must be a mistake. They may and do 
affirm obligation to obey their parents, before they can express in lan- 
guage, and before they would understand, a statement of the ground 
of their obligation. The idea, however, they have, and must have, or 
they could not affirm obligation. 

9. Why is sin so natural to mankind ? Not because their nature is 
itself sinful, but because the appetites and passions tend so strongly to 
self-indulgence. These are temptations to sin, but sin itself consists not 
in these appetites and propensities, but in the voluntary committal of the 
will to their indulgence. This committal of the will is selfishness, and 
when the will is once given up to sin, it is very natural to sin. The will 
once committed to self-indulgence as its end, selfish actions are in a sense 
spontaneous. 

10. The constitution of a moral being as a whole, when all the powers 
are developed, does not tend to sin, but strongly in an opposite direction; 
as is manifest from the fact that when reason is thoroughly developed by 
the Holy Spirit, it is more than a match for the sensibility, and turns 
the heart to G-od. 

The difficulty is, that the sensibility gets the start of reason, and en- 
gages the attention in devising means of self-gratification, and thus re- 
tards, and in a great measure prevents, the development of the ideas of 
the reason which were designed, to control the will. It is this morbid 
development that the Holy Spirit is given to rectify, by so forcing truth 
17 



238 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

upon the attention, as to secure the development of the reason. By 
doing this, he brings the will under the influence of truth. Our senses 
reveal to us the ^Vjects correlated to our animal nature and propensities. 
The Holy Spirit reveals God and the spiritual world, and all that class 
of objects that are correlated to our higher nature, so as to give reason the 
control of the will. This is regeneration and sanctification, as we shall 
see in its proper place. 



LECTURE XXV. 

ATONEMENT. 



We come now to the consideration of a very important feature of the 
moral government of God ; namely, the atonement. 
In discussing this subject, I will — 

I. Call attention to several loell-estalli shed principles of government. 

1. We have already seen that moral law is not founded in the mere 
arbitrary will of God or of any other being, but that it has its foundation 
in the nature and relations of moral agents, that it is that rule of action 
or of willing which is imposed on them by the law of their own intellect. 

2. As the will of no being can create moral law, so the will of no 
being can repeal or alter moral law. It being just that rule of action 
that is agreeable to the nature and relations of moral agents, it is as im- 
mutable as those natures and relations. 

3. There is a distinction between the letter and the spirit of moral 
law. The letter relates to the outward life or action ; the spirit respects 
the motive or intention from which the act should proceed. For exam- 
ple : the spirit of the moral law requires disinterested benevolence, and 
is all expressed in one word — love. The letter of the law is found in the 
commandments of the decalogue, and in divers other precepts relating 
to outward acts. 

' \. To the letter of the law there may be many exceptions, but to the 
spirit of moral law there can be no exception. That is, the spirit of the 
moral law may sometimes admit and require, that the letter of the law 
shall be disregarded or violated ; but the spirit of the law ought never to 
be disregarded or violated. For example : the letter of the law prohibits 
all labor on the sabbath day. But the spirit of the law often requires 
labor on the sabbath. The spirit of the law requires the exercise of uni- 



ATONEMENT. 259 

versal and perfect love or benevolence to God and man, and the law of 
benevolence often requires that labor shall be done on the sabbath ; as 
administering to the sick, relieving the poor, feeding animals ; and in 
short, whatever is plainly the work of necessity or mercy, in such a sense 
that enlightened benevolence demands it, is required by the spirit of 
moral law upon the sabbath, as well as all other days. This is expressly 
taught by Christ, both by precept and example. So again, the letter of 
the law says, "■ The soul that sinneth, it shall die : " but the spirit of the 
law admits and requires that upon certain conditions, to be examined in 
their proper place, the soul that sinneth shall live. The letter of the law 
is inexorable ; it condemns and sentences to death all violators of its 
precepts, without regard to atonement or repentance. The spirit of 
moral law allows and requires that upon condition of satisfaction being 
made to public justice, and the return of the sinner to obedience, he • 
shall live and not die. "^-^ 

5. In establishing a government and promulgating law, the lawgiver 
is always understood as pledging himself duly to administer the laws in 
support of public order, and for the promotion of public morals, to re- 
ward the innocent with his favor and protection, and to punish the dis- 
obedient with the loss of his protection and favor. 

6. Laws are public property in which every subject of the govern- 
ment has an interest. Every obedient subject of government' is inter- 
ested to have law supported and obeyed, and wherever the law is violated, 
every subject of the government is injured, and his rights are invaded ; 
and each and all have a right to expect the government duly to execute 
the penalties of law when it is violated. 

7. There is an important distinction between retributive and public 
justice. Eetributive justice consists in treating every subject of govern- 
ment according to his character. It respects the intrinsic merit or de- 
merit of each individual, and deals with him accordingly. Public jus- 
tice, in its exercise, consists in the promotion and protection of the 
public interests, by such legislation and such an administration of law, 
as is demanded by the highest good of the public. It implies the execu- 
tion of the penalties of law where the precept is violated, unless some- 
thing else is done that will as effectually secure the public interests. 
When this is done, public justice demands, that the execution of the 
penalty shall be dispensed with, by extending pardon to the criminal. 
Ketributive justice makes no exceptions, but punishes without mercy in 
every instance of crime. Public justice makes exceptions, as often as 
this is permitted or required by the public good. Public justice is iden- 
tical with the spirit of the moral law, and in its exercise, regards only 
the law. Eetributive justice cleaves to the letter, and makes no excep- 
tions to the rule, " The soul that sinneth, it shall die." 



260 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

8. The design of legal penalties is to secure obedience to the precept. 
The same is also the reason for executing them when the precept is 
violated. The sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the views 
of the lawgiver, in respect to the importance of his law ; and the execution 
of penalties is designed and calculated to evince his sincerity in enacting, 
and his continued adherence to, and determination to abide by, the prin- 
ciples of his government as revealed in the law ; his abhorrence of all 
crime ; his regard to the public interests ; and his unalterable determina- 
tion to carry out, support and establish, the authority of his law. 

9. It is a fact well established by the experience of all ages and na- 
tions, that the exercise of mercy, in setting aside the execution of penal- 
ties, is a matter of extreme delicacy and danger. The influence of law, 
as might be expected, is found very much to depend upon the certainty 
felt by the subjects that it will be duly executed. It is found in expe- 
rience, to be true, that the exercise of mercy in every government where 
no atonement is made, weakens government, by begetting and fostering 
a hope of impunity in the minds of those who are tempted to violate the 
law. It has been asserted, that the same is true when an atonement has 
been made, and that therefore, the doctrines of atonement and conse- 
quent forgiveness tend to encourage the hope of impunity in the commis- 
sion of sin, and for this reason, are dangerous doctrines, subversive of 
high and sound morality. This assertion I shall notice in its appropri- 
ate place. 

10. Since the head of the government is pledged to protect and pro- 
mote the public interests, by a due administration of law, if in any in- 
stance where the precept is violated, he would dispense with the execu- 
tion of penalties, public justice requires that he shall see, that a substi- 
tute for the execution of law is provided, or that something is done that 
shall as effectually secure the influence of law, as the execution of the 
penalty would do. He cannot make exceptions to the spirit of the law. 
Either the soul that sinneth must die, according to the letter of the law, 
or a substitute must be provided in accordance with the spirit of the law. 

11. Whatever will as fully evince the lawgiver's regard for his law, 
his determination to support it, his abhorrence of all violations of its 
precepts, and withal guard as effectually against the inference, that vio- 
lators of the precept might expect to escape with impunity, as the exe- 
cution of the penalty would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice. 
When these conditions are fulfilled, and the sinner has returned to obedi- 
ence, public justice not only admits, but absolutely demands, that the 
penalty shall be set aside by extending pardon to the offender. The 
offender still deserves to be punished, and, upon the principles of retribu- 
tive justice, might be punished according to his deserts. But the pub- 
lic good admits and requires, that upon the above condition he should 



ATONEMENT. 261 

live; hence, public justice, in compliance with the public interests and 
the spirit of the law of love, spares and pardons him. 

12. If mercy or pardon is to be extended to any who have violated 
law, it ought to be done in a manner and upon some conditions that will 
settle the question, and establish the truth, that the execution of penal- 
ties is not to be dispensed with merely upon condition of the repentance 
of the offender. In other words, if pardon is to be extended, it should 
be known to be upon a condition not within the power of the offender. 
Else he may know, that he can violate the law, and yet be sure to escape 
with impunity, by fulfilling the conditions of forgiveness, which are upon 
the supposition, all within his own power. 

13. So, if mercy is to be exercised, it should be upon a condition that 
is not to be repeated. The thing required by public justice is, that noth- 
ing shall be done to undermine or disturb the influence of law. Hence 
it cannot consent to have the execution of penalties dispensed with, upon 
any condition that shall encourage the hope of impunity. Therefore, 
public justice cannot consent to the pardon of sin but upon condition of 
an atonement, and also upon the assumption that atonement is not to be 
repeated, nor to extend its benefits beyond the limits of the race for whom 
it was made, and that only for a limited time. If an atonement were to 
extend its benefits to all worlds, and to all eternity, it would nullify its 
own influence, and encourage the universal hope of impunity, in case the 
precepts of the law were violated. This would be indefinitely worse than 
no atonement ; and public justice might as well consent to have mercy ex- 
ercised, without any regard to securing the authority and influence of law. 

II. The term Atonement. 

The English word atonement is synonymous with the Hebrew word 
cofer. This is a noun from the verb caufar* to cover. The cofer or cover 
was the name of the lid or cover of the ark of the covenant, and consti- 
tuted what was called the mercy-seat. The Greek word rendered atone- 
ment is KaraTCXayT]. This means reconciliation to favor, or more strictly, 
the means or conditions of reconciliation to favor ; from naTaXlaaau, to 
" change, or exchange." The term properly means substitution. An 
examination of these original words, in the connection in which they 
stand, will show that the atonement is the governmental substitution of 
the sufferings of Christ for the punishment of sinners. It is a covering 
of their sins by his sufferings. 

III. The teachings of natural theology, or the a priori affirmations of 
reason upon this subject. 

The doctrine of atonement has been regarded as so purely a doctrine 
of revelation as to preclude the supposition, that reason could, a priori, 



262 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

make any affirmations about it. It has been generally regarded as lying 
absolutely without the pale of natural theology, in so high a sense, that, 
aside from revelation, no assumption could be made, nor even a reason- 
able conjecture indulged. But there are certain facts in this world's 
history, that render this assumption exceedingly doubtful. It is true, 
indeed, that natural theology could not ascertain and establish the fact, 
that an atonement had been made, or that it certainly would be made ; 
but if I am not mistaken, it might have been reasonably inferred, the 
true character of God being known and assumed, that an atonement of 
some kind would be made to render it consistent with his relations to the 
universe, to extend mercy to the guilty inhabitants of this world. The 
manifest necessity of a divine revelation has been supposed to afford a 
strong presumptive argument, that such a revelation has been or will be 
made. From the benevolence of God, as affirmed by reason, and mani- 
fested in his works and' providence, it has been, as I suppose, justly in- 
ferred, that he would make arrangements to secure the holiness and sal- 
vation of men, and as a condition of this result, that he would grant 
them a further revelation of his will than had been given in creation and 
providence. The argument stands thus : — 

1. From reason and observation we know that this is not a state 
of retribution ; and from all the facts in the case that lie open to obser- 
vation, this is evidently a state of trial or probation. 

2. The providence of God in this world is manifestly disciplinary, and 
designed to reform mankind. 

3. These facts, taken in connection with the great ignorance and 
darkness of the human mind on moral and religious subjects, afford 
a strong presumption that the benevolent Creator will make to the 
inhabitants of this world who are so evidently yet in a state of trial, 
a further revelation of his will. Now, if this argument is good, so far as 
it goes, I see not why we may not reasonably go still further. 

Since the above are facts, and since it is also a fact that when the 
subject is duly considered, and the more thoroughly the better, there is 
manifestly a great difficulty in the exercise of mercy without satisfaction 
being made to public justice ; and since the benevolence of God would 
not allow him on the one hand to pardon sin at the expense of public 
justice, nor on the other to punish or execute the penalty of law, if it 
could be wisely and consistently avoided, these facts being understood 
and admitted, it might naturally have been inferred, that the wisdom 
and benevolence of God would devise and execute some method of meet- 
ing the demands of public justice, that should render the forgiveness of 
sin possible. That the philosophy of government would render this 
possible, is to us very manifest. I know, indeed, that with the light the 
gospel has afforded us, we much more clearly discern this, than they 



ATONEMENT. 263 

could who had no other light; than that of nature. Whatever might 
have been known to the ancients, and those who have not the Bible, 
I think that when the facts are announced by revelation, we can see 
that such a governmental expedient was not only possible, but just what 
might have been expected of the benevolence of God. It would of course 
have been impossible for us, a priori, to have devised, or reasonably 
conjectured, the plan that has been adopted. So little was known or 
knowable on the subject of the trinity of God, without revelation, that 
natural theology could, perhaps, in its best estate, have taught nothing 
further than that, if it was possible, some governmental expedient would 
be resorted to, and was in contemplation, for the ultimate restoration of 
the sinning race, who were evidently spared hitherto from the execution of 
law, and placed under a system of discipline. 

But since the gospel has announced the fact of the atonement, it 
appears that natural theology or governmental philosophy can satisfac- 
torily explain it ; that reason can discern a divine philosophy in it. 

Natural theology can teach — 

1. That the human race is in a fallen state, and that the law of selfish- 
ness, and not the law of benevolence, is that to which unconverted men 
conform their lives. 

2. It can teach that God is benevolent, and hence that mercy must 
be an attribute of God ; and that this attribute will be manifested 
in the actual pardon of sin, when this can be done with safety to the 
divine government. 

3. Consequently that no atonement could be needed to satisfy any 
implacable spirit in the divine mind ; that he was sufficiently and in- 
finitely disposed to extend pardon to the penitent, if this could be wisely, 
benevolently, and safely done. 

4. It can also abundantly teach, that there is a real and a great 
danger in the exercise of mercy under a moral government, and su- 
premely great under a government so vast and so enduring as the 
government of God ; that, under such a government, the danger is very 
great, that the exercise of mercy will be understood as encouraging the 
hope of impunity in the commission of sin. 

5. It can also show the indispensable necessity of such an adminis- 
tration of the divine government as to secure the fullest confidence 
throughout the universe, in the sincerity of God in promulging his law 
with its tremendous penalty, and of his unalterable adherence to its 
spirit, and determination not to falter in carrying out and securing its 
authority at all events. That this is indispensable to the well-being 
of the universe, is entirely manifest. 

6. Hence it is very obvious to natural theology, that sin cannot be 
pardoned unless something is done to forbid the otherwise natural infer- 



264 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ence that sin will be forgiven under the government of God upon condi- 
tion of repentance alone, and of course upon a condition within the 
power of the sinner himself. It must be manifest, that to proclaim 
throughout the universe that sin would be pardoned universally upon 
condition of repentance alone, would be a virtual repeal of the divine 
law. All creatures would instantly perceive, that no one need to fear 
punishment, in any case, as his forgiveness was secure, however much he 
might trample on the divine authority, upon a single condition which he 
could at will perform. 

7. Natural theology is abundantly competent to show, that God 
could not be just to his own intelligence, just to his character, and hence 
just to the universe, in dispensing with the execution of divine law, 
except upon the condition of providing a substitute of such a nature as 
to reveal as fully, and impress as deeply, the lessons that would be taught 
by the execution, as the execution itself would do. The great design of 
penalties is prevention, and this is of course the design of executing pen- 
alties. The head of every government is pledged to sustain the authority 
of law, by a due administration of rewards and punishments, and has no 
right in any instance to extend pardon, except upon conditions that will 
as effectually support the authority of law as the execution of its penal- 
ties would do. It was never found to be safe, or even possible under any 
government, to make the universal offer of pardon to violators of law, 
upon the bare condition of repentance, for the very obvious reason 
already suggested, that it would be a virtual repeal of all law. Public 
justice, by which every executive magistrate in the universe is bound, 
sternly and peremptorily forbids that mercy shall be extended to any 
culprit, without some equivalent being rendered to the government ; that 
is, without something being done that will fully answer as a substitute 
for the execution of penalties. This principle God fully admits to be 
binding upon him ; and hence he affirms that he gave his Son to render 
it just in him to forgive sin. Rom. iii. 24-26 : " Being justified freely 
by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God 
hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare 
his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the for- 
bearance of God ; to declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness ; that 
he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." 

8. All nations have felt the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. This is 
evident from the fact that all nations have offered them. 

9. The wisest heathen philosophers, who saw the intrinsic inefficacy 
of animal sacrifices, held that God could not forgive sin. This proves to 
a demonstration, that they felt the necessity of an atonement, or expia- 
tory sacrifice. And having too just views of God and his government, 
to suppose that either animal, or merely human, sacrifices, could be effi- 



ATONEMENT. 265 

carious under the government of God, they were unable to understand 
upon what principles sin could be forgiven. 

10. Public justice required, either that an atonement should be made, 
or that the law should be executed upon every offender. By public jus- 
tice is intended, that due administration of law, that shall secure in the 
highest manner which the nature of the case admits, private and public 
interests, and establish the order and well-being of the universe. . In 
establishing the government of the universe, God had given the pledge, 
both impliedly and expressly, that he would regard the public interests, 
and by a due administration of the law, secure and promote, as far as 
possible, public and individual happiness. 

11. Public justice could strictly require only the execution of law ; 
for God had neither expressly nor impliedly given a pledge to do any- 
thing more for the promotion of virtue and happiness, than to administer 
due rewards to the righteous, and due punishment to the wicked. Yet 
an atonement, as we shall see, would more fully meet the necessities of 
government, and act as a more efficient preventive of sin, and a more 
powerful persuasive to holiness, than the infliction of the legal penalty 
would do. 

12. An atonement was needed for the removal of obstacles to the free 
exercise of benevolence toward our race. Without an atonement, the 
race of man after the fall sustained to the government of God the rela- 
tion of rebels and outlaws. And before God, as the great executive 
magistrate of the universe, could manifest his benevolence toward them, 
an atonement must be decided upon and made known, as the reason 
upon which his favorable treatment of them was conditionated. 

13. An atonement was needed to promote the glory and influence of 
God in the universe. But more of this hereafter. 

14. An atonement was needed to present overpowering motives to 
repentance. 

15. An atonement was needed, that the offer of pardon might not 
seem like connivance at sin. 

16. An atonement was needed to manifest the sincerity of God in his 
legal enactments. 

17. An atonement was needed to make it safe to present the offer and 
promise of pardon. 

18. Natural theology can inform us, that, if the lawgiver would or 
could condescend so much to deny himself, as to attest his regard to his 
law, and his determination to support it by suffering its curse, in such a 
sense as was possible and consistent with his character and relations, and 
so far forth as emphatically to inculcate the great lesson, that sin was not 
to be forgiven upon the bare condition of repentance in any case, and 
also to establish the universal conviction, that the execution of law was 



2GG SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

not to be dispensed with, but that it is an unalterable rule under his 
divine government, that where there is sin there must be inflicted suffer- 
ing — this would be so complete a satisfaction of public justice, that sin 
might safely be forgiven. 

IV. The fact of atonement. 

This is purely a doctrine of revelation, and in the establishment of 
this truth appeal must be made to the scriptures alone. 

1. The whole Jewish scriptures, and especially the whole ceremonial 
dispensation of the Jews, attest, most unequivocally, the necessity of an 
atonement. 

2. The New Testament is just as unequivocal in its testimony to the 
same point. 

I shall here take it as established, that Christ was properly "God 
manifest in the flesh," and proceed to cite a few out of the great multi- 
tude of passages, that attest the fact of his death, and also its vicarious 
nature ; that is, that it was for us, and as a satisfaction to public justice 
for our sins, that his blood was shed. I will first quote a few passages to 
show that the atonement and redemption through it, was a matter of un- 
derstanding and covenant between the Father and Son. "-.I have made 
a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant. Thy 
seed will I establish forever, and build up thy throne to all generations. 
Selah." — Ps. lxxxix, 3, 4. " Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he 
hath put him to grief : when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin 
he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the 
Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, 
and shall be satisfied ; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant 
justify many ; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide 
him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the 
strong ; because he hath poured out his soul unto death : and he was 
numbered with the transgressors." — Isaiah liii. 10, 11, 12. "All that the 
Father giveth me shall come to me : and he that cometh to me I will in 
no wise cast out. For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own 
will, but the will of him that sent me. And this is the Father's will 
which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose 
nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." — John vi. 37, 38, 
39. " I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me 
out of the world : thine they were, and thou gavest them me ; and they 
have kept thy word. I pray for them : I pray not for the world, but 
for them which thou hast given me ; for they are thine. And now I 
am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. 
Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given 
me, that they may be one, as we are." — John xvii. 6, 9, 11. 



ATONEMENT. 267 

I will next quote some passages to show, that, if sinners were to be 
saved at all, it must be through an atonement. " Neither is there salva- 
tion in any other : for there is none other name under heaven given 
among men whereby we must be saved." — Acts iv. 12. "Be it known 
unto you therefore, men and brethren, that through this man is preached 
unto you the forgiveness of sins : And by him all that believe are justified 
from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." 
— Acts xiii. 38, 39. " Now we know, that what things soever the law 
saith, it saith to them who are under the law ; that every mouth may be 
stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore, 
by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for 
by the law is the knowledge of sin." — Eom. iii. 19, 20. " Knowing that a 
man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus 
Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified 
by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law : for by the works 
of the law shall no flesh be justified. I do not frustrate the grace of 
God : for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain." 
—Gal. ii. 16, 21. "For as many as are of the works of the law are un- 
der the curse : for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not 
in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them. But 
that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident : for, 
The just shall live by faith. And the law is not of faith : but the man 
that doeth them shall live in them. For if the inheritance be of the law, 
it is no more of promise : but God gave it to Abraham by promise. 
Wherefore then serveth the law ? It was added because of transgressions, 
until the seed should come to whom the promise was made ; and it was 
ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator. Now a mediator is not a 
mediator of: one, but God is one. Is the law, then, against the promises 
of God ? God forbid, for if there had been a law given which could 
have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. Where- 
fore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might 
be justified by faith."— Gal. iii. 10-12, 18-21, 24. "And almost all 
things are by the law purged with blood ; and without shedding of blood 
is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the patterns of things 
in the heavens should be purified with these ; but the heavenly things 
themselves with better sacrifices than these." — Heb. ix. 22, 23. 

I will now cite some passages that establish the fact of the vicarious 
death of Christ, and redemption through his blood. "But he was 
wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities : the 
chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are' 
healed. All we like sheep have gone astray ; we have turned every one 
to his own way ; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." 
— Isaiah liii. 5, 6. " Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered. 



268 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." — Matt. 
xx. 28. "For this is my blood of the new testament which is shed for 
many for the remission of sins." — Matt. xxvi. 28. "And as Moses lifted 
up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted 
up ; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal 
life." — John iii. 14, 15. " I am the living bread which came down from 
heaven : if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever : and the 
bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the 
world." — John vi. 51. " Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all 
the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to 
feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." 
— Acts xx. 28. " Being justified freely by his grace, through the re- 
demption that is in Christ Jesus. To declare, I say, at this time, his 
righteousness : that he might be just, and the justifier of him which be- 
lieveth in Jesus. For when we were yet without strength, in due time 
Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one 
die : yet perad venture for a good man some would even dare to die. But 
God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners 
Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, 
we shall be saved from wrath through him. And not only so, but we 
also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now 
received the atonement. Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment 
came upon all men to condemnation ; even so by the righteousness of 
one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by 
one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of 
one shall many be made righteous." — Rom. iii. 24-26 ; v. 9-11, 18, 19. 
"Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye 
are unleavened. For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us : for I 
delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ 
died for our sins according to the scriptures." — 1 Cor. v. 7 : xv. 3. "I 
am crucified with Christ : nevertheless I live : yet not I, but Christ liveth 
in me : and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of 
the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me. Christ hath 
redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us : for it 
is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree. That the bless- 
ing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ ; that 
we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." — Gal. ii. 20 ; 
iii. 13, 14. " But now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off 
are made nigh by the blood of Christ. And walk in love, as Christ also 
hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to 
God for a sweet smelling savour." — Eph. ii. 13 ; v. 2. " Neither by the 
blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into 
the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the 



ATONEMENT. 269 

blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the un- 
clean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh ; how much more shall the 
blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without 
spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living 
God ? And almost all things are by the law purged with blood ; and 
without shedding of blood is no remission. It was therefore necessary 
that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these, 
but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For 
Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are 
the figures of the true ; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the pres- 
ence of God for us. Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the 
high priest entereth into the holy place every year with blood of others ; 
for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world : 
but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin 
by the sacrifice of himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, 
but after this the judgment : so Christ was once offered to bear the sins 
of many : and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second 
time without sin unto salvation." — Heb. ix. 12-14, 22-28. "By the 
which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus 
Christ once for all. And every priest stand eth daily ministering and 
offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins : 
but this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down 
on the right hand of God ; from henceforth expecting till his enemies be 
made his footstool. For by one offering he hath perfected forever them 
that are sanctified." — Heb. x. 10-14. "Having therefore, brethren, 
boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and 
living way which he hath consecrated for us through the vail, that is to 
say, his flesh," etc. — Heb. x. 19, 20. "Forasmuch as ye know that ye 
were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your 
vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers ; but with the 
precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." 
— 1 Pet. i. 18, 19. " Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on 
the tree, that we being dead to sins should live unto righteousness ; by 
whose stripes ye were healed." — 1 Pet. ii. 24. " For Christ also hath once 
suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, 
being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit." — 1 Peter 
iii. 18. " But if we walk in the light as he is in the light, we have fel- 
lowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleans- 
eth us from all sin." — 1 John i. V. "And ye know that he was mani- 
fested to take away our sins ; and in him is no sin." — 1 John iii. 5. " In 
this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent 
his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. 



270 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

r 

Serein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his 
Son to be the propitiation for our sins." — 1 John iv. 9, 10. 

These, as every reader of the Bible must know, are only some of the 
passages that teach the doctrine of atonement and redemption by the 
death of Christ. It is truly wonderful in how many ways this doctrine 
is taught, assumed, and implied in the Bible. Indeed, it is emphatically 
the great theme of the Bible. It is expressed or implied upon nearly 
every page of divine inspiration. . 

V. Tlie next inquiry is what constitutes the atonement. 

The answer to this inquiry has been already, in part, unavoidably 
anticipated. Under this head I will show, — 

1. That Christ's obedience to the moral law as a covenant of works, 
did not constitute the atonement. 

(1.) Christ owed obedience to the moral law, both as God and man. 
He was under as much obligation to be perfectly benevolent as any moral 
agent is. It was, therefore, impossible for him to perform any works of 
supererogation ; that is, so far as obedience to law was concerned, he 
could, neither as God nor as man, do anything more than fulfil its obli- 
gations. 

(2.) Had he obeyed for us, he would not have suffered for us. "Were 
his obedience to be substituted for our obedience, he need not certainly 
have both fulfilled the law for us, as our substitute, under a covenant of 
works, and at the same time have suffered as a substitute, in submitting 
to the penalty of the law. 

(3. ) If he obeyed the law as our substitute, then why should our own 
return to personal obedience be insisted upon as a sine qud non of our 
salvation ? 

(4.) The idea that any part of the atonement consisted in Christ's 
obeying the law for us, and in our stead and behalf, represents God as 
requiring : — 

(i.) The obedience of our substitute. 

(ii. ) The same suffering, as if no obedience had been rendered. 

(iii.) Our repentance. 

(iv.) Our return to personal obedience. 

(v.) And then represents him as, after all, ascribing our salvation to 
grace. Strange grace this, that requires a debt to be paid several times 
over, before the obligation is discharged ! 

2. I must show that the atonement was not a commercial transaction. 
Some have regarded the atonement simply in the light of the payment 

of a debt ; and have represented Christ as purchasing the elect of the 
Father, and paying down the same amount of suffering in his own per- 
son that justice would have exacted of them. To this I answer — 



ATONEMENT. 271 

(1.) It is naturally impossible, as it would require that satisfaction 
should be made to retributive justice. Strictly speaking, retributive 
justice can never be satisfied, in the sense that the guilty can be punished 
as much and as long as he deserves ; for this would imply that he was 
punished until he ceased to be guilty, or became innocent. When law is 
once violated, the sinner can make no satisfaction. He can never cease 
to be guilty, or to deserve punishment, and no possible amount of suffer- 
ing renders him the less guilty or the less deserving of punishment : 
therefore, to satisfy retributive justice is impossible. 

(2.) But, as we have seen in a former lecture, retributive justice must 
have inflicted on him eternal death. To suppose, therefore, that Christ 
suffered in amount, all that was due to the elect, is to suppose that he 
suffered an eternal punishment multiplied by the whole number of the 
elect. 

3. The atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public 
justice. 

The moral law did not originate in the divine will, but is founded in 
his self-existence and immutable nature. He cannot therefore repeal or 
alter it. To the letter of the moral law there may be exceptions. God 
cannot repeal the precept, and just for this reason, he cannot set aside 
the spirit of the sanctions. For to dispense with the sanctions were a 
virtual repeal of the precept. He cannot, therefore, set aside the execu- 
tion of the penalty when the precept has been violated, without some- 
thing being done that shall meet the demands of the true spirit of the 
law. " Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that 
is in Christ Jesus : whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through 
faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins 
that are past, through the forbearance of God ; to declare, I say, at this 
time his righteousness : that he might be just, and the justifier of him 
which belie veth in Jesus. "— Kom. iii. 24-26. This passage assigns the 
reason, or declares the design, of the atonement, to have been to justify- ■--" 
God in the pardon of sin, or in dispensing with the execution of law. 
Isa. xliii. 10-12 : "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he hath put 
him to grief : when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall 
see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord 
shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and 
shall be satisfied : by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify 
many ; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a 
portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong ; 
because he hath poured out his soul unto death : and he was numbered 
with the transgressors : and he bare the sin of many, and made interces- 
sion for the transgressors." 

I present several further reasons why an atonement in the case of the 



272 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

inhabitants of this world was preferable to punishment, or to the execu- 
tion of the divine law. Several reasons have already been assigned, 
to which I will add the following, some of which are plainly revealed in 
the Bible ; others are plainly inferrible from what the Bible does reveal ; 
and others still are plainly inferrible from the very nature of the case. 

(1.) God's great and disinterested love to sinners themselves was a 
prime reason for the atonement. 

John iii. 16. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only 
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but 
have everlasting life." 

(2.) His great love to the universe at large must have been another 
reason, inasmuch as it is impossible that the atonement should not exert 
an amazing influence over moral beings, in whatever world they might 
exist, and where the fact of atonement should be known. 

(3.) Another reason for substituting the sufferings of Christ in the 
place of the eternal damnation of sinners, is, that an infinite amount of 
suffering might be prevented. The relation of Christ to the universe 
rendered his sufferings so infinitely valuable and influential, as an ex- 
pression of God's abhorrence of sin on the one hand, and his great love 
to his subjects on the other, that an infinitely less amount of suffering in 
him than must have been inflicted on sinners, would be equally, and no 
doubt vastly more, influential in supporting the government of God, 
than the execution of the law upon them would have been. Be it borne 
in mind, that Christ was the lawgiver, and his suffering in behalf of 
sinners is to be regarded as the lawgiver and executive magistrate suf- 
fering in the behalf and stead of a rebellious province of his empire. 
As a governmental expedient it is easy to see the great value of such a 
substitute ; that on the one hand it fully evinced the determination 
of the ruler not to yield the authority of his law, and on the other, 
to evince his great and disinterested love for his rebellious subjects. 

(4.) By this substitution, an immense good might be gained, the 
eternal happiness of all that can be reclaimed from sin, together with all 
the augmented happiness of those who have never sinned, that must 
result from this glorious revelation of God. 

(5.) Another reason for preferring the atonement to the punishment 
of sinners must have been, that sin had afforded an opportunity for the 
highest manifestation of virtue in God : the manifestation of forbear- 
ance, mercy, self-denial, and suffering for enemies that were within his 
own power, and for those from whom he could expect no equivalent in 
return. 

It is impossible to conceive of a higher order of virtues than are 
exhibited in the atonement of Christ. It was vastly desirable that God 
should take advantage of such an opportunity to exhibit his true charac- 



ATONEMENT. 273 

ter, and show to the universe what was in his heart. The strength and 
stability of any government must depend upon the estimation in which the 
sovereign is held by his subjects. It was therefore indispensable, that 
God should improve the opportunity, which sin had afforded, to manifest 
and make known his true character, and thus secure the highest confi- 
dence of his subjects. 

(6.) In the atonement God consulted his own happiness and his own 
glory. To deny himself for the salvation of sinners, was a part of his 
own infinite happiness, always intended by him, and therefore always en- 
joyed. This was not selfishness in him, as his own well-being is of in- 
finitely greater value than that of ail the universe besides ; he ought so to 
regard and treat it, because of its supreme and intrinsic value. 

(7.) The atonement would present to creatures the highest possible 
motives to virtue. Example is the highest moral influence that can be 
exerted. If God, or any other being, would make others benevolent, he 
must manifest benevolence himself. If the benevolence manifested in 
the atonement does not subdue the selfishness of sinners, their case is 
hopeless. 

(8.) The circumstances of his government rendered an atonement 
necessary ; as the execution of law was not, as a matter of fact, a sufficient 
preventive of sin. The annihilation of the wicked would not answer the 
purposes of government. A full revelation of mercy, blended with such 
an exhibition of justice, was called for by the circumstances of the uni- 
verse. 

(9. ) To confirm holy beings. Nothing could be more highly calcula- 
ted to establish and confirm the confidence, love, and obedience of holy 
beings, than this disinterested manifestation of love to sinners and rebels. 

(10.) To confound his enemies. How could anything be more di- 
rectly calculated to silence all cavils, and to shut every mouth, and for- 
ever close up all opposing lips, than such an exhibition of love and wil- 
lingness to make sacrifices for sinners ? 

(11.) The fact, that the execution of the law of God on rebel angels 
had not arrested, and could not arrest, the progress of rebellion in the 
universe, proves that something more needed to be done, in support of 
the authority of law, than would be done in the execution of its penalty 
upon rebels. While the execution of law may have a strong tendency to 
prevent the beginning of rebellion among loyal subjects, and to restrain 
rebels themselves ; yet penal inflictions do not, in fact, subdue the heart, 
under any government, whether human or divine. 

As a matter of fact, the law was only exasperating rebels, without 

confirming holy beings. Paul affirmed, that the action of the law upon 

his own mind, while in impenitence, was to beget in him all manner of 

concupiscence. One grand reason for giving the law was, to develop the 

18 



-'<£ SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

nature of sin, and to show that the carnal mind is not subject to the law 
of God, neither indeed can be. The law was therefore given that the 
offence might abound, that thereby it might be demonstrated, that with- 
out an atonement there could be no salvation for rebels under the gov- 
ernment of God. 

(12.) The nature, degree, and execution of the penalty of the law, 
made the holiness and the justice of God so prominent, as to absorb too 
much of public attention to be safe. Those features of his character 
were so fully revealed, by the execution of his law upon the rebel angels, 
that to have pursued the same course with the inhabitants of this world, 
without the offer of mercy, might have had, and doubtless would have 
had, an injurious influence upon the universe, by creating more of fear 
than of love to God and his government. Hence, a fuller revelation of 
the love and compassion of God was necessary, to guard against the in- 
fluence of slavish fear. 

His taking human nature, and obeying unto death, under such cir- 
cumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as right- 
eous. It is a common practice in human governments, and one that is 
founded in the nature and laws of mind, to reward distinguished public 
service by conferring favors on the children of those who have rendered 
this service, and treating them as if they had rendered it themselves. 
This is both benevolent and wise. Its governmental importance, its wis- 
dom and excellent influence, have been most abundantly attested in the 
experience of nations. As a governmental transaction, this same prin- 
ciple prevails, and for the same reason, under the government of God. 
All that are Christ's children and belong to him, are received for his 
sake, treated with favor, and the rewards of the righteous are bestowed 
upon them for his sake. And the public service which he has rendered 
to the universe, by laying down his life for the support of the divine gov- 
ernment, has rendered it eminently wise, that all who are united to him 
by faith should be treated as righteous for his sake. 



LECTURE XXVI. 

EXTENT OF ATONEMENT. 



VI. For whose benefit the atonement was intended. 

1. God does all things for himself ; that is, he consults his own glory 
and happiness, as the supreme and most influential reason for all his 
conduct. This is wise and right in him, because his own glory and 
happiness are infinitely the greatest good in and to the universe. He 



ATONEMENT. 275 

made the atonement to satisfy himself. " God so loved the world, that 
he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever belie veth in him should 
not perish, but have everlasting life." God himself, then, was greatly 
benefited by the atonement : in other words, his happiness has in a 
great measure resulted from its contemplation, execution, and results. 

2. He made the atonement for the benefit of the universe. All holy 
beings are, and must be, benefited by it, from its very nature, as it gives 
them a higher knowledge of God than ever they had before, or ever 
could have gained in any other way. The atonement is the greatest 
work that he could have wrought for them, the most blessed and excel- 
lent, and benevolent thing he could have done for them. For this 
reason, angels are described as desiring to look into the atonement. The 
inhabitants of heaven are represented as being deeply interested in the 
work of atonement, and those displays of the character of God that are 
made in it. The atonement is then no doubt one of the greatest bless- 
ings that ever God conferred upon the universe of holy beings. 

3. The atonement was made for the benefit particularly of the inhab- 
itants of this world, from its very nature, as it is calculated to benefit all 
the inhabitants of this world ; as it is a most stupendous revelation 
of God to man. Its nature is adapted to benefit all mankind. All 
mankind can be pardoned, if they are rightly affected and brought to 
repentance by it, as well as any part of mankind. 

4. All do certainly receive many blessings on account of it. It is 
probable that, but for the atonement, none of our race, except the first 
human pair, would ever have had an existence. 

5. All the blessings which mankind enjoy, are conferred on them on 
account of the atonement of Christ ; that is, God could not consistently 
wait on sinners, and bless, and do all that the nature of the case admits, 
to save them, were it not for the fact of atonement. 

6. That it was made for all mankind, is evident from the fact that it 
is offered to all indiscriminately. 

7. Sinners are universally condemned for not receiving it. 

8. If the atonement is not intended for all mankind, it is impossible 
for us not to regard God as insincere, in making them the offer of salva- 
tion through the atonement. 

9. If the atonement was made only for a part, no man can know 
whether he has a right to embrace it, until by a direct revelation God 
has made known to him that he is one of that part. 

10. If ministers do not believe that it was made for all men, they 
cannot heartily and honestly press its acceptance upon any individual, or 
congregation in the world ; for they cannot assure any individual, or 
congregation, that there is any atonement for him or them, any more 
than there is for Satan. 



276 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

If to this it should be replied, that for fallen angels no atonement 
has been made, but for some men an atonement has been made, so that 
it may be true of any individual that it was made for him, and if he will 
truly believe, he will thereby have the fact revealed, that it was, in 
fact, made for him ; I reply, What is a sinner to believe, as a condition 
of salvation ? Is it merely that an atonement was made for somebody ? 
Is this saving faith ? Must he not embrace it, and personally and indi- 
vidually commit himself to it, and to Christ ? — trust in it as made for 
him ? But how is he authorized to do this upon the supposition that the 
atonement was made for some men only, and perhaps for him ? Is it 
saving faith to believe that it was possibly made for him, and by believ- 
ing this possibility, will he thereby gain the evidence that it was, in 
fact, made for him ? No, he must have the word of God for it, that it 
was made for him. Nothing else can warrant the casting of his soul 
upon it. How then is "he truly to believe," or trust in the atonement, 
until he has the evidence, not merely that it possibly may have been, 
but that it actually was made for him ? The mere possibility that 
an atonement has been made for an individual, is no ground of saving 
faith. What is he to believe ? Why, that of which he has proof. But 
the supposition is, that he has proof only that it is possible that the 
atonement was made for him. He has a right, then, to believe it possi- 
ble that Christ died for him. And is this saving faith ? No, it is not. 
What advantage, then, has he over Satan in this respect. Satan knows 
that the atonement was not made for him ; the sinner upon the supposi- 
tion knows that, possibly, it may have been made for him ; but the latter 
has really no more ground for trust and reliance than the former. He 
might hope, but he could not rationally believe. 

But upon this subject of the extent of the atonement, let the Bible 
speak for itself : " The next day John seeth Jesus coming unto him, and 
saith, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." 
"For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. 
Tor God sent not his Son into the world, to condemn the world : but 
that the world through him might be saved." "And said unto the 
woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying ; for we have heard 
him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour 
of the world."— John i. 29 ; iii. 16, 17 ; iv. 42. '" Therefore, as by the 
offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation ; even 
so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto 
justification of life."— Eom. v. 18. " For the love of Christ constraineth 
us ; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all deed : 
and that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live 
unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again."— 



ATONEMENT 277 

2 Cor. v. 14, 15, "Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in 
due time." "For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because 
we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially 
of those that believe." — 1 Tim. ii. 6 ; iv. 10. "And he is the propitia- 
tion for our sins ; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the 
whole world." — 1 John ii. 2. 

That the atonement is sufficient for all men, and, in that sense, gen- 
eral, as opposed to particular, is also evident from the fact, that the in- 
vitations and promises of the gospel are addressed to all men, and all are 
freely offered salvation through Christ. " Look unto me, and be ye saved, 
all the ends of the earth : for I am God and there is none else." " Ho ! 
every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no 
money ; come ye, buy and eat ; yea, come, buy wine and milk without 
money and without price. Wherefore do ye spend money for that which 
is not bread, and your labor for that which satisfieth not ? Hearken dili- 
gently unto me, and eat ye that which is good, and let your soul delight 
itself in fatness. Incline your ear, and come unto me : hear, and your 
soul shall live ; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even 
the sure mercies of David." — Isa. xlv. 22 ; lv. 1-3. " Come unto me 
all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take 
my yoke upon you, and learn of me ; for I am meek and lowly in heart ; 
and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my bur- 
den is light." "Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them 
which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner ; my oxen and my 
fatlings are killed, and all things are ready ; come unto the marriage." — 
Matt. xi. 28-30 ; xxii. 4. i i And sent his servant at supper time to say 
to them that were bidden, Come, for all things are now ready." — Luke 
xiv. 17. " In the last day, the great day of the feast, Jesus stood and 
cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink." — 
John vii. 37. "Behold, I stand at the door, and knock; if any man 
hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup 
with him, and he with me." "And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. 
And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst 
come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely." — Rev. 
iii. 20 ; xxii. 17. 

Again : I infer that the atonement was made, and is sufficient, for all 
men, from the fact that God not only invites all, but expostulates with 
them for not accepting his invitations. " Wisdom crieth without ; she 
uttereth her voice in the streets : she crieth in the chief place of con- 
course, in the openings of the gates ; in the city she uttereth her words, 
saying, How long ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity ? and the scorn- 
ers delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge ? Turn you at 
my reproof : behold I will pour out my Spirit unto you, I will make 



278 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

known my words unto you." — Prov. i. 20-23. " Come now, and let us 
reason together, saith the Lord : though your sins be as scarlet, they 
shall be white as snow, though they be red like crimson, they shall be as 
wool." — Isaiah i. 18. "Thus saith the Lord, thy Eedeemer, the Holy 
One of Israel, I am the Lord thy God which teacheth thee to profit, 
which leadeth thee by the way that thou shouldest go. Oh that thou 
hadst hearkened to my commandments ! then had thy peace been as 
a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea." — Isaiah xlviii. 
17, 18. " Say unto them, as I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleas- 
ure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his way 
and live ; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye die, 
house of Israel ?" — Ezek. xxxiii. 11. "Hear ye now what the Lord 
saith : Arise, contend thou before the mountains, and let the hills hear 
thy voice. Hear ye, mountains, the Lord's controversy, and ye strong 
foundations of the earth ; for the Lord hath a controversy with his peo- 
ple, and he will plead with Israel. my people, what have I done unto 
thee ? and wherein have I wearied thee ? testify against me." — Micah, 
vi. 1-3. u Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and 
stonest them which are sent unto thee, how. often would I have gathered 
thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her 
wings, and ye would not ! " — Matt, xxiii. 37. 

Again : the same inference is forced upon us by the fact that God 
complains of sinners for rejecting his overtures of mercy : " Because I 
have called, and ye refused ; I have stretched out my hand, and no man 
regarded." — Prov. i. 24. "But they refused to hearken, and pulled away 
the shoulder, and stopped their ears, that they should not hear. Yea, 
they made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the 
law, and the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in his Spirit by 
the former prophets : therefore came a great wrath from the Lord of 
hosts. Therefore it is come to pass ; that as he cried and they would 
not hear : so they cried, and I would not hear, saith the Lord of hosts." 
— Zechariah vii. 11, 12, 13. "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a 
certain king which made a marriage for his son. And sent forth his 
servant to call them that were bidden to the wedding : and they would 
not come. Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which 
are bidden, Behold I have prepared my dinner ; my oxen and my fatlings 
are killed, and all things are ready ; come unto the marriage. But they 
made light of it, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his 
merchandise : and the remnant took his servants, and treated them spite- 
fully, and slew them." — Matthew xxii. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. "And sent his ser- 
vant at supper-time to say to them that were bidden, Come ; for all things 
are now ready. And they all with one consent began to make excuse. 
The first said unto him, I have bought a piece of ground, and I must 



ATONEMENT. 279 

needs go and see it : I pray thee have me excused. And another said, I 
have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to prove them : I pray thee have 
me excused. And another said, I have married a wife ; and therefore 
I cannot come." — Luke xiv. 17, 18, 19, 20. "And ye will not come to 
me, that ye might have life."— John v. 40. "Ye stiff-necked and un- 
circumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost : as 
your fathers did, so do ye." — Acts vii. 51. "And as he reasoned of 
righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled, and 
answered, Go thy way for this time ; when I have a convenient season I 
will call for thee." — Acts xxiv. 25. 

VII. 2" noiu proceed to answer objections. 

1. Objection to the fact of atonement. It is said, that the doctrine 
of atonement represents God as unmerciful. To this I answer, 

(1.) This objection supposes that the atonement was demanded to 
satisfy retributive instead of public justice. 

(2.) The atonement was the exhibition of a merciful disposition. It 
was because God was disposed to pardon that he consented to give his 
own Son to die as the substitute of sinners. 

(3.) The atonement is infinitely the most illustrious exhibition of 
mercy ever made in the universe. The mere pardon of sin, as an act of 
sovereign mercy, could not have been compared, had it been possible, 
with the merciful disposition displayed in the atonement itself. 

2. It is objected that the atonement is unnecessary. 

The testimony of the world and of the consciences of all men are 
against this objection. This is universally attested by their expiatory 
sacrifices. These, as has been said, have been offered by nearly every 
nation of whose religious history we have any reliable account. This 
shows that human beings are universally conscious of being sinners, and 
under the government of a sin-hating God ; that their intelligence de- 
mands either the punishment of sinners, or that a substitute should be 
offered to public justice ; that they all have the idea that substitution is 
conceivable, and hence they offer their sacrifices as expiatory. A heathen 
philosopher can answer this objection, and rebuke the folly of him who 
makes it. 

3. It is objected, that it is unjust to punish an innocent being instead 
of the guilty. 

(1.) Yes, it would not only be unjust, but it is impossible with 
God to punish an innocent moral agent at all. Punishment implies 
guilt. An innocent being may suffer, but he cannot be punished. Christ 
voluntarily " suffered, the just for the unjust." He had a right to exer- 
cise this self-denial ; and as it was by his own voluntary consent, no in- 
justice was done to any one. 



280 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(2. ) If he had no right to make an atonement, he had no right to 
consult and promote his own happiness and the happiness of others ; for 
it is said that " for the joy that was set before him, he endured the cross, 
despising the shame." 

4. It is objected that the doctrine of atonement is utterly incredible. 
To this I have replied in a former lecture ; but will here again state, 

that it would be utterly incredible upon any other supposition, than that 
God is love. But if God is love, as the Bible expressly affirms that he is, 
the work of atonement is just what might be expected of him, under 
the circumstances ; and the doctrine of atonement is then the most rea- 
sonable doctrine in the universe. 

5. It is objected to the doctrine of atonement, that it is of a demoral- 
izing tendency. 

There is a broad distinction between the natural tendency of a 
thing, and such an abuse of a good thing as to make it the instrument of 
evil. The best things and doctrines may be, and often are, abused, and 
their natural tendency perverted. Although the doctrine of the atone- 
ment may be abused, yet its natural tendency is the direct opposite of 
demoralizing. Is the manifestation of infinitely disinterested love natu- 
rally calculated to beget enmity ? Who does not know that the natural 
tendency of manifested love is to excite love in return ? Those who 
have the most cordially believed in the atonement, have exhibited the 
purest morality that has ever been in this world ; while the rejecters of 
the atonement, almost without exception, exhibit a loose morality. This 
is, as might be expected, from the very nature and moral influence of 
atonement. 

6. To a general atonement, it is objected that the Bible represents 
Christ as laying down his life for his sheep, or for the elect only, and not 
for all mankind. 

(1.) It does indeed represent Christ as laying down his life for his 
sheep, and also for all mankind. 1 John ii. 2. — " And he is the propi- 
tiation for our sins ; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the 
whole world." John iii. 17 — " For God sent not his Son into the world 
to condemn the world ; but that the world through him might be 
saved." Heb. ii. 9. — "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower 
than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and 
honor ; that he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man." 

(2.) Those who object to the general atonement, take substantially 
the same course to evade this doctrine, that Unitarians do to set aside 
the doctrine of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. They quote 
those passages that prove the unity of God and the humanity of Christ, 
and then take it for granted that they have disproved the doctrine of 
the Trinity and Christ's Divinity. The asserters of limited atonement, 



ATONEMENT. 281 

in like manner, quote those passages that prove that Christ died for the 
elect and for his saints, and then take it for granted that he died for 
none else. To the Unitarian, we reply, we admit the unity of God and 
the humanity of Christ, and the full meaning of those passages of scrip- 
ture which you quote in proof of these doctrines ; but we insist that this 
is not the whole truth, but that there are still other passages which prove 
the doctrine of the Trinity, and the Divinity of Christ. Just so to the 
asserters of limited atonement, we reply, we believe that Christ laid . 
down his life for his sheep, as well as you ; but we also believe that " he 
tasted death for every man." John iii. 16. — "For God so loved the 
world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever belie veth in---.... 
him should not perish, but have everlasting life." \ 

7. To the doctrine of general atonement it is objected, that it would 
be folly in God to provide what he knew would be rejected ; and that to 
suffer Christ to die for those who, he foresaw, would not repent, would 
be a useless expenditure of the blood and suffering of Christ. 

(1.) This objection assumes that the atonement was a literal payment 
of a debt, which we have seen does not consist with the nature of the 
atonement. 

(2.) If sinners do not accept it, in no view can the atonement be use- 
less, as the great compassion of God, in providing an atonement and 
offering them mercy, will forever exalt his character, in the estimation 
of holy beings, greatly strengthen his government, and therefore benefit 
the whole universe. 

(3.) If all men rejected the atonement, it would, nevertheless, be of 
infinite value to the universe, as the most glorious revelation of God that 
was ever made. 

8. To the general atonement it is objected, that it implies universal 
salvation. 

It would indeed imply this, upon the supposition that the atonement 
is the literal payment of a debt. It was upon this view of the atone- 
ment, that Universalism first took its stand. Universalists taking it for 
granted, that Christ had paid the debt of those for whom he died, and 
finding it fully revealed in the Bible that he died for all mankind, natu- 
rally, and if this were correct, properly, inferred the doctrine of uni- 
versal salvation. But we have seen, that this is not the nature of atone- 
ment. Therefore, this inference falls to the ground. 

9. It is objected that, if the atonement was not a payment of the 
debt of sinners, but general in its nature, as we have maintained, it 
secures the salvation of no one. It is true, that the atonement, of itself, 
does not secure the salvation of any one ; but the promise and oath of 
God, that Christ shall have a seed to serve him, provide that security. 



282 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XXVII. 

REGENERATION. 

In the examination of this subject I will — 

I. Point out the common distinction between regeneration and conver- 
sion. 

1. Regeneration is the term used by some theologians to express the 
divine agency in changing the heart. With them regeneration does not 
include and imply the activity of the subject, but rather -excludes it. 
These theologians, as will be seen in its place, hold that a change of heart 
is first effected by the Holy Spirit while the subject is passive, which 
change lays a foundation for the exercise, by the subject, of repentance, 
faith, and love. 

2. The term conversion with them expresses the activity and taming 
of the subject, after regeneration is effected by the Holy Spirit. Conver- 
sion with them does not include or imply the agency of the Holy Spirit, 
but expresses only the activity of the subject. With them the Holy 
Spirit first regenerates or changes the heart, after which the sinner turns 
or converts himself. So that God and the subject work each in turn. 
God first changes the heart, and as a consequence, the subject afterwards 
converts himself or turns to God. Thus the subject is passive in regen- 
eration, but active in conversion. 

When we come to the examination of the philosophical theories of 
regeneration, we shall see that the views of these theologians respecting 
regeneration result naturally and necessarily from their holding the dog- 
ma of constitutional moral depravity, which we have recently examined. 
Until their views on that subject are corrected, no change can be ex- 
pected in their views of this subject. 

II. The assigned reasons for this distinction. 

1. The original term plainly expresses and implies other than the 
agency of the subject. 

2. We need and must adopt a term that will express the Divine 
agency. 

3. Regeneration is expressly ascribed to the Holy Spirit. 

4. Conversion, as it implies and expresses the activity and turning of 
the subject, does not include and imply any Divine agency, and therefore 
does not imply or express what is intended by regeneration. 

5. As two agencies are actually employed in the regeneration and con- 



REGENERATION. 283 

version of a sinner, it is necessary to adopt terms that will clearly teach this 
fact, and clearly distinguish between the agency of God and of the creature. 
C. The terms regeneration and conversion aptly express this distinc- 
tion, and therefore should be theologically employed. 

III. The objections to this distinction. 

1. The original term yewau, with its derivatives, may be rendered, 
(1.) To beget. (2.) To bear or bring forth. (3.) To be begotten. (4.) 
To be born, or brought forth. 

2. Kegeneration is, in the Bible, the same as the new birth. 

3. To be born again is the same thing, in the Bible use of the term, as 
to have a new heart, to be a new creature, to pass from death unto life. 
In other words, to be born again is to have a new moral character, to be- 
come holy. To regenerate is to make holy. To be born of God, no 
doubt expresses and includes the Divine agency, but it also includes and 
expresses that which the Divine agency is employed in effecting, namely, 
making the sinner holy. Certainly, a sinner is not regenerated whose 
moral character is unchanged. If he were, how could it be truly said, 
that whosoever is born of God overcometh the world, doth not commit 
sin, cannot sin, etc.? If regeneration does not imply and include a 
change of moral character in the subject, how can regeneration be made 
the condition of salvation ? The fact is, the term regeneration, or the 
being born of God, is designed to express primarily and principally the 
thing done, that is, the making of a sinner holy, and expresses also the 
fact, that God's agency induces the change. Throw out the idea of what 
is done, that is, the change of moral character in the subject, and he 
would not be born again, he would not be regenerated, and it could not 
be truly said, in such a case, that God had regenerated him. 

It has been objected, that the term really means and expresses only 
the Divine agency ; and, only by way of implication, embraces the idea 
of a change of moral character and of course of activity in the subject. 
To this I reply — 

(1.) That if it really expresses only the Divine agency, it leaves out of 
view the thing effected by Divine agency. 

(2.) That it really and fully expresses not only the Divine agency, 
but also that which this agency accomplishes. 

(3.) The thing which the agency of God brings about, is a new or 
spiritual birth, a resurrection from spiritual death, the inducing of a new 
and holy life. The thing done is the prominent idea expressed or in- 
tended by the term. 

(4.) The thing done implies the turning or activity of the subject.. 
It is nonsense to affirm that his moral character is changed without any 
activity or agency of his own. Passive holiness is impossible. Holiness- 



284: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

is obedience to the law of God, the law of love, and of course consists in 
the activity of the creature. 

(5.) We have said that regeneration is synonymous, in the Bible, with 
a new heart. But sinners are required to make to themselves a new 
heart, which they could not do, if they were not active in this change. 
If the work is a work of God, in such a sense, that He must first regen- 
erate the heart or soul before the agency of the sinner begins, it were 
absurd and unjust to require him to make to himself a new heart, until 
he is first regenerated. 

Kegeneration is ascribed to man in the gospel, which it could not be, 
if the term were designed to express only the agency of the Holy Spirit. 
" For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not 
many fathers ; for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the 
gospel." — 1 Cor. iv. 15. 

(6.) Conversion is spoken of in the Bible as the. work of another than 
the subject of it, and cannot therefore have been designed to express 
only the activity of the subject of it. 

(i.) It is ascribed to the word of God. — "The law of the Lord is 
perfect, converting the soul : the testimony of the Lord is sure, making 
wise the simple." — Ps. xix. 7. 

(ii.) To man. " Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and 
one convert him ; let him know, that he which converteth the sinner 
from the error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a 
multitude of sins." — James v. 19, 20. 

Both conversion and regeneration are sometimes in the Bible ascribed 
to God, sometimes to man, and sometimes to the subject ; which shows 
clearly that the distinction under examination is arbitrary and theologi- 
cal, rather than biblical. 

The fact is, that both terms imply the simultaneous exercise of both 
human and Divine agency. The fact that a new heart is the thing done, 
demonstrates the activity of the subject ; and the word regeneration^ or 
the expression " born of the Holy Spirit," asserts the Divine agency. 
The same is true of conversion, or the turning of the sinner to God. God 
is said to turn him and he is said to turn himself. God draws him, and 
he follows. In both alike God and man are both active, and their ac- 
tivity is simultaneous. God works or draws, and the sinner yields or 
turns, or which is the same thing, changes his heart, or, in other words, 
is born again. The sinner is dead in trespasses and sins. God calls on 
him, " Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ 
shall give thee light." — Eph. v. 14. God calls ; the sinner hears and 
answers, Here am I. God says, Arise from the dead. The sinner puts 
forth his activity, and God draws him into life ; or rather, God draws, 
and the sinner comes forth to life. 



REGENERATION. 285 

(7.) The distinction set up is not only not recognized in the Bible, but 
is plainly of most injurious tendency, for two reasons : — 

(i.) It assumes and inculcates a false philosophy of depravity and 
regeneration. 

(ii.) It leads the sinner to wait to be regenerated, before lie repents 
or turns to God. It is of most fatal tendency to represent the sinner as 
under a necessity of waiting to be passively regenerated, before he gives 
himself to God. 

As the distinction is not only arbitrary, but anti-scriptural and inju- 
rious, and inasmuch as it is founded in, and is designed to teach a phi- 
losophy false and pernicious on the subject of depravity and regeneration, 
I shall drop and discard the distinction ; and in our investigations 
henceforth, let it be understood, that I use regeneration and conversion 
as synonymous terms. 

IY. What regeneration is not. 

It is not a change in the substance of soul or body. If it were, sin- 
ners could not be required to effect it. Such a change would not consti- 
tute a change of moral character. No such change is needed, as the 
sinner has all the faculties and natural attributes requisite to render 
perfect obedience to God. All he needs is to be induced to use these 
powers and attributes as he ought. The words conversion and regenera- 
tion do not imply any change of substance, but only a change of moral 
state or of moral character. The terms are not used to express a phys- 
ical, but a moral change. Eegeneration does not express or imply the 
creation of any new faculties or attributes of nature, nor any change what- 
ever in the constitution of body or mind. I shall remark further upon 
this point when we come to the examination of the philosophical theories 
of regeneration before alluded to. 

V. What regeneration is. 

It has been said that regeneration and a change of heart are identical. 
It is important to inquire into the scriptural use of the term heart. The 
term, like most others, is used in the Bible in various senses. The heart 
is often spoken of in the Bible, not only as possessing moral character, 
but as being the source of moral action, or as the fountain from which 
good and evil actions flow, and of course as constituting the fountain of 
holiness or of sin, or, in other words still, as comprehending, strictly 
speaking, the whole of moral character. " But those things which pro- 
ceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart ; and they defile the 
man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, 
fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies." — Matt. xv. 18, 19. " 
generation of vipers, how can ye, being evil, speak good things ? for out 



2SG SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of tlie abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of 
the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things : and an evil 
man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things." — Matt. xii. 34, 
35. When the heart is thus represented as possessing moral character, 
and as the fountain of good and evil, it cannot mean, — 

1. The bodily organ that propels the blood. 

2. It cannot mean the substance of the soul or mind itself : substance 
cannot in itself possess moral character. 

3. It is not any faculty or natural attribute. 

4. It cannot consist in any constitutional taste, relish, or appetite, 
for these cannot in themselves have moral character. 

5. It is not the sensibility or feeling faculty of the mind : for we have 
seen, that moral character cannot be predicated of it. It is true, and let 
it be understood, that the term heart is used in the Bible in these senses, 
but not when the heart is spoken of as the fountain of moral action. 
When the heart is represented as possessing moral character, the word 
cannot be meant to designate any involuntary state of mind. For neither 
the substance of soul or body, nor any involuntary state of mind can, by 
any possibility, possess moral character in itself. The very idea of moral 
character implies, and suggests the idea of, a free action or intention. 
To deny this, were to deny a first truth. 

6. The term heart, when applied to mind, is figurative, and means 
something in the mind that has some point of resemblance to the bodily 
organ of that name, and a consideration of the function of the bodily 
organ will suggest the true idea of the heart of the mind. The heart of 
the body propels the vital current, and sustains organic life. It is the 
fountain from which the vital fluid flows, from which either life or death 
may flow, according to the state of the blood. The mind as well as the 
body has a heart which, as we have seen, is represented as a fountain, or 
as an efficient propelling influence, out of which flows good or evil, ac- 
cording as the heart is good or evil. This heart is represented, not only 
as the source or fountain of good and evil, but as being either good or 
evil in itself, as constituting the character of man, and not merely as be- 
ing capable of moral character. 

It is also represented as something over which we have control, for 
which we are responsible, and which, in case it is wicked, we are bound 
to change on pain of death. Again : the heart, in the sense in which 
we are considering it, is that, the radical change of which constitutes a 
radical change of moral character. This is plain from Matthew xii. 34, 
35, and xv. 18, 19, already considered. 

7. Our own consciousness, then, must inform us that the heart of the 
mind that possesses these characteristics, can be nothing else than the 
supreme ultimate intention of the soul. Eegeneration is represented in 



REGENERATION. 2S7 

the Bible as constituting a radical change of character, as the resurrection 
from a death in sin, as the beginning of a new and spiritual life, as con- 
stituting a new creature, as a new creation, not a physical, but a moral 
or spiritual creation, as conversion, or turning to God, as giving God the 
heart, as loving God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. 
Now we have seen abundantly, that moral character belongs to, or is an 
attribute of, the ultimate choice or intention of the soul. 

Regeneration then is a radical change of the ultimate intention, and, 
of course, of the end or object of life. We have seen, that the choice of 
an end is efficient in producing executive volitions, or the use of means 
to obtain its end. A selfish ultimate choice is, therefore, a wicked heart, 
out of which flows every evil ; and a benevolent ultimate choice is a good 
heart, out of which flows every good and commendable deed. 

Regeneration, to have the characteristics ascribed to it in the Bible, 
must consist in a change in the attitude of the will, or a change in its 
ultimate choice, intention, or preference ; a change from selfishness to 
benevolence ; from choosing self -gratification as the supreme and ulti- 
mate end of life, to the supreme and ultimate choice of the highest well- 
being of God and of the universe ; from a state of entire consecration to 
self-interest, self-indulgence, self-gratification for its own sake or as an 
end, and as the supreme end of life, to a state of entire consecration to 
God, and to the interests of his kingdom as the supreme and ultimate 
end of life. 

VI. The universal necessity of regeneration. 

1. The necessity of regeneration as a condition of salvation must be 
co-extensive with moral depravity. This has been shown to be universal 
among the un regenerate moral agents of our race. It surely is impossi- 
ble, that a world or a universe of unholy or selfish beings should be happy. 
It is impossible that heaven should be made up of selfish beings. It is 
intuitively certain that without benevolence or holiness no moral being 
can be ultimately happy. "Without regeneration, a selfish soul can by no 
possibility be fitted either for the employments, or for the enjoyments, 
of heaven. 

2. The scriptures expressly teach the universal necessity of regenera- 
tion. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto 
thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." 
— John iii. 3. "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any 
thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." — Gal. vi. 15. 

VII. Agencies employed in regeneration. 

1. The scriptures often ascribe regeneration to the Spirit of God. 
" Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born 



288 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. 
That which is born of the flesh is flesh ; and that which is born of the 
Spirit is spirit." — John iii. 5, 6. " AVhich were born, not of blood, nor 
of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." — John i. 15. 

2. We have seen that the subject is active in regeneration, that 
regeneration consists in the sinner changing his ultimate choice, inten- 
tion, preference ; or in changing from selfishness to love or benevolence ; 
or, in other words, in turning from the supreme choice of self -gratifica- 
tion, to the supreme love of God and the equal love of his neighbor. 
Of course the subject of regeneration must be an agent in the work. 

3. There are generally other agents, one or more human beings 
concerned in persuading the sinner to turn. The Bible recognizes both 
the subject and the preacher as agents in the work. Thus Paul says : 
" I have begotten you through the gospel." Here the same word is used 
which is used in another case, where regeneration is ascribed to God. 

Again : an apostle says, " Ye have purified your souls by obeying 
the truth." Here the work is ascribed to the subject. There are then 
always two, and generally more than two agents employed in effecting 
the work. Several theologians have held that regeneration is the work 
of the Holy Spirit alone. In proof of this they cite those passages that 
ascribe it to God. But I might just as lawfully insist that it is the work 
of man alone, and quote those passages that ascribe it to man, to substan- 
tiate my position. Or I might assert that it is alone the work of the 
subject, and in proof of this position quote those passages that ascribe it 
to the subject. Or again, I might assert that it is effected by the truth 
alone, and quote such passages as the following to substantiate my posi- 
tion : " Of his own will begat He us with the word of truth, that we 
should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures." — James i. 18. " Being 
born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible by the word of 
God, which liveth and abideth forever." — 1 Peter i.' 23. 

It has been common to regard the third person as a mere instrument 
in the work. But the fact is, he is a willing, designing, responsible 
agent, as really so as God or the subject is. 

If it be inquired how the Bible can consistently ascribe regeneration 
at one time to God, at another to the subject, at another to the truth, at 
another to a third person ; the answer is to be sought in the nature 
of the work. The work accomplished is a change of choice, in respect to 
an end or the end of life. The sinner whose choice is changed, must of 
course act. The end to be chosen must be clearly and forcibly presented ; 
this is the work of the third person, and of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit 
takes of the things of Christ and shows them to the soul. The truth is 
-employed, or it is truth which must necessarily be employed, as an instru- 
ment to induce a change of choice. 



REGENERATION. 289 

VIII. Instrumentalities employed in the work. 

1. Truth. This must, from the nature of regeneration, be employed 
in effecting it, for regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly 
influenced by truth. 

2. There may be, and often are, many providences concerned in en- 
lightening the mind, and in inducing regeneration. These are instrumen- 
talities. They are means or instruments of presenting the truth. Mercies, 
judgments, men, measures, and in short all those things that conduce 
to enlightening the mind, are instrumentalities employed in effecting it. 

Those who hold to physical or constitutional moral depravity must 
hold, of course, to constitutional regeneration ; and, of course, consist- 
ency compels them to maintain that there is but one agent employed in 
regeneration, and that is the Holy Spirit, and that no instrument what- 
ever is employed, because the work is, according to them, an act of 
creative power ; that the very nature is changed, and of course no instru- 
ment can be employed, any more than in the creation of the world. 
These theologians have affirmed, over and over again, that regeneration 
is a miracle ; that there is no tendency whatever in the gospel, however 
presented, and whether presented by God or man, to regenerate the 
heart. Dr. Griffin, in his Park Street Lectures, maintains that the 
gospel, in its natural and necessary tendency, creates and perpetuates 
only opposition to, and hatred of God, until the heart is changed by the 
Holy Spirit. He understands the carnal mind to be not a voluntary 
state, not a minding of the flesh, but the very nature and constitution of 
the mind ; and that enmity against God is a part, attribute, or appetite 
of the nature itself. Consequently, he must deny the adaptability of the 
gospel to regenerate the soul. It has been proclaimed by this class 
of theologians, times without number, that there is no philosophical 
connection between the preaching of the gospel and the regeneration 
of sinners, no adaptedness in the gospel to produce that result ; but, on 
the contrary, that it is adapted to produce an opposite result. The 
favorite illustrations of their views have been EzekiePs prophesying over 
the dry bones, and Christ's restoring sight to the blind man by putting 
clay on his eyes. Ezekiel's prophesying over the dry bones had no 
tendency to quicken them, they say. And the clay used by the Saviour 
was calculated rather to destroy than to restore sight. This shows how 
easy it is for men to adopt a pernicious and absurd philosophy, and then 
to find, or think they find, it supported by the Bible. What must 
be the effect of inculcating the dogma, that the gospel has nothing 
to do with regenerating the sinner ? Instead of telling him that regen- 
eration is nothing else than his embracing the gospel, to tell him that he 
must wait, and first have his constitution recreated before he can possi- 



290 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

bly do anything but oppose God ! This is to tell him the greatest and 
most abominable and ruinous of falsehoods. It is to mock his intelli- 
gence. What ! call on him, on pain of eternal death, to believe ; to 
embrace the gospel ; to love God with all his heart, and at the same 
time represent him as entirely helpless, and constitutionally the enemy 
of God and of the gospel, and as being under the necessity of waiting for 
God to regenerate his nature, before it is possible for him to do otherwise 
than to hate God with all his heart ! 

IX. In regeneration the subject is doth passive and active, 

1. That he is active is plain from what has been said, and from the 
very nature of the change. 

2. That he is, at the same time, passive, is plain from the fact that 
he acts only when and as he is acted upon. That is he is passive in the 
perception of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit. I know that this 
perception is no part of regeneration. But it is simultaneous with re- 
generation. It induces regeneration. It is the condition and the occa- 
sion of regeneration. Therefore the subject of regeneration must be a 
passive recipient or percipient of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit, 
at the moment, and during the act of regeneration. The Spirit acts 
upon him through or by the truth : thus far he is passive. He closes 
with the truth : thus far he is active. What a mistake those theologians 
have fallen into who represent the subject as altogether passive in regen- 
eration ! This rids the sinner at once of the conviction of any duty or 
responsibility about it. It is wonderful that such an absurdity should 
have been so long maintained in the church. But while it is maintained, 
it is no wonder that sinners are not converted to God. While the sinner 
believes this, it is impossible, if he has it in mind, that he should be re- 
generated. He stands and waits for God to do what God requires him 
to do, and which no one can do for him. Neither God, nor any other 
being, can regenerate him, if he will not turn. If he will not change 
his choice, it is impossible that it should be changed. Sinners who have 
been taught thus and have believed what they have been taught, would 
never have been regenerated had not the Holy Spirit drawn off their at- 
tention from this error, and ere they were aware, induced them to close in 
with the offer of life. 

X. What is implied in regeneration. 

1. The nature of the change shows that it must be instantaneous. It 
is a change of choice, or of intention. This must be instantaneous. The 
preparatory work of conviction and enlightening the mind may have been 
gradual and progressive. But when regeneration occurs, it must be in- 
stantaneous. 



THEORIES OF REGENERATION. 291 

2. It implies an entire present change of moral character, that is, a 
change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness. We have seen that it 
consists in a change from selfishness to benevolence. We have also seen 
that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist in the same mind ; that 
selfishness is a state of supreme and entire consecration to self; that be- 
nevolence is a state of entire and supreme consecration to God and the 
good of the universe. Eegeueration, then, surely implies an entire 
change of moral character. 

Again : the Bible represents regeneration as a dying to sin and be- 
coming alive to God. Death in sin is total depravity. This is generally 
admitted. Death to sin and becoming alive to God, must imply entire 
present holiness. 

3. The scriptures represent regeneration as the condition of salvation 
in such a sense, that if the subject should die immediately after regen- 
eration, and without any further change, he would go immediately to 
heaven. 

Again : the scriptures require only perseverance in the first love, as 
the condition of salvation, in case the regenerate soul should live long in 
the world subsequently to regeneration. 

4. When the scriptures require us to grow in grace, and in the 
knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, this does not imply that there is yet 
sin remaining in the regenerate heart which we are required to put away 
by degrees. But the spirit of the requirement must be, that we should 
acquire as much knowledge as we can of our moral relations, and continue 
to conform to all truth as fast as we know it. This, and nothing else, is 
implied in abiding in our first love, or abiding in Christ, living and walk- 
ing in the Spirit. 



LECTURE XXVIII. 

REGENERATION. 



XL Philosophical theories of regeneration. 

The principal theories that have been advocated, so far as my knowl- 
edge extends, are the following : — 

1. The taste scheme. 2. The divine efficiency scheme. 3. The sus- 
ceptibility scheme. 4. The divine moral suasion scheme. 

1. The taste scheme. 

This theory is based upon that view of mental philosophy which re- 
gards the mental heart as identical with the sensibility. Moral deprav- 



292 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ity, according to this school, consists in a constitutional relish, taste, or 
craving for sin. They hold the doctrine of original sin — of a sinful na- 
ture or constitution, as was shown in my lectures on moral depravity. 
The heart of the mind, in the estimation of this school, is not identical 
with choice or intention. They hold that it does not consist in any vol- 
untary state of mind, but that it lies back of, and controls voluntary ac- 
tion, or the actions of the will. The wicked heart, according to them, 
consists in an appetency or constitutional taste for sin, and with them, 
the appetites, passions, and propensities of human nature in its fallen 
state, are in themselves sinful. They often illustrate their ideas of the 
sinful taste, craving, or appetite for sin, by reference to the craving of 
carnivorous animals for flesh. 

A change of heart, in the view of this philosophy, must consist in a 
change of constitution. It must be a physical change, and wrought by a 
physical, as distinguished from a moral agency. It is a change wrought 
by the direct and physical power of the Holy Spirit in the constitution 
of the soul, changing its susceptibilities, implanting or creating a new 
taste, relish, appetite, craving for, or love of, holiness. It is, as they ex- 
press it, the implantation of a new principle of holiness. It is described 
as a creation of a new taste or principle, as an infusion of a holy princi- 
ple, etc. This scheme, of course, holds and teaches that, in regeneration, 
the subject is entirely passive. With this school, regeneration is exclu- 
sively the work of the Holy Spirit, the subject having no agency in it. 
It is an operation performed upon him, may be, while he is asleep, or in 
a fit of derangement, while he is entirely passive, or perhaps when at the 
moment he is engaged in flagrant rebellion against God. The agency by 
which this work is wrought, according to them, is sovereign, irresistible, 
and creative. They hold that there are of course no means of regenera- 
tion, as it is a direct act of creation. They hold the distinction already 
referred to and examined, between regeneration and conversion ; that 
when the Holy Spirit has performed the sovereign operation and im- 
planted the new principle, then the subject is active in conversion, or in 
turning to God. 

They hold that the soul, in its very nature, is enmity against God ; 
that therefore the gospel has no tendency to regenerate or convert the 
soul to God ; but, on the contrary, that previous to regeneration by the 
sovereign and physical agency of the Holy Spirit, every exhibition of God 
made in the gospel, tends only to inflame and provoke this constitutional 
enmity. 

They hold, that when the sinful taste, relish, or craving for sin is 
weakened, for they deny that it is ever wholly destroyed in this life, or 
while the soul continues connected with the body, and a holy taste, relish, 
or craving is implanted or infused by the Holy Spirit into the constitu- 



THEORIES OF REGENERATION. 293 

tion of the soul, then, and not till then, the gospel has a tendency to turn 
or convert the sinner from the error of his ways. 

As I have said, their philosophy of moral depravity is the basis of 
their philosophy of regeneration. It assumes the dogma of original sin, 
as taught in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, and attempts to har- 
monize the philosophy of regeneration with that philosophy of sin, or 
moral depravity. 

Upon this scheme or theory of regeneration, I remark, — 

(1.) That it has been sufficiently refuted in the lectures on moral de- 
pravity. If, as was then shown, moral depravity is altogether voluntary, 
and consists in selfishness, or in a voluntary state of mind, this philoso- 
phy of regeneration is of course without foundation. 

(2.) It was shown in the lectures on moral depravity, that sin is not 
chosen for its own sake, — that there is no constitutional relish, taste, or 
craving for sin, — that in sinful choice, sin is not the end or object 
chosen, but that self -gratification is chosen, and that this choice is sin- 
ful. If this is so, then the whole philosophy of the taste scheme turns 
out to be utterly baseless. 

The taste, relish, or craving, of which this philosophy speaks, is not 
a taste, relish or craving for sin, but for certain things and objects, 
the enjoyment of which is, to a certain extent, and upon certain condi- 
tions, lawful. But when the will prefers the gratification of taste or ap- 
petite to higher interests, this choice or act of will is sin. The sin never 
lies in the appetite, but in the will's consent to unlawful indulgence. 

(3.) This philosophy confounds appetite or temptation to unlawful 
indulgence, with sin. Nay, it represents sin as consisting mostly, if not 
altogether, in that which is only temptation. 

(4.) It throws the blame of unregeneracy upon God. If the sinner is 
passive, and has no agency in it ; if it consists in what this philosophy 
teaches, and is accomplished in the manner which this theory represents, 
it is self-evident that God alone is responsible for the fact, that any sin- 
ner is unregenerate. 

(5.) It renders holiness after regeneration physically necessary, just 
as sin was before, and perseverance also as physically necessary, and fall- 
ing from grace as a natural impossibility. In this case holy exercises and 
living are only the gratification of a constitutional appetite, implanted in 
regeneration. 

Let us consider next, — 

2. The divine efficiency scheme or theory. 

This scheme is based upon, or rather is only a carrying out of, an an- 
cient heathen philosophy, bearing the same name. This ancient philoso- 
phy denies second causes, and teaches that what we call laws of nature 
are nothing else than the mode of divine operation. It denies that the 



29J: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

universe would even exist for a moment, if the divine upholding were 
withdrawn. It maintains that the universe exists only by an act of pres- 
ent and perpetual creation. It denies that matter, or mind, has in itself 
any inherent properties that can originate laws or motions ; that all ac- 
tion, whether of matter or mind, is the necessary result of direct divine 
irresistible efficiency or power ; that this is not only true of the natural 
universe, but also of all the exercises and actions of moral agents in all 
worlds. 

The abettors of the divine efficiency scheme of regeneration apply 
this philosophy especially to moral agents. They hold, that all the 
exercises and actions of moral agents in all worlds, and whether those 
exercises be holy or sinful, are produced by a divine efficiency, or by a 
direct act of Omnipotence ; that holy and sinful acts are alike effects of 
an irresistible cause, and that this cause is the power and agency, or 
efficiency, of God. 

This philosophy denies constitutional moral depravity, or original sin, 
and maintains that moral character belongs alone to the exercises or 
choices of the will ; that regeneration does not consist in the creation of 
any new taste, relish, or craving, nor in the implantation or infusion of 
any new principles in the soul : but that it consists in a choice conformed 
to the law of God, or in a change from selfishness to disinterested benev- 
olence ; that this change is effected by a direct act of divine power or 
efficiency, as irresistible as any creative act whatever. This philosophy 
teaches, that the moral character of every moral agent, whether holy or 
sinful, is formed by an agency as direct, as sovereign, and as irresistible, 
as that which first gave existence to the universe ; that true submission 
to God implies the hearty consent of the will to have the character thus 
formed, and then to be treated accordingly, for the glory of God. 

To this theory I make the following objections : — 

(1.) It tends to produce and perpetuate a sense of divine injustice. 
To create a character by an agency as direct and irresistible as that of 
the creation of the world itself, and then treat moral beings according to 
that character so formed, is wholly inconsistent with all our ideas of 
justice. 

(2.) It contradicts human consciousness. I know it is said, that con- 
sciousness only gives our mental actions and states, but not the cause of 
them. This I deny, and affirm that consciousness not only gives us our 
mental actions and states, but it also gives us the cause of them ; espe- 
cially it gives the fact, that we ourselves are the sovereign and efficient 
causes of the choices and actions of our will. I am as conscious of origi- 
nating in a sovereign manner my choices, as I am of the choices them- 
selves. We cannot but affirm to ourselves, that we are the efficient 
causes of our own choices and volitions. 



THEORIES OF REGENERATION. 295 

(3.) The philosophy in question, really represents God as the only 
agent, in any proper sense of that term, in the universe. If God pro- 
duces the exercises of moral beings in the manner represented by this 
philosophy, then they are in fact no more agents than the planets are 
agents. If their exercises are all directly produced by the power of God, 
it is ridiculous to call them agents. What we generally call moral beings 
and moral agents, are no more so than the winds and the waves, or any 
other substance or thing in the universe. 

(4.) If this theory be true, no being but God has, or can have, moral 
character. No other being is the author of his own actions. 

(5.) This theory obliges its advocates, together with all other necessita- 
rians, to give a false and nonsensical definition of free agency. Free 
agency, according to them, consists in doing as we will, while their 
theory denies the power to will, except as our willings are necessitated by 
God. But as we have seen in former lectures, this is no true account of 
freedom, or liberty. Liberty to execute my choices is no liberty at all. 
Choice is connected with its sequents by a law of necessity ; and if an 
effect follow my volitions, that effect follows by necessity, and not freely. 
All freedom of will must, as was formerly shown, consist in the sovereign 
power to originate our own choices. If I am unable to will, I am unable 
to do any thing ; and it is absurd to affirm, that a being is a moral or a 
free agent, who has not power to originate his own choices. 

(6.) If this theory is true, the whole moral government of God is no 
government at all, distinct from, and superior to, physical government. 
It overlooks and virtually denies the fundamentally important distinc- 
tion between moral and physical power, and moral and physical govern- 
ment. All power and all government, upon this theory, are physical. 

(7.) This theory involves the delusion of all moral beings. God not 
only creates our volitions, but also creates the persuasion and affirmation 
that we are responsible for them. 

3. The susceptibility scheme. 

This theory represents, that the Holy Spirit's influences are both physi- 
cal and moral ; that he, by a direct and physical influence, excites the 
susceptibilities of the soul and prepares them to be affected by the truth ; 
that he, thereupon, exerts a moral or persuasive influence by presenting 
the truth, which moral influence induces regeneration. 

This philosophy maintains the necessity and the fact of a physical in- 
fluence superadded to the moral or persuasive influence of the Holy Spirit 
as a sine qua non of regeneration. It admits and maintains, that regen- 
eration is effected solely by a moral influence, but also that a work pre- 
paratory to the efficiency of the moral influence, and indispensable to its 
efficiency, in producing regeneration, is performed by a direct and physi- 
cal agency of the Holy Spirit upon the constitutional susceptibilities of 



296 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the soul, to quicken and wake it up, and predispose it to be deeply and 
duly affected by the truth. 

It is maintained by the defenders of this scheme, that the representa- 
tions of the Bible upon the subject of the Holy Spirit's agency in regen- 
eration, are such as to forbid the supposition, that his influence is alto- 
gether moral or persuasive, and such as plainly to indicate that he also 
exerts a physical agency, in preparing the mind to be duly affected by 
the truth. 

In reply to this argument, I observe, — that I fear greatly to dispar- 
age the agency of the Holy Spirit in the work of man ? s redemption from 
sin, and would, by no means, resist or deny, or so much as call in ques- 
tion, any thing that is plainly taught or implied in the Bible upon this 
subject. I admit and maintain that regeneration is always induced and 
effected by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit. The question now 
before us relates wholly to the mode, and not at all to the fact, of divine 
agency in regeneration. Let this be distinctly understood, for it has 
been common for theologians of the old school, as soon as the dogma of a 
physical regeneration, and of a physical influence in regeneration, has 
been called in question, to cry out and insist that this is Pelagianism, and 
that it is a denial of divine influence altogether, and that it is teaching 
a self-regeneration, independent of any divine influence. I have been 
ashamed of such representations as these on the part of Christian divines, 
and have been distressed by their want of candor. It should, however, 
be distinctly stated that, so far as I know, the defenders of the theory 
now under consideration have never manifested this want of candor to- 
ward those who have called in question that part of their theory that re- 
lates to a physical influence. 

Since the advocates of this theory admit that the Bible teaches that 
regeneration is induced by a divine moral suasion, the point of debate is 
simply, whether the Bible teaches that there is also a physical influence 
exerted by the Holy Spirit, in exciting the constitutional susceptibilities. 
We will now attend to their proof texts. " Then opened he their under- 
standing, that they might understand the scriptures." — Luke xxiv. 45. 
It is affirmed, that this text seems to teach or imply a physical influence in 
opening their understandings. But what do we mean by such language as 
this in common life ? Language is to be understood according to the sub- 
ject- matter of discourse. Here the subject of discourse is the understand- 
ing. But what can be intended by opening it ? Can this be a physical 
prying, pulling, or forcing open any department of the constitution ? 
Such language in common life would be understood only to mean, that 
such instruction was imparted as to secure a right understanding of the 
scriptures. Every one knows this, and why should we suppose and 
assume that anything more is intended here ? The context plainly 



THEORIES OF REGENERATION". 297 

indicates that this was the thing, and the only thing done in this case. 
"Then he said unto them, fools, and slow of heart to believe all that 
the prophets have spoken ! Ought not Christ to have suffered these 
things, and to enter into his glory ? And beginning at Moses and all 
the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things 
concerning himself. — And said unto them, thus it is written, and thus 
it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day." — 
Luke xxiv. 25-27, 46. From these verses it appears that he expounded 
the scriptures to them, when in the light of what had passed, and in 
the light of that measure of divine illumination which was then imparted 
to them, they understood the things which he explained to them. It 
does not seem to me, that this passage warrants the inference that there 
was a physical influence exerted. It certainly affirms no such thing. 
"And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of 
Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us ; whose heart the Lord 
opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul." 
— Acts xvi. 14. Here is an expression similar to that just examined. 
Here it is said, "that the Lord opened the heart of Lydia, so that she 
attended," etc. ; that is, the Lord inclined her to attend. But how ? 
Why, say the advocates of this scheme, by a physical influence. But 
how does this appear ? What is her heart that it should be pulled, 
or forced open ? and what can be intended by the assertion, " that 
the Lord opened her heart ? " All that can be meant is, that the Lord 
secured her attention, or disposed her to attend, and so enlightened her 
when she did attend, that she believed. Surely here is no assertion 
of a physical influence, nor, so far as I can see, any just ground for the 
inference, that such an influence was exerted. A moral influence can 
sufficiently explain all the phenomena ; and any text that can equally well 
consist with either of two opposing theories, can prove neither. 

Again : there are many passages that represent God as opening the 
spiritual eyes, and passages in which petitions are offered to God to do 
this. It is by this theory assumed that such passages strongly imply 
a physical influence. But this assumption appears to me unwarranta- 
ble. We are in the habit of using just such language, and speak of 
opening each other's eyes, when no such thing is intended or implied, as 
a physical influence, and when nothing more than a moral or persuasive 
influence is so much as thought of. Why then resort to such an assump- 
tion here ? Does the nature of the case demand it ? This I know 
is contended for by those who maintain a constitutional moral depravity. 
But this dogma has been shown to be false, and it is admitted to be so by 
those who maintain the theory now under consideration. Admitting, 
then, that the constitution is not morally depraved, should it be inferred 
that any constitutional change, or physical influence is needed to produce 



298 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

regeneration ? I can see no sufficient reason for believing, or affirming, 
that a physical influence is demanded or exerted. This much I freely 
admit, that we cannot affirm the impossibility of such an influence, nor 
the impossibility of the necessity of such an influence. The only ques- 
tion with me is, does the Bible plainly teach or imply such an influence ? 
Hitherto I have been unable to see that it does. The passages already 
quoted are of a piece with all that are relied upon in support of this 
theory, and as the same answer is a sufficient reply to them all, I will 
not spend time in citing and remarking upon them. 

Again : a physical influence has been inferred from the fact, that 
sinners are represented as dead in trespasses and sins, as asleep, etc. etc. 
But all such representations are only declaratory of a moral state, a state 
of voluntary alienation from G-od. If the death is moral, and the sleep 
moral, why suppose that a physical influence is needed to correct a moral 
evil ? Cannot truth, when urged and pressed by the Holy Spirit, effect 
the requisite change ? 

But a physical influence is also inferred from the fact, that truth 
makes so different an impression at one time from what it does at 
another. Answer : this can well enough be accounted for by the fact, 
that sometimes the Holy Spirit so presents the truth, that the mind 
apprehends it and feels its power, whereas at another time he does not. 

But it is said, that there sometimes appears to have been a prepara- 
tory work performed by a physical influence pre-disposing the mind 
to attend to, and be affected by, the truth. Answer : there often is no 
doubt a preparatory work pre-disposing the mind to attend to, and be 
affected by, truth. But why assume that this is a physical influence ? 
Providential occurrences may have had much to do with it. The Holy 
Spirit may have been directing the thoughts and communicating instruc- 
tions in various ways, and preparing the mind to attend and obey. Who 
then is warranted in the affirmation that this preparatory influence 
is physical ? I admit that it may be, but I cannot see either that it 
must be, or that there is any good ground for the assumption that it is. 

4. The last theory to be examined is that of a Divine Moral Suasion. 

This theory teaches — 

(1.) That regeneration consists in a change in the ultimate intention 
or preference of the mind, or in a change from selfishness to disinterested 
benevolence ; and — 

(2.) That this change is induced and effected by a divine moral in- 
fluence ; that is, that the Holy Spirit effects it with, through, or by the 
truth. The advocates of this theory assign the following as the principal 
reasons in support of it. 

(1.) The Bible expressly affirms it; "Jesus answered, Verily, verily, 
I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he 



THEORIES OF REGENERATION. 21)1) 

cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh 
is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." — John iii. 5, G. 
"Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the 
word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever." — 1 Pet. i. 23. "Of 
his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind 
of first-fruits of his creatures." — James i. 18. " For though ye have ten 
thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers : for in 
Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel." — 1 Cor. iv. 15. 

(2.) Men are represented as being sanctified by and through the 
truth. " Sanctify them through thy truth : thy word is truth." — John 
xvii. 17. " Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken 
unto you." — John xv. 3. 

(3.) The nature of regeneration decides the philosophy of it so far as 
this, that it must be effected by truth, addressed to the heart through the 
intelligence. The regenerate are conscious of having been influenced by 
the truth in turning to God. They are conscious of no other influence 
than light poured upon the intelligence, or truth presented to the mind. 

When God affirms that he regenerates the soul with or by the truth, 
we have no right to infer that he does it in some other way. This he 
does affirm ; therefore the Bible has settled the philosophy of regenera- 
tion. That he exerts any other than a moral influence, or the influence 
of divine teaching and illumination, is sheer assumption. 

ItEMAKKS. 

1. This scheme honors the Holy Spirit without disparaging the truth 
of God. 

2. Eegeneration by the Holy Spirit through the truth illustrates the 
wisdom of God. There is a deep and divine philosophy in regeneration. 

3. This theory is of great practical importance. For if sinners are to 
be regenerated by the influence of truth, argument, and persuasion, then 
ministers can see what they have to do, and how it is that they are to be 
" workers together with God." 

4. So also sinners may see, that they are not to wait for a physical 
regeneration or influence, but must submit to, and embrace, the truth, if 
they ever expect to be saved. 

5. If this theory is true, sinners are most likely to be regenerated 
while sitting under the sound of the gospel, while listening to the clear 
exhibition of truth. 

6. Ministers should lay themselves out, and press every consideration 
upon the attention of sinners, just as heartily and as freely, as if they 
expected to convert them themselves. They should aim at, and expect 
the regeneration of sinners, upon the spot, and before they leave the' 
house of God. 



300 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

7. Sinners must not wait for and expect physical omnipotence to re- 
generate them. The physical omnipotence of God affords no presump- 
tion that all men will be converted ; for regeneration is not effected by 
physical power. God cannot do the sinner's duty, and regenerate him 
without the right exercise of the sinner's own agency. 

8. This view of regeneration shows that the sinner's dependence upon 
the Holy Spirit arises entirely not of his own voluntary stubbornness, 
and that his guilt is all the greater, by how much the more perfect this 
kind of dependence is. 

9. Physical regeneration, under every modification of it, is a stum- 
bling-block. Original or constitutional sinfulness, physical regeneration, 
and all their kindred and resulting dogmas, are alike subversive of the 
gospel, and repulsive to the human intelligence ; and should be laid 
aside as relics of a most unreasonable and confused philosophy. 



LECTURE XXIX. 

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 

I. Introductory remarks, 

1. In ascertaining what are, and what are not, evidences of regenera- 
tion, we must constantly keep in mind what is not, and what is regenera- 
tion ; what is not, and what is implied in it. 

2. We must constantly recognize the fact, that saints and sinners 
have precisely similar constitutions and constitutional susceptibilities, 
and therefore that many things are common to both. What is common 
to both cannot, of course, be an evidence of regeneration. 

3. That no state of the sensibility has any moral character in itself. 
That regeneration does not consist in, or imply, any physical change 
whatever, either of the iutellect, sensibility, or the faculty of will. 

4. That the sensibility of the sinner is susceptible of every kind and 
degree of feeling that is possible to saints. 

5. The same is true of the consciences of both saints and sinners, and 
of the intelligence generally. 

6. The inquiry is, "What are evidences of a change in the ultimate 
intention ? What is evidence that benevolence is the ruling choice, 
preference, intention of the soul ? It is a plain question, and demands, 
and may have, a plain answer. But so much error prevails as to the 
nature of regeneration, and, consequently, as to what are evidences of 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 301 

regeneration, that we need patience, discrimination, and perseverance, 
and withal candor, to get at the truth upon this subject. 

II. WJierein the experience and outward life of saints and sinners may 
agree. 

It is plain that they may be alike, in whatever does not consist in," or 
necessarily proceed from, the attitude of their will ; that is, in whatever 
is constitutional or involuntary. For example :— 

1. They may both desire their own happiness. This desire is consti- 
tutional, and, of course, common to both saints and sinners. 

2. They may both desire the happiness of others. This also is con- 
stitutional, and of course common to both saints and sinners. There is 
no moral character in these desires, any more than there is in the desire 
for food and drink. That men have a natural desire for the happiness 
of others, is evident from the fact that they manifest pleasure when 
others are happy, unless they have some selfish reason for envy, or unless 
the happiness of others is in some way inconsistent with their own. 
They also manifest uneasiness and pain when they see others in misery, 
unless they have some selfish reason for desiring their misery. 

3. Saints and sinners may alike dread their own misery, and the 
misery of others. This is strictly constitutional, and has therefore no 
moral character. I have known that very wicked men, and men who had 
been infidels, when they were convinced of the truths of Christianity, 
manifested great concern about their families and about their neigh- 
bors ; and, in one instance, I heard of an aged man of this description 
who, when convinced of the truth, went and warned his neighbors to flee 
from the wrath to come, avowing at the same time his conviction, that 
there was no mercy for him, though he felt deeply concerned for others. 
Such like cases have repeatedly been witnessed. The case of the rich 
man in hell seems to have been one of this description, or to have illus- 
trated the same truth. Although he knew his own case to be hopeless, 
yet he desired that Lazarus should be sent to warn his five brethren, lest 
they also should come to that place of torment. In this case and in the 
case of the aged man just named, it appears that they not only desired 
that others should avoid misery, but they actually tried to prevent it, 
and used the means that were within their reach to save them. Now it 
is plain that this desire took control of their will, and, of course, the 
state of the will was selfish. It sought to gratify desire. It was the pain 
and dread of seeing their misery, and of having them miserable, that led 
them to use means to prevent it. This was not benevolence, but self- 
ishness. 

Let it be understood, then, that as both saints and sinners constitu- 
tionally desire, not only their own happiness, but also the happiness of 



302 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

others, they may alike rejoice in the happiness and safety of others, 
and in converts to Christianity, and may alike grieve at the danger and 
misery of those who are unconverted. I well recollect, when far from 
home, and while an impenitent sinner, I received a letter from my young- 
est brother, informing me that he was converted to God. He, if he was 
converted, was, as I supposed, the first and the only member of the family 
who then had a hope of salvation. I was at the time, and both before 
and after, one of the most careless sinners, and yet on receiving this in- 
telligence, I actually wept for joy and gratitude, that one of so prayer- 
less a family was likely to be saved. Indeed, I have repeatedly known 
sinners to manifest much interest in the conversion of their friends, 
and express gratitude for their conversion, although they had no religion 
themselves. These desires have no moral character in themselves. In 
as far as they control the will, the will yielding to impulse instead of 
the law of the intelligence, this is selfishness. 

4. They may agree in desiring the triumph of truth and righteous- 
ness, and the suppression of vice and error, for the sake of the bearings 
of these things on self and friends. These desires are constitutional and 
natural to both, under certain circumstances. When they do not influ- 
ence the will, they have in themselves no moral character ; but when 
they influence the will, their selfishness takes on a religious type. It 
then manifests zeal in promoting religion. But if desire, and not the 
intelligence, controls the will, it is selfishness notwithstanding. 

5. Moral agents constitutionally approve of what is right and disap- 
prove of what is wrong. Of course, both saints and sinners may both ap- 
prove of and delight in goodness. I can recollect weeping at an instance 
of what, at the time, I supposed to be goodness, while at the same time, I 
was not religious myself. I have no doubt that wicked men, not only 
often are conscious of strongly approving the goodness of God, but that 
they also often take delight in contemplating it. This is constitutional, 
both as it respects the intellectual approbation, and also as it respects the 
feeling of delight. It is a great mistake to suppose that sinners are never 
conscious of feelings of complacency and delight in the goodness of God. 
The Bible represents sinners as taking delight in drawing near to him. 
" Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that 
did righteousness, and forsook not the ordinance of their God : they ask 
of me the ordinances of justice ; they take delight in approaching to 
God." — Isa. lviii. 2. "And lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely 
song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instru- 
ment : for they hear thy words, but they do them not." — Ezek. xxxiii. 
32. "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man." — Kom. 
vii. 22. 

£. Saints and sinners may alike not only intellectually approve, but 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 303 

have feelings of deep complacency in, the characters of good men, some- 
times good men of their own time and of their acquaintance, but more 
frequently good men either of a former age, or, if of their own age, of a 
distant country. The reason is this : good men of their own day and 
neighborhood are very apt to render them uneasy in their sins ; to annoy 
them by their faithful reproofs and rebukes. This offends them, and 
overcomes their natural respect for goodness. But who has not observed 
the fact, that good and bad men unite in praising, admiring, and loving, 
— so far as feeling is concerned — good men of by-gone days, or good men 
at a distance, whose life and rebukes have annoyed the wicked in their 
own neighborhood ? The fact is, that moral agents, from the laws of 
their being, necessarily approve of goodness wherever they witness it. 
Multitudes of sinners are conscious of this, and suppose that this is a vir- 
tuous feeling. It is of no use to deny, that they sometimes have feelings 
of love and gratitude to God, and of respect for, and complacency in good 
men. They often have these feelings, and to represent them as always 
having feelings of hatred and of opposition to God and to good men, is 
sure either to offend them, or to lead them to deny the truths of religion, 
if they are told that the Bible teaches this. Or, again, it may lead them 
to think themselves Christians, because they are conscious of such feel- 
ings as they are taught to believe are peculiar to Christians. Or again, 
they may think that, although they are not Christians, yet they are far 
from being totally depraved, inasmuch as they have so many good de- 
sires and feelings. It should never be forgotten, that saints and sinners 
may agree in their opinions and intellectual views and judgments. Many 
professors of religion, it is to be feared, have supposed religion to consist 
in desires and feelings, and have entirely mistaken their own character. 
Indeed, nothing is more common than to hear religion spoken of as 
consisting altogether in mere feelings, desires, and emotions. Professors 
relate their feelings, and suppose themselves to be giving an account of 
their religion. It is infinitely important, that both professors of religion 
and non-professors, should understand more than most of them do of 
their mental constitution, and of the true nature of religion. Multi- 
tudes of professors of religion have, it is to be feared, a hope founded 
altogether upon desires and feelings that are purely constitutional, and 
therefore common to both saints and sinners. 

7. Saints and sinners agree in this, that they both disapprove of, and 
are often disgusted with, and deeply abhor, sin. They cannot but disap- 
prove of sin. Necessity is laid upon every moral agent, whatever his 
character may be, by the law of his being, to condemn, and disapprove of 
sin. And often the sensibility of sinners, as well as of saints, is filled 
with deep disgust and loathing in view of sin. I know that representa- 
tions the direct opposite of these are often made. Sinners are repre- 



304: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sented as universally having complacency in sin, as having a constitu 
tional craving for sin, as they have for food and drink. But such 
representations are false and most injurious. They contradict the 
sinner's consciousness, and lead him either to deny his total depravity, 
or to deny the Bible, or to think himself regenerate. As was shown 
when upon the subject of moral depravity, sinners do not love sin for its 
own sake ; yet they crave other things, and this leads to prohibited in- 
dulgence, which indulgence is sin. But it is not the sinfulness of the 
indulgence that was desired. That might have produced disgust and 
loathing in the sensibility, if it had been considered even at the moment 
of the indulgence. For example : suppose a licentious man, a drunkard, 
a gambler, or any other wicked man, engaged in his favorite indulgence, 
and suppose that the sinfulness of this indulgence should be strongly set 
before his mind by the Holy Spirit. He might be deeply ashamed and 
disgusted with himself, and so much so as to feel a great contempt for 
himself, and feel almost ready, were it possible, to spit in his own face. 
And yet, unless this feeling becomes more powerful than the desire and 
feeling which the will is seeking to indulge, the indulgence will be per- 
severed in, notwithstanding this disgust. If the feeling of disgust should 
for the time overmatch the opposing desire, the indulgence will be, for 
the time being, abandoned for the sake of gratifying or appeasing the 
feeling of disgust. But this is not virtue. It is only a change in the 
form of selfishness. Feeling still governs, and not the law of the intelli- 
gence. The indulgence is only abandoned for the time being, to gratify 
a stronger impulse of the sensibility. The will, will of course return 
to the indulgence again, when the feelings of fear, disgust, or loathing 
subside. This, no doubt, accounts for the multitudes of spurious con- 
versions sometimes witnessed. Sinners are convicted, fears awakened, 
and disgust and loathing excited. These feelings for the time become 
stronger than their desires for their former indulgences, and conse- 
quently they abandon them for a time, in obedience, not to the law of 
God or of their intelligence, but in obedience to their fear, disgust, and 
shame. But when conviction subsides, and the consequent feelings are 
no more, these spurious converts "return like a dog to his vomit, and 
like a sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire." It should be 
distinctly understood, that all these feelings of which I have spoken, and 
indeed any class or degree of mere feelings, may exist in the sensibility ; 
and further, that these or any other feelings may, in their turn, control 
the will, and produce of course a corresponding outward life, and yet 
the heart be and remain all the while in a selfish state, or in a state of 
total depravity. Indeed, it is perfectly common to see the impenitent 
sinner manifest much disgust and opposition to sin in himself and in 
others, yet this is not principle in him ; it is only the effect of present 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 305 

feeling. The next day, or perhaps hour, he will repeat his sin, or do that 
which, when beheld in others, enkindled his indignation. 

8. Both saints and sinners approve of, and often delight in, justice. 
It is common to see in courts of justice, and on various other occasions, 
impenitent sinners manifest great complacency in the administration of 
justice, and the greatest indignation at, and abhorrence of, injustice. 
So strong is this feeling sometimes that it cannot be restrained, but will 
burst forth like a smothered volcano, and carry desolation before it. It 
is this natural love of justice, and abhorrence of injustice, common alike 
to saints and sinners, to which popular tumults and bloodshed are often 
to be ascribed. This is not virtue, but selfishness. It is the will giving 
itself up to the gratification of a constitutional impulse. But such feel- 
ings and such conduct are often supposed to be virtuous. It should 
always be borne in mind that the love of justice, and the sense of delight 
in it, and the feeling of opposition to injustice, are not only not peculiar 
to good men, but that such feelings are no evidence whatever of a regen- 
erate heart. Thousands of instances might be adduced as proofs and 
illustrations of this position. But such manifestations are too common 
to need to be cited, to remind any one of their existence. 

9. The same remarks may be made in regard to truth. Both saints 
and sinners have a constitutional respect for, approbation of, and delight 
in truth. Who ever knew a sinner to approve of the character of a liar ? 
What sinner will not resent it, to be accused or even suspected of lying ? 
All men spontaneously manifest their respect for, complacency in, and 
approbation of truth. This is constitutional ; so that even the greatest 
liars do not, and cannot, love lying for its own sake. They lie to gratify, 
not a love for falsehood on its own account, but to obtain some object 
which they desire more strongly than they hate falsehood. Sinners, in 
spite of themselves, venerate, respect, and fear a man of truth. They 
just as necessarily despise a liar. If they are liars, they despise them- 
selves for it, just as drunkards and debauchees despise themselves for 
indulging their filthy lusts, and yet continue in them. 

10. Both saints and sinners not only approve of, and delight in good 
men, when, as I have said, wicked men are not annoyed by them, but 
they agree in reprobating, disapproving, and abhorring wicked men and 
devils. Who ever heard of any other sentiment and feeling being ex- 
pressed either by good or bad men, than of abhorrence and indignation 
toward the devil ? Nobody ever approved, or can approve, of his charac- 
ter ; sinners can no more approve of it than holy angels can. If he 
could approve of and delight in his own character, hell would cease to be 
hell, and evil would become his good. But no moral agent can, by any 
possibility, know wickedness and approve it. ~No man, saint or sinner, 
can entertain any other sentiments and feelings toward the devil, or 

20 



306 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

wicked men, but those of disapprobation, distrust, disrespect, and often 
of loathing and abhorrence. The intellectual sentiment will be uniform. 
Disapprobation, distrust, condemnation, will always necessarily possess 
the minds of all who know wicked men and devils. And often, as occa- 
sions arise, wherein their characters are clearly revealed, and under cir- 
cumstances favorable to such a result, the deepest feelings of disgust, of 
loathing, of indignation, and abhorrence of their wickedness, will mani- 
fest themselves alike among saints and sinners. 

11. Saints and sinners may be equally honorable and fair in business 
transactions, so far as the outward act is concerned. They have differ- 
ent reasons for their conduct, but outwardly it may be the same. This 
leads to the remark, — 

12. That selfishness in the sinner, and benevolence in the saint, may, 
and often do, produce, in many respects, the same results or manifesta- 
tions. For example : benevolence in the saint, and selfishness in the 
sinner, may beget the same class of desires, to wit, as we have seen, de- 
sire for their own sanctification, and for that of others, to be useful, and 
to have others so ; desires for the conversion of sinners, and many such 
like desires. 

13. This leads to the remark, that, when the desires of an inrpenitent 
person for these objects become strong enough to influence the will, he 
may take the same outward course, substantially, that the saint takes in 
obedience to his intelligence. That is, the sinner is constrained by his 
feelings to do what the saint does from principle, or from obedience to 
the law of his intelligence. In this, however, although the outward 
manifestations be the same for the time being, yet the sinner is entirely 
selfish, and the saint benevolent. The saint is controlled by principle, 
and the sinner by impulse. In this case, time is needed to distinguish 
between them. The sinner not having the root of the matter in him, 
will return to his former course of life, in proportion as his convictions 
of the truth and importance of religion subside, and his former feelings 
return ; while the saint will evince his heavenly birth, by manifesting his 
sympathy with God, and the strength of principle that has taken pos- 
session of his heart. That is, he will manifest that his intelligence, and 
not his feelings, controls his will. 

REMARKS. 

1. For want of these and such like discriminations, many have stum- 
bled. Hypocrites have held onto a false hope, and lived upon mere con- 
stitutional desires and spasmodic turns of giving up the will, during sea- 
sons of special excitement, to the control of these desires and feelings. 
These spasms they call their waking up. But no sooner does their ex- 
citement subside, than selfishness again assumes its wonted forms. It is 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 307 

truly wonderful and appalling to see to what an extent this is true. Be- 
cause, in seasons of special excitement they feel deeply, and are conscious 
of feeling, as they say, and acting, and of being entirely sincere in fol- 
lowing their impulses, they have the fullest confidence in their good 
estate. They say they cannot doubt their conversion. They felt so and 
so, and gave themselves up to their feelings, and gave much time and 
money to promote the cause of Christ. Now this is a deep delusion, and 
one of the most common in Christendom, or at least one of the most 
common that is to be found among what are called revival Christians. 
This class of deluded souls do not see that they are, in such cases, gov- 
erned by their feelings, and that if their feelings were changed, their 
conduct would be so, of course ; that as soon as the excitement subsides, 
they will go back to their former ways, as a thing of course. When the 
state of feeling that now controls them has given place to their former 
feelings, they will of course appear as they used to do. This is, in few 
words, the history of thousands of professors of religion. 

2. This has greatly stumbled the openly impenitent. Not knowing 
how to account for what they often witness of this kind among professors 
of religion, they are led to doubt whether there is any such thing as true 
religion. 

Again : many sinners have been deceived just in the way I have 
pointed out, and have afterwards discovered that they had been deluded, 
but could not understand how. They have come to the conclusion that 
everybody is deluded, and that all professors are as much deceived as 
they are. This leads them to reject and despise all religion. 

3. Some exercises of impenitent sinners, and of which they are con- 
scious, have been denied for fear of denying total depravity. They have 
been represented as necessarily hating God and all good men ; and this 
hatred has been represented as a feeling of malice and enmity towards 
God. Many impenitent sinners are conscious of having no such feelings ; 
but, on the contrary, they are conscious of having at times feelings of 
respect, veneration, awe, gratitude, and affection towards God and good 
men. To this class of sinners, it is a snare and a stumbling-block to tell 
them, and insist, that they only hate God, and Christians, and ministers, 
and revivals ; and to represent their moral depravity to be such, that they 
crave sin as they crave food, and that they necessarily have none but 
feelings of mortal enmity against God. Such representations either drive 
them into infidelity on the one hand, or to think themselves Christians 
on the other. But those theologians who hold the views of constitu- 
tional depravity of which we have spoken, cannot, consistently with their 
theory, admit to these sinners the real truth, and then show them con- 
clusively that in all their feelings which they call good, and in all their 
yielding to be influenced by them, there is no virtue ; that their desires 



308 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and feelings have in themselves no moral character, and that when they 
yield the will to their control, it is only selfishness. 

The thing needed is a philosophy and a theology that will admit and 
explain all the phenomena of experience, and not deny human conscious- 
ness. A theology that denies human consciousness is only a curse and a 
stumbling-block. But such is the doctrine of universal constitutional 
moral depravity. 

It is frequently true, that the feelings of sinners become exceedingly 
rebellious and exasperated, even to the most intense opposition of feeling 
toward God, and Christ, and ministers, and revivals, and toward every- 
thing of good report. If this class of sinners are converted, they are 
very apt to suppose, and to represent all sinners as having just such 
feelings as they had. But this is a mistake, for many sinners never had 
those feelings. Nevertheless, they are no less selfish and guilty than 
the class who have the rebellious and blasphemous feelings which I have 
mentioned. This is what they need to know. They need to under- 
stand definitely what sin is, and what it is not ; that sin is selfishness ; 
that selfishness is the yielding of the will to the control of feeling, and 
that it matters not at all what the particular class of feelings is, if feelings 
control the will, and not intelligence. Admit their good feelings, as 
they call them, and take pains to show them, that these feelings are 
merely constitutional, and have in themselves no moral character. 

4. The ideas of depravity and of regeneration, to which I have often 
alluded, are fraught with great mischief in another respect. Great 
numbers, it is to be feared, both of private professors of religion and of 
ministers, have mistaken the class of feelings of which I have spoken, as 
common among certain impenitent sinners, for religion. They have 
heard the usual representations of the natural depravity of sinners, and 
also have heard certain desires and feelings represented as religion. 
They are conscious of these desires and feelings, and also, sometimes, 
when they are very strong, of being influenced in their conduct by them. 
They assume, therefore, that they are regenerate, and elected, and heirs 
of salvation. These views lull them asleep. The philosophy and theol- 
ogy that misrepresent moral depravity and regeneration thus, must, if 
consistent, also misrepresent true religion ; and oh ! the many thousands 
that have mistaken the mere constitutional desires and feelings, and the 
selfish yielding of the will to their control, for true religion, and have 
gone to the bar of God with a lie in their right hand ! 

5. Another great evil has arisen out of the false views I have been 
exposing, namely : — 

Many true Christians have been much stumbled and kept in bondage, 
and their comfort and their usefulness much abridged, by finding them- 
selves, from time to time, very languid and unfeeling. Supposing reli- 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 309 

gion to consist in feeling, if at any time the sensibility becomes ex- 
hausted, and their feelings subside, they are immediately thrown into 
unbelief and bondage. Satan reproaches them for their want of feeling, 
and they have nothing to say, only to admit the truth of his accusations. 
Having a false philosophy of religion, they judge of the state of their 
hearts by the state of their feelings. They confound their hearts with 
their feelings, and are in almost constant perplexity to keep their hearts 
right, by which they mean their feelings, in a state of great excitement. 

Again : they are not only sometimes languid, and have no pious feel- 
ings and desires, but at others they are conscious of classes of emotions 
which they call sin. These they resist, but still blame themselves for 
having them in their hearts, as they say. Thus they are brought into 
bondage again, although they are certain that these feelings are hated, 
and not at all indulged, by them. 

Oh, how much all classes of persons need to have clearly defined ideas 
of what really constitutes sin and holiness ! A false philosophy of the 
mind, especially of the will, and of moral depravity, has covered the 
world with gross darkness on the subject of sin and holiness, of regenera- 
tion, and of the evidences of regeneration, until the true saints, on the 
one hand, are kept in a continual bondage to their false notions ; and 
on the other, the church swarms with unconverted professors, and is 
cursed with many self-deceived ministers. 



LECTURE XXX. 

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 

III. Wherein saints and sinners must differ. 

1. Let it be distinctly remembered, that all unregenerate persons, 
without exception, have one heart, that is, they are selfish. This is their 
whole character. They are universally and only devoted to self-gratifica- 
tion. Their unregenerate heart consists in this selfish disposition, or in 
this selfish choice. Tnis choice is the foundation of, and the reason for, 
all their activity. One and the same ultimate reason actuates them in all 
they do, and in all they omit, and that reason is either presently or re- 
motely, directly or indirectly, to gratify themselves. 

2. The regenerate heart is disinterested benevolence. In other words, 
it is love to God and our neighbor. All regenerate hearts are precisely 
similar. All true saints, whenever they have truly the heart of the 



310 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

saints of God, are actuated by one and the same motive. They have only 
one ultimate reason for all they do, and suffer, or omit. They have one 
ultimate intention, one end. They live for one and the same object, and 
that is the same end for which God lives. 

3. The saint is governed by reason, the law of God, or the moral 
law ; in other words still, the law of disinterested and universal benevo- 
lence is his law. This law is not only revealed and developed in his in- 
telligence, but it is written in his heart. So that the law of his intellect 
is the law of his heart. He not only sees and acknowledges what he 
ought to do and be, but he is conscious to himself, and gives evidence to 
others, whether they receive it and are convinced by it or not, that his 
heart, his will, or intention, is conformed to his convictions of duty. He 
sees the path of duty, and follows it. He knows what he ought to will, 
intend, and do, and does it. Of this he is conscious. And of this others 
may be satisfied, if they. are observing, charitable, and candid. 

4. The sinner is contrasted with this, in the most important and 
fundamental respects. He is not governed by reason and principle, 
but by feeling, desire, and impulse. Sometimes his feelings coincide 
with the intelligence, and sometimes they do not. But when they 
do so coincide, the will does not pursue its course out of respect or in 
obedience to the law of the intelligence, but in obedience to the impulse 
of the sensibility, which, for the time being, impels in the same direction 
as does the law of the reason. But for the most part the impulses of the 
sensibility incline him to worldly gratifications, and in an opposite direc- 
tion to that which the intelligence points out. This leads him to a course 
of life that is too manifestly the opposite of reason, to leave any room for 
doubt as to what his true character is. 

5. The saint is justified, and he has the evidence of it in the peace of 
his own mind. He is conscious of obeying the law of reason and of love. 
Consequently he naturally has that kind and degree of peace that flows 
from the harmony of his will with the law of his intelligence. He some- 
times has conflicts with the impulses of feeling and desire. But unless 
he is overcome, these conflicts, though they may cause him inwardly, 
and, perhaps audibly, to groan, do not interrupt his peace. There are 
still the elements of peace within him. His heart and conscience are at 
one, and while this is so, he has thus far the evidence of justification in 
himself. That is, he knows that God cannot condemn his present state. 
Conscious as he is of conformity of heart to the moral law, he cannot but 
affirm to himself, that the Lawgiver is pleased with his present attitude. 
But further, he has also within the Spirit of God witnessing with his 
spirit, that he is a child of God, forgiven, accepted, adopted. He feels 
the filial spirit drawing his heart to exclaim, Father, Father. He is con- 
scious that he pleases God, and has God's smile of approbation. 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 31.1 

He is at peace with himself, because he affirms his heart to be in uni- 
son with the law of love. His conscience does not upbraid, but smile. 
The harmony of his own being is a witness to himself, that this is the 
state in which he was made to exist. He is at peace with God, because 
he and God are pursuing precisely the same end, and by the same means. 
There can be no collision, no controversy between them. He is at peace 
with the universe, in the sense, that he has no ill-will, and no malicious 
feelings or wish to gratify, in the injury of any one of the creatures of 
God. He has no fear, but to sin against God. He is not influenced on 
the one hand by the fear of hell, nor on the other by the hope of reward. 
He is not anxious about his own salvation, but prayerfully and calmly 
leaves that question in the hands of God, and concerns himself only 
to promote the highest glory of God, and the good of being. " Being 
justified by faith, he has peace with God through our Lord Jesus 
Christ." "There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ 
Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." 

6. The sinner's experience is the opposite of this. He is under con- 
demnation, and seldom can so far deceive himself, even in his most reli- 
gious moods, as to imagine that he has a consciousness of acceptance 
either with his own conscience or with God. There is almost never 
a time in which he has not a greater or less degree of restlessness and 
misgiving within. Even when he is most engaged in religion, as he 
supposes, he finds himself dissatisfied with himself. Something is 
wrong. There is a struggle and a pang. He may not exactly see where 
and what the difficulty is. He does not, after all, obey reason and con- 
science, and is not governed by the law and will of God. Not having 
the consciousness of this obedience, his conscience does not smile. He 
sometimes feels deeply, and acts as he feels, and is conscious of being 
sincere in the sense of feeling what he says, and acting in obedience to 
deep feeling. But this does not satisfy conscience. He is more or less 
wretched after all. He has not true peace. Sometimes he has a self- 
righteous quiet and enjoyment. But this is neither peace of conscience 
nor peace with God. He, after all, feels uneasy and condemned, not- 
withstanding all his feeling, and zeal, and activity. They are not of the 
right kind. Hence they do not satisfy the conscience. They do not 
meet the demands of his intelligence. Conscience does not approve. 
He has not, after all, true peace. He is not justified ; he cannot be 
fully and permanently satisfied that he is. 

7. Saints are interested in, and sympathize with, every effort to 
reform mankind, and promote the interests of truth and righteousness in 
the earth. 

The good of being is the end for which the saint really and truly 
lives. This is not merely held by him as a theory, as an opinion, as a 



312 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

theological or philosophical speculation. It is in his heart, and precisely 
for this reason he is a saint. He is a saint just because the theory, which 
is lodged in the head of both saint and sinner, has also a lodgment and 
reigning power in his heart, and consequently in his life. 

As saints supremely value the highest good of being, they will, and 
must, take a deep interest in whatever is promotive of that end. Hence, 
their spirit is necessarily that of the reformer. To the universal reforma- 
tion of the world they stand committed. To this end they are devoted. 
For this end they live, and move, and have their being. Every proposed 
reform interests them, and naturally leads them to examine its claims. 
The fact is, they are studying and devising ways and means to convert, 
sanctify, reform mankind. Being in this state of mind, they are predis- 
posed to lay hold on whatever gives promise of good to man. True 
saints love reform. It is their business, their profession, their life to 
promote it ; consequently they are ready to examine the claims of any 
proposed reform ; candid and self-denying, and ready to be convinced, 
however much self-denial it may call them to. They have actually re- 
jected self-indulgence, as the end for which they live, and are ready to 
sacrifice any form of self-indulgence, for the sake of promoting the good 
of men and the glory of God. The saint is truly and greatly desirous 
and in earnest, to reform all sin out of the world, and just for this reason 
is ready to hail with joy, and to try whatever reform seems, from the best 
light he can get, to bid fair to put down sin, and the evils that are in 
the world. Even mistaken men, who are honestly endeavoring to re- 
form mankind, and denying their appetites, as many have done in 
dietetic reform, are deserving of the respect of their fellow men. Sup- 
pose their philosophy to be incorrect, yet they have intended well. They 
have manifested a disposition to deny themselves, for the purpose of 
promoting the good of others. They have been honest and zealous in 
this. Now no true saint can feel or express contempt for such re- 
formers, however much mistaken they may be. No : his natural senti- 
ments and feelings will be, and must be, the reverse of contempt or 
censoriousness in respect to them. If their mistake has been injurious, 
he may mourn over the evil, but will not, cannot, severely judge the 
honest reformer. War, slavery, licentiousness, and all such like evils 
and abominations, are necessarily regarded by the saint as great and sore 
evils, and he longs for their complete and final overthrow. It is impos- 
sible that a truly benevolent mind should not thus regard these abomina- 
tions of desolation. 

The saints in all ages have been reformers. I know it is said, that 
neither prophets, Christ, nor apostles, nor primitive saints and martyrs 
declaimed against war and slavery, etc. But they did. The entire in- 
structions of Christ, and of apostles and prophets, were directly opposed 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 313 

to these and all other evils. If they did not come out against certain 
legalized forms of sin, and denounce them by name, and endeavor to 
array public sentiment against them, it is plainly because they were, for 
the most part, employed in a preliminary work. To introduce the gospel 
as a divine revelation ; to set up and organize the visible kingdom of 
God on earth ; to lay a foundation for universal reform, was rather their 
business, than the pushing forward of particular branches of reform. 
The overthrow of state idolatry, the great and universal sin of the world 
in that age ; the labor of getting the world and the governments of 
earth to tolerate and receive the gospel as a revelation from the one only 
living and true God ; the controversy with the Jews, to overthrow their 
objections to Christianity ; in short, the great and indispensable and pre- 
liminary work of gaining for Christ and his gospel a hearing, and an ac- 
knowledgment of its divinity, was rather their work, the pushing of 
particular precepts and doctrines of the gospel to their legitimate results 
and logical consequences. This work once done, has left it for later 
saints to bring the particular truths, precepts, and doctrines of the 
blessed gospel to bear down every form of sin. Prophets, Christ, and his 
apostles, have left on the pages of inspiration no dubious testimony 
against every form of sin. The spirit of the whole Bible breathes from 
every page blasting and annihilation upon every unholy abomination, 
while it smiles upon everything of good report that promises blessings 
to man and glory to God. The saint is not merely sometimes a re- 
former ; he is always so. 

8. The sinner is never a reformer in any proper sense of the word. 
He is selfish and never opposed to sin, or to any evil whatever, from any 
such motive as renders him worthy the name of reformer. He some- 
times selfishly advocates and pushes certain outward reforms ; but as 
certain as it is that he is an unregenerate sinner, so certain is it, that he 
is not endeavoring to reform sin out of the world from any disinterested 
love to God or to man. Many considerations of a selfish nature may en- 
gage him at times in certain branches of reform. Eegard to his reputa- 
tion may excite his zeal in such an enterprise. Self-righteous considera- 
tions may also lead him to enlist in the army of reformers. His relation 
to particular forms of vice may influence him to set his face against 
them. Constitutional temperament and tendencies may lead to his en- 
gaging in certain reforms. For example, his constitutional benevolence, 
as phrenologists call it, may be such that from natural compassion he 
may engage in reforms. But this is only giving way to an impulse of 
the sensibility, and it is not principle that governs him. His natural 
conscientiousness may modify his outward character, and lead him to 
take hold of some branches of reform. But whatever other motives he 
may have, sure it is that he is not a reformer ; for he is a sinner, and it 



314 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

is absurd to say that a sinner is truly engaged in opposing sin as sin. 
No, it is not sin that he is opposing, but he is seeking to gratify an am- 
bitious, a self-righteous, or some other spirit, the gratification of which 
is selfishness. 

But as a general thing, it is easy to distinguish sinners, or deceived 
professors from saints by looking steadfastly at their temper and deport- 
ment in their relations to reform. They are self-indulgent, and just for 
the reason that they are devoted to self-indulgence. Sometimes their 
self-indulgent spirit takes on one type, and sometimes another. Of course 
they need not be expected to ridicule or oppose every branch of reform, 
just because it is not every reformer that will rebuke their favorite indul- 
gences, and call them to reform their lives. But as every sinner has 
one or more particular form of indulgence to which he is wedded, and as 
saints are devising and pushing reforms in all directions, it is natural 
that some sinners should manifest particular hostility to one reform, and 
some to another. Whenever a reform is proposed that would reform 
them out of their favorite indulgences, they will either ridicule it, and 
those that propose it, or storm and rail, or in some way oppose or wholly 
neglect it. Not so, and so it cannot be, with a true saint. He has no 
indulgence that he values when put in competition with the good of 
being. Nay, he holds his all and his life at the disposal of the highest 
good. Has he, in ignorance of the evils growing out of his course, used 
ardent spirits, wine, tobacco, ale, or porter ? Has he held slaves ; been 
engaged in any traffic that is found to be injurious ; has he favored war 
through ignorance ; or, in short, has he committed any mistake what- 
ever ? Let but a reformer come forth and propose to discuss the tendency 
of such things ; let the reformer bring forth his strong reasons ; and, from 
the very nature of true religion, the saint will listen with attention, 
weigh with candor, and suffer himself to be carried by truth, heart, and 
hand, and influence with the proposed reform, if it be worthy of support, 
how much soever it conflict with his former habits. This must be true, 
if he has a single eye to the good of being, which is the very character- 
istic of a saint. 

9. The true saint denies himself. Self-denial must be. his character- 
istic, just for the reason that regeneration implies this. Eegeneration, 
as we have seen, consists in turning away the heart or will from the 
supreme choice of self -gratification, to a choice of the highest well-being 
of God and of the universe. This is denying self. This is abandoning 
self-indulgence, and pursuing or committing the will, and the whole 
being to an opposite end. This is the dethroning of self, and the en- 
throning of God in the heart. Self-denial does not consist, as some seem 
to imagine, in acts of outward austerity, in an ascetic and penance-doing 
course of starvation, and mere legal and outward retrenchment, in wear- 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 315 

ing a coat with one button, and in similar acts of "will worship and 
voluntary humility, and neglecting the body ;" but self-denial consists 
in the actual and total renunciation of selfishness in the heart. It con- 
sists in ceasing wholly to live for self, and can be exercised just as truly 
upon a throne, surrounded with the paraphernalia of royalty, as in a cot- 
tage of logs, or as in rags, and in caves and dens of the earth. 

The king upon his throne may live and reign to please himself. He 
may surround himself with all that can minister to his pleasure, his 
ambition, his pride, his lusts, and his power. He may live to and 
for himself. Self-pleasing, self-gratification, self-aggrandizement, may 
be the end for which he lives. This is selfishness. But he may also live 
and reign for God, and for his people. That is, he may be as really 
devoted to God, and render this as a service to God, as well as anything 
else. No doubt his temptation is great ; but, nevertheless, he may 
be perfectly self-denying in all this. He may not do what he does for 
his own sake, nor be what he is, nor possess what he possesses for his 
own sake, but, accommodating his state and equipage to his relations,. 
he may be as truly self-denying as others in the humbler walks of life. 
This is not an impossible, though, in all probability, a rare case. A 
man may as truly be rich for God as poor for him, if his relations and 
circumstances make it essential to his highest usefulness that he should 
possess a large capital. He is in the way of great temptation ; but if 
this is plainly his duty, and submitted to for God and the world, he may 
have grace to be entirely self-denying in these circumstances, and all the 
more commendable, for standing fast under these circumstances. 

So a poor man may be poor from principle, or from necessity. He 
may be submissive and happy in his poverty. He may deny himself 
even the comforts of life, and do all this to promote the good of being, 
or he may do it to promote his own interest, temporal or eternal, to 
secure a reputation for piety, to appease a morbid conscience, to appease 
his fears, or to secure the favor of God. In all things he may be selfish. 
He may be happy in this, because it may be real self-denial : or he may 
be murmuring at his poverty, may complain, and be envious at others 
who are not poor. He may be censorious, and think everybody proud 
and selfish who dresses better, or possesses a better house and equipage 
than he does. He may set up his views as a standard, and denounce 
as proud and selfish all who do not square their lives by his rule. This 
is selfishness, and these manifestations demonstrate the fact. A man; 
may forego the use of a coat, or a cloak, or a horse, or a carriage, or any 
and every comfort and convenience of life, and all this may proceed) 
from either a benevolent or a selfish state of mind. If it be benevolence' 
and true self-denial, it will be cheerfully and happily submitted to, with- 
out murmuring and repining, without censoriousness, and without envy 



316 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

towards others, without insisting that others shall do and be, just what 
he does and is. He will allow the judge his ermine, the king his robes of 
state, and the merchant his capital, and the husbandman his fields 
and his flocks, and will see the reasonableness and propriety of all this. 

But if it be selfishness and the spirit of self-gratification instead 
of self-denial, he will be ascetic, caustic, sour, ill-natured, unhappy, 
severe, censorious, envious, and disposed to complain of, and pick at, the 
extravagance and self-indulgence of others. 

Especially does the true saint deny his appetites and passions. His 
artificial appetites he denies absolutely, whenever his attention is called 
to the fact and the nature of the indulgence. The Christian is such just 
because he has become the master of his appetites and passions, has 
denied them, and consecrated himself to God. The sinner is a sinner 
just because his appetites and passions and the impulses of his desires 
are his masters, and he bows down to them, and serves them. They 
are his masters instead of his servants, as they are made to be. He is 
consecrated to them and not to God. But the saint has ceased to live to 
gratify his lusts. Has he been a drunkard, a rake, a tobacco user ? Has 
he been in self-indulgent habits of any kind ? He is reformed : old things 
are past away, and behold all things are become new. Has he still 
any habit the character of which he has either mistaken or not consid- 
ered ; such as smoking, chewing, or snuffing tobacco, using injurious 
stimulants of any kind, high and unwholesome living, extravagant dress- 
ing or equipage, retiring late at night and rising late in the morning, 
eating too much, or between meals, or in short, has there been any form 
of self-indulgence about him whatever ? Only let his attention be called 
to it, he will listen with candor, be convinced by reasonable evidence, 
and renounce his evil habits without conferring with flesh and blood. 
All this is implied in regeneration, and must follow from its very nature. 
This also the Bible everywhere affirms to be true of the saints. " They 
have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts." It should be 
forever remembered, that a self-indulgent Christian is a contradiction. 
Self-indulgence and Christianity are terms of opposition. 

10. The sinner does not deny himself. He may not gratify all his 
desires, because the desires are often contradictory, and he must deny one 
for the sake of indulging another. Avarice may be so strong as to forbid 
his indulging in extravagance in eating, drinking, dressing, or equipage. 
His love of reputation may be so strong as to prevent his engaging in any- 
thing disgraceful, and so on. But self-indulgence is his law notwith- 
standing. The fear of hell, or his desire to be saved, may forbid his out- 
ward indulgence in any known sin. But still he lives, and moves, and 
has his being only for the sake of indulging himself. He may be a miser, 
and starve and freeze himself, and deny himself the necessaries of life ; 



EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION. 317 

yet self-indulgence is his law. Some lusts he may and must control, as 
they may be inconsistent with others. But others he does not control. 
He is a slave. He bows down to his lusts and serves them. He is en- 
slaved by his propensities, so that he cannot overcome them. This 
demonstrates that he is a sinner and unregenerate, whatever his station 
and profession may be. One who cannot, because he will not, conquer 
himself and his lusts — this is the definition of an unregenerate sinner. 
He is one over whom some form of desire, or lust, or appetite, or passion 
has dominion. He cannot, or rather will not, overcome it. This one is 
just as certainly in sin, as that sin is sin. 

11. The truly regenerate soul overcomes sin. 

Let the Bible be heard upon this subject. "And hereby we do know 
that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He that saith I 
know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth 
is not in him." — 1 John ii. 3, 4. "And every man that hath this hope 
in him purifieth himself y even as he is pure. Whosoever committeth sin 
transgresseth also the law : for sin is the transgression of the law. And 
ye know that he was manifested to take away our sins : and in him is no 
sin. Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not : whosoever sinneth hath 
not seen him, neither known him. Little children, let no man deceive 
you : he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous. 
He that committeth sin, is of the devil ; for the devil sinneth from the 
beginning. For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he 
might destroy the works of the devil. Whosoever is born of God doth 
not commit sin : for his seed remaineth in him : and he cannot sin, be- 
cause he is born of God. In this the children of God are manifest, and 
the children of the devil ; whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God, 
neither he that loveth not his brother." — 1 John iii. 3-10. "Whosoever 
believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God, and every one that 
loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. By this 
we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and keep 
his commandments. For this is the love of God, that we keep his com- 
mandments ; and his commandments are not grievous. For whatsoever 
is born of God overcometh the world : and this is the victory that over- 
cometh the world, even our faith." — 1 John v. 1-4. 

These passages, understood and pressed to the letter, would not only 
teach, that all regenerate souls overcome and live without sin, but also 
that sin is impossible to them. This last circumstance, as well as other 
parts of scripture, forbid us to press this strong language to the letter. 
But this much must be understood and admitted, that to overcome sin is 
the rule with every one who is born of God, and that sin is only the ex- 
ception ; that the regenerate habitually live without sin, and fall into sin 
only at intervals, so few and far between, that in strong language it may 



31 S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

be said in truth they do not sin. This is surely the least which can be 
meant by the spirit of these texts, not to press them to the letter. And 
this is precisely consistent with many other passages of scripture, several 
of which I haye quoted ; such as these : — " Therefore, if any man be in 
Christ, he is a new creature : old things are passed away ; behold, all 
things are become new." — 2 Cor. v. 17. "For in Jesus Christ, neither 
circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision ; but faith which 
worketh by love." — Gal. v. 6. "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcis- 
ion availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature."— Gal. 
vi. 15. "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in 
Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. For the 
law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law 
of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak 
through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful 
flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh : that the righteousness of 
the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after 
the Spirit." — Eom. viii. 1-4. " What shall we say then ? Shall we con- 
tinue in sin, that grace may abound ? God forbid. How shall we that 
are dead to sin, live any longer therein ? Know ye not, that so many of 
us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death ? 
Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death : that like as 
Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so 
we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted to- 
gether in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his 
resurrection : knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that 
the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve 
sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with 
Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him ; knowing that Christ 
being raised from the dead, dieth no more ; death hath no more domin- 
ion over him. For in that he died, he died Unto sin once : but in that 
he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be 
dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God, through Jesus Christ our 
Lord. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should 
obey it in the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instru- 
ments of unrighteousness unto sin : but yield yourselves unto God, as 
those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of 
righteousness unto God. For sin shall not have dominion over you : for 
ye are not under the law, but under grace." — Rom. vi. 1-14. 

The fact is, if God is true, and the Bible is true, the truly regenerate 
soul has overcome the world, the flesh, and Satan, and sin, and is a con- 
queror, and more than a conqueror. He triumphs over temptation as a 
general thing, and the triumphs of temptation over him are so far be- 
tween, that it is said of him in the living oracles, that he does not, can- 



EVIDENCES OP REGENERATION. 319 

not sin. Ho is not a sinner, but a saint. He is sanctified ; a holy per- 
son ; a child and son of God. If at any time he is overcome, it is only 
to rise again, and soon return like the weeping prodigal. " The steps 
of a good man are ordered by the Lord : and he delighteth in his way. 
Though he fall he shall not be utterly cast down : for the Lord uphold- 
eth him with his hand." — Psalm xxxvii. 23, 24. 

12. The sinner is the slave of sin. The seventh of Romans is his ex- 
perience in his best estate. When he has the most hope of himself, and 
others have the most hope of his good estate, he goes no further than to 
make and break resolutions. His life is but a death in sin. He has not 
the victory. He sees the right, but does it not. Sin is his master, to 
whom he yields himself a servant to obey. He only tries, as he says, to 
forsake sin, but does not in fact forsake it, in his heart. And yet be- 
cause he is convicted, and has desires, and forms resolutions of amend- 
ment, he hopes he is regenerated. 0, what a horrible delusion ! Stop 
short with conviction, with the hope that he is already a Christian ! 
Alas ! how many are already in hell who have stumbled at this stum- 
bling stone ! 

13. The subject of regeneration may know, and if honest he must 
know, for what end he lives. There is, perhaps, nothing of which he 
may be more certain than of his regenerate or unregenerate state ; and 
if he will keep in mind what regeneration is, it would seem that he can 
hardly mistake his own character, so far as to imagine himself to be re- 
generate when he is not. The great difficulty that has been in the way 
of the regenerate soul's knowing his regeneration, and has led to so much 
doubt and embarrassment upon this subject, is that regeneration has been 
regarded as belonging to the sensibility, and hence the attention has 
been directed to the ever-fluctuatinsr feelings for evidence of the change. 
No wonder that this has led conscientious souls into doubt and embar- 
rassment. But let the subject of regeneration be disenthralled from a 
false philosophy, and let it be known that the new heart consists in su- 
preme disinterested benevolence, or in entire consecration to God, and 
then who cannot know for what end he lives, or what is the supreme 
preference or intention of his soul ? If men can settle any question 
whatever beyond all doubt by an appeal to consciousness, it would seem 
that this must be the question. Hence the Bible enjoins it as an im- 
perative duty to know ourselves, whether we are Christians. We are to 
know each other by our fruits. This is expressly given in the Bible as 
the rule of judgment in the case. The question is not so much, What 
are the man's opinions ? as, What does he live for ? Does he manifest a 
charitable state of mind ? Does he manifest the attributes of benevo- 
lence in the various circumstances in which he is placed ? 0, when 
shall the folly of judging men more by their opinions and feelings, than 



320 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

by the tenor of tlieir lives cease ? It seems difficult to rid men of the 
prejudice that religion consists in feelings and in experiences in which 
they are altogether passive. Hence they are continually prone to delu- 
sion upon the most momentous of all questions. Nothing can break 
this spell but the steady and thorough inculcation of the truth, in regard 
to the nature of regeneration. 



LECTURE XXXI. 

NATURAL ABILITY. 



We next proceed to the examination of the question of man's ability 
or inability to obey the commandments of God. This certainly must be 
a fundamental question in morals and religion ; and as our views are 
upon this subject, so, if we are consistent, must be our views of God, of 
his moral government, and of every practical doctrine of morals and re- 
ligion. This is too obvious to require proof. The question of ability has 
truly been a vexed question. In the discussion of it, I shall consider the 
elder President Edwards as the representative of the common Calvinistic 
view of this subject, because he has stated it more clearly than any other 
Calvinistic author with whom I am acquainted. When, therefore, I 
speak of the Edwardean doctrine of ability and inability, you will under- 
stand me to speak of the common view of Calvinistic theological writers, 
as stated, summed up, and defended by Edwards. 

In discussing this subject I will endeavor to show, — 

1. President Edwards's notion of natural ability. 

Edwards considers freedom and ability as identical. He defines free- 
dom or liberty to consist in the power, opportunity, or advantage, that 
any one has, to do as he pleases. " Or, in other words, his being free 
from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any 
respect as he wills." — Works, vol. ii., page 38. 

Again, page 39, he says, "One thing more I should observe concern- 
ing what is vulgarly called liberty ; namely, that power and opportunity 
for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all 
that is meant by it ; without taking into the meaning of the word any- 
thing of the cause of that choice ; or at all considering how the person 
came to have such a volition ; whether it was caused by some external 
motive, or internal habitual bias ; whether it was determined by some in- 
ternal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause ; 
whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not 
connected. Let the person come by his choice anyhow, yet if he is able, 



NATURAL ABILITI r . 321 

and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and exerting his 
will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common 
notion of freedom." In the preceding paragraph, he says, "There are 
two things contrary to what is called liberty in common speech. One is, 
constraint ; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary 
to his will : the other is, restraint, which is his being hindered, and not 
having power to do according to his will." 

Power, ability, liberty, to do as you will, are synonymous with this 
writer. The foregoing quotations, with many like passages that might 
be quoted from the same author, show that natural liberty, or natural 
ability, according to him, consists in the natural and established connec- 
tion between volition and its effects. Thus he says in another place, 
'•Men are justly said to be able to do what they can do, if they will." 
His definition of natural ability, or natural liberty, as he frequently calls 
it, wholly excludes the power to will, and includes only the power or 
ability to execute our volitions. Thus it is evident, that natural ability, 
according to him, respects external action only, and has nothing to do 
with willing. When there is no restraint or hindrance to the execution 
of volition, when there is nothing interposed to disturb and prevent the 
natural and established result of our volitions, there is natural ability ac- 
cording to this school. It should be distinctly understood, that Edwards, 
and those of his school, hold that choices, volitions, and all acts of will, 
are determined, not by the sovereign power of the agent, but are caused 
by the objective motive, and that there is the same connection, or a con- 
nection as certain and as unavoidable between motive and choice, as 
between any physical cause and its effect : " the difference being," ac- 
cording to him, " not in the nature of the connection, but in the terms 
connected." Hence, according to his view, natural liberty or ability 
cannot consist in the power of willing or of choice, but must consist in 
the power to execute our choices or volitions. Consequently, this class 
of philosophers define free or moral agency to consist in the power to do 
as one wills, or power to execute one's purposes, choices, or volitions. 
That this is a fundamentally false definition of natural liberty or ability, 
and of free or moral agency, we shall see in due time. It is also plain, 
that the natural ability or liberty of Edwards and his school, has nothing 
to do with morality or immorality. Sin and holiness, as we have seen 
in a former lecture, are attributes of acts of will only. But this natural 
ability respects, as has been said, outward or muscular action only. Let 
this be distinctly borne in mind as we proceed. 

II. This natural ability is no ability at all. 

We know from consciousness that the will is the executive faculty, 
and that we can do absolutely nothing without willing. The power or 
21 



o22 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ability to will is indispensable to our acting at all. If we have not the 
power to will, we have not power or ability to do anything. All ability 
or power to do resides in the will, and power to will is the necessary con- 
dition of ability to do. In morals and religion, as we shall soon see, the 
willing is the doing. The power to will is the condition of obligation to 
do. Let us hear Edwards himself upon this subject. Vol. ii. p. 156, he 
says, " The will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of 
the will, is the proper object of precept or command. That is, such a 
state or acts of men's wills, are in many cases properly required of them 
by commands ; and not only those alterations in the state of their bodies 
or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest ; 
for it is the mind only that is properly and directly the subject of pre- 
cepts or commands ; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving 
commands. The motions of the body are matters of command only as 
they are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But the soul 
has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, 
consent, yield to, or comply with any command, but the faculty of the 
will ; and it is by this faculty only that the soul can directly disobey or 
refuse compliance ; for the very notions of consenting, yielding, accept- 
ing, complying, refusing, rejecting, etc., are, according to the meaning 
of terms, nothing but certain acts of will." Thus we see that Edwards 
himself held, that the will is the executive faculty, and that the soul can 
do nothing except as it wills to do it, and that for this reason a command 
to do is strictly a command to will. We shall see by and by, that he 
held also that the willing and the doing are identical, so far as moral 
obligation, morals, and religion are concerned. For the present, it is 
enough to say, whether Edwards or anybody else ever held it or not, that 
it is absurd and sheer nonsense to talk of an ability to do when there is 
no ability to will. Every one knows with intuitive certainty that he has 
no ability to do what he is unable to will to do. It is, therefore, the 
veriest folly to talk of a natural ability to do anything whatever, when 
We exclude from this ability the power to will. If there is no ability to 
will, there is, and can be no ability to do ; therefore the natural ability 
of the Edwardean school is no ability at all. 

Let it be distinctly understood, that whatever Edwards held in respect 
to the ability of man to do, ability to will entered not at all into his idea 
and definition of natural ability or liberty. But according to him, 
natural ability respects only the connection that is established by a law 
of nature between volition and its sequents, excluding altogether the in- 
quiry how the volition comes to exist. This the foregoing quotations 
abundantly show. Let the impression, then, be distinct, that the 
Edwardean natural ability is no ability at all, and nothing but an empty 
name, a metaphysico-theological fiction. 



NATURAL ABILITY. 323 

III. What constitutes natural inability according to this school. 

Edwards, vol. ii. p. 35, says, " We are said to be naturally unable to 
do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most com- 
monly called nature, does not allow of it ; or because of some impeding 
defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will ; either in the faculty of 
understanding, constitution of body, or external objects." This quota- 
tion, together with much that might be quoted from this author to the 
same effect, shows that natural inability, according to him, consists in a 
want of power to execute our volitions. In the absence of power to do 
as we will, if the willing exists and. the effect does not follow, it is only 
because w r e are unable to do as we will, and this is natural inability. We 
are naturally unable, according to him, to do what does not follow by a 
natural law from our volitions. If I will to move my arm, and the mus- 
cles do not obey volition, I am naturally unable to move my arm. So 
w r ith anything else. Here let it be distinctly observed, that natural in- 
ability, as well as natural ability, respects and belongs only to outward 
action or doing. It has nothing to do with ability to will. Whatever 
Edwards held respecting ability to will, which will be shown in its proper 
place, I wish it to be distinctly understood that his natural inability had 
nothing to do with willing, but only with the effects of willing. When 
the natural effect of willing does not follow volition, its cause, here is a 
proper natural inability. 

IV. This natural inability is no inability at all. 

By this is intended that, so far as morals and religion are concerned, 
the willing is the doing, and therefore where the willing actually takes 
place, the real thing required or prohibited is already done. Let us 
hear Edwards upon this subject. Vol. ii. p. 164, he says, " If the will 
fully complies and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the 
laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly 
excused : he has a natural inability to do the thing required. For the will 
itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately 
required by command, and other things only indirectly, as connected 
with the will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of will, the per- 
son has done his duty : and if other things do not prove to be connected 
with his volition, that is not criminally owing to him." Here, then, it 
is manifest, that the Edwardean notions of natural ability and inability 
have no connection with moral law or moral government, and, of course, 
with morals and religion. That the Bible everywhere accounts the 
willing as the deed, is most manifest. Both as it respects sin and holi- 
ness, if the required or prohibited act of the will takes place, the moral 
law and the lawgiver regard the deed as having been done, or the sin 



S2tt SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

committed, whatever impediment may have prevented the natural effect 
from following. Here, then, let it be distinctly understood and remem- 
bered that Edwards's natural inability is, so far as morals and religion are 
concerned, no inability at all. An inability to execute our volitions, 
is in no case an inability to do our whole duty, since moral obligation, 
and of course, duty, respect strictly only acts of will. A natural inabil- 
ity must consist, as we shall see, in an inability to will. It is truly 
amazing that Edwards could have written the paragraph just quoted, 
and others to the same effect, without perceiving the fallacy and absurd- 
ity of his speculation — without seeing that the ability or inability about 
which he was writing, had no connection with morals or religion. How 
could he insist so largely that moral obligation respects acts of will only, 
and yet spend so much time in writing about an ability or inability 
to comply with moral obligation that respects outward action exclusively ? 
This, on the face of it, was wholly irrelevant to the subject of morals 
and religion, upon which subjects he was professedly writing. 

V. Natural ability is identical ivitli freedom or liberty of will. 

It has been, I trust, abundantly shown in a former lecture, and is 
admitted and insisted on by Edwards, — 

1. That moral obligation respects strictly only acts of will. 

2. That the whole of moral obligation resolves itself into an obliga- 
tion to be disinterestedly benevolent, that is, to will the highest good of 
being for its own sake. 

3. That willing is the doing required by the true spirit of the moral 
law. Ability, therefore, to will in accordance with the moral law, must 
be natural ability to obey God. But, — 

4. This is and must be the only proper freedom of the will, so far as 
morals and religion, or so far as moral law is concerned. That must 
constitute true liberty of will that consists in the ability or power to will, 
either in accordance with, or in opposition to the requirements of moral 
law. Or in other words, true freedom or liberty of will must consist in 
the power or ability to will in every instance either in accordance with, 
or in opposition to, moral obligation. Observe, moral obligation respects 
acts of will. What freedom or liberty of will can there be in relation to 
moral obligation, unless the will or the agent has power or ability to act 
in conformity with moral obligation ? To talk of a man's being free to 
will, or having liberty to will, when he has not the power or ability, is to 
talk nonsense. Edwards himself holds that ability to do, is indispensa- 
ble to liberty to do. But if ability to do be a sine qua non of liberty to 
do, must not the same be true of willing ? That is, must not ability to 
will be essential to liberty to will ? Natural ability and natural liberty 
to will, must then be identical. Let this be distinctly remembered, since 



NATURAL ABILITY. 325 

many have scouted the doctrine of natural ability to obey God, who have 
nevertheless been great sticklers for the freedom of the will. In this 
they are greatly inconsistent. This ability is called a natural ability, 
because it belongs to man as a moral agent, in such a sense that without 
it he could not be a proper subject of command, of reward or punish- 
ment. That is, without this liberty or ability he could not be a moral 
agent, and a proper subject of moral government. He must then either 
possess this power in himself as essential to his own nature, or must 
possess power, or be able to avail himself of power to will in every in- 
stance in accordance with moral obligation. Whatever he can do, he 
can do only by willing ; he must therefore either possess the power 
in himself directly to will as God commands, or he must be able by 
willing it to avail himself of power, and to make himself willing. If 
he has power by nature to will directly as God requires, or by willing 
to avail himself of power so to will, he is naturally free and able to obey 
the commandments of God. Then let it be borne distinctly in mind, 
that natural ability, about which so much has been said, is nothing 
more nor less than the freedom or liberty of the will of a moral agent. 
No man knows what he says or whereof he affirms, who holds to the one 
and denies the other, for they are truly and properly identical. 

VI. The human will is free, therefore men have power or ability to do 
all their duty. 

1. The moral government of God everywhere assumes and implies 
the liberty of the human will, and the natural ability of men to obey 
God. Every command, every threatening, every expostulation and de- 
nunciation in the Bible implies and assumes this. JSTor does the Bible 
do violence to the human intelligence in this assumption ; for, — 

2. The human mind necessarily assumes the freedom of the human 
will as a first truth. 

First truths, let it be remembered, are those that are necessarily as- 
sumed by every moral agent. They are assumed always and necessarily 
by a law of the intelligence, although they may seldom be the direct ob- 
jects of thought or attention. It is a universal law of the intelligence, to 
assume the truths of causality, the existence and the infinity of space, 
the existence and infinity of duration, and many other truths. These 
assumptions every moral agent always and necessarily takes with him, 
whether these things are matters of attention or not. And even should 
he deny any one or all of these first truths, he knows them to be true 
notwithstanding, and cannot but assume their truth in all his practical 
judgments. Thus, should any one deny the law and the doctrine of 
causality, as some in theory have done, he knows, and cannot but know, 
— he assumes, and cannot but assume, its truth at every moment. With- 



326 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

oat this assumption he could not so much as intend, or think of doing, 
or of any one else doing anything whatever. But a great part of his 
time, he may not, and does not, make this law a distinct object of thought 
or attention. Nor is he directly conscious of the assumption that there 
is such a law. He acts always upon the assumption, and a great part of 
his time is insensible of it. His whole activity is only the exercise of his 
own causality, and a practical acknowledgment of the truth, which in 
theory he may deny. JSTow just so it is with the freedom of the will, and 
with natural ability. Did we not assume our own liberty and ability, we 
should never think of attempting to do anything. We should not so 
much as think of moral obligation, either as it respects ourselves or others, 
unless we assumed the liberty of the human will. In all our judgments 
respecting our own moral character and that of others, we always and 
necessarily assume the liberty of the human will, or natural ability to obey 
God. Although we may not be distinctly conscious of this assumption, 
though we may seldom make the liberty of the human will the subject 
of direct thought or attention, and even though we may deny its reality, 
and strenuously endeavor to maintain the opposite, we, nevertheless, in 
this very denial and endeavor, assume that we are free. This truth never 
was, and never can be rejected in our practical judgments. All men 
assume it. All men must assume it. Whenever they choose in one di- 
rection, they always assume, whether conscious of the assumption or not, 
and cannot but assume, that they have power to will in the opposite 
direction. Did they not assume this, such a thing as election between 
two ways or objects would not be, and could not be, so much as thought 
of. The very ideas of right and wrong, of the praiseworthiness, and 
blameworthiness of human beings, imply the assumption, on the part of 
those who have these ideas, of the universal freedom of the human will, 
or of the natural ability of men as moral agents to obey God. Were not 
this assumption in the mind, it were impossible from its own nature and 
laws that it should affirm moral obligation, right or wrong, praiseworthi- 
ness or blameworthiness of men. I know that philosophers and theolo- 
gians have in theory denied the doctrine of natural ability or liberty, in 
the sense in which I have defined it ; and I know, too, that with all their 
theorizing, they did assume, in common with all other men, that man is 
free in the sense that he has liberty or power to will as God commands. 
I know that, but for this assumption, the human mind could no more 
predicate praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, right or wrong of man, 
than it could of the motions of a windmill. Men have often made the 
assumption in question without being aware of it, have affirmed right and 
wrong of human willing without seeing and understanding the conditions 
of this affirmation. But the fact is, that in all cases the assumption 
has lain deep in the mind as a first truth, that men are free in the 



NATURAL ABILITY. 327 

sense of being naturally able to obey God : and this assumption is a neces- 
sary condition of the affirmation that moral character belongs to man. 

VII. Wliat constitutes moral inability, according to Edivards and those 
who hold ivith Mm. 

I examine their views of moral inability first in order, because from 
their views of moral inability we ascertain more clearly what are their 
views of moral ability. Edwards regards moral ability and inability as 
identical with moral necessity. Concerning moral necessity, he says, vol. 
ii. pp. 32, 33, " And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that neces- 
sity of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes 
as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there 
is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. 
And it is in this sense that I shall use the phrase moral necessity in the 
following discourse. By natural necessity, as applied to men, I mean 
such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes, as 
distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dis- 
positions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men 
placed in certain circumstances are the subjects of particular sensations 
by necessity. They feel pain when their bodies are wounded ; they see 
the objects presented before them in a clear light when their eyes are 
open : so they assent to the truth of certain propositions as soon as the 
terms are understood ; as that two and two make four, that black is not 
white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another ; so by a natural 
necessity men's bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support 
them. But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds 
of necessity. 1. Moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity. 
That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a 
natural effect is with its natural cause. Whether the will is in every case 
necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the will ever 
makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest 
present inclination or not ; if that matter should be controverted, yet I 
suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclina- 
tion, or the motive presented may be so powerful, that the act of the will 
may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or 
previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty 
in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty 
would be still greater. And therefore if more were still added to their 
strength up to a certain degree, it might make the difficulty so great that 
it would be wholly impossible to surmount it, for this plain reason, be- 
cause whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount diffi- 
culties, yet that power is not infinite, and so goes not beyond certain 
limits. If a certain man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this 



328 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

kind, with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength 
are beyond the degrees of difficulty, yet if the difficulty be increased to 
thirty, or a hundred, or to a thousand degrees, and his strength not also 
increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the diffi- 
culty. As therefore it must be allowed that there may be such a thing 
as a sure and perfect connection between moral causes and effects ; so this 
only is what I call by the name of moral necessity." Page 35, he says : 
" What has been said of natural and moral necessity may serve to explain 
what is intended by natural and moral inability. We are said to be nat- 
urally unable to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because of 
some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in 
the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. 
Moral inability consists not in any of these things, but either in a want 
of inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and 
excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the con- 
trary. Or both these may be resolved into one, and it may be said in one 
word that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclina- 
tion. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through 
a defect of motives or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing 
as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence 
of a contrary inclination in such circumstances, and under the influence 
of such views.'" 

From these quotations, and much more that might be quoted to the 
same purpose, it is plain that Edwards, as the representative of his school, 
holds moral inability to consist, either in an existing choice or attitude 
of the will opposed to that which is required by the law of God, which 
inclination or choice is necessitated by motives in view of the mind, or in 
the absence of such motives as are necessary to cause or necessitate the 
state of choice required by the moral law, or to overcome an opposing 
choice. Indeed he holds these two to be identical. Observe, his words 
are, " Or these may be resolved into one, and it may be said in one word, 
that moral inability consists in opposition or want of inclination. For 
when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect 
of motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of 
an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such cir- 
cumstances and under the influence of such views," that is, in the pres- 
ence of such motives. If there is a present prevalent contrary inclina- 
tion^ it is, according to him : 1. Because there are present certain rea- 
sons that necessitate this contrary inclination ; and 2. Because there are 
not sufficient motives present to the mind to overcome these opposing 
motives and inclination, and to necessitate the will to determine or choose 
in the direction of the law of God. By inclination Edwards means choice 
or volition, as is abundantly evident from what he all along says in this 



NATURAL ABILITY. 329 

connection. This no one will deny who is at all familiar with his 
writings. 

It was the object of the treatise from which the above quotations 
have been made, to maintain that the choice invariably is as the great- 
est apparent good is. And by the greatest apparent good he means, a 
sense of the most agreeable. By which he means, as he says, that the 
sense of the most agreeable, and choice or volition, are identical. Vol. 
h\, page 20, he says, "And therefore it must be true in some sense, that 
the will always is as the greatest apparent good is." "It must be 
observed in what sense I use the term 'good/ namely, as of the same im- 
port with agreeable. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, 
is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind." Again, 
pp. 21, 22, he says : "I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that 
the will always is as the greatest apparent good is, or as what appears 
most agreeable, than to say that the will is determined by the greatest 
apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable ; because an appearing 
most agreeable to the mind and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely dis- 
tinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly 
be said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate consequence 
of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agree- 
able, than the choice itself." Thus it appears that the sense of the most 
agreeable, and choice or volition, according to Edwards, are the same 
things. Indeed, Edwards throughout confounds desire and volition, 
making them the same thing. Edwards regarded the mind as possessing 
but two primary faculties — the will and the understanding. He con- 
founded all the states of the sensibility with acts of will. The strongest 
desire is with him always identical with volition or choice, and not merely 
that which determines choice. When there is a want of inclination or 
desire, or the sense of the most agreeable, there is a moral inability ac- 
cording to the Edwardean philosophy. This want of the strongest de- 
sire, inclination, or sense of the most agreeable, is always owing ; 1. To 
the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite desire, choice, 
etc.; and 2. To the want of such objective motives as shall awaken this 
required desire, or necessitate this inclination or sense of the most agree- 
able. In other words, when volition or choice, in consistency with the 
law of God, does not exist, it is, 1. Because an opposite choice exists, and 
is necessitated by the presence of some motive ; and 2. For want of 
sufficiently strong objective motives to necessitate the required choice or 
volition. Let it be distinctly understood and remembered, that Edwards 
held that motive, and not the agent, is the cause of all actions of the 
will. Will, with him, is always determined in its choice by motives as 
really as physical effects are produced by their causes. The differ- 
ence with him in the connection of moral and physical causes and 



330 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

effects "lies not in the nature of the connection, but in the terms 
connected." 

"That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently (by 
what has already been proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, 
and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is 
evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some 
motive, which is manifest ; because, if the mind, in willing after the 
manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no 
end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing ; it aims at nothing, 
and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it does not go after 
anything, or exert any inclination or preference towards anything ; which 
brings the matter to a contradiction ; because for the mind to will some- 
thing, and for it to go after something by an act of preference and in- 
clination, are the same thing. 

" But if every act of the will is excited by a motive, then that motive 
is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by motives, 
then motives are the causes of their being excited ; or, which is the same 
thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts 
of the will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do nothing, 
as motives or inducements, but by their influence ; and so much as is 
done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of 
an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of something 
else. 

"And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they 
are necessarily connected with their motives ; every effect and event 
being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the 
proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest that voli- 
tion is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the 
will."— Vol. ii./pp. 86,87. 

Moral inability, then, according to this school, consists in a want of 
inclination, desire, or sense of the most agreeable, or the strength of an 
opposite desire or sense of the most agreeable. This want of inclination, 
etc., or this opposing inclination, etc., are identical with an opposing 
choice or volition. This opposing choice or inclination, or this want of 
the required choice, inclination, or sense of the most agreeable is owing, 
according to Edwards, 1. To the presence of such motives as to necessi- 
tate the opposing choice ; and 2. To the absence of sufficient motives to 
beget or necessitate them. Here then we have the philosophy of this 
school. The will or agent is unable to choose as God requires in all 
cases, when, 1. There are present such motives as to necessitate an oppo- 
site choice ; and, 2. When there is not such a motive or such motives in 
the view of the mind, as to determine or necessitate the required choice 
or volition ; that is, to awaken a desire, or to create an inclination or 



NATURAL ABILITY. 331 

sense of the agreeable stronger than any existing and opposing desire, 
inclination, or sense of agreeable. This is the moral inability of the 
Edwardeans. 

VIII. Their moral inability to obey God consists in real disobedience 
and a natural inability to obey. 

1. If we understand Edwardeans to mean that moral inability con- 
sists, — 

(1.) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite 
choice ; and, — 

(2.) In the want or absence of sufficient motives to necessitate choice 
or volition, or, which is the same thing, a sense of the most agreeable, or 
an inclination, then their moral inability is a proper natural inability. 
Edwards says, he " calls it a moral inability, because it is an inability of 
will." But by his own showing, the will is the only executive faculty. 
Whatever a man can do at all, he can accomplish by willing, and what- 
ever he cannot accomplish by willing he cannot accomplish at all. An 
inability to will then must be a natural inability. We are, by nature, 
unable to do what we are unable to will to do. Besides, according to 
Edwards, moral obligation respects strictly only acts of will, and willing 
is the doing that is prohibited or required by the moral law. To be un- 
able to will then, is to be unable to do. To be unable to will as God re- 
quires, is to be unable, to do what he requires, and this surely is a proper, 
and the only proper natural inability. 

2. But if we are to understand this school, as maintaining that moral 
inability to obey God, consists in a want of the inclination, choice, de- 
sire, or sense of the most agreeable that God requires, or in an inclination 
or existing choice, volition, or sense of the most agreeable, which is 
opposed to the requirement of God, this surely is really identical with 
disobedience, and their moral inability to obey consists in disobedience. 
For, be it distinctly remembered, that Edwards holds, as we have seen, 
that obedience and disobedience, properly speaking, can be predicated 
only of acts of will. If the required state of the will exists, there is 
obedience. If it does not exist, there is disobedience. Therefore, by 
his own admission and express holding, if by moral inability we are to 
understand a state of the will not conformed, or, which is the same 
thing, opposed to the law and will of God, this moral inability is nothing 
else than disobedience to God. A moral inability to obey is identical 
with disobedience. It is not merely the cause of future or present dis- 
obedience, but really constitutes the whole of present disobedience. 

3. But suppose that we understand his moral inability to consist both: 
in the want of an inclination, choice, volition, etc., or in the existence of 
an opposing state of the will, and also, — 



332 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(1.) In the presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite 
choice, and, — 

(2. ) In the want of sufficient motives to overcome the opposing state, 
and necessitate the required choice, volition, etc., then his views stand 
thus : moral inability to choose as God commands, consists in the want of 
this choice, or in the existence of an opposite choice, which want of choice, 
or, which is the same thing with him, which opposite choice is caused : — 

(i. ) By the presence of such motives as to necessitate the opposite 
choice, and, — 

(ii.) By the absence of such motives as would necessitate the required 
choice. Understand him which way you will, his moral inability is real 
disobedience, and is in the highest sense a proper natural inability to 
obey. The cause of choice or volition he always seeks, and thinks or as- 
sumes that he finds, in the objective motive, and never for once ascribes 
it to the sovereignty or freedom of the agent. Choice or volition is an 
event, and must have some cause. He assumes that the objective motive 
was the cause, when, as consciousness testifies, the agent is himself the 
cause. Here is the great error of Edwards. Edwards assumed that no 
agent whatever, not even God himself, possesses a power of self-determi- 
nation, that the will of God and of all moral agents is determined, not by 
themselves, but by an objective motive. If they will in one direction 
or another, it is not from any free and sovereign self-determination in 
view of motives, but because the motives or inducements present to the 
mind, inevitably produce or necessitate the sense of the most agreeable, 
or choice. If this is not fatalism or natural necessity, what is ? 

IX. This pretended distinction between natural and moral inability is 
nonsensical. 

What does it amount to ? Why this : — 

1. This natural inability is an inability to do as we will, or to execute 
our volitions. 

2. This moral inability is an inability to will. 

3. This moral inability is the only natural inability that has, or can 
have, anything to do with duty, or with morality and religion ; or, as has 
been shown,— 

4. It consists in disobedience itself. Present moral inability to obey is 
identical with present disobedience, with a natural inability to obey ! It 
is amazing to see how so great and good a man could involve himself in 
a metaphysical fog, and bewilder himself and his readers to such a degree, 
that an absolutely senseless distinction should pass into the current 
phraseology, philosophy, and theology of the church, and a score of theo- 
logical dogmas be built upon the assumption of its truth. This nonsen- 
sical distinction has been in the mouth of the Edwardean school of theo- 



NATURAL ABILITY. 333 

logians, from Edwards's day to the present. Both saints and sinners 
have been bewildered, and, I must say, abused by it. Men have been 
told that they are as really unable to will as God directs, as they were to 
create themselves ; and when it is replied that this inability excuses the 
sinner, we are directly silenced by the assertion, that this is only a moral 
inability, or an inability of will, and therefore, that it is so far from ex- 
cusing the sinner, that it constitutes the very ground, and substance, and 
whole of his guilt. Indeed ! Men are under moral obligation only to 
will as God directs. But an inability thus to will, consisting in the 
absence of such motives as would necessitate the required choice, or the 
presence of such motives as to necessitate an opposite choice, is a moral 
inability, and really constitutes the sinner worthy of an M exceeding great 
and eternal weight " of damnation ! Eidiculous ! Edwards I revere ; 
his blunders I deplore. I speak thus of this Treatise on the Will, be- 
cause, while it abounds with unwarrantable assumptions, distinctions 
without a difference, and metaphysical subtleties, it has been adopted as 
the text-book of a multitude of what are called Calvinistic divines for 
scores of years. It has bewildered the head, and greatly embarrassed the 
heart and the action of the church of God. It is time, high time, that 
its errors should be exposed, and so exploded, that such phraseology 
should be laid aside, and the ideas which these words represent should 
cease to be entertained. 

X. What constitutes moral ability according to this school f 

It is of course the opposite of moral inability. Moral ability, according 
to them, consists in willingness, with the cause of it. That is, moral 
ability to obey God consists in that inclination, desire, choice, volition, 
or sense of the most agreeable, which God requires together with its cause. 
Or it consists in the presence of such motives as do actually necessitate 
the above-named state or determination of the will. Or, more strictly, 
it consists in this state caused by the presence of these motives. This is 
as exact a statement of their views as I can make. According to this, 
a man is morally able to do as he does, and is necessitated to do, or, he 
is morally able to will as he does will, and as he cannot help willing. 
He is morally able to will in this manner, simply and only because he is 
caused thus to will by the presence of such motives as are, according to 
them, "indissolubly connected " with such a willing by a law of nature 
and necessity. But this conducts us to the conclusion, — 

XI. Their moral ability to obey God is nothing else than real obedience 
and a natural inability to disobey. 

Strictly, this moral ability includes both the state of will required by 
the law of God, and also the cause of this state, to wit, the presence of 



334 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

such motives as necessitate the inclination, choice, volition, or sense of 
the most agreeable, that God requires. The agent is able thus to will 
because he is caused thus to will. Or more strictly, his ability, and his 
inclination or willing, are identical. Or still further, according to Ed- 
wards, his moral ability thus to will and his thus willing, and the pres- 
ence of the motives that cause this willing, are identical. This is a sub- 
lime discovery in philosophy ; a most transcendental speculation ! I 
would not treat these notions as ridiculous, were they not truly so, or 
if I could treat them in any other manner, and still do them anything like 
justice. If, where the theory is plainly stated, it appears ridiculous, the 
fault is not in me, but in the theory itself. I know it is trying to you, 
as it is to me, to connect anything ridiculous with so great and so revered 
a name as that of President Edwards. But if a blunder of his has en- 
tailed perplexity and error on the church, surely his great and good soul 
would now thank the hand that should blot out the error from under 
heaven. 

Thus, when closely examined, this long established and venerated 
fog-bank vanishes away ; and this famed distinction between moral and 
natural ability and inability, is found to be "a thing of nought." 

XII. / will state what 1 consider to ~be the fundamental errors of 
Edwards and his school upon the subject of ability. 

1. He denied that moral agents are the causes of their own actions. 
He started, of course, with the just assumption, that every event is 
an effect, and must have some cause. The choices and volitions of moral 
agents are effects of some cause. What is that cause ? He assumed that 
every act of will must have been caused by a preceding one, or by the 
objective motive. By the reductio ad absurdum, he easily showed the 
absurdity of the first hypothesis, and consequently assumed the truth of 
the last. £>ut how does he know that the sovereign power of the agent 
is not the cause ? His argument against self-determination amounts to 
nothing ; for it is, in fact, only a begging of the whole question. If we 
are conscious of anything, we are of the affirmation that we do, in fact, 
originate our own choices and volitions. Edwards, as really as any 
other man, believed himself to originate and be the proper cause of 
his own volitions. In his practical judgment he assumed his own cau- 
sality, and the proper causality of all moral agents, or he never could 
have had so much as a conception of moral agency and accountability. 
But in theory, he adopted the capital error of denying the proper causality 
of moral agents. This error is fundamental. Every definition of a moral 
agent that denies or overlooks, his proper causality is radically defective. 
It drops out of the definition the very element that we necessarily affirm 
to be essential to liberty and accountability. Denying, as he did, the 



NATURAL ABILITY. 335 

proper causality of moral agents, he was driven to give a false definition 
of free agency, as has been shown. Edwards rightly regarded the 
choices and volitions of moral agents as effects, but he looks in the 
wrong direction for the cause. Instead of heeding the affirmation of his 
own mind that causality, or the power of self-determination, is a sine 
qua non of moral agency, he assumed, in theorizing, the direct opposite, 
and sought for the cause of choice and volition out of the agent, and in 
the objective motive ; thus, in fact, denying the validity of the testi- 
mony of the pure reason, and reducing moral agents to mere machines. 
No wonder that so capital an error, and defended with so much ability, 
should have led one of his own sons into scepticism. But the piety 
of the president was stronger than even his powerful logic. Assuming 
a false major premise, his straightforward logic conducted him to the 
dogma of a universal necessity. But his well-developed reason, and 
deep piety of heart, controlled his practical judgment, so that few men 
have practically held the doctrines of accountability and retribution 
with a firmer grasp. 

2. Edwards adopted the Lockean philosophy. He regarded the mind 
as possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and the will. 
He considered all the desires, emotions, affections, appetites, and passions 
as voluntary, and as really consisting in acts of will. This confounding 
of the states of the sensibility with acts of the will, I regard as another 
fundamental error of his whole system of philosophy, so far as it respects 
the liberty of the will, or the doctrine of ability. Being conscious that 
the emotions, which he calls affections, the desires, the appetites and 
passions, were so correlated to their appropriate objects, that they are 
excited by the presence or contemplation of them, and assuming them to 
be voluntary states of mind, or actions of the will, he very naturally, and 
with this assumption, necessarily and justly, concluded, that the will 
was governed or decided by the objective motive. Assuming as he 
did that the mind has but two faculties, understanding and will, and 
that every state of feeling and of mind that did not belong to the under- 
standing, must be a voluntary state or act of will, and being conscious 
that his feelings, desires, affections, appetites and passions, were excited 
by the contemplation of their correlated objects, he could consistently 
come to no other conclusion than that the will is determined by motives, 
and that choice always is as the most agreeable is. 

XIII. 1 will noiu present another scheme of inability and its philosophy. 

1. This philosophy properly distinguishes between the will and the 
sensibility. It regards the mind as possessing three primary departments, 
powers, or susceptibilities, the intellect, the sensibility, and the will. It 
does not always call these departments or susceptibilities by these names, 



336 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

but if I -understand them, the abetters of this philosophy hold to their 
existence, by whatever name they may call them. 

2. This philosophy also holds, that the states of the intellect and of 
the sensibility are passive and involuntary. 

3. It holds that freedom of will is a condition of moral agency. 

4. It also teaches that the will is free, and consequently that man is 
a free moral agent. 

5. It teaches that the will controls the outward life and the attention 
of the intellect, directly, and many of the emotions, desires, affections, 
appetites, and passions, or many states of the sensibility, indirectly. 

6. It teaches that men have ability to obey God so far as acts of will 
are concerned, and also so far as those acts and states of mind are con- 
cerned that are under the direct or indirect control of the will. 

7. But it holds that moral obligation may, and in the case of man at 
least, does extend beyond moral agency and beyond the sphere of ability ; 
that ability or freedom of will is essential to moral agency, but that free- 
dom of will or moral agency does not limit moral obligation ; that moral 
agency and moral obligation are not co-extensive ; consequently that 
moral obligation is not limited by ability or by moral agency. 

8. This philosophy asserts that moral obligation extends to those 
states of mind that lie wholly beyond or without the sphere or control of 
the will ; that it extends not merely to voluntary acts and states, together 
with all acts and states that come within the direct or indirect control of 
the will, but, as was said, it insists that those mental states that lie wholly 
beyond the will's direct or indirect control, come within the pale of moral 
legislation and obligation : and that therefore obligation is not limited by 
ability. 

9. This philosophy seems to have been invented to reconcile the doc- 
trine of original sin, in the sense of a sinful nature, or of constitutional 
moral depravity, with moral obligation. Assuming that original sin in 
this sense is a doctrine of divine revelation, it takes the bold and uncom- 
promising ground already stated, namely, that moral obligation is not 
merely co-extensive with moral agency and ability, but extends beyond 
both into the region of those mental states that lie entirely without the 
will's direct or indirect control. 

10. This bold assertion the abetters of this philosophy attempt to 
support by an appeal to the necessary convictions of men and to the au- 
thority of the Bible. They allege that the instinctive judgments of men, 
as well as the Bible, everywhere assume and affirm moral obligation and 
moral character of the class of mental states in question. 

11. They admit that a physical inability is a bar to or inconsistent 
with moral obligation : but they of course deny that the inability to 
which they hold is physical. 



NATURAL ABILITY. 337 

XIV. This "brings us to a brief consideration of the claims of this 
philosophy of inability. 

1. It is based upon a petitio principii, or a begging of the question. 
It assumes that the instinctive or irresistible and universal judgments of 
men, together with the Bible, assert and assume that moral obligation 
and moral character extend to the states of mind in question. It is ad- 
mitted that the teachings of the Bible are to be relied upon. It is also 
admitted that the first truths of reason, or what this philosophy calls the 
instinctive and necessary judgments of all men, must be true. But it is 
not admitted that the assertion in question is a doctrine of the Bible or a 
first truth of reason. On the contrary both are denied. It is denied, at 
least by me, that either reason or divine revelation affirms moral obliga- 
tion or moral character of any state of mind, that lies wholly beyond both 
the direct and the indirect control of the will. Now this philosophy 
must not be allowed to beg the question in debate. Let it be shown, if 
it can be, that the alleged truth is either a doctrine of the Bible or a first 
truth of reason. Both reason and revelation do assert and assume, that 
moral obligation and moral character extend to acts of will, and to all 
those outward acts or mental states that lie within its direct or indirect 
control. "But further these deponents say not." Men are conscious of 
moral obligation in respect to these acts and states of mind, and of guilt 
when they fail, in these respects, to comply with moral obligation. But 
who ever blamed himself for pain, when, without his fault, he received a 
blow, or was seized with the tooth-ache, or a fit of bilious colic ? 

2. Let us inquire into the nature of this inability. Observe, it is ad- 
mitted by this school that a physical inability is inconsistent with moral 
obligation — in other words, that physical ability is a condition of moral 
obligation. But what is a physical inability ? The primary definition of 
the adjective physical, given by Webster, is, "pertaining to nature, or 
natural objects." A physical inability then, in the primary sense of the 
term physical, is an inability of nature. It may be either a material or a 
mental inability ; that is, it may be either an inability of body or mind. 
It is admitted by the school whose views we are canvassing, that all hu- 
man causality or ability resides in the will, and therefore that there is a 
proper inability of nature to perform anything that does not come within 
the sphere of the direct or indirect causality of, or control of the will. It 
is plain, therefore, that the inability for which they contend must be a 
proper natural inability, or inability of nature. This they fully admit 
and maintain. But this they do not call a physical inability. But why 
do they not ? Why, simply because it would, by their own admissions, 
overthrow their favorite position. They seem to assume that a physical 
inability must be a material inability. But where is the authority for 

22 



338 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

such an assumption ? There is no authority for it. A proper inability 
of nature must be a physical inability, as opposed to moral inability, or 
there is no meaning in language. It matters not at all whether the ina- 
bility belongs to the material organism, or to the mind. If it be consti- 
tutional, and properly an inability of nature, it is nonsense to deny that 
this is a physical inability, or to maintain that it can be consistent with 
moral obligation. It is in vain to reply that this inability, though a real 
inability of nature, is not physical but moral, because a sinful inability. 
This is another begging of the question. 

The school whose views I am examining, maintain, that this inability 
is founded in the first sin of Adam. His first sin plunged himself and 
his posterity, descending from him by a natural law, into a total inability 
of nature to render any obedience to God. This first sin of Adam en- 
tailed a nature on all his posterity " wholly sinful in every faculty and 
part of soul and body." This constitutional sinfulness that belongs to 
every faculty and part of soul and body, constitutes the inability of which 
we are treating. But mark, it is not physical inability, because it is a 
sinful inability ! Important theological distinction ! — as truly wonderful, 
surely, as any of the subtleties of the Jesuits. But if this inability is 
sinful, it is important to inquire, Whose sin is it ? Who is to blame for 
it ? Why to be sure, we are told that it is the sin of him upon whom it 
is thus entailed by the natural law of descent from parent to child with- 
out his knowledge or consent. This sinfulness of nature, entirely irre- 
spective of, and previous to any actual transgression, renders its possessor 
worthy of and exposed to the wrath and curse of God for ever. This sin- 
fulness, observe, is transmitted by a natural or physical law from Adam, 
but it is not a physical inability. It is something that inheres in, and 
belongs to every faculty and part of soul and body. It is transmitted by 
a physical law from parent to child. It is, therefore, and must be a phys- 
ical thing. But yet we are told that it cannot be a physical inability, 
because first, it is sinful, or sin itself ; and, secondly, because a physical 
inability is a bar to, or inconsistent with, moral obligation. Here, then, 
we have their reasons for not admitting this to be a physical inability. 
It would in this case render moral obligation an impossibility ; and, be- 
sides, if a bar to moral obligation, it could not be sinful. But it is sinful, 
it is said, therefore it cannot be physical. But how do we know that it 
is sinful ? Why, we are told, that the instinctive judgments of men, and 
the Bible everywhere affirm and assume it. We are told, that both the 
instinctive judgments of men and the Bible affirm and assume, both the 
inability in question and the sinfulness of it ; " that we ought to be able, 
but are not ;" that is, that we are so much to blame for this inability of 
nature entailed upon us without our knowledge or consent, by a physical 
necessity, as to deserve the wrath and curse of God for ever. We are 



NATURAL ABILITY. 33-9 

under a moral obligation not to have this sinful nature. We deserve 
damnation for having it. To be sure, we are entirely unable to put it 
away, and had no agency whatever in its existence. But what of that ? 
We are told, that " moral obligation is not limited by ability ;" that our 
being as unable to change our nature as we are to create a world, is no 
reason why we should not be under obligation to do it, since " moral ob- 
ligation does not imply ability of any kind to do what we are under obli- 
gation to do ! "... . I was about to expose the folly and absurdity of 
these assertions, but hush ! It is not allowable, we are told, to reason on 
this subject. We shall deceive ourselves if we listen to the "miserable 
logic of our understandings." We must fall back, then, upon the intui- 
tive affirmations of reason and the Bible. Here, then, we are willing to 
lodge our appeal. The Bible defines sin to be a transgression of the law. 
What law have we violated in inheriting this nature ? What law requires 
us to have a different nature from that which we possess ? Does reason 
affirm that we are deserving of the wrath and curse of God for ever, for 
inheriting from Adam a sinful nature ? 

What law of reason have we transgressed in inheriting this nature ? 
Eeason cannot condemn us, unless we have violated some law which it 
can recognize as such. Eeason indignantly rebukes such nonsense. Does 
the Bible hold us responsible for impossibilities ? Does it require of us 
what we cannot do by willing to do it ? Nay, verily ; but it expressly 
affirms, that " if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to 
that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." The plain 
meaning of this passage is, that if one wills as God directs, he has thereby 
met all his obligation ; that he has done all that is naturally possible to 
him, and therefore nothing more is required. In this passage, the Bible 
expressly limits obligation by ability. This we have repeatedly seen in 
former lectures. The law also, as we have formerly seen, limits obliga- 
tion by ability. It requires only that we should love the Lord with all 
our strength, that is, with all our ability, and our neighbor as ourselves. 

Does reason hold us responsible for impossibilities, or affirm our obli- 
gation to do, or be, what it is impossible for us to do and be ? No in- 
deed ! Reason never did and never can condemn us for our nature, and 
hold us worthy of the wrath and curse of God for possessing it. Nothing 
is more shocking and revolting to reason, than such assumptions as are 
made by the philosophy in question. This every man's consciousness 
must testify. 

But is it not true that some, at least, do intelligently condemn them- 
selves for their nature, and adjudge themselves to be worthy of the wrath 
and curse of God for ever for its sinfulness ? The framers of the West- 
minster Confession of Faith made this affirmation in words, at least ; 
whether intelligently or unintelligently,- we are left to inquire. The 



340 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

reason of a moral agent condemning himself, and adjudging himself 
worthy of the wrath and curse of God for ever, for possessing a nature 
entailed on him by a natural law, without his knowledge or consent ! 
This can never be. 

But is it not true, as is affirmed, that men instinctively and neces- 
sarily affirm their obligation to be able to obey God, while they at the 
same time affirm that they are not able ? I answer, no. They affirm 
themselves to be under obligation simply, and only, because deeply in 
their inward being lies the assumption that they are able to comply with 
the requirements of God. They are conscious of ability to will, and of 
power to control their outward life directly, and the states of the intel- 
lect and of their sensibility, either directly or indirectly, by willing. 
Upon this consciousness they found the affirmation of obligation, and of 
praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness in respect to these acts and states 
of mind. But for the consciousness of ability, no affirmation of moral 
obligation, or of praise-worthiness or blame-worthiness, were possible. 

But do not those who affirm both their inability and their obligation, 
deceive themselves ? I answer, yes. It is common for persons to over- 
look assumptions that lie, so to speak, at the bottom of their minds. 
This has been noticed in former lectures, and need not be here repeated. 

It is true indeed that God requires of men, especially under the 
gospel, what they are unable to do directly in their own strength. Or 
more strictly speaking, he requires them to lay hold on his strength, or 
to avail themselves of his grace, as the condition of being what he re- 
quires them to be. With strict propriety, it cannot be said that in this, 
or in any case, he requires directly any more than we are able directly to 
do. The direct requirement in the case under consideration, is to avail 
ourselves of, or to lay hold upon his strength. This we have power to 
do. He requires us to lay hold upon his grace and strength, and 
thereby to rise to a higher knowledge of himself, and to a consequent 
higher state of holiness than would be otherwise possible to us. The 
direct requirement is to believe, or to lay hold upon his strength, or to 
receive the Holy Spirit, or Christ, who stands at the door, and knocks, 
and waits for admission. The indirect requirement is to rise to a degree 
of knowledge of God, and to spiritual attainments that are impossible to 
us in our own strength. We have ability to obey the direct command 
directly, and the indirect command indirectly. That is, we are able by 
virtue of our nature, together with the proffered grace of the Holy 
Spirit, to comply with all the requirements of God. So that in fact 
there is no proper inability about it. 

But are not men often conscious of there being much difficulty in the 
way of rendering to God all that we affirm ourselves under obligation to 
render ? I answer, yes. But strictly speaking, they must admit their 



GRACIOUS ABILITY. 341 

direct or indirect ability, as a condition of affirming their obligation. 
This difficulty, arising out of their physical depravity, and the power of 
temptation from without, is the foundation or cause of the spiritual war- 
fare of which the Scriptures speak, and of which all Christians are con- 
scious. But the Bible abundantly teaches, that through grace we are 
able to be more than conquerors. If we are able to be this through 
grace, we are able to avail ourselves of the provisions of grace, so that 
there is no proper inability in the case. However great the difficulties 
may be, we are able through Christ to overcome them all. This we 
must and do assume as the condition of the affirmation of obligation. 



LECTURE XXXII. 

GRACIOUS ABILITY. 



Grace is unmerited favor. Its exercise consists in bestowing that 
which, without a violation of justice, might be withheld. 

Ability to obey God, as we have seen, is the possession of power 
adequate to the performance of that which is required. If, then, the 
terms are used in the proper sense, by a gracious ability must be intended 
that the power which men at present possess to obey the commands of 
God, is a gift of grace relatively to the command ; that is, the bestow- 
ment of power adequate to the performance of the thing required, is a 
matter of grace as opposed to justice. 

I. I will show what is intended by the term gracious ability. 

The abettors of this scheme hold that by the first sin of Adam, 
he, together with all his posterity, lost all natural power and all ability 
of every kind to obey God ; that therefore they were, as a race, wholly 
unable to obey the moral law, or to render to God any acceptable service 
whatever ; that is, that they became, as a consequence of the sin of 
Adam, wholly unable to use the powers of nature in any other way than 
to sin. They were able to sin or to disobey God, but entirely unable to 
obey him ; that they did not lose all power to act, but that they had 
power to act only in one direction, that is, in opposition to the will and 
law of God. By a gracious ability they intend, that in consequence 
of the atonement of Christ, God has graciously restored to man ability to 
accept the terms of mercy, or to fulfil the conditions of acceptance with 
God ; in other words, that by the gracious aid of the Holy Spirit which, 
upon condition of the atonement, God has given to every member of the 



342 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

human family, all men are endowed with a gracious ability to obey God. 
By a gracious ability is intended, then, that ability or power to obey 
God, which all men now possess, not by virtue of their own nature 
or constitutional powers, but by virtue of the indwelling and gracious 
influence of the Holy Spirit, gratuitously bestowed upon man in conse- 
quence of the atonement of Christ. The inability, or total loss of 
all natural power to obey God into which men as a race fell by the first 
sin of Adam, they call original sin ; perhaps more strictly, this inability 
is a consequence of that original sin into which man fell ; which original 
sin itself consisted in the total corruption of man's whole nature. They 
hold, that by the atonement Christ made satisfaction for original sin, in 
such a sense that the inability resulting from it is removed, and that 
now men are by gracious aid able to obey and accept the terms of salva- 
tion. That is, they are able to repent and believe the gospel. In short, 
they are able, by virtue of this gracious ability, to do their duty, or to 
obey God. This, if I understand these theologians, is a fair statement 
of their doctrine of gracious ability. 

II. TJlis doctrine of a gracious ability is an absurdity. 

The question is not whether, as a matter of fact, men ever do obey 
God without the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. I hold that they do 
not. So the fact of the Holy Spirit's gracious influence being exerted in 
every case of human obedience, is not a question in debate between those 
who maintain, and those who deny the doctrine of gracious ability, in 
the sense above explained. The question in debate is not whether men 
do, in any case, use the powers of nature in the manner that God re- 
quires, without the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, but whether 
they are naturally able so to use them. Is the fact, that they never 
do so use them without a gracious divine influence, to be ascribed to 
absolute inability, or to the fact that, from the beginning, they univer- 
sally and voluntarily consecrate their powers to the gratification of self, 
and that therefore they will not, unless they are divinely persuaded, 
by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, in any case turn and conse- 
crate their powers to the service of God ? If this doctrine of natural 
inability and of gracious ability be true, it inevitably follows : — 

1. That but for the atonement of Christ, and the consequent bestow- 
ment of a gracious ability, no one of Adam's race could ever have been 
capable of sinning. For in this case the whole race would have been 
wholly destitute of any kind or degree of ability to obey God. Conse- 
quently they could not have been subjects of moral government, and 
of course their actions could have had no moral character. It is a first- 
truth of reason, a truth everywhere and by all men necessarily assumed 
in their practical judgments, that a subject of moral government must 



GRACIOUS ABILITY. 34:3 

be a moral agent, or that moral agency is a necessary condition of any 
one's being a subject of a moral government. And in the practical 
judgment of men, it matters not at all whether^ a being ever was a moral 
agent, or not. If by any means whatever he has ceased to be a moral 
agent, men universally and necessarily assume, that it is impossible 
for him to be a subject of moral government any more than a horse 
can be such a subject. Suppose he has by his own fault made himself 
an idiot or a lunatic ; all men know absolutely, and in their practical 
judgment assume, that in this state he is not, and cannot be a subject 
of moral government. They know that in this state, moral character 
cannot justly be predicated of his actions. His guilt in thus depriving 
himself of moral agency may be exceeding great, and his guilt in thus 
depriving himsef of moral agency may equal the sum of all the default 
of which it is the cause, — but be a moral agent, be under moral obliga- 
tion, in this state of dementation or insanity, he cannot. This is a first- 
truth of reason, irresistibly and universally assumed by all men. If 
therefore Adam's posterity had by their own personal act cast away and 
deprived themselves of all ability to obey God, in this state they would 
have ceased to be moral agents, and consequently they could have sinned 
no more. But the case under consideration is not the one just supposed, 
but is one where moral agency was not cast away by the agent himself. 
It is one where moral agency was never, and never could have been 
possessed. In the case under consideration, Adam's posterity, had he 
ever had any, would never have possessed any power to obey God, or to 
do anything acceptable to him. Consequently, they never could have 
sustained to God the relation of subjects of his moral government. Of 
course they never could have had moral character ; right or wrong, in a 
moral sense, never could have been predicated of their actions. 

2. It must follow from this doctrine of gracious ability and natural 
inability, that mankind lost their freedom, or the liberty of will in the 
first sin of Adam ; that both Adam himself, and all his posterity would 
and could have sustained to God only the relation of necessary, as opposed 
to free, agents, had not God bestowed upon them a gracious ability. 

But that either Adam or his posterity lost their freedom or free 
agency by the first sin of Adam, is not only a sheer but an absurd as- 
sumption, To be sure Adam fell into a state of total alienation from the 
law of God, and lapsed into a state of supreme selfishness. His posterity 
have unanimously followed his example. He and they have become dead 
in trespasses and sins. Now that this death in sin either consists in, or 
implies, the loss of free agency, is the very thing to be proved. But this 
cannot be proved. I have so fully discussed the subject of human moral 
depravity or sinfulness on a former occasion, as to render it unnecessary 
to enlarge upon it here. 



344 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

3. Again, if it be true, as these theologians affirm, that men have 
only a gracious ability to obey God, and that this gracious ability con- 
sists in the presence and gracious agency of the Holy Spirit, it follows 
that, when the Holy Spirit is withdrawn from man, he is no longer a free 
agent, and from that moment he is incapable of moral action and of 
course can sin no more. Hence, should he live any number of years 
after this withdrawal, neither sin nor holiness, virtue nor vice, praise- 
worthiness nor blameworthiness could be predicated of his conduct. 
The same will and must be true of all his future eternity. 

4. If the doctrine in question be true, it follows, that from the mo- 
ment of the withdrawal of the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, man 
is no longer a subject of moral obligation. It is from that moment absurd 
and unjust to require the performance of any duty of him. Nay to con- 
ceive of him as being any longer a subject of duty ; to think or speak of 
duty as belonging to him, is as absurd as to think or speak of the duty of 
a mere machine. He has, from the moment of the withholding of a gra- 
cious ability, ceased to be a free and become a necessary agent, having 
power to act but in one direction. Such a being can by no possibility be 
capable of sin or holiness. Suppose he still possesses power to act con- 
trary to the letter of the law of G-od ; what then ? This action can have 
no moral character, because, act in some way he must, and he can act in 
no other way. It is nonsense to affirm that such action can be sinful in 
the sense of blameworthy. To affirm that it can, is to contradict a first 
truth of reason. Sinners, then, who have quenched the Holy Spirit, and 
from whom he is wholly withdrawn, are no longer to be blamed for their 
enmity against God, and for all their opposition to him. They are, ac- 
cording to this doctrine, as free from blame as are the motions of a mere 
machine. 

5. Again, if the doctrine in question be true, there is no reason to 
believe that the angels that fell from their allegiance to God ever sinned 
but once. If Adam lost his free agency by the fall, or by his first sin, 
there can be no doubt that the angels did so too. If a gracious ability 
had not been bestowed upon Adam, it is certain, according to the doc- 
trine in question, that he never could have been the subject of moral 
obligation from the moment of his first sin, and consequently, could 
never again have sinned. The same must be true of devils. If by their 
first sin they fell into the condition of necessary agents, having lost their 
free agency, they have never sinned since. That is, moral character 
cannot have been predicable of their conduct since that event, unless a 
gracious ability has been bestowed upon them. That this has been done 
cannot, with even a show of reason, be pretended. The devils, then, ac- 
cording to this doctrine, are not now to blame for all they do to oppose 
God and to ruin souls. Upon the supposition in question, they cannot 



GRACIOUS ABILITY. 345 

help it ; and you might as well blame the winds and the waves for the 
evils which they sometimes do, as blame Satan for what he does. 

fi. If this doctrine be true, there is not, and never will be, any sin in 
hell, for the plain reason, that there are no moral agents there. They 
are necessary agents, unless it be true, that the Holy Spirit and a gra- 
cious ability be continued there. This is not, I believe, contended for by 
the abettors of this scheme. But if they deny to the inhabitants of hell 
freedom of the will, or, which is the same thing, natural ability to obey 
God, they must admit, or be grossly inconsistent, that there is no sin in 
hell, either in men or devils. But is this admission agreeable either to 
reason or revelation ? I know that the abettors of this scheme maintain, 
that God may justly hold both men, from whom a gracious ability is 
withdrawn, and devils, responsible for their conduct, upon the ground 
that they have destroyed their own ability. But suppose this were true 
— that they had rendered themselves idiots, lunatics, or necessary as op- 
posed to free agents, could God justly, could enlightened reason still re- 
gard them as moral agents, and as morally responsible for their conduct ? 
No, indeed ! God and reason may justly blame, and render them miser- 
able, for annihilating their freedom or their moral agency, but to hold 
them still responsible for present obedience, were absurd. 

7. We have seen that the ability of all men of sane mind to obey God, 
is necessarily assumed as a first truth, and that this assumption is from 
the very laws of mind, the indispensable condition of the affirmation, or 
even the conception, that they are subjects of moral obligation ; that, but 
for this assumption, men could not so much as conceive the possibility 
of moral responsibility, and of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. 
If the laws of mind remain unaltered, this is and always will be so. In the 
eternal world and in hell, men and devils must necessarily assume their 
own freedom or ability to obey God, as the condition of their obligation 
to do so, and, consequently of their being capable of sin or holiness. Since 
revelation informs us that men and devils continue to sin in hell, we 
know that there also it must be assumed as a first truth of reason, that 
they are free agents, or that they have natural ability to obey God. 

8. But that a gracious ability to do duty or to obey God is an ab- 
surdity, will further appear, if we consider that it is a first truth of rea- 
son, that moral obligation implies moral agency, and that moral agency 
implies freedom of will ; or in other words, it implies a natural ability to 
comply with obligation. This ability is necessarily regarded by the in- 
telligence as the sine qua non of moral obligation, on the ground of 
natural and immutable justice. A just command always implies an 
ability to obey it. A command to perform a natural impossibility would 
not, and could not, impose obligation. Suppose God should command 
human beings to fly without giving them power ; could such a command 



316 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

impose moral obligation ? No, indeed ! But suppose tie should give 
them power, or promise them power, upon the performance of a condi- 
tion within their reach ; then he might in justice require them to fly, and 
a command to do so would be obligatory. But relatively to the require- 
ment, the bestowment of power would not be grace, but justice. Rela- 
tively to the results or the pleasure of flying, the bestowment of power 
might be gracious. That is, it might be grace in God to give me power 
to fly, that I might have the pleasure and profit of flying ; so that rela- 
tively to the results of flying, the giving of power might be regarded as 
an act of grace. But, if God requires me to fly as a matter of duty, he 
must in justice supply the power or ability to fly. This would in justice 
be a necessary condition of the command imposing moral obligation. 

Nor would it at all vary the case if I had ever possessed wings, and 
by the abuse of them had lost the power to fly. In this case, considered 
relatively to the pleasure, and profit, and results of flying, the restoring 
of the power to fly might and would be an act of grace. But if God 
would still command me to fly, he must, as a condition of my obligation, 
restore the power. It is vain and absurd to say, as has been said, that 
in such a case, although I might lose the power of obedience, this could 
not alter the right of God to claim obedience. This assertion proceeds 
upon the absurd assumption that the will of God makes or creates law, 
instead of merely declaring and enforcing the law of nature. We have 
seen in former lectures, that the only law or rule of action that is, or 
can be obligatory on a moral agent, is the law of nature, or just that 
course of willing and acting, which is for the time being, suitable to his 
nature and relations. We have seen that God's will never makes or 
creates law, that it only declares and enforces it. If therefore, by any 
means whatever, the nature of a moral agent should be so changed that 
his will is no longer free to act in conformity with, or in opposition to, 
the law of nature, if God would hold him still obligated to obey, he must 
in justice, relatively to his requirement, restore his liberty or ability. 
Suppose one had by the abuse of his intellect lost the use of it, and 
become a perfect idiot, could he by any possibility be still required to 
understand and obey God ? Certainly not. So neither could he be re- 
quired to perform anything else that had become naturally impossible to 
him. Viewed relatively to the pleasure and results of obedience, the restor- 
ing of power would be an act of grace. But viewed relatively to his duty or 
to God's command, the restoring of power to obey is an act of justice and not 
of grace. To call this grace were to abuse language, and confound terms. 

III. Li ivliat sense is a gracious ability possible ? 

1. Not, as we have just seen, in the sense that the bestowment of 
power to render obedience to a command possible, can be properly a gift 



GRACIOUS ABILITY. 3±7 

of grace. Grace is undeserved favor, something not demanded by jus- 
tice, that which under the circumstances might be withholden without 
injustice. It never can be just in any being to require that which under 
the circumstances is impossible. As has been said, relatively to the re- 
quirement and as a condition of its justice, the bestowment of power 
adequate to the performance of that which is commanded, is an unaltera- 
ble condition of the justice of the command. This I say is a first truth 
of reason, a truth everywhere by all men necessarily assumed and known. 
A gracious ability to obey a command, is an absurdity and an im- 
possibility. 

2. But a gracious ability considered relatively to the advantages to 
result from obedience is possible. Suppose, for example, that a servant 
who supports himself and his family by his wages, should by his own 
fault render himself unable to labor and to earn his wages. His master 
may justly dismiss him, and let him go with his family to the poor-house. 
But in this disabled state his master cannot justly exact labor of him. 
Nor could he do so if he absolutely owned the servant. Now suppose 
the master to be able to restore to the servant his former strength. If 
he would require service of him, as a condition of the justice of this re- 
quirement, he must restore his strength so far at least as to render obe- 
dience possible. This would be mere justice. But suppose he restored 
the ability of the servant to gain support for himself and his family by 
labor. This, viewed relatively to the good of the servant, to the results 
of the restoration of his ability to himself and to his family, is a matter 
of grace. Eelatively to the right of the master in requiring the labor of 
the servant, the restoration of ability to obey is an act of justice. But 
relatively to the good of the servant, and the benefits that result to him 
from this restoration of ability, and making it once more possible for 
him to support himself and his family, the giving of ability is properly 
an act of grace. 

Let this be applied to the case under consideration. Suppose the 
race of Adam to have lost their free agency by the first sin of Adam, and 
thus to have come into a state in which holiness and consequent salva- 
tion were impossible. Now, if God would still require obedience of 
them, he must in justice restore their ability. And viewed relatively to 
his right to command, and their duty to obey, this restoration is properly 
a matter of justice. But suppose he would again place them in circum- 
stances to render holiness and consequent salvation possible to them : — 
viewed relatively to their good and profit, this restoration of ability is- 
properly a matter of grace. 

A gracious ability to obey, viewed relatively to the command to be 
obeyed, is impossible and absurd. But a gracious ability to be saved,, 
viewed relatively to salvation, is possible. There is no proof that man- 



348 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

kind ever lost their ability to obey, either by the first sin of Adam, or by 
their own sin. For this would imply, as we have seen, that they had 
ceased to be free, and had become necessary agents. But if they had, 
and God had restored their ability to obey, all that can be justly said in 
this case, is, that so far as his right to command is concerned, the resto- 
ration of their ability was an act of justice. But so far as the rendering 
of salvation possible to them is concerned, it was an act of grace. 

3. But it is asserted, or rather assumed by the defenders of the dogma 
under consideration, that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a natural in- 
ability, and of a gracious ability in man to obey the commands of God. 1 
admit, indeed, that if we interpret scripture without regard to any just 
rules of interpretation, this assumption may find countenance in the word 
of God, just as almost any absurdity whatever may do, and has done. 
But a moderate share of attention to one of the simplest and most uni- 
versal and most important rules of interpreting language, whether in the 
Bible or out of it, will strip this absurd dogma of the least appearance 
of support from the word of God. The rule to which I refer is this, 
" That language is always to be interpreted in accordance with the subject- 
matter of discourse." 

When used of acts of will, the term "cannot," interpreted by this 
rule, must not be understood to mean a proper impossibility. If I say, I 
cannot take five dollars for my watch, when it is offered to me, every one 
knows that I do not and cannot mean to affirm a proper impossibility. 
So when the angel said to Lot, " Haste thee, for I cannot do anything 
until thou be come thither," who ever understood him as affirming a 
natural or any proper impossibility ? All that he could have meant was, 
that he was not willing to do anything until Lot was in a place of safety. 
Just so when the Bible speaks of our inability to comply with the com- 
mands of God, all that can be intended is, that we are so unwilling that, 
without divine persuasion, we, as a matter of fact, shall not and will not 
obey. This certainly is the sense in which such language is used in com- 
mon life. And in common parlance, we never think of such language, 
when used of acts of will, as meaning anything more than unwillingness, 
a state in which the will is strongly committed in an opposite direction. 

When Joshua said to the children of Israel, " Ye cannot serve the 
Lord, for he is a holy God," the whole context, as well as the nature of 
the case, shows that he did not mean to affirm a natural, nor indeed any 
kind of impossibility. In the same connection, he requires them to serve 
the Lord, and leads them solemnly to pledge themselves to serve him. 
He undoubtedly intended to say, that with wicked hearts they could not 
render him an acceptable service, and therefore insisted on their putting 
away the wickedness of their hearts, by immediately and voluntarily con- 
secrating themselves to the service of the Lord. So it must be in all cases 



GRACIOUS ABILITY. 3±9 

where the term "cannot/"' and such-like expressions which, when applied 
to muscular action, would imply a proper impossibility, are used in ref- 
erence to acts of will ; they cannot, when thus used, be understood as im- 
plying a proper impossibility, without doing violence to every sober rule 
of interpreting language. What would be thought of a judge or an ad- 
vocate at the bar of an earthly tribunal, who should interpret the lan- 
guage of a witness without any regard to the rule, " That language is to 
be understood according to the subject-matter of discourse. " Should an 
advocate in his argument to the court or jury, attempt to interpret the 
language of a witness in a manner that made "cannot," when spoken of 
an act of will, mean a proper impossibility, the judge would soon rebuke 
his stupidity, and remind him that he must not talk nonsense in a court 
of justice ; and might possibly add, that such nonsensical assertions were 
allowable on]y in the pulpit. I say again, that it is an utter abuse and 
perversion of the laws of language, so to interpret the Bible as to make it 
teach a proper inability in man to will as God directs. The essence of 
obedience to God consists in willing. Language, then, used in reference 
to obedience must, when properly understood, be interpreted in accord- 
ance with the subject-matter of discourse. Consequently, when used in 
reference to acts of will, such expressions as "cannot," and the like, can 
absolutely mean nothing more than a choice in an opposite direction. 

But it may be asked, Is there no grace in all that is done by the Holy 
Spirit to make man wise unto salvation ? Yes, indeed, I answer. And 
it is grace, and great grace, just because the doctrine of a natural inability 
in man to obey God is not true. It is just because man is well able to 
render obedience, and unjustly refuses to do so, that all the influence that 
God brings to bear upon him to make him willing, is a gift and an influ- 
ence of grace. The grace is great, just in proportion to the sinner's ability 
to comply with God's requirements, and the strength of his voluntary 
opposition to his duty. If man were properly unable to obey, there could 
be no grace in giving him ability to obey, when the bestowment of ability 
is considered relatively to the command. But let man be regarded as 
free, as possessing natural ability to obey all the requirements of God, 
and all his difficulty as consisting in a wicked heart, or, which is the same 
thing, in an unwillingness to obey, then an influence on the part of God 
designed and tending to make him willing, is grace indeed. But strip 
man of his freedom, render him naturally unable to obey, and you ren- 
der grace impossible, so far as his obligation to obedience is concerned. 

But it is urged in support of the dogma of natural inability and of a 
gracious ability, that the Bible everywhere represents man as dependent 
on the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit for all holiness, and conse- 
quently for eternal life. I answer, it is admitted that this is the repre- 
sentation of the Bible, but the question is, in what sense is he depend- 



350 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

exit ? Does his dependence consist in a natural inability to embrace the 
gospel and be saved ? or does it consist in a voluntary selfishness — in an 
unwillingness to comply with the terms of salvation ? Is man depend- 
ent on the Holy Spirit to give him a proper ability to obey God ? or is he 
dependent only in such a sense that, as a matter of fact, he will not em- 
brace the gospel unless the Holy Spirit makes him willing ? The latter, 
beyond reasonable question, is the truth. This is the universal repre- 
sentation of scripture. The difficulty to be overcome is everywhere in 
the Bible represented to be the sinner's unwillingness alone. It cannot 
possibly be anything else; for the willingness is the doing required by 
God. "If there is first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a 
man hath, and not according to that he hath not." 

But it is said, if man can be willing of himself, what need of divine 
persuasion or influence to make him willing ? I might ask, suppose a 
man is able but unwilling to pay his debts, what need of any influence to 
make him willing ? Why, divine influence is needed to make a sinner 
willing, or to induce him to will as God directs, just for the same reason 
that persuasion, entreaty, argument, or the rod, is needed to make our 
children submit their wills to ours. The fact therefore that the Bible 
represents the sinner as in some sense dependent upon divine influence 
for a right heart, no more implies a proper inability in the sinner, than 
the fact that children are dependent for their good behavior, oftentimes, 
upon the thorough and timely discipline of their parents, implies a prop- 
er inability in them to obey their parents without chastisement. 

The Bible everywhere, and in every way, assumes the freedom of the 
will. This fact stands out in strong relief upon every page of divine in- 
spiration. But this is only the assumption necessarily made by the uni- 
versal intelligence of man. The strong language often found in scripture 
upon the subject of man's inability to obey God, is designed only to rep- 
resent the strength of his voluntary selfishness and enmity against God, 
and never to imply a proper natural inability. It is, therefore, a gross 
and most injurious perversion of scripture, as well as a contradiction of 
human reason, to deny the natural ability, or which is the same thing, 
the natural free agency of man, and to maintain a proper natural inabil- 
ity to obey God, and the absurd dogma of a gracious ability to do our 
duty. 

REMARKS. 

1. The question of ability is one of great practical importance. To 
deny the ability of man to obey the commandments of God, is to repre- 
sent God as a hard master, as requiring a natural impossibility of his 
creatures on pain of eternal damnation. This necessarily begets in the 
mind that believes it hard thoughts of God. The intelligence cannot be 



GRACIOUS ABILITY. 351 

satisfied with the justice of such a requisition. In fact, so far as this 
error gets possession of the mind and gains assent, just so far it natu- 
rally and necessarily excuses itself for disobedience, or for not complying 
with, the commandments of God. 

2. The moral inability of Edwards is a real natural inability, and so 
it has been understood by sinners and professors of religion. When I 
entered the ministry, I found the persuasion of an absolute inability on 
the part of sinners to repent and believe the gospel, almost universal. 
When I urged sinners and professors of religion to do their duty without 
delay, I frequently met with stern opposition from sinners, professors of 
religion, and ministers. They desired me to say to sinners, that they 
could not repent, and that they must wait God's time, that is, for God 
to help them. It was common for the classes of persons just named to 
ask me, if I thought sinners could be Christians whenever they pleased, 
and whether I thought that any class of persons could repent, believe, 
and obey God without the strivings and new-creating power of the Holy 
Spirit. The church was almost universally settled down in the belief of 
a physical moral depravity, and, of course, in a belief in the necessity of 
a physical regeneration, and also of course in the belief, that sinners 
must wait to be regenerated by divine power while they were passive. 
Professors also must wait to be revived, until God, in mysterious sove- 
reignty, came and revived them. As to revivals of religion, they were 
settled down in the belief to a great extent, that man had no more agency 
in producing them than in producing showers of rain. To attempt to 
effect the conversion of a sinner, or to promote a revival, was an attempt 
to take the work out of the hands of God, to go to work in your own 
strength, and to set sinners and professors to do the same. The vigor- 
ous use of means and measures to promote a work of grace, was regarded 
by many as impious. It was getting up an excitement of animal feeling, 
and wickedly interfering with the prerogative of God. The abominable 
dogmas of physical moral depravity, or a sinful constitution, with a con- 
sequent natural, falsely called moral, inability, and the necessity of a 
physical and passive regeneration, had chilled the heart of the church, 
and lulled sinners into a fatal sleep. This is the natural tendency of 
such doctrines. 

3. Let it be distinctly understood before we close this subject, that 
we do not deny, but strenuously maintain, that the whole plan of salva- 
tion, and all the influences, both providential and spiritual, which God 
exerts in the conversion, sanctification, and salvation, of sinners, is grace 
from first to last, and that I deny the dogma of a gracious ability, be- 
cause it robs God of his glory. It really denies the grace of the gospel. 
The abettors of this scheme, in contending for the grace of the gospel, 
really deny it. W^hat grace can there be, that should surprise heaven 



352 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and earth, and cause " the angels to desire to look into it," in bestowing 
ability on those who never had any, and, of course, who never cast away 
their ability — to obey the requirements of God ? According to them all 
men lost their ability in Adam, and not by their own act. God still re- 
quired obedience of them upon pain of eternal death. Now he might, 
according to this view of the subject, just as reasonably command all men, 
on pain of eternal death, to fly, or to undo all that Adam had done, or 
perform any other natural impossibility, as to command them to be holy, 
to repent and believe the gospel. Now, I ask again, what possible grace 
w r as there, or could there be, in his giving them power to obey him ? To 
have required the obedience without giving the power had been infinitely 
unjust. To admit the assumption, that men had really lost their ability 
to obey in Adam, and call this bestowment of ability for which they con- 
tend, grace, is an abuse of language, an absurdity, and a denial of the 
true grace of the gospel not to be tolerated. I reject the dogma of a 
gracious ability, because it involves a denial of the true grace of the gos- 
pel. I maintain that the gospel, with all its influences, including the 
gift of the Holy Spirit, to convict, convert, and sanctify the soul, is a 
system of grace throughout. But to maintain this, I must also maintain, 
that God might justly have required obedience of men without making 
these provisions for them. And to maintain the justice of God in re- 
quiring obedience, I must admit and maintain that obedience was pos- 
sible to man. 

Let it not be said then, that we deny the grace of the glorious gospel 
of the blessed God, nor that we deny the reality and necessity of the 
influences of the Holy Spirit to convert and sanctify the soul, nor that 
this influence is a gracious one ; for all these we most strenuously main- 
tain. But I maintain this upon the ground, that men are able to do 
their duty, and that the difficulty does not lie in a proper inability, but 
in a voluntary selfishness, in an unwillingness to obey the blessed gospel. 
I say again, that I reject the dogma of a gracious ability, as I understand 
its abettors to hold it, not because I deny, but solely because it denies 
the grace of the gospel. The denial of ability is really a denial of the 
possibility of grace in the affair of man's salvation. I admit the ability 
of man, and hold that he is able, but utterly unwilling to obey God. 
Therefore I consistently hold that all the influences exerted by God 
to make him willing, are of free grace abounding through Christ Jesus. 



THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 353 

LECTURE XXXIII. 

THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 
PKOPER METHOD OF ACCOUXTItfG FOR IT. 

I have represented ability, or the freedom of the will, as a first- 
truth of consciousness, a truth necessarily known to all moral agents. 
The inquiry may naturally arise, How then is it to be accounted for, that 
so many men have denied the liberty of the will, or ability to obey God ? 
A. recent writer thinks this denial a sufficient refutation of the affirma- 
:ion, that ability is a first- truth of consciousness. It is important that 
;his denial should be accounted for. That mankind affirm their obliga- 
tion upon the real, though often latent and unperceived assumption 
of ability, there is no reasonable ground of doubt. I have said that 
first-truths are frequently assumed, and certainly known without being 
always the direct object of thought or attention ; and also that these 
truths are universally held in the practical judgments of men, while 
they sometimes in theory deny them. They know them to be true, and 
in all their practical judgments assume their truth, while they reason 
against them, think they prove them untrue, and not unfrequentlv 
affirm, that they are conscious of an opposite affirmation. For example, 
men have denied, in theory, the law of causality, while they have at 
every moment of their lives acted upon the assumption of its truth. 
Others have denied the freedom of the will, who have, every hour of 
their lives, assumed, and acted, and judged, upon the assumption that 
the will is free. The same is true of ability, which, in respect to the 
commandments of God, is identical with freedom. Men have often 
denied the ability of man to obey the commandments of God, while they 
have always, in their practical judgments of themselves and of others, 
assumed their ability, in respect to those things that are really com- 
manded by God. Now, how is this to be accounted for ?. 

1. Multitudes have denied the freedom of the will, because they have 
loosely confounded the will with the involuntary powers — with the intel- 
lect and the sensibility. Locke, as is well known, regarded the mind as 
possessing but two primary faculties, the understanding and the will. 
President Edwards, as was said in a former lecture, followed Locke, and 
regarded all the states of the sensibility as acts of the will. Multitudes, 
nay the great mass of Calvinistic divines, with their hearers, have held 
the same views. This confounding of the sensibility with the will has 
been common for a long time. JSTow everybody is conscious, that the 
23 



354 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

states of the sensibility, or mere feelings, cannot be produced or changed 
by a direct effort to feel thus or thus. Everybody knows from conscious- 
ness that the feelings come and go, wax and wane, as motives are pre- 
sented to excite them. And they know also that these feelings are 
under the law of necessity and not of liberty ; that is, that necessity is an 
attribute of these feelings, in such a sense, that under the circumstances, 
they will exist in spite of ourselves, and that they cannot be controlled 
by a direct effort to control them. Everybody knows that our feelings, 
or the states of our sensibility can be controlled only indirectly, that is, 
by the direction of our thoughts. By directing our thoughts to an 
object calculated to excite certain feelings,, we know that, when the 
excitability is not exhausted, feelings correlated to that object will come 
into play, of course and of necessity. So when any class of feelings 
exist, we all know that by diverting the attention from the object tha; 
excites them, they subside of course, and give place to a class correlated 
to the new object that at present occupies the attention. Now, it is very 
manifest how the freedom of the will has come to be denied by those who 
confound the will proper with the sensibility. These same persons have 
always known and assumed, that the actions of the will proper were free. 
Their error has consisted in not distinguishing in theory between the 
action of the proper will, and the involuntary states of the sensibility. 
In their practical judgments, and in their conduct, they have recognized 
the distinction which they have failed to recognize in their speculations 
and theories. They have every hour been exerting their own freedom, 
have been controlling directly their attention and their outward life, by 
the free exercise of their proper will. They have also, by the free exer- 
cise of the same faculty, been indirectly controlling the states of their 
sensibility. They have all along assumed the absolute freedom of the 
will proper, and have always acted upon the assumption, or they would 
not have acted at all, or even attempted to act. But since they did not 
in theory distinguish between the sensibility and the will proper, they 
denied in theory the freedom of the will. If the actions of the will be 
confounded with desires and emotions, as President Edwards confounded 
them, and as has been common, the result must be a theoretical denial 
of the freedom of the will. In this way we are to account for the doc- 
trine of inability, as it has been generally held. It has not been clearly 
understood that moral law legislates directly, and, with strict propriety of 
speech, only over the will proper, and over the involuntary powers only 
indirectly through the will. It has been common to regard the law and 
the gospel of God, as directly extending their claims to the involuntary 
powers and states of mind ; and, as was shown in a former lecture, many 
have regarded, in theory, the law as extending its claims to those states 
that lie wholly beyond, either the direct or indirect control of the will. 



/ 



THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 355 

"Now, of course, with these views of the claims of God, ability is and 
must be denied. I trust we have seen in past lectures, that, strictly and 
properly speaking, the moral law restricts its claims to the actions of the 
will proper, in such a sense that, if there be a willing mind, it is accepted 
as obedience ; that the moral law and the lawgiver legislate over invol- 
untary states only indirectly, that is, through the will ; and that the 
whole of virtue, strictly speaking, consists in good-will or disinterested 
benevolence. Sane ' minds never practically deny, or can deny, the free- 
dom of the will proper, or the doctrine of ability, when they make the 
proper discriminations between the will and the sensibility, and properly 
regard moral law as legislating directly only over the will. It is worthy 
of all consideration, that those who have denied ability, have almost 
always confounded the will and the sensibility ; and that those who have 
denied ability, have always extended the claims of moral law beyond the 
pale of proper voluntariness ; and many of them even beyond the limits 
of either the direct or the indirect control of the will. 

But the inquiry may arise, how it comes to pass that men have so ex- 
tensively entertained the impression, that the moral law legislates directly 
over those feelings, and over those states of mind which they know to 
be involuntary ? I answer, that this mistake has arisen out of a want of 
just discrimination between the direct and indirect legislation of the law, 
and of the lawgiver. It is true that men are conscious of being respon- 
sible for their feelings and for their outward actions, and even for their 
thoughts. And it is really true that they are responsible for them, in so 
far as they are under either the direct or indirect control of the will. 
And they know that these acts and states of mind are possible to them, 
that is, that they have an indirect ability to produce them. They, how- 
ever, loosely confound the direct and indirect ability and responsibility. 
The thing required by the law directly and presently is benevolence or 
good-will. This is what, and all that, the law strictly, presently or di- 
rectly requires. It indirectly requires all those outward and inward acts 
and states that are connected directly and indirectly with this required 
act of will, by a law of necessity ; that is, that those acts and states 
should follow as soon as by a natural and necessary law they will follow 
from a right action of the will. When these feelings, and states, and 
acts do not exist, they blame themselves, generally with propriety, 
because the absence 01 them is in fact owing to a want of the required 
act of the will. Sometimes, no doubt, they blame themselves unjustly, 
not considering that, although the will is right, of which they are con- 
scious, the involuntary state or act does not follow, because of exhaus- 
tion, or because of some disturbance in the established and natural con- 
nection between the acts of the will and its ordinary sequents. When 
this exhaustion or disturbance exists, men are apt, loosely and unjustly, 



356 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

to write bitter things against themselves. They often do the same in 
hours of temptation, when Satan casts his fiery darts at them, lodging 
them in the thoughts and involuntary feelings. The will repels them, 
but they take effect, for the time being, in spite of one's self, in the intel- 
lect and sensibility. Blasphemous thoughts are suggested to the mind, 
unkind thoughts of God are suggested, and in spite of one's self, these 
abominable thoughts awaken their correlated feelings. The will abhors 
them and struggles to suppress them, but for the time being, finds itself 
unable to do anything more than to fight and resist. 

Now, it is very common for souls in this state to write the most bitter 
accusations against themselves. But should it be hence inferred that 
they really are as much in fault as they assume themselves to be ? No, 
indeed ! But why do ministers, of all schools, unite in telling such 
tempted souls, You are mistaken, my dear brother or sister, these 
thoughts and feelings, though exercises of your own mind, are not yours 
in such a sense that you are responsible for them ? The thoughts are 
suggested by Satan, and the feelings are a necessary consequence. Your 
will resists them, and this proves that you are unable, for the time being, 
to avoid them. You are therefore not responsible for them while you 
resist them with all the power of your will, any more than you would be 
guilty of murder should a giant overpower yonr strength, and use your 
hand against your will to shoot a man. In such cases it is, so far as I 
know, universally true, that all schools admit that the tempted soul is 
not responsible or guilty for those things which it cannot help. The in- 
ability is here allowed to be a bar to obligation ; and such souls are 
justly told by ministers, You are mistaken in supposing yourself guilty 
in this case. It is just as absurd, in the one case as in the other, to 
infer real responsibility from a feeling or persuasion of responsibility. 
To hold that men are always responsible, because they loosely think 
themselves to be so, is absurd. In cases of temptation, such as that just 
supposed, as soon as the attention is directed to the fact of inability to 
avoid those thoughts and feelings, and the mind is conscious of the will's 
resisting them, and of being unable to banish them, it readily rests in 
the assurance that it is not responsible for them. Its own irresponsi- 
bility in such cases appears self-evident to the mind, the moment the 
proper inability is considered, and the affirmation of irresponsibility 
attended to. Now if the soul naturally and truly regarded itself as re- 
sponsible, when there is a proper inability and impossibility, the in- 
structions above referred to could not relieve the mind. It would say, 
To be sure I know that I cannot avoid having these thoughts and feel- 
ings, any more than I can cease to be the subject of consciousness, yet I 
know I am responsible notwithstanding. These thoughts and feelings 
are states of my own mind, and no matter how I come by them, or 



THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 357 

whether I can control or prevent them or not. Inability, you know, is 
no bar to •obligation ; therefore, my obligation and my guilt remain. 
"Woe is me, for I am undone. The idea, then, of responsibility, when 
there is in fact real inability, is a prejudice of education, a mistake. 

The mistake, unless strong prejudice of education has taken posses- 
sion of the mind, lies in overlooking the fact of a real and proper in- 
ability. Unless the judgment has been strongly biased by education, it 
never judges itself bound to perform impossibilities, nor even conceives 
of such a thing. Who ever held himself bound to undo what is past, to 
recall past time, or to substitute holy acts and states of mind in the place 
of past sinful ones ? No one ever held himself bound to do this ; first, 
because he knows it to be impossible ; and secondly, because no one that I 
have heard of ever taught or asserted any such obligation ; and therefore 
none have received so strong a bias from education as loosely to hold 
such an opinion. But sometimes the bias of education is so great, that 
the subjects of it seem capable of believing almost anything, however in- 
consistent with the intuitions of the reason, and consequently in the face 
of the most certain knowledge. For example, President Edwards relates 
of a young woman in his congregation, that she was deeply convicted of 
being guilty for Adam's first sin, and deeply repented of it. Now sup- 
pose that this and like cases should be regarded as conclusive proof that 
men are guilty of that sin, and deserve the wrath and curse of God for 
ever for that sin ; and that all men will suffer the pains of hell forever, 
except they become convinced of their personal guilt for that sin, and re- 
pent of it in dust and ashes ! President Edwards's teaching on the sub- 
ject of the relation of all men to Adam's first sin, it is well known, was 
calculated in a high degree to pervert the judgment upon that subject ; 
and this sufficiently accounts for the fact above alluded to. But apart 
from education, no human being ever held himself responsible for, or 
guilty of, the first or any other sin of Adam, or of any other being, who 
existed and died before he himself existed. The reason is that all moral 
agents naturally know, that inability or a proper impossibility is a bar to 
moral obligation and responsibility ; and they never conceive to the con- 
trary, unless biased by a mystifying education that casts a fog over their 
primitive and constitutional convictions. 

2. Some have denied ability because they have strangely held, that 
the moral law requires sinners to be, in all respects, what they might 
have been had they never sinned. That is, they maintain that God re- 
quires of them just as high and perfect a service as if their powers had 
never been abused by sin ; as if they had always been developed by the 
perfectly right use of them. This they admit to be a natural impossi- 
bility ; nevertheless they hold that God may justly require it, and that 
sinners are justly bound to perform this impossible service, and that they 



358 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sin continually in coming short of it. To this sentiment I answer, that 
it might be maintained with as much show of reason, arid as much 
authority from the Bible, that God might and does require of all sinners 
to undo all their acts of sin, and to substitute holy ones in their places, 
and that he holds them as sinning every moment by the neglect to do 
this. Why may not God as well require one as the other ? They are 
alike impossibilities originating in the sinner's own act or fault. If the 
sinner's rendering himself unable to obey in one case does not set aside 
the right of God to command, so does it not for the same reason in the 
other. If an inability resulting from the sinner's own act cannot bar the 
right of God to make the requisition in the one case, neither can it for 
the same reason in the other. But every one can see that God cannot 
justly require the sinner to recall past time, and to undo past acts. But 
why ? No other reason can be assigned than that it is impossible. But 
the same reason, it is admitted, exists in its full extent in the other case. 
It is admitted that sinners, who have long indulged in sin, or who have 
sinned at all, are really as unable to render as high a degree of service as 
they might have done had they never sinned, as they are to recall past 
time, or to undo all their past acts of sin. On what ground, then, of 
reason or revelation does the assertion rest, that in one case an impossi- 
bility is a bar to obligation, and not in the other ? I answer, there is no 
ground whatever for the assertion in question. It is a sheer and an 
absurd assumption, unsupported by any affirmation of reason, or any 
truth or principle of revelation. 

But to this assumption I reply again, as I have done on a former 
occasion, that if it be true, it must follow, that no one on earth or in 
heaven who has ever sinned will be able to render as perfect a service as 
the law demands ; for there is no reason to believe, that any being who 
has abused his powers by sin will ever in time or eternity be able to 
render as high a service as he might have done had he at every moment 
duly developed them by perfect obedience. If this theory is true, I see 
not why it does not follow that the saints will be guilty in heaven of 
the sin of omission. A sentiment based upon an absurdity in the 
outset, and resulting in such consequences as this, must be rejected 
without hesitation. 

3. A consciousness of the force of habit, in respect to all the acts and 
states of body and mind, has contributed to the loose holding of the 
doctrine of inability. Every one who is at all in the habit of observation 
and self-reflection is aware, that for some reason we acquire a greater 
and greater facility in doing anything by practice or repetition. We 
find this to be true in respect to acts of will as really as in respect to 
the involuntary states of mind. When the will has been long committed 
to the indulgence of the propensities, and in the habit of submitting 



THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 359 

itself to their impulse, there is a real difficulty of some sort in the way 
of changing its action. This difficulty cannot really impair the liberty 
of the will. If it could, it would destroy, or so far impair, moral agency 
and accountability. But habit may, and, as every one knows, does 
interpose an obstacle of some sort in the way of right willing, or, on 
the other hand, in the way of wrong willing. That is, men both obey 
and disobey with greatest facility from habit. Habit strongly favors 
the accustomed action of the will in any direction. This, as I said, 
never does or can properly impair the freedom of the will, or render 
it impossible to act in a contrary direction : for if it could and should, 
the actions of the will, in that case, being determined by a law of neces- 
sity in one direction, would have no moral character. If benevolence 
became a habit so strong that it were utterly impossible to will in an 
opposite direction, or not to will benevolently, benevolence would cease 
to be virtuous. So, on the other hand, with selfishness. If the will 
came to be determined in that direction by habit grown into a law of 
necessity, such action would and must cease to have moral character. 
But, as I said, there is a real conscious difficulty of some sort in the way 
of obedience, when the will has been long accustomed to sin. This 
is strongly recognized in the language of inspiration and in devotional 
hymns, as well as in the language of experience by all men. The lan- 
guage of scripture is often so strong upon this point, that, but for a 
regard to the subject-matter of discourse, we might justly infer a proper 
inability. For example, Jer. xiii. 23 : " Can the Ethiopian change 
his skin, or the leopard his spots ? then may ye also do good, that are 
accustomed to do evil." This and similar passages recognize the influ- 
ence of habit. ■• Then may ye who are accustomed to do evil :" cus- 
tom or habit is to be overcome, and, in the strong language of the 
prophet, this is like changing the Ethiop's skin or the leopard's spots. 
But to understand the prophet as here affirming a proper inability were to 
disregard one of the fundamental rules of interpreting language, namely, 
that it is to be understood by reference to the subject of discourse. The 
latter part of the seventh chapter of Komans affords a striking instance 
and an illustration of this. It is, as has just been said, a sound and 
most important rule of interpreting all language, that due regard be had 
to the subject-matter of discourse. When "cannot," and such like 
terms, that express an inability are applied to physical or involuntary 
actions or states of mind, they express a proper natural inability ; but 
when they are used in reference to actions of free will, they express not 
a proper impossibility, but only a difficulty arising out of the existence of 
a contrary choice, or the law of habit, or both. 

Much question has been made about the seventh of Eomans in its 
relation to the subject of ability and inability. Let us, therefore, look a 



360 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

little into this passage, Romans vii. 15-23 : " For that which I do, I 
allow not ; for what I would, that do I not ; but what I hate, that do I. 
If then I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it 
is good. Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth 
in me. For I know that in me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good 
thing ; for to will is present with me ; but how to perform that which is 
good I find not. For the good that I would I do not ; bat the evil 
which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no 
more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that 
when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the 
law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my mem- 
bers, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into cap- 
tivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Now what did the 
apostle mean by this language ? Did he use language here in the popu- 
lar sense, or with strictly philosophical propriety ? He says he finds 
himself able to will, but not able to do. Is he then speaking of a mere 
outward or physical inability ? Does he mean merely to say, that the 
established connection between volition and its sequents was disturbed, 
so that he could not execute his volitions ? This his language, literally 
interpreted, and without reference to the subject-matter of discourse, 
and without regard to the manifest scope and design of the writer, 
would lead us to conclude. But who ever contended for such an inter- 
pretation ? The apostle used popular language, and was describing a 
very common experience. Convicted sinners and backslidden saints 
often make legal resolutions, and resolve upon obedience under the influ- 
ence of legal motives, and without really becoming benevolent, and 
changing the attitude of their wills. They, under the influence of con- 
viction, purpose selfishly to do their duty to God and man, and, in the 
presence of temptation, they constantly fail of keeping their resolutions. 
It is true, that with their selfish hearts, or in the selfish attitude of their 
wills; they cannot keep their resolutions to abstain from those inward 
thoughts and emotions, nor from those outward actions that result by 
a law of necessity from a selfish state or attitude of the will. These 
legal resolutions the apostle popularly calls willings. " To will is pres- 
ent with me, but how to do good I find not. When I would do good, 
evil is present with me, so that the good I would I do not, and the evil I 
would not, that I do. If then I do the evil I would not, it is no longer 
I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I delight in the law of God 
after the inner man. But I see another law in my members warring 
against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin 
which is in my members," etc. Now, this appears to me to be descriptive 
of a very familiar experience of every deeply convicted sinner or back- 
slider. The will is committed to the propensities, to the law in the 



THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 361 

members, or to the gratification of the impulses of the sensibility. 
Hence, the outward life is selfish. Conviction of sin leads to the forma- 
tion of resolutions of amendment, while the will does not submit to God. 
These resolutions constantly fail of securing the result contemplated. 
The will still abides in a state of committal to self-gratification ; and 
hence resolutions to amend in feeling or the outward life, fail of securing 
those results. 

Nothing was more foreign from the apostle's purpose, it seems to me, 
than to affirm a proper inability of will to yield to the claims of God. 
Indeed, he affirms and assumes the freedom of his will. " To will," he 
says, " is present with me ;" that is, to resolve. But resolution is an act 
of will. It is a purpose, a design. He purposed, designed to amend. 
To form resolutions was present with him, but how to do good he found 
not. The reason why he did not execute his purposes was, that they were 
selfishly made ; that is, he resolved upon reformation without giving his 
heart to God, without submitting his will to God, without actually be- 
coming benevolent. This caused his perpetual failure. This language, 
construed strictly to the letter, would lead to the conclusion, that the 
apostle was representing a case where the will is right, but where the es- 
tablished and natural connection between volition and its sequents is 
destroyed, so that the outward act did not follow the action of the will. 
In this case all schools would agree that the act of the will constitutes 
real obedience. The whole passage, apart from the subject-matter of 
discourse, and from the manifest design and scope of the writer, might 
lead us to conclude, that the apostle was speaking of a proper inability, 
and that he did not therefore regard the failure as his own fault. " It 
is no more I, but sin that dwelleth in me. wretched man that I am," 
etc. Those who maintain that the apostle meant to assert a proper ina- 
bility to obey, must also admit that he represented this inability as a bar 
to obligation, and regarded his state as calamitous, rather than as properly 
sinful. But the fact is, he was portraying a legal experience, and spoke 
of finding himself unable to keep selfish resolutions of amendment in the 
presence of temptation. His will was in a state of committal to the in- 
dulgence of the propensities. In the absence of temptation, his convic- 
tions, and fears, and feelings were the strongest impulses, and under their 
influence he would form resolutions to do his duty, to abstain from fleshly 
indulgences, etc. But as some other appetite or desire came to be more 
strongly excited, he yielded to that of course, and broke his former reso- 
lution. Paul writes as if speaking of himself, but was doubtless speaking 
as the representative of a class of persons already named. He found the 
law of selfish habit exceedingly strong, and so strong as to lead him to 
cry out, " wretched man," etc. But this is not affirming a proper ina- 
bility of will to submit to God. 



362 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

4. All men who seriously undertake their own reformation find them- 
selves in great need of help and support from the Holy Spirit, in conse- 
quence of the physical depravity of which I have formerly spoken, and 
because of the great strength of their habit of self-indulgence. They 
are prone, as is natural, to express their sense of dependence on the 
Divine Spirit in strong language, and to speak of this dependence as if it 
consisted in a real inability, when, in fact, they do not really consider it 
as a proper inability. They speak upon this subject just as they do upon 
any and every other subject, when they are conscious of a strong inclina- 
tion to a given course. They say in respect to many things, " I cannot," 
when they mean only " I will not,' 7 and never think of being understood 
as affirming a proper inability. The inspired writers expressed them- 
selves in the common language of men upon such subjects, and are 
doubtless to be understood in the same way. In common parlance, " can- 
not" often means " will not," and perhaps is used as often in this sense 
as it is to express a proper inability. Men do not misinterpret this lan- 
guage, and suppose it to affirm a proper inability, when used in reference 
to acts of will, except on the subject of obedience to God ; and why should 
they assign a meaning to language when used upon this subject which 
they do not assign to it anywhere else ? 

But, as I said in a former lecture, under the light of the gospel, and 
with the promises in our hands, God does require of us what we should be 
unable to do and be, but for these promises and this proffered assistance. 
Here is a real inability to do directly in our own strength all that is re- 
quired of us, upon consideration of the proffered aid. We can only do it 
by strength imparted by the Holy Spirit. That is, we cannot know 
Christ, and avail ourselves of his offices and relations, and appropriate to 
our own souls his fulness, except as we are taught by the Holy Spirit. 
The thing immediately and directly required, is to receive the Holy Spirit 
by faith to be our teacher and guide, to take of Christ's and show it to 
us. This confidence we are able to exercise. Who ever really and intel- 
ligently affirmed that he had not power or ability to trust or confide in 
the promise and oath of God ? 

Much that is said of inability in poetry, and in the common language 
of the saints, respects not the subjection of the will to God, but those ex- 
periences, and states of feeling that depend on the illuminations of the 
Spirit just referred to. The language that is so common in prayer and 
in the devotional dialect of the church, respects generally our dependence 
upon the Holy Spirit for such divine discoveries of Christ, as to charm 
the soul into a steadfast abiding in him. We feel our dependence upon 
the Holy Spirit so to enlighten us, as to break up for ever the power of 
sinful habit, and draw us away from our idols entirely and for ever. 

In future lectures I shall have occasion to enlarge much upon the 



THE NOTION OF INABILITY. 363 

subject of our dependence upon Christ and the Holy Spirit. But this 
dependence does not consist in a proper inability to will as God directs, 
but, as I have said, partly in the power of sinful habit, and partly in 'the 
great darkness of our souls in respect to Christ and his mediatorial work 
and relations. All these together do not constitute a proper inability, 
for the plain reason, that through the right action of our will which is 
always possible to us, these difficulties can all be directly or indirectly 
overcome. Whatever we can do or be, directly or indirectly, by willing, 
is possible to us. But there is no degree of spiritual attainment required 
of us, that may not be reached directly or indirectly by right willing. 
Therefore these attainments are possible. " If any man," says Christ, 
" will do his will," that is, has an obedient will, "he shall know of the 
doctrine whether it be of God." "If thine eye be single," that is, if the 
intention or will is right, " thy whole body shall be full of light." " If 
any man love me, he will keep my words, and my Father will love him, 
and we will come and make our abode with him." The scriptures 
abound with assurances of light and instruction, and of all needed grace 
and help, upon condition of a right will or heart, that is, upon condition 
of our being really willing to obey the light, when and as fast as we 
receive it. I have abundantly shown on former occasions, that a right 
state of the will constitutes, for the time being, all that, strictly speak- 
ing, the moral law requires. But I said, that it also, though in a less 
strict and proper sense, requires all those acts and states of the intellect 
and sensibility which are connected by a law of necessity with the right 
action of the will. Of course, it also requires that cleansing of the sen- 
sibility, and all those higher forms of Christian experience that result 
from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. That is, the law of God re- 
quires that these attainments shall be made when the means are pro- 
vided and enjoyed, and as soon as, in the nature of the case, these at- 
tainments are possible. But it requires no more than this. For the law 
of God can never require absolute impossibilities. That which requires 
absolute impossibilities, is not and cannot be moral law. For, as was 
formerly said, moral law is the law of nature, and what law of nature 
would that be that should require absolute impossibilities ? This would 
be a mockery of a law of nature. What ! a law of nature requiring that 
which is impossible to nature, both directly and indirectly ! Impossible. 



364: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XXXIY. 

REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 

Ik the discussion of this subject I shall show, — 

I. Wliat repentance is not. 

1. The Bible everywhere represents repentance as a virtue, and as 
constituting a change of moral character ; consequently, it cannot be a 
phenomenon of the intelligence : that is, it cannot consist in conviction 
of sin, nor in any intellectual apprehension of our guilt or ill-desert. 
All the states or phenomena of the intelligence are purely passive states 
of mind, and of course moral character, strictly speaking, cannot be pre- 
dicated of them. 

2. Eepentance is not a phenomenon of the sensibility : that is, it 
does not consist in a feeling of regret or remorse, of compunction or sor- 
row for sin, or of sorrow in view of the consequences of sin to self or to 
others, nor in any feelings or emotions whatever. All feelings or emo- 
tions belong to the sensibility, and are, of course, purely passive states of 
mind, and consequently can have no moral character in themselves. 

It should be distinctly understood, and always borne in mind, that 
repentance cannot consist in any involuntary state of mind, for it is im- 
possible that moral character, strictly speaking, should pertain to passive 
states. 

II. What repentance is. 

There are two Greek words which are translated by the English word, 
repent. 

1. Metamelomai, " to care for," or to be concerned for one's self ; 
hence to change one's course. This term seems generally to be used to 
express a state of the sensibility, as regret, remorse, sorrow for sin, etc. 
But sometimes it also expresses a change of purpose as a consequence of 
regret, or remorse, or sorrow ; as in Matt. xxi. 29, " He answered and 
said, I will not ; but afterwards he repented and went." It is used to 
represent the repentance of Judas, which evidently consisted of remorse 
and despair. 

2. Metanoeo, "to take an after view ;" or more strictly, to change 
one's mind as a consequence of, and in conformity with, a second and 
more rational view of the subject. This word evidently expresses a 
change of choice, purpose, intention, in conformity with the dictates of 
the intelligence. 



REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 365 

This is no doubt the idea of evangelical repentance. It is a phenom- 
enon of will, and consists in the turning or change of the ultimate in- 
tention from selfishness to benevolence. The term expresses the act of 
turning ; the changing of the heart, or of the ruling preference of the 
soul. It might with propriety be rendered by the terms " changing the 
heart." The English word " repentance " is often used to express regret, 
remorse, sorrow, etc., and is used in so loose a sense as not to convey a 
distinct idea, to the common mind, of the true nature of evangelical re- 
pentance. A turning from sin to holiness, or more strictly, from a 
state of consecration to self to a state of consecration to God, is and must 
be the turning, the change of mind, or the repentance that is required 
of all sinners. Nothing less can constitute a virtuous repentance, and 
nothing more can be required. 

III. Wliat is implied in repentance. 

1. Such is the correlation of the will to the intellect, that repentance 
must imply reconsideration or after thought. It must imply self-reflec- 
tion, and such an apprehension of one's guilt as to produce self-condemna- 
tion. That selfishness is sin, and that it is right and duty to consecrate 
the whole being to God and his service, are first truths, necessarily as- 
sumed by all moral agents. They are, however, often unthought of, not 
reflected upon. Eepentance implies the giving up of the attention to the 
consideration and self -application of these first truths, and consequently 
implies conviction of sin, and guilt, and ill-desert, and a sense of shame, 
and self-condemnation. It implies an intellectual and a hearty justifica- 
tion of God, of his law, of his moral and providential government, and 
of all his works and ways. 

It implies an apprehension of the nature of sin, that it belongs to 
the heart, and does not essentially consist in, though it leads to, outward 
conduct ; that it is an utterly unreasonable state of mind, and that it 
justly deserves the wrath and curse of God forever. 

It implies an apprehension of the reasonableness of the law and com- 
mands of God, and of the folly and madness of sin. It implies an in- 
tellectual and a hearty giving up of all controversy with God upon all 
and every point. 

It implies a conviction, that God is wholly right, and the sinner wholly 
wrong, and a thorough and hearty abandonment of all excuses and apolo- 
gies for sin. It implies an entire and universal acquittal of God from 
every shade and degree of blame, a thorough taking of the entire blame 
of sin to self. It implies a deep and thorough abasement of self in the 
dust, a crying out of soul against self, and a most sincere and universal, 
intellectual, and hearty exaltation of God. 

%. Such, also, is the connection of the will and the sensibility, that 



366 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the turning of the will, or evangelical repentance, implies sorrow for sin 
as necessarily resulting from the turning of the will, together with the 
intellectual views of sin which are implied in repentance. Neither con- 
viction of sin, nor sorrow for it, constitutes repentance. Yet from the 
correlation which is established between the intelligence, the sensibility, 
and the will, both conviction of sin, and sorrow for it, are implied in 
evangelical repentance, the one as necessarily preceding, and the other as 
often preceding, and always and necessarily resulting from repentance. 
During the process of conviction, it often happens, that the sensibility is 
hardened and unfeeling ; or, if there is much feeling, it is often only re- 
gret, remorse, agony, and despair. But when the heart has given away, 
and the evangelical turning has taken place, it often happens that the 
fountain of the great deep in the sensibility is broken up, the sorrows 
of the soul are stirred to the very bottom, and the sensibility pours forth 
its gushing tides like an irresistible torrent. But it frequently happens, 
too, in minds less subject to deep emotion, that the sorrows do not im- 
mediately flow in deep and broad channels, but are mild, melting, ten- 
der, tearful, silent, subdued. 

Self-loathing is another state of the sensibility implied in evangelical 
repentance. This state of mind may and often does, exist where repent- 
ance is not, just as outward morality does. But, like outward morality, 
it must exist where true repentance is. Self-loathing is a natural and a 
necessary consequence of those intellectual views of self that are implied 
in repentance. While the intelligence apprehends the utter, shameful 
guilt of self, and the heart yields to the conviction, the sensibility neces- 
sarily sympathizes, and a feeling of self-loathing and abhorrence is the 
inevitable consequence. 

It implies a loathing and abhorrence of the sins of others, a most 
deep and thorough feeling of opposition to sin — to all sin, in self and 
everybody else. Sin has become, to the penitent soul, the abominable 
thing which it hates. It implies a holy indignation toward all sin and 
all sinners, and a manifest opposition to every form of iniquity. 

3. Eepentance also implies peace of mind. The soul that has full 
confidence in the infinite wisdom and love of God, in the atonement of 
Christ, and in his universal providence, cannot but have peace. And 
further, the soul that has abandoned all sin, and turned to God, is no 
longer in a state of warfare with itself and with God. It must have 
peace of conscience, and peace with God. It implies heart-complacency 
in God, and in all the holy. This must follow from the very nature of 
repentance. 

It implies confession of sin to God and to man, as far as sin has been 
committed against men. If the heart has thoroughly renounced sin, it 
; has become benevolent, and is of course disposed, as far as possible, to 



REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 367 

undo the wrong it has committed, to confess sin., and humble self on ac- 
count of it, before God and our neighbor, whom we have injured. Ee- 
pentance implies humility, or a willingness to be known and estimated 
according to our real character. It implies a disposition to do right, 
and to confess our faults to God and man, as far as man has a right to 
know them. Let no one who has refused, and still refuses or neglects to 
confess his sins to God, and those sins to men that have been committed 
against them, profess repentance unto salvation ; but let him remember 
that God has said, " He that covereth his sins shall not prosper ; but 
whoso coufesseth and forsaketh them shall find mercy :" and again, 
" Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye 
may be healed." 

Eepentance implies a willingness to make restitution, and the actual 
making of it as far as ability goes. He is not just, and of course is not 
penitent, who has injured his neighbor in his person, reputation, prop- 
erty, or in anything, and is unwilling to make restitution. And he is 
unwilling to make restitution who neglects to do so whenever he is able. 
It is impossible that a soul truly penitent should neglect to make all 
practicable restitution, for the plain reason that penitence implies a be- 
nevolent and just attitude of the will, and the will controls the conduct 
by a law of necessity. 

Eepentance implies reformation of outward life. This follows from 
reformation of heart by a law of necessity. It is naturally impossible 
that a penitent soul, remaining penitent, should indulge in any known 
sin. If the heart be reformed, the life must be as the heart is. 

It implies a universal reformation of life, that is, a reformation ex- 
tending to all outward sin. The penitent does not, and remaining peni- 
tent, cannot, reform in respect to some sins only. If penitent at all, he 
must have repented of sin as sin, and of course of all sin. If he has 
turned to God, and consecrated himself to God, he has of course ceased 
from sin, from all sin as such. Sin, as we have seen on a former occasion, 
is a unit, and so is holiness. Sin consists in selfishness, and holiness in 
disinterested benevolence : it is therefore sheer nonsense to say that re- 
pentance can consist with indulgence in some sins. What are generally 
termed little, as well as what are termed great sins, are alike rejected and 
abhorred by the truly penitent soul, and this from a law of necessity, he 
being truly penitent. 

4. It implies faith or confidence in God in all things. It implies, not 
only the conviction that God is wholly right in all his controversy with 
sinners, but also that the heart has yielded to this conviction, and has 
come fully over to confide most implicitly in him in all respects, so that 
it can readily commit all interests for time and eternity to his hands. 
Eepentance is a state of mind that implies the fullest confidence in all the 



3CS SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

promises and threatenings of God, and in the atonement and grace of 
Christ. 

IV. Wliat impenitence is not. 

1. It is not a negation, or the mere absence of repentance. Some 
seem to regard impenitence as a nonentity, as the mere absence of repent- 
ance ; but this is a great mistake. 

2. It is not mere apathy in the sensibility in regard to sin, and a 
mere want of sorrow for it. 

3. It is not the absence of conviction of sin, nor the consequent care- 
lessness of the sinner in respect to the commandments of God. 

4. It is not an intellectual self -justification, nor does it consist in a 
disposition to cavil at truth and the claims of God. These may and often 
do result from impenitence, but are not identical with it. 

5. It does not consist in the spirit of excuse-making, so often mani- 
fested by sinners. This spirit is a result of impenitence, but does not 
constitute it, 

6. Nor does it consist in the love of sin for its own sake, nor in the 
love of sin in any sense. It is not a constitutional appetite, relish, or 
craving for sin. If this constitutional craving for sin existed, it could 
have no moral character, inasmuch as it would be a wholly involuntary 
state of mind. It could not be the crime of impenitence. 

V. What impenitence is. 

1. It is everywhere in the Bible represented as a heinous sin, as in 
Matt. xi. 20-24 : " Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of 
his mighty works were done, because they repented not. Woe unto thee, 
Chorazin ! woe unto thee, Bethsaida ! for if the mighty works which 
were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have 
repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you, it shall 
be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment than for 
you. And thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be 
brought down to hell ; for if the mighty works which have been done in 
thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. 
But I say unto you, that it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom, 
in the day of judgment, than for thee." Here, as elsewhere, impenitence 
is represented as most aggravated wickedness. 

2. Impenitence is a phenomenon of the will, and consists in the will's 
cleaving to self-indulgence under light. It consists in the will's pertina- 
cious adherence to the gratification of self, in despite of all the light with 
which the sinner is surrounded. It is not, as has been said, a passive 
state nor a mere negation, nor the love of sin for its own sake ; but it is 
an active and obstinate state of the will, a determined holding on to that 



EEPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 369 

course of self-seeking which constitutes sin, not from a love to sin, but 
for the sake of the gratification. This, under light, is of course, aggra- 
vated wickedness. Considered in this view, it is easy to account for all 
the woes and denunciations that the Saviour uttered against it. When 
the claims of God are revealed to the mind, it must necessarily yield to 
them, or strengthen itself in sin. It must, as it were, gird itself up, and 
struggle to resist the claims of duty. This strengthening self in sin under 
light is the particular form of sin which we call impenitence. All sin- 
ners are guilty of it, because all have some light, but some are vastly more 
guilty of it than others. 

VI. Notice some tilings that are implied in impenitence. 

As it essentially consists in a cleaving to self-indulgence under light, 
it implies, — 

1. That the impenitent sinner obstinately prefers his own petty and 
momentary gratification to all the other and higher interests of God and 
the universe ; that because these gratifications are his own, or the grati- 
fication of self, he therefore gives them the preference over all the infinite 
interests of all other beings. 

2. It implies the deliberate and actual setting at naught, not only of 
the interests of God and of the universe, as of no value, but it implies 
also a total disregard, and even contempt, of the rights of all other 
beings. It is a practical denial that they have any rights or interests to 
be promoted. 

3. It implies a rejection of the authority of God, and contempt for it, 
as well as a spurning of his law and gospel. 

4. It implies a present justification of all past sin. The sinner who 
holds on to his self-indulgence, in the presence of the light of the gospel, 
really in heart justifies all his past rebellion. 

5. Consequently present impenitence, especially under the light of 
the glorious gospel, is a heart-justification of all sin. It is taking sides 
deliberately with sinners against God, and is a virtual endorsing of all 
sins of earth and hell. This principle is clearly implied in Christ's 
teaching, Matt, xxiii. 34-36 : "Wherefore, behold, I send unto you 
prophets, and wise men, and scribes ; and some of them ye shall kill and 
crucify ; and some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and 
persecute them from city to city ; that upon you may come all the right- 
eous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto 
the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the 
temple and the altar. Verily, I say unto you, All these things shall 
come upon this generation." 

6. Present impenitence, under all the light and experience which the 
sinner now has, involves the guilt of all his past sin. If he still holds on 

24 



o70 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

to it, he in heart justifies it. If he in heart justifies it, he virtually re- 
commits it. If in the presence of accumulated light, he still persists in 
sin, he virtually endorses, recommits, and is again guilty of all past sin. 
It implies a total want of confidence in God ; want of confidence in 
his character and government ; in his works and ways. It virtually 
charges God with usurpation, falsehood, and selfishness in all their 
odious forms. It is a making war on every moral attribute of God, and 
is utter enmity against him. It is mortal enmity, and would of course 
always manifest itself in sinners, as it did when Christ was upon the 
earth. When he poured the light upon them, they hardened themselves 
until they were ripe for murdering him. This is the true nature of im- 
penitence. It involves the guilt of a mortal enmity against God. 

VII. Notice some of the characteristics or evidences of impenitence. 

1. A manifested indifference to the sins of men is evidence of an im- 
penitent and sin-justifying state of mind. It is impossible that a peni- 
tent soul should not be deeply and heartily opposed to all sin ; and if 
heartily opposed to it, it is impossible that he should not manifest this 
opposition, for the heart controls the life by a law of necessity. 

2. Of course a manifest heart-complacency in sin or in sinners is 
sure evidence of an impenitent state of mind. " He that will be the 
friend of the world is the enemy of God." Heart-complacency in sin- 
ners is that friendship with the world that is enmity against God. 

3. A manifest want of zeal in opposing sin and in promoting reforma- 
tion, is a sure indication of an impenitent state of mind. The soul that 
has been truly convinced of sin, and turned from sin to the love and 
service of God, cannot but manifest a deep interest in every effort to ex- 
pel sin out of the world. Such a soul cannot but be zealous in opposing 
sin, and in building up and establishing righteousness in the earth. 

4. A manifest want of sympathy with God in respect to his govern- 
ment, providential and moral, is an evidence of impenitence of heart. 
A penitent soul, as has been said, will and must of course justify God in 
all his ways. This is implied in genuine repentance. A disposition to 
complain of the strictness and rigor of God's commandments — to speak 
of the providence of God in a complaining manner, to murmur at its 
allotments, and repine at the circumstances in which it has placed a 
soul, is to evince an impenitent and rebellious state of mind. 

5. A manifest want of confidence in the character, faithfulness, and 
promises of God, is also sure evidence of an impenitent state of mind. 
A distrust of God in any respect cannot consist with a penitent state of 
heart. 

6. The absence of peace of mind is sure evidence of an impenitent 
state. The penitent soul must have peace of conscience, because peni- 



KEPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE. 371 

tence is a state of conscious rectitude. It also must have peace with 
God, in view of, and through confidence in, the atonement of Christ. 
Repentance is the turning from an attitude of rebellion against God, to 
a state of universal submission to his will, and approbation of it as wise 
and good. This must of course bring peace to the soul. When therefore 
there is a manifest want of peace, there is evidence of impenitence of heart. 
7. Every unequivocal manifestation of selfishness is a conclusive 
evidence of present impenitence. Eepentance, as we have seen, consists 
in the turning of the soul from selfishness to benevolence. It follows of 
course that the presence of selfishness, or a spirit of self-indulgence, is 
conclusive evidence of an impenitent state of mind. Repentance implies 
the denial of self ; the denial or subjection of all the appetites, passions, 
and propensities to the law of the intelligence. Therefore a manifest 
spirit of self-indulgence, a disposition to seek the gratification of the 
appetites and passions, such as the subjection of the will to the use of 
tobacco, of alcohol, or to any of the natural or artificial appetites, under 
light, and in opposition to the law of the reason, is conclusive evidence 
of present impenitence. I say, " under light, and in opposition to the 
law of the reason." Such articles as those just named, are sometimes 
used medicinally, and because they are regarded as useful, and even in- 
dispensable to health under certain circumstances. In such cases their 
use may be a duty. But they are more frequently used merely to gratify 
appetite, and in the face of a secret conviction that they are not only un- 
necessary, but absolutely injurious. This is indulgence that constitutes 
sin. It is impossible that such indulgence should consist with repen- 
tance. Such a mind must be in impenitence, or there is no such thing 
as impenitence. 

8. A spirit of self-justification is another evidence of impenitence. 
This manifestation must be directly the opposite of that which the truly 
penitent soul will make. 

9. A spirit of excuse-making for neglect of duty is also a conclusive 
evidence of an impenitent heart. Repentance implies the giving up of 
all excuses for disobedience, and a hearty obedience in all things. Of 
course, where there is a manifest disposition to make excuses for not 
being what and all God requires us to be, it is certain that there is, and 
must be an impenitent state of mind. It is war with God. 

10. A want of candor upon any moral subject relating to self, also 
betrays an impenitent heart. A penitent state of the will is committed 
to know and to embrace all truth. Therefore a prejudiced, uncandid 
state of mind must be inconsistent with penitence, and a manifestation 
of prejudice must evince present impenitence. An unwillingness to 
be searched, and to have all our words and ways brought into the light 
of truth, and to be reproved when we are in error, is a sure indication 



372 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of an impenitent state of mind. " Every one that doeth evil hateth 
the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. 
But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be 
made manifest, that they are wrought in God." 

11. Only partial reformation of life, also indicates that the heart 
has not embraced the whole will of God. When there is a disposition 
manifested to indulge in some sin, no matter how little, it is sure evi- 
dence of impenitence of heart. The penitent soul rejects sin as sin ; of 
course every kind or degree of iniquity is put away, loathed, and abhorred. 
" Whoso keepeth the whole law and yet offends in one point, is guilty of 
all ;" that is, if a man in one point unequivocally sins or disobeys God, 
it is certain that he truly from the heart obeys him in nothing. He has 
not an obedient state of mind. If he really had supreme respect to 
God's authority, he could not but obey him in all things. If therefore it 
be found, that a professor of penitence does not manifest the spirit 
of universal obedience ; if in some things he is manifestly self-indulgent, 
it may be known that he is altogether yet in sin, and that he is still "in 
the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity." 

12. Neglect or refusal to confess and make restitution, so far as 
opportunity and ability are enjoyed, is also a sure indication of an unjust 
and impenitent state of mind. It would seem impossible for a penitent 
soul not at once to see and be impressed with the duty of making confes- 
sion and restitution to those who have been injured by him. When this 
is refused or neglected, there must be impenitence. The heart controls 
the life by a law of necessity ; when, therefore, there is a heart that 
confesses and forsakes sin, it is impossible that this should not appear in 
outward confession and restitution. 

13. A spirit of covetousness, or grasping after the World, is a sure 
indication of impenitence. ". Covetousness is idolatry." It is a hunger- 
ing and thirsting after, and devotion to this world. Acquisitiveness 
indulged must be positive proof of an impenitent state of mind. If any 
man love the world, how dwelleth the love of God in him ? 

14. A want of interest in, and compassion for, sinners, is a sure 
indication of impenitence. If one has seen his own guilt and ruin, and 
has found himself sunk in the horrible pit and miry clay of his own 
abominations, and has found the way of escape, to feel deeply for sinners, 
to manifest a great compassion and concern for them, and a zeal for 
their salvation, is as natural as to breathe. If this sympathy and zeal 
are not manifested, we may rely upon it that there is still impenitence. 
There is a total want of that love to God and souls that is always implied 
in repentance. Seest thou a professed convert to Christ whose compas- 
sions are not stirred, and whose zeal for the salvation of souls is not 
awakened ? Be assured that you behold a hypocrite. 



FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 373 

15. Spiritual sloth or indolence is another evidence of an impenitent 
heart. The soul that thoroughly turns to God, and consecrates itself to 
him, and wholly commits itself to promote his glory in the building up 
of his kingdom, will be, must be, anything but slothful. A disposition 
to spiritual idleness, or to lounging or indolence of any kind, is an evi- 
dence that the heart is impenitent. I might pursue this subject to an 
indefinite length ; but what has been said must suffice for this course of 
instruction, and is sufficient to give you the clue by which you may de- 
tect the windings and delusions of the impenitent heart. 



LECTURE XXXV. 

FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 



I. What evangelical faith is not. 

1. The term faith, like most other words, has diverse significations, 
and is manifestly used in the Bible sometimes to designate a state of the 
intellect, in which case it means an undoubting persuasion, a firm con- 
viction, an unhesitating intellectual assent. This, however, is not its 
evangelical sense. Evangelical faith cannot be a phenomenon of the in- 
tellect, for the plain reason that, when used in an evangelical sense, it is 
always regarded as a virtue. But virtue cannot be predicated of intel- 
lectual states, because these are involuntary, or passive states of mind. 
Faith is a condition of salvation. It is something which we are com- 
manded to do upon pain of eternal death. But if it be something to be 
done — a solemn duty, it cannot be a merely passive state, a mere intel- 
lectual conviction. The Bible distinguishes between intellectual and 
saving faith. There is a faith of devils, and there is a faith of saints. 
James clearly distinguishes between them, and also between an antino- 
mian and a saving faith. " Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, 
being alone. Yea, a man may say, thou hast faith, and I have works : show 
me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my 
works. Thou believest that there is one God ; thou doest well : the 
devils also believe, and tremble. But wilt thou know, vain man, that 
faith without works is dead ? "Was not Abraham our father justified by 
works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar ? Seest thou 
how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect ? 
And the scripture was fulfilled which saith, Abraham believed God, and 
it was imputed unto him for righteousness ; and he was called the friend 
of God. Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by 



374 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

faith only. Likewise also was not Eahab the harlot justified by works, 
when she had received the messengers, and had sent them out another 
way ? For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works 
is dead also." — James ii. 17-26. The distinction is here clearly marked, 
as it is elsewhere in the Bible, between intellectual and saving faith. 
One produces good works or a holy life ; the other is unproductive. This 
shows that one is a phenomenon of the intellect merely, and does not of 
course control the conduct. The other must be a phenomenon of the 
will, because it manifests itself in the outward life. Evangelical faith, 
then, is not a conviction, a perception of truth. It does not belong to 
the intellect, though it implies intellectual conviction, yet the evangelical 
or virtuous element does not consist in it. 

2. It is not a feeling of any kind ; that is, it does not belong to, and 
is not a phenomenon of, the sensibility. The phenomena of the sensibility 
are passive states of mind, and therefore have no moral character in 
themselves. Faith, regarded as a virtue, cannot consist in any involun- 
tary state of mind whatever. It is represented in the Bible as an active 
and most efficient state of mind. It works, and "works by love." It 
produces "the obedience of faith." Christians are said to be sanctified 
by the faith that is in Christ. Indeed the Bible, in a great variety of 
instances and ways, represents faith in God and in Christ as a cardinal 
form of virtue, and as the mainspring of an outwardly holy life. Hence, 
it cannot consist in any involuntary state or exercise of mind whatever. 

II. What evangelical faith is. 

Since the Bible uniformly represents saving or evangelical faith as a 
virtue, we know that it must be a phenomenon of the will. It is an 
efficient state of mind, and therefore it must consist in the embracing of 
the truth by the heart or will. It is the will's closing in with the truths 
of the gospel. It is the soul's act of yielding itself up, or committing itself 
to the truths of the evangelical system. It is a trusting in Christ, a 
committing of the soul and the whole being to him, in his various offices 
and relations to men. It is a confiding in him, and in what is revealed 
of him, in his word and providence, and by his Spirit. 

The same word that is so often rendered faith in the New Testament 
is also rendered commit ; as in John ii. 24, " But Jesus did not commit 
himself unto them, because he knew all men." Luke xvi. 11, " If, there- 
fore, ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will 
commit to your trust the true riches ? " In these passages the word ren- 
dered commit is the same word as that which is rendered faith. It is a 
confiding in God and in Christ, as revealed in the Bible and in reason. 
It is a receiving of the testimony of God concerning himself, and con- 
cerning all things of which he has spoken. It is a receiving of Christ for 



FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 375 

just what he is represented to be in his gospel, and an unqualified sur- 
render of the will, and of the whole being to him. 

III. What is implied in evangelical faith 9 

1. It implies an intellectual perception of the things, facts, and truths 
believed. No one can believe that which he does not understand. It is 
impossible to believe that which is not so revealed to the mind, that the 
mind understands it. It has been erroneously assumed, that faith did 
not need light, that is, that it is not essential to faith that we under- 
stand the doctrines or facts that we are called upon to believe. This 
is a false assumption ; for how can we believe, trust, confide, in what we 
do not understand ? I must first understand what a proposition, a fact, 
a doctrine, or a thing is, before I can say whether I believe, or whether 
I ought to believe, or not. Should you state a proposition to me in an 
unknown tongue, and ask me if I believe it, I must reply, I do not, for 
I do not understand the terms of the proposition. Perhaps I should be- 
lieve the truth expressed, and perhaps I should not ; I cannot tell, until I 
understand the proposition. Any fact or doctrine not understood is like a 
proposition in an unknown tongue ; it is impossible that the mind should 
receive or reject it, should believe or disbelieve it, until it is understood. 
We can receive or believe a truth, or fact, or doctrine no further than we 
understand it. So far as we do understand it, so far we may believe it, 
although we may not understand all about it. For example : I can be- 
lieve in both the proper divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. That 
he is both God and man, is a fact that I can understand. Thus far I can 
believe. But how his divinity and humanity are united I cannot under- 
stand. Therefore, I only believe the fact that they are united ; the quo 
modo of their union I know nothing about, and I believe no more than 
I know. So I can understand that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
one God. That the Father is God, that the Son is. God, that the Holy 
Spirit is God ; that these three are Divine persons, I can understand as 
a fact. I can also understand that there is no contradiction or impossi- 
bility in the declared fact, that these three are one in their substratum 
of being ; that is that they are one in a different sense from that in which 
they are three ; that they are three in one sense, and one in another. I 
understand that this may be a fact, and therefore I can believe it. But 
the quo modo of their union I neither understand nor believe : that is, I 
have no theory, no idea, no data on the subject, have no opinion, and 
consequently no faith, as to the manner in which they are united. Faith, 
then, in any fact or doctrine, implies that the intellect has an idea, or 
that the soul has an understanding, an opinion of that which the heart 
embraces or believes. 

2. Evangelical faith implies the appropriation of the truths of the 



376 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

gospel to ourselves. It implies an acceptance of Christ as our wisdom, 
righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. The soul that truly be- 
lieves, believes that Christ tasted death for every man, and of course for 
it. It apprehends Christ as the Saviour of the world, as offered to all, 
and embraces and receives him for itself. It appropriates his atonement, 
and his resurrection, and his intercession, and his promises to itself. 
Christ is thus presented in the gospel, not only as the Saviour of the 
world, but also to the individual acceptance of men. He is embraced by 
the world no further than he is embraced by individuals. He saves the 
world no further than he saves individuals. He died for the world, be- 
cause he died for the individuals that compose the race. Evangelical 
faith, then, implies the belief of the truths of the Bible, the apprehension 
of the truths just named, and a reception of them, and a personal accept- 
ance and appropriation of Christ to meet the necessities of the individual 
soul. 

3. Evangelical faith implies an evangelical life. This would not be 
true if faith were merely an intellectual state or exercise. But since, as 
we have seen, faith is of the heart, since it consists in the committal of 
the will to Christ, it follows, by a law of necessity, that the life will cor- 
respond with the faith. Let this be kept in perpetual remembrance. 

4. Evangelical faith implies repentance towards God. Evangelical 
faith particularly respects Jesus Christ and his salvation. It is an em- 
bracing of Christ and his salvation. Of course it implies repentance to- 
wards God, that is, a turning from sin to God. The will cannot be sub- 
mitted to Christ, it cannot receive him as he is presented in the gospel, 
while it neglects repentance toward God ; while it rejects the authority 
of the Father, it cannot embrace and submit to the Son. 

5. Disinterested benevolence, or a state of good-will to being, is im- 
plied in evangelical faith ; for that is the committal of the soul to God 
and to Christ in all obedience. It must, therefore, imply fellowship or 
sympathy with him in regard to the great end upon which his heart is 
set, and for which he lives. A yielding up of the will and the soul to 
him, must imply the embracing of the same end that he embraces. 

6. It implies a state of the sensibility corresponding to the truths be- 
lieved. It implies this, because this state of the sensibility is a result of 
faith by a law of necessity, and this result follows necessarily upon the 
acceptance of Christ and his gospel by the heart. 

7. Of course it implies peace of mind. In Christ the soul finds its 
full and present salvation. It finds justification, which produces a sense 
of pardon and acceptance. It finds sanctification, or grace to deliver 
from the reigning power of sin. It finds all its wants met, and ail needed 
grace proffered for its assistance. It sees no cause for disturbance, noth- 
ing to ask or desire that is not treasured up in Christ. It has ceased to 






FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 377 

war with Gcd — with itself. It has found its resting-place in Christ, and 
rests in profound peace under the shadow of the Almighty. 

8. It must imply the existence in the soul of every virtue, because it 
is a yielding up of the whole being to the will of God. Consequently, 
all the phases of virtue required by the gospel must be implied as exist- 
ing, either in a developed or in an undeveloped state, in every heart that 
truly receives Christ by faith. Certain forms or modifications of virtue 
may not in all cases have found the occasions of their development, but 
certain it is, that every modification of virtue will manifest itself as its 
occasion shall arise, if there be a true and a living faith in Christ. This 
follows from the very nature of faith. 

9. Present evangelical faith implies a state of present sinlessness. 
Observe, faith is the yielding and committal of the whole will, and of the 
whole being to Christ. This, and nothing short of this, is evangelical 
faith. But this comprehends and implies the whole of present, true 
obedience to Christ. This is the reason why faith is spoken of as the 
condition, and as it were, the only condition, of salvation. It really 
implies all virtue. Faith may be contemplated either as a distinct form 
of virtue, and as an attribute of love, or as comprehensive of all virtue. 
When contemplated as an attribute of love, it is only a branch of sancti- 
fication. When contemplated in the wider sense of universal conformity 
of will to the will of God, it is then synonymous with entire present 
sanctification. Contemplated in either light, its existence in the heart 
must be inconsistent with present sin there. Faith is an attitude of the 
will, and is wholly incompatible with present rebellion of will against 
Christ. This must be true, or what is faith ? 

10. Faith implies the reception and the practice of all known or per- 
ceived truth. The heart that embraces and receives truth as truth, and 
because it is truth, must of course receive all known truth. For it is plainly 
impossible that the will should embrace some truth perceived for a benev- 
olent reason, and reject other truth perceived. All truth is harmonious. 
One truth is always consistent with every other truth. The heart that 
truly embraces one, will, for the same reason, embrace all truth known. 
If out of regard to the highest good of being, any one revealed truth 
is truly received, that state of mind continuing, it is impossible that 
all truth should not be received as soon as known. 

IV. What unlelief is not, 

1. It is not ignorance of truth. Ignorance is a blank ; it is the 
negation or absence of knowledge. This certainly cannot be the unbe- 
lief everywhere represented in the Bible as a heinous sin. Ignorance 
may be a consequence of unbelief, but cannot be identical with it. We 
may be ignorant of certain truths as a consequence of rejecting others, 
but this ignorance is not, and, we shall see, cannot be unbelief. 



378 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

2. Unbelief is not the negation or absence of faith. This were a 
mere nothing — a nonentity. But a mere nothing is not that abominable 
thing which the scriptures represent as a great and a damning sin. 

3. It cannot be a phenomenon of the intellect, or an intellectual 
scepticism. This state of the intellect may result from the state of mind 
properly denominated unbelief, but it cannot be identical with it. Intel- 
lectual doubt or unbelief often results from unbelief properly so called, 
but unbelief, when contemplated as a sin, should never be confounded 
with theoretic or intellectual infidelity. They are as entirely distinct as 
any two phenomena of mind whatever. 

4. It cannot consist in feelings or emotions of incredulity, doubt, or 
opposition to truth. In other words, unbelief as a sin cannot be a phe- 
nomenon of the sensibility. The term unbelief is sometimes used to 
express or designate a state of the intellect, and sometimes of the sensi- 
bility. It sometimes is used to designate a state of intellectual incredu- 
lity, doubt, distrust, scepticism. But when used in this sense, moral 
character is not justly preclicable of the state of mind which the term 
unbelief represents. 

Sometimes the term expresses a mere feeling of incredulity in regard 
to truth. But neither has this state of mind moral character ; nor can 
it have, for the very good reason that it is involuntary. In short, the 
unbelief that is so sorely denounced in the Bible, as a most aggravated 
abomination, cannot consist in any involuntary state of mind whatever. 

V. What unbelief is. 

The term, as used in the Bible, in those passages that represent it 
as a sin, must designate a phenomenon of will. It must be a voluntary 
state of mind. It must be the opposite of evangelical faith. Faith 
is the will's reception, and unbelief is the will's rejection, of truth. 
Faith is the soul's confiding in truth and in the God of truth. Unbelief 
is the soul's withholding confidence from truth and the God of truth. 
It is the heart's rejection of evidence, and refusal to be influenced by it. 
It is the will in the attitude of opposition to truth perceived, or evidence 
presented. Intellectual scepticism or unbelief, where light is proffered, 
always implies the unbelief of the will or heart. For if the mind knows, 
or supposes, that light may be had, on any question of duty, and does 
not make honest efforts to obtain it, this can be accounted for only 
by ascribing it to the will's reluctance to know the path of duty. In 
this case light is rejected. The mind has light so far as to know that 
more is proffered, but this proffered light is rejected. This is the sin of 
unbelief. All infidelity is unbelief in this sense, and infidels are so, not 
for want of light, but, in general, they have taken much pains to shut 
their eyes against it. Unbelief must be a voluntary state or attitude 



FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 379 

of the will, as distinguished from a mere volition, or executive act 
of the will. Volition may, and often does, give forth, through words 
and deeds, expressions and manifestations of unbelief. But the volition 
is only a result of unbelief, and not identical with it. Unbelief is a 
deeper and more efficient and more permanent state of mind than mere 
volition. It is the will in its profoundest opposition to the truth and 
will of God. 

VI. Conditions of both faith and unbelief. 

1. A revelation in some way to the mind, of the truth and will of God, 
must be a condition of faith and of unbelief. Be it remembered, that 
neither faith nor unbelief is consistent with total ignorance. There can 
be unbelief no further than there is light. 

2. In respect to that class of truths which are discerned only upon 
condition of divine illumination, such illumination must be a condition 
both of faith and unbelief. It should be remarked, that when a truth 
has been once revealed by the Holy Spirit to the soul, the continuance of 
the divine light is not essential to the continuance of unbelief. The 
truth, once known and lodged in the memory, may continue to be re- 
sisted, when the agent that revealed it is withdrawn. 

3. Intellectual perception is a condition of the heart's unbelief. The 
intellect must have evidence of truth as the condition of a virtuous 
belief of it. So the intellect must have evidence of the truth, as a con- 
dition of a wicked rejection of it. Therefore, intellectual light is the 
condition, both of the heart's faith and unbelief. By the assertion, that 
intellectual light is a condition of unbelief is intended, not that the in- 
tellect should at all times admit the truth in theory ; but that the evi- 
dence must be such, that by virtue of its own laws, the mind or intellect 
could justly admit the truth rejected by the heart. It is a very common 
case, that the unbeliever denies in words, and endeavors to refute in 
theory, that which he nevertheless assumes as true, in all his practical 
judgments. 

VII. The guilt and ill-desert of unbelief. 

We have seen, on a former occasion, that the guilt of sin is condition- 
ated upon, and graduated by, the light under which it is committed. 
The amount of light is the measure of guilt, in every case of sin. This is 
true of all sin. But it is peculiarly manifest in the sin of unbelief ; for 
unbelief is the rejection of light ; it is selfishness in the attitude of re- 
jecting truth. Of course, the amount of light rejected, and the degree^ 
of guilt in rejecting it, are equal. This is everywhere assumed and. 
taught in the Bible, and is plainly the doctrine of reason. 

The guilt of unbelief under the light of the gospel must be indefi- 



380 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

nitely greater, than when merely the light of nature is rejected. The 
guilt of unbelief, in cases where special divine illumination has been en- 
joyed, must be vastly and incalculably greater, than where the mere light 
of the gospel has been enjoyed, without a special enlightening of the 
Holy Spirit. 

The guilt of unbelief in one who has been converted, and has known 
the love of God, must be greater beyond comparison, than that of an 
ordinary sinner. Those things that are implied in unbelief show that it 
must be one of the most provoking abominations to God in the universe. 
It is the perfection of all that is unreasonable, unjust, ruinous. It is 
infinitely slanderous and dishonorable to God, and destructive to man, 
and to all the interests of the kingdom of God. 

VIII. Natural and governmental consequences of loth faith and un- 
belief 

By natural consequences are intended consequences that flow from 
the constitution and laws of mind, by a natural necessity. By govern- 
mental consequences are intended those that result from the constitution, 
laws, and administration of moral government. 

1. One of the natural consequences of faith is peace of conscience. 
When the will receives the truth, and yields itself up to conformity with 
it, the conscience is satisfied with its present attitude, and the man 
becomes at peace with himself. The soul is then in a state to really 
respect itself, and can, as it were, behold its own face without a blush. 
But faith in truth perceived is the unalterable condition of a mans being 
at peace with himself. 

A governmental consequence of faith is peace with God : — 
(1.) In the sense that God is satisfied with the present obedience of 
the soul. It is given up to be influenced by all truth, and this is com- 
prehensive of all duty. Of course God is at peace with the soul, so far 
as its present obedience is concerned. 

(2. ) Faith governmentally results in peace with God, in the sense of 
being a condition of pardon and acceptance. That is, the penalty of the 
law for past sins is remitted upon condition of true faith in Christ. 
The soul not only needs preseut and future obedience, as a necessary 
condition of peace with self ; but it also needs pardon and acceptance on 
the part of the government for past sins, as a condition of peace with 
God. But since the subject of justification or acceptance with God is to 
com* up as a distinct subject for consideration, I will not enlarge upon 
it here. 

2. Self-condemnation is one of the natural consequences of unbelief. 
Such are the constitution and laws of mind, that it is naturally impossi- 
ble for the mind to justify the heart's rejection of truth. On the con- 



FAITH AND UNBELIEF. 381 

trary, the conscience necessarily condemns such rejection, and pro- 
nounces judgment against it. 

Legal condemnation is a necessary governmental consequence of un- 
belief. No just government can justify the rejection of known truth. 
But. on the contrary, all just governments must utterly abhor and con- 
demn the rejection of truths, and especially those truths that relate to 
the obedience of the subject, and the highest well-being of the rulers and 
ruled. The government of God must condemn and utterly abhor all 
unbelief, as a rejection of those truths that are indispensable to the 
highest well-being of the universe. 

3. A holy or obedient life results from faith by a natural or necessary 
law. Faith is an act of will which controls the life by a law of necessity. 
It follows of course that, when the heart receives or obeys the truth, the 
outward life must be conformed to it. 

4. A disobedient and unholy life results from unbelief also by a law 
of necessity. If the heart rejects the truth, of course the life will not be 
conformed to it. 

5. Faith, will develop every form of virtue in the heart and life, as 
their occasions shall arise. It consists in the committing of the will to 
truth and to the God of truth. Of course as different occasions arise, 
faith will secure conformity to all truth on all subjects, and then every 
modification of virtue will exist in the heart, and appear in the life, as. 
circumstances in the providence of God shall develop them. 

6. Unbelief may be expected to develop resistance to all truth upon 
all subjects that conflict with selfishness ; and hence nothing but selfish- 
ness in some form can restrain its appearing in any other and every other 
form possible or conceivable. It consists, be it remembered, in the 
heart's rejection of truth, and of course implies the cleaving to error. 
The natural result of this must be the development in the heart, and the 
appearance in the life, of every form of selfishness that is not prevented 
by some other form. Tor example, avarice may restrain amativeness, 
intemperance, and many other forms of selfishness. 

7. Faith, governmentally results in obtaining help of God. God may 
and does gratuitously help those who have no faith. But this is not a 
governmental result or act in God. But to the obedient he extends his 
governmental protection and aid. 

8. Faith lets God into the soul to dwell and reign there. Faith re- 
ceives, not only the atonement and mediatorial work of Christ as a 
redeemer from punishment, but it also receives Christ as king to set up 
his throne, and reign in the heart. Faith secures to the soul communion 
with God. 

9. Unbelief shuts God out of the soul, in the sense of refusing his 
reign in the heart. It also shuts the soul out from an interest in Christ's 



382 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

mediatorial work. This results not from an arbitrary appointment, but 
is a natural consequence. Unbelief shuts the soul out from communion 
with God. 

These are hints at some of the natural and governmental consequences 
of faith and unbelief. They are designed not to exhaust the subject, but 
merely to call attention to topics which any one who desires may pursue 
at his pleasure. It should be here remarked, that none of the ways, com- 
mandments, or appointments of God are arbitrary. Faith is a naturally 
indispensable condition of salvation, which is the reason of its being made 
a governmental condition. Unbelief renders salvation naturally impos- 
sible : it must, therefore, render it govern mentally impossible. 



LECTURE XXXVL 

JUSTIFICATION. 



Cheist is represented in the gospel as sustaining to men three classes 
of relations. 

1. Those which are purely governmental. 

2. Those which are purely spiritual. 

3. Those which unite both these. 

We shall at present consider him as Christ our justification. I shall 
show, — 

I. What gospel justification is not. 

There is scarcely any question in theology that has been encumbered 
with more injurious and technical mysticism than that of justification. 

Justification is the pronouncing of one just. It may be done in words, 
or, practically, by treatment. Justification must be, in some sense, a 
governmental act ; and it is of importance to a right understanding of 
gospel justification, to inquire whether it be an act of the judicial, the 
executive, or the legislative department of government ; that is, whether 
gospel justification consists in a strictly judicial or forensic proceeding, 
or whether it consists in pardon, or setting aside the execution of an in- 
curred penalty, and is therefore properly either an executive or a legis- 
lative act. We shall see that the settling of this question is of great im- 
portance in theology ; and as we view this subject, so, if consistent, we 
must view many important and highly practical questions in theology. 
This leads me to say, — 

That gospel justification is not to be regarded as a forensic or judicial 
proceeding. Dr. Chalmers and those of his school hold that it is. But 



JUSTIFICATION. 383 

this is certainly a great mistake, as we shall see. The term forensic is 
from forum, "a court." A forensic proceeding belongs to the judicial 
department of government, whose business it is to ascertain the facts and 
declare the sentence of the law. This department has no power over the 
law, but to pronounce judgment, in accordance with its true spirit and 
meaning. Courts never pardon, or set aside the execution of penalties. 
This does not belong to them, but either to the executive or to the law- 
making department. Oftentimes, this power in human governments is 
lodged in the head of the executive department, who is, generally at 
least, a branch of the legislative power of government. But never is the 
power to pardon exercised by the judicial department. The ground of a 
judicial or forensic justification invariably is, and must be, universal 
obedience to law. If but one crime or breach of law is alleged and proved, 
the court must inevitably condemn, and can in no such case justify, or 
pronounce the convicted just. Gospel justification is the justification of 
sinners ; it is, therefore, naturally impossible, and a most palpable con- 
tradiction, to affirm that the justification of a sinner, or of one who has 
violated the law, is a forensic or judicial justification. That only is or 
can be a legal or forensic justification, that proceeds upon the ground of 
its appearing that the justified person is guiltless, or, in other words, that 
he has not violated the law, that he has done only what he had a legal 
right to do. Now it is certainly nonsense to affirm, that a sinner can be 
pronounced just in the eye of law ; that he can be justified by deeds of 
law, or by the law at all. The law condemns him. But to be justified 
judicially or forensically, is to be pronounced just in the judgment of 
law. This certainly is an impossibility in respect to sinners. The Bible 
is as express as possible on this point. Komans iii. 20, — " Therefore by 
the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for by 
the law is the knowledge of sin." 

It is proper to say here, that Dr. Chalmers and those of his school do 
not intend that sinners are justified by their own obedience to law, but 
by the perfect and imputed obedience of Jesus Christ. They maintain 
that, by reason of the obedience to law which Christ rendered when on 
earth, being set down to the credit of elect sinners, and imputed to them, 
the law regards them as having rendered perfect obedience in him, or 
regards them as having perfectly obeyed by proxy, and therefore pro- 
nounces them just, upon condition of faith in Christ. This they insist 
is properly a forensic or judicial justification. But this subject will come 
up more appropriately under another head. 

II. What is gospel justification ? 

It consists not in the law pronouncing the sinner just, but in his be- 
ing ultimately governmentally treated as if he were just ; that is, it con- 



38± SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sists in a governmental decree of pardon or amnesty — in arresting and 
setting aside the execution of the incurred penalty of law — in pardoning 
and restoring to favor those who have sinned, and those whom the law 
had pronounced guilty, and upon whom it had passed the sentence of 
eternal death, and rewarding them as if they had been righteous. In 
proof of this position, I remark, — 

1. That this is most unequivocally taught in the Old Testament scrip- 
tures. The whole system of sacrifices taught the doctrine of pardon 
upon the conditions of atonement, repentance, and faith. This, under 
the old dispensation, is constantly represented as a merciful acceptance 
of the penitents, and never as a forensic or judicial acquittal or justifica- 
tion of them. The mercy-seat covered the law in the ark of the cove- 
nant. Paul informs us what justification was in the sense in which the 
Old Testament saints understood it, in Eom. iv. 6-8 : — "Even also as 
David describeth the blessedness of the man to whom God imputeth 
righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are 
forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the 
Lord will not impute sin." This quotation from David shows both what 
David and what Paul understood by justification, to wit, the pardon and 
acceptance of the penitent sinner. 

2. The New Testament fully justifies and establishes this view of the 
subject, as we shall abundantly see under another head. 

3. Sinners cannot possibly be just in any other sense. Upon certain 
conditions they may be pardoned and treated as just. But for sinners to 
be forensically pronounced just, is impossible and absurd. 

III. Conditions of justification. 

In this discussion I use the term condition in the sense of a sine qua 
non, a "not without which." This is its philosophical sense. A con- 
dition as distinct from a ground of justification, is anything without 
which sinners cannot be justified, which, nevertheless, is not the procur- 
ing cause or fundamental reason of their justification. As we shall see, 
there are many conditions, while there is but one ground, of the justifi- 
cation of sinners. The application and importance of this distinction we 
shall perceive as we proceed. 

As has been already said, there can be no justification in a legal or 
forensic sense, but upon the ground of universal, perfect, and uninter- 
rupted obedience to law. This is of course denied by those who hold 
that gospel justification, or the justification of penitent sinners, is of the 
nature of a forensic or judicial justification. They hold to the legal 
maxim, that what a man does by another he does by himself, and there- 
fore the law regards Christ's obedience as ours, on the ground that he 
obeyed for us. To this I reply, — 



JUSTIFICATION. 385 

1. The legal maxim just repeated does not apply, except in cases 
where one acts in behalf of another by his own appointment, which was 
not the case with the obedience of Christ ; and, — 

2. The doctrine of an imputed righteousness, or that Christ's obedi- 
ence to the law was accounted as our obedience, is founded on a most 
false and nonsensical assumption ; to wit, that Christ owed no obedience 
to the law in his own person, and that therefore his obedience was alto- 
gether a work of supererogation, and might be made a substitute for our 
own obedience ; that it might be set down to our credit, because he did 
not need to obey for himself. 

I must here remark, that justification respects the moral law ; and 
that it must be intended that Christ owed no obedience to the moral law, 
and therefore his obedience to this law, being wholly a work of superero- 
gation, is set down to our account as the ground of our justification upon 
condition of faith in him. But surely this is an obvious mistake. We 
have seen, that the spirit of the moral law requires good- will to God and 
the universe. Was Christ under no obligation to do this ? Nay, was he 
not rather under infinite obligation to be perfectly benevolent ? Was it 
possible for him to be more benevolent than the law requires God and all 
beings to be ? Did he not owe entire consecration of heart and life to 
the highest good of universal being ? If not, then benevolence in him 
were no virtue, for it would not be a compliance with moral obligation. 
It was naturally impossible for him, and is naturally impossible for any 
being, to perform a work of supererogation ; that is, to be more benevo- 
lent than the moral law requires him to be. This is and must be as true 
of God as it is of any other being. Would not Christ have sinned had he 
not been perfectly benevolent ? If he would, it follows that he owed 
obedience to the law, as really as any other being. Indeed, a being that 
owed no obedience to the moral law must be wholly incapable of virtue, 
for what is virtue but obedience to the moral law ? 

But if Christ owed personal obedience to the moral law, then his obe- 
dience could no more than justify himself. It can never be imputed to 
us. He was bound for himself to love God with all his heart, and soul, 
and mind, and strength, and his neighbor as himself. He did no more 
than this. He could do no more. It was naturally impossible, then, for 
him to obey in our behalf. 

There are, however, valid grounds and valid conditions of justification. 

1. The vicarious suffering or atonement of Christ is a condition of 
justification, or of the pardon and acceptance of penitent sinners. It has 
been common either to confound the conditions with the ground of jus- 
tification, or purposely to represent the atonement and work of Christ as 
the ground, as distinct from and opposed to a condition of justification. 
In treating this subject, I find it important to distinguish between the 
25 



3S6 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ground and conditions of justification and to regard the atonement and 
work of Christ not as a ground, but only as a condition of gospel justifi- 
cation. By the ground I mean the moving, procuring cause ; that in 
which the plan of redemption originated as its source, and which was the 
fundamental reason or ground of the whole movement. This was the 
benevolence and merciful disposition of the whole Godhead, Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. This love made the atonement, but the atonement did 
not beget this love. The Godhead desired to save sinners, but could not 
safely do so without danger to the universe, unless something was done 
to satisfy public, not retributive justice. The atonement was resorted to 
as a means of reconciling forgiveness with the wholesome administration 
of justice. A merciful disposition in the Godhead was the source, ground, 
mainspring, of the whole movement, while the atonement was only a con- 
dition or means, or that without which the love of God could not safely 
manifest itself in justifying and saving sinners. 

Failing to make this distinction, and representing the atonement as 
the ground of the sinner's justification, has been a sad occasion of stum- 
bling to many. Indeed, the whole questions of the nature, design, extent, 
and bearings of the atonement turn upon, and are involved in, this dis- 
tinction. Some represent the atonement as not demanded by, nor as 
proceeding from the love or merciful disposition, but from the inexora- 
ble wrath of the Father, leaving the impression that Christ was more 
merciful, and more the friend of sinners than the Father. Many have 
received this impression from pulpit and written representations, as I 
well know. 

Others, regarding the atonement as the ground as opposed to a con- 
dition of justification, have held the atonement to be the literal payment 
of the debt of sinners, and of the nature of a commercial transaction : a 
quid pro quo, a valuable consideration paid down by Christ, by suffering 
the same amount as was deserved by the whole number of the elect ; thus 
negativing the idea of a merciful disposition in the Father, and repre- 
senting him as demanding pay for discharging and saving sinners. Some 
of this class have held, that since Christ has died, the elect sinner has a 
right to demand his justification, on the ground of justice, that he may 
present the atonement and work of Christ, and say to the Father, 
" Here is the price ; I demand the commodity." This class, of course, 
must hold to the limited nature of the atonement, or be universalists. 

While others again, assuming that the atonement was the ground of 
justification in the sense of the literal payment of the debt of sinners, 
and that the scriptures represent the atonement as made for all men, 
have very consistently become universalists. 

Others again have given up, or never held the view that the atonement 
was of the nature of the literal payment of a debt, and hold that it was a 



JUSTIFICATION. 387 

governmental expedient to reconcile the pardon of sin with a wholesome 
administration of justice : that it was sufficient for all as for a part of 
mankind : that it does not entitle those for whom it was made to a par- 
don on the score of justice, but that men are justified freely by grace 
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, and yet they inconsis- 
tently persist in representing the atonement as the ground, and not 
merely as a condition of justification. 

Those who hold that the atonement and obedience of Christ were and 
are the ground of the justification of sinners, in the sense of the pay- 
ment of their debt, regard all the grace in the transaction as consisting 
in the atonement and obedience of Christ, and exclude grace from the 
act of justification. Justification they regard as a forensic act. I regard 
the atonement of Christ as the necessary condition of safely manifesting 
the benevolence of God in the justification and salvation of sinners. A 
merciful disposition in the whole Godhead was the ground, and the 
atonement a condition of justification. Mercy would have saved without 
an atonement, had it been possible to do so. 

That Christ's sufferings, and especially his death, were vicarious, has 
been abundantly shown in treating the subject of atonement. I need 
not repeat here what I said there. Although Christ owed perfect obe- 
dience to the moral law for himself, and could not therefore obey as our 
substitute, yet since he perfectly obeyed, he owed no suffering to the law 
or to the Divine government on his own account. He could therefore 
suffer for us. That is, he could, to answer governmental purposes, sub- 
stitute his death for the infliction of the penalty of the law on us. He 
could not perform works of supererogation, but he could endure suffer- 
ings of supererogation, in the sense that he did not owe them for him- 
self. The doctrine of substitution, in the sense just named, appears 
everywhere in both Testaments. It is the leading idea, the prominent 
thought, lying upon the face of the whole scriptures. Let the few pas- 
sages that follow serve as specimens of the class that teach this doctrine : 

Lev. xvii. 11. " For the life of the flesh is in the blood ; and I have 
given it to you upon the altar, to make an atonement for your souls ; 
for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." 

Isa. liii. 5, 6, 11. " But he was wounded for our transgressions, he 
was bruised for our iniquities ; the chastisement of our peace was upon 
him, and with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone 
astray ; we have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath 
laid on him the iniquity of us all. He shall see of the travail of his soul, 
and shall be satisfied ; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant jus- 
tify many ; for he shall bear their iniquities." 

Matt. xx. 18. "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered 
unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." 



388 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Matt. xxvi. 28. " For this is my blood of the New Testament, which 
is shed for many for the remission of sins." 

John iii. 14. " And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, 
even so must the Son of man be lifted up : 15. That whosoever be- 
lieveth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." 

John vi. 51. " I am the living bread which came down from heaven ; 
if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever ; and the bread that I 
will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." 

Acts xx. 28. " Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the 
flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed 
the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." 

Eom. iii. 24. " Being justified freely by his grace, through the re- 
demption that is in Christ Jesus. 25. Whom God hath set forth to be 
a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness 
for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God. 
26. To declare, I say at this time his righteousness ; that he might be 
just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." 

Eom. v. 6. " For when we were yet without strength, in due time 
Christ died for the ungodly. 7. For scarcely for a righteous man will 
one die ; yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. 
8. But God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet 
sinners, Christ died for us. 9. Being now justified by his blood, we 
shall be saved from wrath through him. 11. And not only so, but we 
also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now 
received the atonement. 18. Therefore, as by the offence of one judg- 
ment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness 
of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. 19. For 
as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obe- 
dience of one shall many be made righteous." 

1 Cor. v. 7. "For even Christ our passover is sacrificed for us." 

1 Cor. xv. 3. " Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." 

Gal. iii. 13. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, 
being made a curse for us ; for it is written, Cursed is every one that 
hangeth on a tree. 14. That the blessing of Abraham might come on 
the Gentiles through Jesus Christ ; that we might receive the promise of 
the Spirit through faith." 

Eph. ii. 13. "But now, in Christ Jesus, ye who sometimes were far 
off, are made nigh by the blood of Christ." 

Heb. ix. 12. "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his 
own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained 
eternal redemption for us. 13. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, 
and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the puri- 
fying of the flesh ; 14. How much more shall the blood of Christ, who 



JUSTIFICATION. 389 

through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge 
your conscience from dead works to serve the living God ? 22. And 
almost all things are by the law purged with blood ; and without shed- 
ding of blood is no remission. 23. It was therefore necessary that the 
patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these ; but the 
heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. 24. For 
Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are 
the figures of the true : but into heaven itself, now to appear in the 
presence of God for us ; 25. Nor yet that he should offer himself often, 
as the high priest entereth into the holy place every year with blood of 
others ; 26. For then must he often have suffered since the foundation 
of the world ; but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to 
put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. 27. And as it is appointed 
unto men once to die, but after this the judgment ; 28. So Christ was 
once offered to bear the sins of many." 

1 Pet. i. 18. " Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed 
with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation 
received by tradition from your fathers : 19. But with the precious blood 
of Christ." 

1 Pet. ii. 24. " Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on 
the tree, that we being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness ; by 
whose stripes ye are healed." 

1 John i. 7. " But if we walk in the light, we have fellowship one 
with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all 
sin." 

1 John iv. 9. " In this was manifested the love of God toward us, 
because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we 
might live through him. 10. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but 
that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." 

These and many such like passages establish the fact beyond question, 
that the vicarious atonement of Christ is a condition of our pardon and 
acceptance with God. 

2. Eepentance is also a condition of our justification. Observe, I 
here also use the term condition, in the sense of a "not without which" 
and not in the sense of a "that for the salce of which" the sinner is 
justified. It must be certain that the government of God cannot pardon 
sin without repentance. This is as truly a doctrine of natural as of 
revealed religion. It is self-evident that, until the sinner breaks off 
from sins by repentance or turning to God, he cannot be justified in any 
sense. This is everywhere assumed, implied, and taught in the Bible. 
No reader of the Bible can call this in question, and it were a useless 
occupation of time to quote more passages. 

3. Faith in Christ is, in the same sense, another condition of justifi- 



390 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

cation. We have already examined into the nature and necessity of 
faith. I fear that there has been much of error in the conceptions of 
many upon this subject. They have talked of justification by faith, 
as if they supposed that, by an arbitrary appointment of God, faith 
was the condition, and the only condition of justification. This seems 
to be the antinomian view. The class of persons alluded to speak of 
justification by faith ; as if it were by faith, and not by Christ through 
faith, that the penitent sinner is justified ; as if faith, and not Christ, 
were our justification. They seem to regard faith not as a natural, but 
merely as a mystical condition of justification ; as bringing us into a 
covenant and mystical relation to Christ, in consequence of which his 
y righteousness or personal obedience is imputed to us. It should never 
be forgotten that the faith that is the condition of justification, is the 
faith that works by love. It is the faith through and by which Christ 
sanctifies the soul. A sanctifying faith unites the believer to Christ 
as his justification ; but be it always remembered, that no faith receives 
Christ as a justification, that does not receive him as a sanctification, 
to reign within the heart. We have seen that repentance, as well as 
faith, is a condition of justification. We shall see that perseverance 
in obedience to the end of life is also a condition of justification. Faith 
is often spoken of in scripture as if it were the sole condition of salva- 
tion, because, as we have seen, from its very nature it implies repentance 
and every virtue. 

That faith is a naturally necessary condition of justification, we have 
seen. Let the following passages of scripture serve as examples of the 
manner in which the scriptures speak upon this subject. 

Mark xiv. 15. "And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, 
and preach the gospel to every creature. 16. He that believeth and 
is baptized, shall be saved ; but he that believeth not, shall be damned. " 

John i. 12. " As many as received him, to them gave he power to 
become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." 

John iii. 16. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only- 
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but 
have everlasting life. 36. He that believeth on the Sou hath everlast- 
ing life ; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the 
wrath of God abideth on him." 

John vi. 28. " Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that 
we might work the works of God ? 29. Jesus answered and said unto 
them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath 
sent. 40. This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which 
seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life ; and 
I will raise him up at the last day." 

John viii. 24. " If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your 



JUSTIFICATION. 391 

sins. 44. Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father 
ye will do ; he was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the 
truth ; because there is no truth in him. 47. He that is of God, heareth 
God's words ; ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God." 

John xi. 25. "Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the 
life ; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live ; 
26. And whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die." 

Acts x. 43. " To him give all the prophets witness, that through his 
name, whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins." 

Acts xvi. 31. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be 
saved, and thy house." 

Eom. iv. 5. " But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him 
that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness." 

Eom. x. 4. "For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to 
every one that believeth." 

Gal. ii. 16. " Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of 
the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus 
Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the 
works of the law ; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justi- 
fied." 

Heb. ii. 6. " Without faith it is impossible to please him ; for he that 
cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them 
that diligently seek him." 

1 John v. 10. " He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness 
in himself ; he that believeth not God hath made him a liar, because he 
believeth not the record that God gave of his Son. 11. And this is the 
record, that God hath given to us eternal life ; and this life is in his Son. 
12. He that hath the Son hath life ; and he that hath not the Son of 
God, hath not life. 13. These things have I written unto you that be- 
lieve on the name of the Son of God ; that ye may know that ye have 
eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God." 

4. Present sanctification, in the sense of present full consecration to 
God, is another condition, not ground, of justification. Some theologians 
have made justification a condition of sanctification, instead of making 
sanctification a condition of justification. But this we shall see is an 
erroneous view of the subject. The mistake is founded in a misapprehen- 
sion of the nature both of justification and of sanctification. To sanctify 
is to set apart, to consecrate to a particular use. To sanctify anything to 
God is to set apart to his service, to consecrate it to him. To sanctify 
one's self is voluntarily to set one's self apart, to consecrate one's self to 
God. To be sanctified is to be set apart, to be consecrated to God. 
Sanctification is an act or state of being sanctified, or set apart to the 
service of God. It is a state of consecration to him. This is present 



392 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

obedience to the moral law. It is the whole of present duty, and is im- 
plied in repentance, faith, regeneration, as we have abundantly seen. 
Sanctification is sometimes used to express a permanent state of obedience 
to God, or of consecration. In this sense it is not a condition of present 
justification, or of pardon and acceptance. But it is a condition of con- 
tinued and permanent acceptance with God. It certainly cannot be true, 
that God accepts and justifies the sinner in his sins. The Bible every- 
where represents justified persons as sanctified, and always expressly, or 
impliedly, conditionates justification upon sanctification, in the sense of 
present obedience to God. 1 Cor. vi. 11 ; " And such were some of you : 
but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name 
of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God." This is but a specimen 
of the manner in which justified persons are spoken of in the Bible. 
Also, Eom. viii. 1 ; " There is therefore now no condemnation to them 
which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the 
Spirit." They only are justified who walk after the Spirit. Should it be 
objected, as it may be, that the scripture often speaks of saints, or truly 
regenerate persons, as needing sanctification, and of sanctification as 
something that comes after regeneration, and as that which the saints 
are to aim at attaining, I answer, that when sanctification is thus spoken 
of, it is doubtless used in the higher sense already noticed ; to wit, to 
denote a state of being settled, established in faith, rooted and grounded 
in love, being so confirmed in the faith and obedience of the gospel, as to 
hold on in the way steadfastly, unmovably, always abounding in the 
work of the Lord. This is doubtless a condition of permanent justifica- 
tion, as has been said, but not a condition of present justification. By 
sanctification being a condition of justification, the following things are 
intended : ' 

(1.) That present, full, and entire consecration of heart and life to 
God and his service, is an unalterable condition of present pardon of past 
sin, and of present acceptance with God. 

(2.) That the penitent soul remains justified no longer than this full- 
hearted consecration continues. If he falls from his first love into the 
spirit of self-pleasing, he falls again into bondage to sin and to the law, is 
condemned, and must repent and do his " first work," must return to 
Christ, and renew his faith and love, as a condition of his salvation. 
This is the most express teaching of the Bible, as we shall fully see. 

5. Perseverance in faith and obedience, or in consecration to God, is 
also an unalterable condition of justification, or of pardon and acceptance 
with God. By this language in this connection, you will of course un- 
derstand me to mean, that perseverance in faith and obedience is a con- 
dition, not of present, but of final or ultimate acceptance and salvation. 

Those who hold that justification by imputed righteousness is a foren- 



JUSTIFICATION. 393 

sic proceeding, take a view of final or ultimate justification, according 
with their view of the nature of the transaction. With them, faith re- 
ceives an imputed righteousness, and a judicial justification. The first 
act of faith, according to them, introduces the sinner into this relation, 
and obtains for him a perpetual justification. They maintain that after 
this first act of faith it is impossible for the sinner to come into condem- 
nation ; that, being once justified, he is always thereafter justified, what- 
ever he may do ; indeed that he is never justified by grace, as to sins that 
are past, upon condition that he ceases to sin ; that Christ's righteousness 
is the ground, and that his own present obedience is not even a condition 
of his justification, so that, in fact, his own present or future obedience 
to the law of God is, in no case, and in no sense, a sine qua non of his 
justification, present or ultimate. 

Now this is certainly another gospel from the one I am inculcating. 
It is not a difference merely upon some speculative or theoretic point. 
It is a point fundamental to the gospel and to salvation, if any one can 
be. Let us therefore see which of these is the true gospel. 

I object to this view of justification : — 

1. That it is antiuomianism. Observe, they hold that upon the first 
exercise of faith, the soul enters into such a relation to Christ, that with 
respect to it the penalty of the divine law is for ever set aside, not only 
as it respects all past, but also as it respects all future acts of disobedience; 
so that sin does not thereafter bring the soul under the condemning sen- 
tence of the law of God. But a precept without a penalty is no law. 
Therefore, if the penalty is in their case permanently set aside or repealed, 
this is, and must be, a virtual repeal of the precept, for without a penalty 
it is only counsel, or advice, and no law. 

2. But again : it is impossible that this view of justification should be 
true ; for the moral law did not originate in the arbitrary will of God, 
and he cannot abrogate it either as to its precept or its penalty. He may 
for good and sufficient reasons dispense in certain cases with the execu- 
tion of the penalty. But set it aside in such a sense, that sin would not 
incur it, or that the soul that sins shall not be condemned by it, he can- 
not — it is naturally impossible ! The law is as unalterable and unre- 
pealable, both as to its precept and its penalty, as the nature of God. It 
cannot but be, in the very nature of things, that sin in any being, in any 
world, and at any time, will and must incur the penalty of the moral 
law. God may pardon as often as the soul sins, repents and believes, but 
to prevent real condemnation where there is sin, is not at the option of 
any being. 

3. But again ; I object to the view of justification in question, that 
it is of course inconsistent with forgiveness or pardon. If justified by 
imputed righteousness, why pardon him whom the law accounts as 



394: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

already and perpetually, and perfectly righteous ? Certainly it were 
absurd and impossible for the law and the law-giver judicially to justify 
a person on the ground of the perfect obedience of his substitute, and at 
the same time pardon him who is thus regarded as perfectly righteous. 
Especially must this be true of all sin committed subsequently to the 
first and justifying act of faith. If when once the soul has believed, it 
can no more come into condemnation, it certainly can no more be for- 
given. Forgiveness implies previous condemnation, and consists in 
setting aside the execution of an incurred penalty. 

4. If the view of justification I am opposing be true, it is altogether 
out of place for one who has once believed, to ask for the pardon of sin. 
It is a downright insult to God, and apostacy from Christ. It amounts 
according to their view of justification, to a denial of perpetual justifica- 
tion by imputed righteousness, and to an acknowledgment of being con- 
demned. It must therefore imply a falling from grace, to pray for 
pardon after the soul has once believed. 

5. But this view of justification is at war with the whole Bible. This 
everywhere represents Christians as condemned when they sin — teaches 
them to repent, confess, and pray for pardon — to betake themselves 
afresh to Christ as their only hope. The Bible, in almost every variety 
or manner, represents perseverance in faith, and obedience to the end, as 
a condition of ultimate justification and final salvation. Let the follow- 
ing passages serve as examples of the manner in which the Bible repre- 
sents this subject : — 

Ezek. xviii. 24. " But when the righteous turneth away from his 
righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the 
abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live ? All his right- 
eousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned ; in his trespass that 
he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he 
die." 

Ezek. xxxiii. 13. " When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall 
surely live ; if he trust to his own righteousness, and commit iniquity, all 
his righteousness shall not be remembered ; but for his iniquity that he 
hath committed, he shall die for it." 

Matt. x. 22. " And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake ; 
but he that endureth to the end shall be saved." [Matt. xxiv. 13.] 

1 Cor. ix. 27. "But I keep under my body, and bring it into sub- 
jection ; lest that by any means when I have preached to others, I myself 
should be a castaway." 

1 Cor. x. 12. " Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth, take 
heed lest he fall." 

2 Cor. vi. 1. " We then, as workers together with him, beseech you 
also that ye receive not the grace of God in vain." 



JUSTIFICATION. 395 

Col. i. 23. " If ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and 
be not moved away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, 
and which was preached to every creature which is under heaven ; where- 
of I Paul am made a minister." 

Heb. iv. 1. " Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of 
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. 11. 
Letfus labor therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the 
same example of unbelief." 

2 Pet. i. 10. " Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make 
your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall." 
Eev. ii. 10. " Pear none of those things which thou shalt suffer. 
Behold, the devil shall cast some of you into prison, that ye may be 
tried ; and ye shall have tribulation ten days. Be thou faithful unto 
death, and I will give thee a crown of life. 11. He that hath an ear, 
let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches ; He that overcom- 
eth, shall not be hurt of the second death. 17. To him that overcometh 
will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, 
and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth, saving he 
that receiveth it. 26. And he that overcometh, and keepeth my words 
unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations ; 27. And he 
shall rule them with a rod of iron ; as the vessels of a potter shall they 
be broken to shivers ; even as I received of my Father." 

Observe, I am not here calling in question the fact, that all true 
saints do persevere in faith and obedience to the end ; but am showing 
that such perseverance is a condition of salvation, or ultimate justifica- 
tion. The subject of the perseverance of the saints will come under 
consideration in its proper place. 

6. The view of justification which I am opposing is contradicted by 
the consciousness of the saints. I think I may safely affirm that the 
saints in all time are very conscious of condemnation when they fall into 
sin. This sense of condemnation may not subject them to the same 
kind and degree of fear which they experienced before regeneration, 
because of the confidence they have that God will pardon their sin. 
Nevertheless, until they repent, and by a renewed act of faith lay hold 
on pardon and fresh justification, their remorse, shame, and conscious- 
ness of condemnation, do in fact, if I am not much deceived, greatly 
exceed, as a general thing, the remorse, shame, and sense of condemna- 
tion experienced by the impenitent. But if it be true, that the first 
act of faith brings the soul into a state of perpetual justification, so that 
it cannot fall into condemnation thereafter, do what it will, the experi- 
ence of the saints contradicts facts, or, more strictly, their consciousness 
of condemnation is a delusion. They are not in fact condemned by the- 
moral law as they conceive themselves to be. 



396 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

7; If I understand the framers of the Westminster Confession of 
Faith, they regarded justification as a state resulting from the relation of 
an adopted child of God, which state is entered into by faith alone, 
and held that justification is not conditionated upon obedience for 
the time being, but that a person in this state may, as they hold that all 
in this life in fact do, sin daily, and even continually, yet without pon- 
demnation by the law, their sin bringing them only under his fatherly 
displeasure, and subjecting them to the necessity of repentance, as a 
condition of his fatherly favor, but not as a condition of pardon or 
of ultimate salvation. They seem to have regarded the child of God as 
no longer under moral government, in such a sense that sin was imputed 
to him, this having been imputed to Christ, and Christ's righteousness so 
literally imputed to him that, do what he may, after the first act of faith 
he is accounted and treated in his person as wholly righteous. If this is 
not antinomianism, I know not what is ; since they hold that all who 
once believe will certainly be saved, yet that their perseverance in holy 
obedience to the end is, in no case, a condition of final justification, 
but that this is conditionated upon the first act of faith alone. They 
support their positions with quotations from scripture about as much in 
point as is common for them. They often rely on proof-texts that, 
in their meaning and spirit, have not the remotest allusion to the point 
in support of which they are quoted. I have tried to understand the 
subject of justification as it is taught in the Bible, without going into 
labored speculations or to theological technicalities. If I have succeeded 
in understanding it, the following is a succinct and a true account of 
the matter : 

The Godhead, in the exercise of his adorable love and compassion, 
sought the salvation of sinners, through and by means of the media- 
torial death and work of Christ. This death and work of Christ were 
resorted to, not to create, but, as a result of, the merciful disposition of 
God and as a means of securing the universe against a misapprehen- 
sion of the character and design of God in forgiving and saving sinners. 
To Christ, as Mediator between the Godhead and man, the work of 
justifying and saving sinners is committed. He is made unto sinners 
"wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption." In considera- 
tion of Christ's having by his death for sinners secured the subjects 
of the divine government against a misconception of his character 
and designs, God does, upon the further conditions of a repentance 
and faith that imply a renunciation of their rebellion and a return 
to obedience to his laws, freely pardon past sin, and restore the penitent 
and believing sinner to favor, as if he had not sinned, while he remains 
penitent and believing, subject however to condemnation and eternal 
■death, unless he holds the beginning of his confidence steadfast unto the 



JUSTIFICATION. 397 

end. The doctrine of a literal imputation of Adam's sin to all his pos- 
terity, of the literal imputation of all the sins of the elect to Christ, and 
of his suffering for them the exact amount due to the transgressors, 
of the literal imputation of Christ's righteousness or obedience to the elect, 
and the consequent perpetual justification of all that are converted from 
the first exercise of faith, whatever their subsequent life may be — I 
say I regard these dogmas as fabulous, and better befitting a romance 
than a system of theology. 

But it is said, that the Bible speaks of the righteousness of faith. 
" What shall we say then ? That the Gentiles, which followed not after 
righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness 
which is of faith." — Eom. ix. 30. "And be found in him, not having 
mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through 
the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith."— Phil, 
iii. 9. These and similar passages are relied upon, as teaching the doc- 
trine of an imputed righteousness ; and such as these : " The Lord our 
righteousness ;" "Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness 
and strength." By "the Lord our righteousness," we may understand, 
either that we are justified, that is, that our sins are atoned for, and that 
we are pardoned and accepted by, or on account of the Lord, that is 
Jesus Christ ; or we may understand that the Lord makes us righteous, 
that is, that he is our sanctification, or working in us to will and to do 
of his good pleasure ; or both, that is, he atones for our sins, brings us 
to repentance and faith, works sanctification or righteousness in us, and 
then pardons our past sins, and accepts us. By the righteousness of 
faith, or of God by faith, I understand the method of making sinners 
holy, and of securing their justification or acceptance by faith, as op- 
posed to mere works of law or self-righteousness. Dikaiosune, rendered 
righteousness, may be with equal propriety, and often is, rendered justi- 
fication. So undoubtedly it should be rendered in 1 Cor. i. 30. " But 
of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and 
righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." The meaning here 
doubtless is, that he is the author and finisher of that scheme of redemp- 
tion, whereby we are justified by faith, as opposed to justification by our 
own works. "Christ our righteousness" is Christ the author or pro- 
curer of our justification. But this does not imply that he procures our 
justification by imputing his obedience to us. 

The doctrine of a literal imputation of Christ's obedience or right- 
eousness is supported by those who hold it, by such passages as the fol- 
lowing : Eom. iv. 5-8. " But to him that worketh not, but believeth on 
him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. 
Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God 
imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose 



398 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to 
whom the Lord will not impute sin." But here justification is represented 
only as consisting in forgiveness of sin, or in pardon and acceptance. 
Again, 2 Cor. v. 19, 21. "To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling 
the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them ; and 
hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. For he hath made 
him to be sin for us who knew no sin ; that we might be made the 
righteousness of God in him." Here again the apostle is teaching only 
his much loved doctrine of justification by faith, in the sense that upon 
condition or in consideration of the death and mediatorial interference 
and work of Christ, penitent believers in Christ are forgiven and rewarded 
as if they were righteous. 

IV. Foundation of the justification of penitent believers in Christ, 
What is the ultimate ground or reason of their justification ? 

1. It is not founded in Christ's literally suffering the exact penalty of 
the law for them, and in this sense literally purchasing their justification 
and eternal salvation. The Westminster Confession of Faith affirms as 
follows: chapter on Justification section 3 — "Christ by his obedience 
and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, 
and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice 
in their behalf. Yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, 
and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both 
freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, 
that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in 
the justification of sinners." If the framers of this confession had made 
the distinction between the grounds and conditions of justification, so 
as to represent the gracious disposition that gave the Son, and that 
accepted his obedience and satisfaction in their stead, as the ground 
or moving cause, and the death and work of Christ as a condition or 
a means, as " that without which " the benevolence of God could not 
wisely justify sinners, their statement had been much improved. As 
it stands, the transaction is represented as a proper quid pro quo, a 
proper full payment of the debt of the justified. All the grace con- 
sisted in giving his Son, and consenting to the substitution. But they 
deny that there is grace in the act of justification itself. This proceeds 
upon the ground of "exact justice." There is then according to this, 
no grace in the act of pardon and accepting the sinner as righteous. 
This is " exact justice," because the debt is fully cancelled by Christ. 
Indeed, " Christian, what do you think of this ?" God has, in the act of 
giving his Son and in consenting to the substitution, exercised all the 
grace he ever will. Now your forgiveness and justification are, accord- 
ing to this teaching, placed on the ground of "exact justice." You have 



JUSTIFICATION. 399 

now only to believe and demand "exact justice." One act of faith places 
your salvation on the ground of " exact justice." Talk no more of the 
grace of God in forgiveness ! But stop, let us see. What is to be under- 
stood here by exact justice, and by a real, full satisfaction to his Father's 
justice ? I suppose all orthodox Christians to hold, that every sinner and 
every sin, strictly on the score of justice, deserves eternal death or end- 
less suffering. Did the framers of this confession hold that Christ bore 
the literal penalty of the law for each of the saints ? Or did they hold 
that by virtue of his nature and relations, his suffering, though indefi- 
nitely less in amount than was deserved by the transgressors, was a full 
equivalent to public justice, or govern mentally considered, for the exe- 
cution of the literal penalty upon the transgressors ? If they meant this 
latter, I see no objection to it. But if they meant the former, namely, 
that Christ suffered in his own person the full amount strictly due to all 
the elect, I say, 

(1.) That it was naturally impossible. 

(2.) That his nature and relation to the government of God was such 
as to render it wholly unnecessary to the safe forgiveness of sin, that he 
should suffer precisely the same amount deserved by sinners. 

(3.) That if, as their substitute, Christ suffered for them the full 
amount deserved by them, then justice has no claim upon them, since 
their debt is fully paid by the surety, and of course the principal is, in 
justice, discharged. And since it is undeniable that the atonement was 
made for the whole posterity of Adam, it must follow that the salvation 
of all men is secured upon the ground of "exact justice." This is the 
conclusion to which Huntington and his followers came. This doctrine 
of literal imputation, is one of the strongholds of universalism, and while 
this view of atonement and justification is held they cannot be driven 
from it. 

(4.) If he satisfied justice for them, in the sense of literally and exactly 
obeying for them, why should his suffering be imputed to them as a con- 
dition of their salvation ? Surely they could not need both the imputa- 
tion of his perfect obedience to them, so as to be accounted in law as 
perfectly righteous, and also the imputation of his sufferings to them, as 
if he had not obeyed for them. Is God unrighteous ? Does he exact of 
the surety, first, the literal and full payment of the debt, and secondly, 
perfect personal obedience for and in behalf of the sinner ? Does he 
first exact full and perfect obedience, and then the same amount of suf- 
fering as if there had been no obedience ? And this, too, of his beloved 
Son? 

(5.) What Christian ever felt, or can feel in the presence of God, that 
he has a right to demand justification in the name of Christ, as due to 
him on the ground of "exact justice ?" Observe, the framers of the Con- 



400 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

fession just quoted, studiously represent all the grace exercised in the 
justification of sinners, as confined to the two acts of giving his Son and 
accepting the substitution. This done, Christ fully pays the debt, fully 
and exactly satisfies his Father's justice. You now need not, must not 
conceive of the pardon of sin as grace or favor. To do this is, according 
to the teaching of this Confession, to dishonor Christ. It is to reject 
his righteousness and salvation. What think you of this ? One act of 
grace in giving his Son, and consenting to the substitution, and all for- 
giveness, all accepting and trusting as righteous, is not grace, but " ex- 
act justice." To pray for forgiveness, as an act of grace, is apostacy 
from Christ. Christian ! Can you believe this ? No ; in your closet, 
smarting under the sting of a recently committed sin, or broken down 
and bathed in tears, you cannot find it in your heart to demand ' ' exact 
justice " at the hand of God, on the ground that Christ has fully and 
literally paid your debt. To represent the work and death of Christ as 
the ground of justification in this sense, is a snare and a stumbling-block. 
This view that I have just examined, contradicts the necessary convic- 
tions of every saint on earth. For the truth of this assertion I appeal to 
the universal consciousness of saints. 

2. Our own works, or obedience to the law or to the gospel, are not 
the ground or foundation of our justification. That is, neither our faith, 
nor repentance, nor love, nor life, nor anything done by us or wrought 
in us, is the ground of our justification. These are conditions of our 
justification, in the sense of a "not ivitliout ivliich" but not the ground 
of it. We are justified upon condition of our faith, but not for our 
faith ; upon condition of our repentance, love, obedience, perseverance 
to the end, but not for these things. These are the conditions, but not 
the reason, ground, or procuring cause of our justification. We cannot 
be justified without them, neither are we or can we be justified by them. 
None of these things must be omitted on pain of eternal damnation. 
Nor must they be put in the place of Christ, upon the same penalty. 
Faith is so much insisted on in the gospel as the sine qua non of our jus- 
tification, that some seem disposed, or at least to be in danger of substi- 
tuting faith in the place of Christ ; of making faith instead of Christ the 
Savior. 

3. Neither is the atonement, nor anything in the mediatorial work of 
Christ, the foundation of our justification, in the sense of the source, 
moving, or procuring cause. This, that is the ground of our justifica- 
tion, lies deep in the heart of infinite love. We owe all to that merciful 
disposition that performed the mediatorial work, and died the accursed 
death to supply an indispensable condition of our justification and salva- 
tion. To stop short in the act which supplied the condition, instead of 
finding the depths of a compassion as fathomless as infinity, as the source 



JUSTIFICATION. 401 

of the whole movement, is to fail in discrimination. The work, and 
death, and resurrection, and advocacy of Christ are indispensable condi- 
tions, are all-important, bat not the fundamental reason of our justi- 
fication. 

4. Nor is the work of the Holy Spirit in converting and sanctifying 
the soul, the foundation of our justification. This is only a condition 
or means of bringing it about, but is not the fundamental reason. 

5. But the disinterested and infinite love of God, the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, is the true and only foundation of the justification and 
salvation of sinners. God is love, that is, he is infinitely benevolent. 
All he does, or says, or suffers, permits or omits, is for one and the same 
ultimate reason, namely, to promote the highest good of universal being. 

6. Christ, the second person in the glorious Trinity, is represented in 
scripture, as taking so prominent a part in this work, that the number 
of offices and relations which he sustains to God and man in it are truly 
wonderful. For example, he is represented as being, — King — Judge — 
Mediator — Advocate — Redeemer — surety — wisdom — righteousness — 
sanctification — redemption — Prophet — Priest — passover, or Lamb of 
God — the bread and water of life — true God and eternal life — our life 
—our all in all — as the repairer of the breach — as dying for our sins — 
as rising for our justification — as the resurrection and the life — as 
bearing our griefs and carrying our sorrows — as he, by whose stripes we 
are healed — as the head of his people — as the bridegroom or husband of 
his church — as the shepherd of his flock — as the door by which they 
enter — as the way to salvation — as our salvation — as the truth — as 
being made sin for us — that we are made the righteousness of God in 
him — that in him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead — that in him 
all fulness dwells — all power in heaven and earth are said to be given to 
him — the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world 
— Christ in us the hope of glory — the true vine of which we are the 
branches — our brother — Wonderful — Counsellor — the mighty God — 
the everlasting Father — the prince of peace — the captain of salvation — 
the captain of the Lord's host. 

These are among the official relations of Christ to his people, and to 
the great work of our justification. I shall have frequent occasion to 
consider him in some of these relations, as we proceed in this course of 
study. Indeed, the offices, relations, and works of Christ, are among 
the most important topics of Christian theology. 

Christ is our Justification, in the sense that he carries into execution 
the whole scheme of redemption devised by the adorable Godhead. To 
him the scriptures everywhere direct the eyes of our faith and of our in- 
telligence also. The Holy Spirit is represented not as glorifying himself, 
but as speaking of Jesus, as taking of the things of Christ and showing 
26 



402 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

them to his people, as glorifying Christ Jesus, as being sent by Christ, as 
being the Spirit of Christ, as being Christ himself dwelling in the hearts 
of his people. But I must forbear at present. This subject of Christ's 
relations needs elucidation in future lectures. 

REMARK. 

The relations of the old school view of justification to their view of 
depravity is obvious. They hold, as we have seen, that the constitution 
in every faculty and part is sinful. Of course, a return to personal, pre- 
sent holiness, in the sense of entire conformity to the law, cannot with 
them be a condition of justification. They must have a justification 
while yet at least in some degree of sin. This must be brought about by 
imputed righteousness. The intellect revolts at a justification in sin. 
So a scheme is devised to divert the eye of the law and of the lawgiver 
from the sinner to his substitute, who has perfectly obeyed the law. But 
in order to make out the possibility of his obedience being imputed to 
them, it must be assumed, that he owed no obedience for himself ; than 
which a greater absurdity cannot be conceived. Constitutional depravity 
or sinfulness being once assumed, physical regeneration, physical sancti- 
fication, physical divine influence, imputed righteousness and justifica- 
tion, while personally in the commission of sin, follow of course. 



LECTURE XXXVII. 

SANCTIFICATION. 



I. I will remind you of some points that have oeen settled in this course 
of study. 

1. The true intent and meaning of the law of Cod has been, as I 
trust, ascertained in the lectures on moral government. Let this point 
if need be, be examined by reference to those lectures. 

2. We have also seen, in those lectures, what is not, and what is im- 
plied in entire obedience to the moral law. 

3. In those lectures, and also in the lectures on justification and re- 
pentance, it has been shown that nothing is acceptable to God, as a con- 
dition of justification, and of consequent salvation, but a repentance that 
implies a return to full obedience to the moral law. 

4. It has also been shown, that nothing is holiness short of full obe- 
dience, for the time being, to the moral law. 



SANCTIFICATION. 403 

5. It has also been shown, that regeneration and repentance consist 
in the heart's return to full obedience, for the time being, to this law. 

6. We have also examined the doctrine of depravity, and seen, that 
moral depravity, or sin, consists in selfishness, and not at all in the con- 
stitution of men ; that selfishness does not consist in the involuntary ap- 
petites, passions, and propensities, but that it consists alone in the com- 
mittal of the will to the gratification of the propensities. 

7. We have seen that holiness consists, not at all in the constitution 
of body or mind ; but that it belongs, strictly, only to the will or heart, 
and consists in obedience of will to the law of God, as it lies revealed in 
the intellect ; that it is expressed in one word, love ; that this love is 
identical with the entire consecration of the whole being to the glory of 
God, and to the highest well-being of the universe ; or in other words, 
that it consists in disinterested benevolence. 

8. We have seen that all true saints, while in a state of acceptance 
with God, do actually render, for the time being, full obedience to all the 
known requirements of God ; that is, that they do for the time being 
their whole duty — all that God, at this time, requires of them. 

9. We have seen that this obedience is not rendered independent of 
the grace of God, but is induced by the indwelling spirit of Christ re- 
ceived by faith, and reigning in the heart. This fact will be more fully 
elucidated in this discussion than it has been in former lectures. A 
former lecture was devoted to it ; but a fuller consideration of it remains 
to be entered upon hereafter. 

II. Define the principal terms to he used in this discussion. 

Here let me remark, that a definition of terms, in all discussions, is of 
prime importance. Especially is this true of this subject. I have ob- 
served that almost without an exception, those who have written on this 
subject dissenting from the views entertained here, do so upon the ground 
that they understand and define the terms sanctification and Christian 
perfection differently from what we do. Every one gives his own defini- 
tion, varying materially from others, and from what we understand by 
the terms ; and then he goes on professedly opposing the doctrine as in- 
culcated here. Now this is not only utterly unfair, but palpably absurd. 
If I oppose a doctrine inculcated by another man, I am bound to oppose 
what he really holds. If I misrepresent his sentiments, "I fight as one 
that beateth the air." I have been amazed at the diversity of definitions 
that have been given to the terms Christian perfection, sanctification, 
etc. ; and to witness the diversity of opinion as to what is, and what is 
not, implied in these terms. One objects wholly to the use of the term 
Christian perfection, because, in his estimation, it implies this, and that, 
and the other thing, which I do not suppose are at all implied in it. 



404 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Another objects to our using the term sanctification, because that implies, 
according to his understanding of it, certain things that render its use 
improper. Now it is no part of my design to dispu te about the use of 
words. I must however use some terms ; and I ought to be allowed to 
use Bible language in its scriptural sense, as I understand it. And if I 
should sufficiently explain my meaning, and define the sense in which I 
use the terms, and the sense in which the Bible manifestly uses them, 
this ought to suffice. And I beg, that nothing more or less may be un- 
derstood by the language I use, than I profess to mean by it. Others 
may, if they please, use the same terms, and give a different definition of 
them. But I have a right to hope and expect, if they feel called upon to 
oppose what I say, that they will bear in mind, my definition of the terms, 
and not pretend, as some have done, to oppose my views, while they have 
only differed, from me in their definition of the terms used, giving their 
own definition varying materially and, I might say, infinitely from the 
sense in which I use the same terms, and then arraying their arguments 
to prove, that according to their definition of it, sanctification is not really 
attainable in this life, when no one here or anywhere else, that I ever 
heard of pretended that, in their sense of the term, it ever was or ever 
will be, attainable in this life, and I might add, or in that which is to 
come. 

Sanctification is a term of frequent use in the Bible. Its simple and 
primary meaning is a state of consecration to God. To sanctify is to set 
apart to a holy use — to consecrate a thing to the service of God. This is 
plainly both the Old and the New Testament use of the term. The 
Greek word hagiazo means to sanctify, to consecrate, or devote a person 
or thing to a particular, especially to a sacred, use. This word is syn- 
onymous with the Hebrew Icaudash. This last word is used in the Old 
Testament to express the same thing that is intended by the Greek hag- 
iazo, namely, to consecrate, devote, set apart, sanctify, purify, make clean 
or pure. Hagiasmos, a substantive from hagiazo, means sanctification, 
devotion, consecration, purity, holiness. 

From the Bible use of these terms it is most manifest, — 

1. That sanctification does not imply any constitutional change, either 
of soul or body. It consists in the consecration or devotion of the con- 
stitutional powers of body and soul to God, and not in any change 
wrought in the constitution itself. 

2. It is also evident from the scriptural use of the term, that sancti- 
fication is not a phenomenon, or state of the intellect. It belongs neither 
to the reason, conscience, nor understanding. In short, it cannot con- 
sist in any state of the intellect whatever. All the states of this faculty 
are purely passive states of mind ; and of course, as we have abundantly 
seen, holiness is not properly predicable of them. 



SANCTIFICATION. 405 

3. It is just as evident that sanctification, in the scriptural and proper 
sense of the term, is not a mere feeling of any kind. It is not a desire, 
an appetite, a passion, a propensity, an emotion, nor indeed any kind or 
degree of feeling. It is not a state or phenomenon of the sensibility. 
The states of the sensibility are, like those of the intellect, purely passive 
states of mind, as has been repeatedly shown. They of course can have 
no moral character in themselves. 

4. The Bible use of the term, when applied to persons, forbids the 
understanding of it, as consisting in any involuntary state or attitude of 
mind whatever. 

5. The inspired writers evidently used the terms which are translated 
by the English word sanctify, to designate a phenomenon of the will, or 
a voluntary state of mind. They used the term hagiazo in Greek, and 
Jcaudash in Hebrew, to represent the act of consecrating one's self, or 
anything else to the service of God, and to the highest well-being of 
the universe. The term manifestly not only represents an act of the 
will, but an ultimate act or choice, as distinguished from a mere volition, 
or executive act of the will. Thus the terms rendered sanctified are 
used as synonymous with loving God with all the heart, and our neigh- 
bor as ourselves. The Greek liagiasmos, translated by the word sancti- 
fication, is evidently intended to express a state or attitude of voluntary 
consecration to God, a continued act of consecration ; or a state of 
choice as distinct from a mere act of choice, an abiding act or state 
of choice, a standing and controlling preference of mind, a continu- 
ous committal of the will to the highest well-being of God and of 
the universe. Sanctification, as a state differing from a holy act, is 
a standing, ultimate intention, and exactly synonymous or identical with 
a state of obedience, or conformity to the law of God. We have repeat- 
edly seen that the will is the executive or controlling faculty of the mind. 
Sanctification consists in the will's devoting or consecrating itself and 
the whole being, all we are and have, so far as powers, susceptibilities, 
possessions are under the control of the will, to the service of God, 
or, which is the same thing, to the highest interests of God and of being. 
Sanctification, then, is nothing more nor less than entire obedience, 
for the time being, to the moral law. 

Sanctification may be entire in two senses : (1.) In the sense of 
present, full obedience, or entire consecration to God ; and (2.) In the 
sense of continued, abiding consecration or obedience to God. Entire 
sanctification, when the terms are used in this sense, consists in being 
established, confirmed, preserved, continued in a state of sanctification 
or of entire consecration to God. 

In this discussion, then, I shall use the term entire sanctification 
to designate a state of confirmed, and entire consecration of body, soul, 



406 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and spirit, or of the whole being to God — confirmed, not in the sense, 
(1.) That a soul entirely sanctified cannot sin, but that as a matter 
of fact, he does not, and will not sin. (2.) Nor do I use the term 
entire sanctification as implying that the entirely sanctified soul is in 
no such danger of sinning as to need the thorough use and application 
of all the means of grace to prevent him from sinning, and to secure his 
continued sanctification. (3.) Nor, do. I mean by entire sanctification, 
a state in which there will be no further struggle or warfare with temp, 
tation, or in which the Christian warfare will cease. This certainly did 
not cease in Christ to the end of life, nor will it with any being in the 
flesh. (4.) Nor do I use the term as implying a state in which no 
further progress in holiness is possible. No such state is, or ever will be, 
possible to any creature, for the plain reason, that all creatures must 
increase in knowledge ; and increase of knowledge implies increase 
of holiness in a holy being. The saints will doubtless grow in grace 
or holiness to all eternity. (5.) Nor do I mean by the term entire 
sanctification, that the entirely sanctified soul will no longer need the 
continual grace and indwelling Spirit of Christ to preserve it from sin, 
and to secure its continuance in a state of consecration to God. It is 
amazing that such men as Dr. Beecher and others should suppose, that a 
state of entire consecration implies that the entirely sanctified soul no 
longer needs the grace of Christ to preserve it. Entire sanctification, 
instead of implying no further dependence on the grace of Christ, implies 
the constant appropriation of Christ by faith as the sanctification of 
the soul. 

But since entire sanctification, as I understand the term, is identical 
with entire and continued obedience to the law of God, and since I have 
in lectures on moral government fully shown what is not, and what is, 
implied in full obedience to the law of God, to avoid much repetition in 
this place, I must refer you to what I have there said upon the topics 
just named. 

III. Show ivhat the real question now at issue is. 

1. It is not whether a state of present full obedience to the divine 
law is attainable in this life. For this has, I trust, been clearly estab- 
lished in former lectures. 

2. It is not whether a state of permanent, full obedience has been 
attained by all, or by any of the saints on earth. 

3. But the true question at issue is, Is a state of entire, in the sense 
of permanent sanctification, attainable in this life ? 

If in this discussion I shall insist upon the fact, that this state has 
been attained, let it be distinctly understood, that the fact that the 
attainment has been made, is only adduced in proof of the attainability 



SANCTIFICATION. 407 

of this state ; that it is only one of the arguments by which the attaina- 
bility of this state is proved. Let it also be distinctly borne in mind, 
that if there should be in the estimation of any one a defect in the proof, 
that this state has been attained, still the integrity and conclusiveness of 
the other arguments in support of the attainability will not thereby 
be shaken. It is no doubt true, that the attainability of this state 
in this life may be abundantly established, entirely irrespective of the 
question whether this state has ever been attained. 

The true question is, Is a state of entire, established, abiding conse- 
cration to God attainable in this life, in such a sense, that we may ration- 
ally expect or hope to become thus established in this life ? Are the 
conditions of attaining this established state in the grace and love of God, 
such that we may rationally expect or hope to fulfil them, and thus be- 
come established, or entirely sanctified in this life ? This is undoubtedly 
the true and the greatly important question to be settled. 

IV. That entire sanctification is attainable in this life. 

1. It is self-evident, that entire obedience to God's law is possible on 
the ground of natural ability. To deny this, is to deny that a man is 
able to do as well as he can. The very language of the law is such as to 
level its claims to the capacity of the subject, however great or small 
that capacity may be. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with 
all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy 
strength." Here then it is plain, that all the law demands, is the exer- 
cise of whatever strength we have, in the service of God. JSTow, as entire 
sanctification consists in perfect obedience to the law of God, and as the 
law requires nothing more than the right use of whatever strength we 
have, it is, of course, forever settled, that a state of entire sanctification 
is attainable in this life, on the ground of natural ability. 

This is generally admitted by those who are called moderate Oalvin- 
ists. Or, perhaps I should say, it generally has been admitted by them, 
though at present some of them seem inclined to give up the doctrine of 
natural ability, and to take refuge in constitutional depravity, rather 
than admit the attainableness of a state of entire sanctification in this 
life. But let men take refuge where they will, they can never escape 
from the plain letter, and spirit, and meaning of the law of God. Mark 
with what solemn emphasis it says, " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God 
with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy 
strength." This is its solemn injunction, whether it be given to an 
angel, a man, or a child. An angel is bound to exercise an angel's 
strength ; a man, the strength of a man ; and a child, the strength of a 
child. It comes to every moral being in the universe, just as he is, where 
he is, and requires, not that he should create new powers, or possess other 



40S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

powers than he has, but that such as his powers are, they should all be 
used with the utmost perfection and constancy for God. 

2. The provisions of grace are such as to render its actual attainment 
in this life, the object of reasonable pursuit. It is admitted, that the 
entire sanctification of the church is to be accomplished. It is also 
admitted, that this work is to be accomplished, " through the sanctifica- 
tion of the Spirit and the belief of the truth." It is also universally 
agreed, that this work must be begun here ; and also that it must be 
completed before the soul can enter heaven. This then is the inquiry, — 
Is this state attainable, as a matter of fact before death ? 

BIBLE ARGUMENT. 

I come now to consider the question directly, and wholly as a Bible 
question, whether entire sanctification is in such a sense attainable in 
this life, as to make its attainment an object of rational pursuit. 

1. It is evident from the fact, expressly stated, that abundant means 
are provided for the accomplishment of this end. Eph. iv. 15-19. " He 
that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, 
that he might fill all things. And he gave some, apostles ; and some, 
prophets ; and some, evangelists ; and some, pastors and teachers ; for 
the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying 
of the body of Christ ; till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of 
the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure 
of the stature of the fulness of Christ ; that we henceforth be no more 
children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, 
by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to 
deceive ; but speaking the truth in love, may grow up into him in all 
things, which is the head, even Christ ; from whom the whole body fitly 
joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, ac- 
cording to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh 
increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in love." Upon this 
passage I remark : — 

(1.) That what is here spoken of is plainly applicable only to this life. 
It is in this life that the apostles, evangelists, prophets, and teachers, 
exercise their ministry. These means therefore are applicable, and so far 
as we know, only applicable to this life. 

(2.) The apostle here manifestly teaches, that these means are de- 
signed and adequate to perfecting the whole church as the body of Christ, 
"till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the 
Son of God, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." 
Now observe, — 

(3.) These means are for the perfecting of the saints, till the whole 
church, as a perfect man, " has come to the measure of the stature of the 



SANCTIFICATION. 400 

fulness of Christ." If this is not entire sanctification, what is ? That 
this is to take place in this world is evident from what follows. For the 
apostle adds, " that we henceforth be no more tossed to and fro, and 
carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and 
cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive." 

(4.) It should be observed, that this is a very strong passage in sup- 
port of the doctrine, inasmuch as it asserts that abundant means are pro- 
vided for the sanctifl cation of the church in this life. And as the whole 
includes all its parts, there must be sufficient provision for the sanctifi- 
cation of each individual. 

(5.) If the work is ever to be effected, it is by these means. But 
these means are used only in this life. Entire sanctiflcation then must 
take place in this life. 

(6.) If this passage does not teach a state of entire sanctiflcation, such 
a state is nowhere mentioned in the Bible. And if believers are not here 
said to be wholly sanctified by these means, and of course in this life, I 
know not that it is anywhere taught that they shall be sanctified at all. 

(7.) But suppose this passage to be put into the language of a com- 
mand, how should we understand it ? Suppose the saints commanded to 
be perfect, and to " grow up to the measure of the stature of the fulness 
of Christ," could anything less than entire sanctiflcation be understood 
by such requisitions ? Then by what rule of sober criticism, I would in- 
quire, can this language, used in this connection, mean anything less 
than I have supposed it to mean ? 

2. But let us look into some of the promises. It is not my design to 
examine a great number of scripture promises, but rather to show, that 
those which I do examine, fully sustain the positions I have taken. One 
is sufficient, if it be full and its application just, to settle this question 
for ever. I might occupy many pages in the examination of the prom- 
ises, for they are exceedingly numerous, and full, and in point. But my 
design is at present to examine somewhat critically a few only out of the 
many. This will enable you to apply the same principles to the exami- 
nation of the scripture promises generally. 

(1.) I begin by referring you to the law of God, as given in Deut. x. 
12. " And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, 
but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, 
and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul ? " 
Upon this passage I remark :— 

(i.) It professedly sums up the whole duty of man to God — to fear 
and love him with all the heart and all the soul. 

(ii.) Although this is said of Israel, yet it is equally true of all men. 
It is equally binding upon all, and is all that God requires of any man in 
regard to himself. 



410 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(iii.) Continued obedience to this requirement is entire sanctification, 
In the sense in which I use those terms. 

See Deut. xxx. 6. "And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine 
heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine 
heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." Here we have a 
promise couched in the same language as the command just quoted. 
Upon this passage I remark : — 

It promises just what the law requires. If the law requires a state of 
entire sanctification, or if that which the law requires is a state of entire 
sanctification, then this is a promise of entire sanctification. As the 
command is universally binding upon all and applicable to all, so this 
promise is universally applicable to all who will lay hold upon it. Faith 
is an indispensable condition of the fulfilment of this promise. It is en- 
tirely impossible that we should love God with all the heart, without con- 
fidence in him. God begets love in man in no other way than by so 
revealing himself as to inspire confidence, that confidence which works 
by love. 

Now here there is no perceivable reason why we should not understand 
the language of the promise as meaning as much as the language of the 
command. This promise appears to have been designed to cover the 
whole ground of the requirement. Suppose the language in this promise 
to be used in a command, or suppose that the form of this promise were 
changed into that of a command ; — suppose God should say as he does 
elsewhere, "Thou sh alt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and 
with all thy soul :" who would doubt that God designed to require a state 
of entire sanctification or consecration to himself ? How then are we to 
understand it when used in the form of a promise ? If his bountif ulness 
equals his justice, his promises of grace must be understood to mean as 
much as the requirements of his justice. If he delights in giving as much 
as in receiving, his promises mnst mean as much as the language of his 
requirements. 

This promise is designed to be fulfilled in this life. The language 
and connection imply this : "I will circumcise thy heart, and the heart 
of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul." This in some sense takes place in regeneration, but more than 
simple regeneration seems here to be promised. It is plain, I think, that 
this promise relates to a state of mind, and not merely to an exercise. 

This promise as it respects the church, at some day, must be absolute 
and certain. So that God will undoubtedly, at some period, beget this 
state of mind in the church. But to what particular individuals and 
generation this promise will be fulfilled, must depend upon their faith in 
the promise. 

(2.) See Jer. xxxi. 31-34 : "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, 



SANCTIFICATION. 411 

that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the 
house of Judah ; not according to the covenant that I made with their 
fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand, to bring them out of 
the land of Egypt, (which my covenant they brake, although I was a 
husband unto them, saith the Lord ;) but this shall be the covenant that 
I will make with the house of Israel : After those days, saith the Lord, 
I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts ; and 
I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach 
no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, 
Know the Lord ; for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto 
the greatest of them, saith the Lord ; for I will forgive their iniquity, 
and I will remember their sin no more." Upon this passage, I re- 
mark : — , 

(i.) It was to become due, or the time when its fulfilment might be 
claimed and expected, was at the advent of Christ. This is unequivo- 
cally settled in Heb. viii. 8-12, where this passage is quoted at length, 
as being applicable to the gospel day. 

(ii.) This is undeniably a promise of entire sanctification. It is a 
promise that the " law shall be written in the heart." It means that the 
very temper and spirit required by the law shall be begotten in the soul. 
Now, if the law requires entire sanctification or perfect holiness, this is 
certainly a promise of it ; for it is a promise of all that the law requires. 
To say that this is not a promise of entire sanctification, is the same 
absurdity as to say, that perfect obedience to the law is not entire sanc- 
tification ; and this last is the same absurdity as to say, that something; 
more is our duty than what the law requires : and this again is to say, 
that the law is imperfect and unjust. 

(iii.) A permanent state or entire sanctification is plainly implied in 
this promise. The reason for setting aside the first covenant was, that it 
was broken : " Which my covenant they brake." One grand design of 
the new covenant is, that it shall not be broken, for then it would be no 
better than the first. Permanency is implied in the fact, that it is to be 
engraven in the heart. Permanency is plainly implied in the assertion, 
that God will remember their sin no more. In Jer. xxxii. 39, 40, where 
the same promise is in substance repeated, you will find it expressly 
stated, that the covenant is to be " everlasting," and that he will so* 
" put his fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from him." 
Here permanency is as expressly promised as it can be. 

Suppose the language of this promise to be thrown into the form of,' 
a command. Suppose God to say, "Let my law be within your hearts,, 
and let it be in your inward parts, and let my fear be so within your 
hearts, that you shall not depart from me. Let your covenant with me 
be everlasting." If this language were found in a command, would any 



412 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

man in his senses doubt that it meant to require perfect and permanent 
sanctification ? If not, by what rule of sober interpretation does he 
make it mean anything else, when found in a promise ? It appears to 
be profane trifling, when such language is found in a promise, to make 
it mean less than it does when found in a command. 

This promise as it respects the church, at some period of its history, 
is unconditional, and its fulfilment certain. But in respect to any par- 
ticular individuals or generation of the church, its fulfilment is neces- 
sarily conditioned upon their faith. The church, as a body, have cer- 
tainly never received this new covenant. Yet, doubtless, multitudes in 
every age of the Christian dispensation have received it. And God will 
hasten the time when it shall be so fully accomplished, that there shall 
be no need for one man to say to his brother, " Know th£ Lord, for all 
shall know him from the least to the greatest." 

It should be understood, that this promise was made to the Christian 
church, and not at all to the Jewish church. The saints under the old 
dispensation had no reason to expect the fulfilment of this and kindred 
promises to themselves, because their fulfilment was expressly deferred 
until the commencement of the Christian dispensation. 

It has been said, that nothing more is here promised than regenera- 
tion. But were not the Old Testament saints regenerated ? Yet it is 
expressly said, that they received not the promises. Heb. xi. 13, 39, 40 : 
" These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having 
seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, 
and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth." 
"And these all, having obtained a good report through faith, received 
not the promise ; God having provided some better thing for us, that 
they without us should not be made perfect." Here we see that these 
promises were not received by the Old Testament saints. Yet they were 
regenerated. 

It has also been said, that the promise implies no more than the final 
perseverance of the saints. But I would inquire, did not the Old Testa- 
ment saints persevere ? And yet we have just seen, that the Old Testa- 
ment saints did not receive these promises in their fulfilment. 

(3.) I will next examine the promise in Ezek. xxxvi. 25-2? : "Then 
will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean ; from all 
your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. Anew heart 
also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you ; and I will 
take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart 
of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in 
my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them." Upon this 
I remark : — 

(i.) It was written within nineteen years after that which we have 



SANCTIFICATION. 413 

just examined in Jeremiah. It plainly refers to the same time, and is 
a promise of the same blessing. 

(ii.) It seems to be admitted, nor can it be denied, that this is a 
promise of entire sanctification. The language is very definite and full. 
" Then," — referring to some future time, when it should become due, 
"will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean." Mark, 
the first promise, "ye shall be clean." If to be " clean " does not mean 
entire sanctification, what does it mean ? 

The second promise is, "From all your filthiness and from all your 
idols will I cleanse you." If to be cleansed "from all filthiness and 
all idols," be not a state of entire sanctification, what is ? 

The third promise is, "A new heart also will I give you, and a new 
spirit will I put within you ; I will take away the stony heart out of 
your flesh, and will give you an heart of flesh." If to have a "clean 
heart," a " new heart," a " heart of flesh," in opposition to a " heart of 
stone," be not entire sanctification, what is ? 

The fourth promise is, " I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you 
to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them." 

(iii.) Let us turn the language of these promises into that of com- 
mand, and understand God as saying, " Make you a clean heart, a new 
heart, and a new spirit ; put away all your iniquities, all your filthiness, 
and all your idols ; walk in my statutes, and keep my judgments, and 
do them." Now what man, in the sober exercise of his reason, would 
doubt whether God meant to require a state of entire sanctification 
in such commands as these ? The rules of legitimate interpretation 
would demand that we should so understand him. 

If this is so, what is the fair and proper construction of this language, 
when found in a promise ? I do not hesitate to say, that to me it is 
amazing, that any doubt should be left on the mind of any man whether, 
in these promises, God means as much as in his commands, couched 
in the same language : for example, see Ezek. xviii. 30, 31 : " Eepent, 
and turn yourselves from all your transgressions ; so iniquity shall not 
be your ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby 
ye have transgressed and make you a new heart and a new spirit ; for 
why will ye die, house of Israel ? " Now, that the language in the 
promise under consideration, should mean as much as the language 
of this command, is demanded by every sober rule of interpretation. 
And who ever dreamed, that when God required his people to put away 
all their iniquities, he only meant that they should put away a part 
of them. 

(iv. ) This promise respects the church, and it cannot be pretended, 
that it has ever been fulfilled, according to its proper import, in any past 
age of the church. 



414 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(v.) As it regards the church, at a future period of its history, this 
promise is absolute, in the sense that it certainly will be fulfilled. 

(vi.) It was manifestly designed to apply to Christians under the new 
dispensation, rather than to the Jews under the old dispensation. The 
sprinkling of clean water, and the outpouring of the Spirit, seems plainly 
to indicate, that the promise belonged more particularly to the Christian 
dispensation. It undeniably belongs to the same class of promises with 
that in Jer. xxvi. 31-34 ; Joel ii. 28, and many others, that manifestly 
look forward to the gospel-day as the time when they shall become due. 
As these promises have never been fulfilled, in their extent and meaning, 
their complete fulfilment remains to be realized by the church as a body. 
And those individuals, and that generation, will take possession of the 
blessing, who understand, and believe, and appropriate them to their 
own case. 

(4.) I will next examine the promise in 1 Thess. v. 23, 24 : "And 
the very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and I pray God your whole 
spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of 
our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do 
it." Upon this I remark : — 

(i.) It is admitted, that this is a prayer for, and a promise of, entire 
sanctification. 

(ii.) The very language shows, that both the prayer and the promise 
refer to this life, as it is a prayer for the sanctification of the body 
as well as the soul ; also that they might be preserved, not after, but 
unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. 

(iii.) This is a prayer of inspiration, to which is annexed an express 
promise that God will do it. 

(iv.) Its fulfilment is, from the nature of the case, conditioned upon 
our faith, as sanctification without faith is naturally impossible. 

(v.) Now, if this promise, with those that have already been exam- 
ined, does not, honestly interpreted, fully settle the question of the 
attainability of entire sanctification in this life, it is difficult to under- 
stand how anything can be settled by an appeal to scripture. 

There are great multitudes of promises of the same import, to which 
I might refer you, and which, if examined in the light of the foregoing 
rules of interpretation, would be seen to heap up demonstration upon 
demonstration, that this is a doctrine of the Bible. Only examine them 
in -the light of these plain, self-evident principles, and it seems to me, 
that they cannot fail to produce conviction. 

Having examined a few of the promises in proof of the position that 
a state of entire sanctification is attainable in this life, I will now pro- 
ceed to mention other considerations, in support of this doctrine. 

3. The apostles evidently expected Christians to attain this state in 



SANCTIFICATION. 415 

this life. See Col. iii. 12. " Epaphras, who is one of you, a servant of 
Christ, saluteth you, always laboring fervently for you in prayers, that 
ye may stand perfect and complete in all the will of God." Upon this 
passage I remark, — 

(1.) It was the object of the efforts of Epaphras, and a thing which; 
he expected to effect, to be instrumental in causing those Christians to 
be " perfect and complete in all the will of God." 

(2.) If this language does not describe a state of entire, in the sense 
of permanent, sanctification, I know of none that would. If "to be 
perfect and complete in all the will of God," be not Christian perfection, 
what is ? 

(3.) Paul knew that Epaphras was laboring to this end, and with 
this expectation ; and he informed the church of it, in a manner that 
evidently showed his approbation of the views and conduct of Epaphras. 

That the apostles expected Christians to attain this state is further 
manifest, from 2 Cor. vii. 1 : " Having therefore these promises, dearly 
beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit* 
perfecting holiness in the fear of God." 

Now, does not the apostle speak in this passage, as if he really ex- 
pected those to whom he wrote, " to perfect holiness in the fear of 
God ? " Observe how strong and full the language is : " Let us cleanse 
ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." If " to cleanse our- 
selves from all filthiness of the flesh, and all filthiness of the spirit, and 
to perfect holiness," be not entire sanctification, what is ? That he ex- 
pected this to take place in this life, is evident from the fact, that he re- 
quires them to be cleansed from all filthiness of the flesh as well as of 
the spirit. This passage plainly contemplates a state as distinguished 
from an act of consecration or sanctification, that is, it evidently expresses 
the idea of entire, in the sense of continued, sanctification. 

4. All the intermediate steps can be taken ; therefore the end can be 
reached. There is certainly no point in our progress towards entire 
sanctification, where it can be said we can go no further. To this it has 
been objected, that though all the intermediate steps can be taken, yet 
the goal can never be reached in this life, just as five may be divided by 
three ad infinitum, without exhausting the fraction. Now this illustra- 
tion deceives the mind that uses it, as it may the minds of those who 
listen to it. It is true, that you can never exhaust the fraction in divid- 
ing five by three, for the plain reason, that the division may be carried 
on ad infinitum. There is no end. You cannot, in this case, take all 
the intermediate steps, because they are infinite. But in the case of 
entire sanctification, all the intermediate steps can be taken : for there 
is an end, or state of entire sanctification, and that too at a point infi- 
nitely short of infinite. 



416 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, 

5. That this state may be attained in this life, I argue from the fact, 
that provision is made against all the occasions of sin. Men sin only 
when they are tempted, either by the world, the flesh, or the devil. And 
it is expressly asserted, that, in every temptation, provision is made for 
our escape. Certainly, if it is possible for us to escape without sin, under 
every temptation, then a state of entire and permanent sanctification is 
attainable. 

Full provision is made for overcoming the three great enemies of our 
souls, the world, the flesh, and the devil. 

(1.) The world — "This is the victory that overcometh the world, 
even your faith." " Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that 
believeth that Jesus is the Christ." 

(2.) The flesh—"' If ye walk in the Spirit, ye shall not fulfil the lusts 
of the flesh." 

(3.) Satan— "The shield of faith shall quench all the fiery darts of 
the wicked." And, " God shall bruise Satan under your feet shortly." 

6. God is able to perform this work in and for us. Eph. iii. 14-19 : 
" For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, that he 
would grant you according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened 
with might by his Spirit in the inner man ; that Christ may dwell in your 
hearts by faith ; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able 
to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and 
depth, and height ; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowl- 
edge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God." Upon this 
passage I remark, — 

(1.) Paul evidently prays here for the entire sanctification of believers 
in this life. It is implied in our being "rooted and grounded in love," 
and being " filled with all the fulness of God," that we be as perfect in- 
our measure and according to our capacity, as he is. If to be filled with 
the fulness of God, does not imply a state of entire sanctification, what 
does ? 

(2.) That Paul did not see any difficulty in the way of God's accom- 
plishing this work, is manifest from what he says in the twentieth verse 
— "Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that 
we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us," etc. 

7. The Bible nowhere represents death as the termination of sin in 
the saints, which it could not fail to do, were it true, that they cease not 
to sin until death. It has been the custom of the church for a long time, 
to console individuals, in view of death, by the consideration, that it would 
be the termination of all their sin. And how almost universal has been 
the custom in consoling the friends of deceased saints, to mention this as 
a most important fact, that now they had ceased from sin ! Now, if 



SANCTIFICATION. 417 

death is the termination of sin in the saints, and if they never cease to 
sin until they pass into eternity, too much stress never has been or can 
be laid upon that circumstance ; and it seems utterly incredible, that no 
inspired writer should ever have noticed the fact. The representations 
of scripture are all directly opposed to this idea. It is said, "Blessed are 
the dead who die in the Lord, for they rest from their labors, and their 
works do follow them." Here it is not intimated that they rest from 
their sins, but from their good works in this life ; such works as shall 
follow, not to curse, but to bless them. The representations of scripture 
are, that death is the termination of the saint's sufferings and labors of 
love in this world, for the good of men and the glory of God. But no- 
where in the Bible is it intimated, that the death of a saint is the termina- 
tion of his serving the devil. 

The Bible representations of death are utterly inconsistent with its 
being an indispensable means of sanctification. Death is represented in 
the Bible as an enemy. But if death is the only condition upon which 
men are brought into a state of entire sanctification, its agency is as im- 
portant and as indispensable as the influence of the Holy Ghost. When 
death is represented in the Bible as any thing else than an enemy, it is 
because it cuts short the sufferings of the saints, and introduces them 
into a state of eternal glory — not because it breaks them off from com- 
munion with the devil ! How striking is the contrast between the lan- 
guage of the church and that of inspiration on this subject ! The church 
is consoling the Christian in view of death, that it will be the termination 
of his sins — that he will then cease to serve the devil and his own lusts. 
The language of inspiration, on the other hand, is, that he will cease, not 
from wicked, but from good works, and labors and sufferings for God in 
this world. The language of the church is, that then he will enter upon 
a life of unalterable holiness — that he shall then, and not till then, be 
entirely sanctified. The language of inspiration is, that because he is 
sanctified, death shall be an entrance into a state of eternal glory. 

8. Ministers are certainly bound to set up some definite standard, to 
which, as the ministers of God, they are to insist upon complete con- 
formity. And now I would ask, what other standard can they and dare 
they set up than this ? To insist upon any thing less than this, is to 
turn pope and grant an indulgence to sin. But to set up this standard, 
and then inculcate that conformity to it is not, as a matter of fact, at- 
tainable in this life, is as absolutely to take the part of sin against God, 
as it would be to insist upon repentance in theory, and then avow that in 
practice it is not attainable. And here let me ask Christians what they 
expect ministers to preach ? Do you think they have a right to connive 
at any sin in you, or to insist upon any thing else as a practicable fact, 
than that you should abandon every iniquity ? I ask, by what authority 
2? 



418 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

can a minister preach any thing less ? And how shall any minister dare 
to inculcate the duty as a theory, and yet not insist upon it as a practical 
matter, as something to be expected of every subject of (rod's kingdom. 

9. A denial of this doctrine has the natural tendency to beget the very 
apathy witnessed in the church. Professors of religion go on in sin, with- 
out much conviction of its wickedness. Sin unblushingly stalks abroad 
even in the church of God, and does not fill Christians with horror, be- 
cause they expect its existence as a thing of course. Tell a young con- 
vert that he must expect to backslide, and he will do so of course, and 
with comparatively little remorse, because he looks upon it as a kind of 
necessity. And being led to expect it, you find him, in a few months 
after his conversion, away from God, and not at all horrified with his 
state. Just so, inculcate the idea among Christians, that they are not 
expected to abandon all sin, and they will of course go on in sin with 
comparative indifference. Eeprove them for their sin, and they will say, 
" 0, we are imperfect creatures ; we do not pretend to be perfect, nor do 
we expect we ever shall be in this world." Many such answers as these 
will show you at once the God-dishonoring and soul-ruining tendency of 
a denial of this doctrine. 

10. A denial of this doctrine prepares the minds of ministers to tem- 
porize, and wink at great iniquity in their churches. Feeling, as they 
certainly must, if they disbelieve this doctrine, that a great amount of sin 
in all believers is to be expected as a thing of course, their whole preach- 
ings and spirit, and demeanor, will be such as to beget a great degree of 
apathy among Christians, in regard to their abominable sins. 

11. If this doctrine is not true, how profane and blasphemous is the 
covenant of every church of every evangelical denomination. Every 
church requires its members to make a solemn covenant with God and 
with the church, in the presence of God and angels, and with their hands 
upon the emblems of the broken body and shed blood of the blessed Jesus, 
" to abstain from all ungodliness and every worldly lust, to live soberly, 
righteously, and godly, in this present world." Now, if the doctrine of 
the attainability of entire sanctification in this life is not true, what pro- 
fane mockery is this covenant ! It is a covenant to live in a state of en- 
tire sanctification, made under the most solemn circumstances, enforced 
by the most awful sanctions, and insisted upon by the minister of God 
distributing the bread and wine. Now what right has any minister on 
earth to require less than this ? And again, what right has any minister 
on earth to require this, unless it is. a practicable thing, and unless it is 
expected of him who makes the vow ? 

Suppose, when this covenant was proposed to a convert about to unite 
with the church, he should take it to his closet, and spread it before the 
Lord, and inquire whether it would be right for him to make such a cove- 






SANCTIFICATION. 410 

nant, and whether the grace of the gospel can enable him to fulfil it ? 
Do you suppose the Lord Jesus would reply, that if he made that cove- 
nant, he certainly would, and must, as a matter of course, live in the 
habitual violation of it as long as he lives, and that his grace was not 
sufficient to enable him to keep it ? Would he, in such a case, have any 
right to take upon himself this covenant ? No, no more than he would 
have a right to lie to the Holy Ghost. 

It has long been maintained by orthodox divines, that a person is not 
a Christian who does not aim at living without sin — that unless he aims 
at perfection, he manifestly consents to live in sin ; and is therefore im- 
penitent. It has been said, and I think truly, that if a man does not, in 
the fixed purpose of his heart, aim at total abstinence from sin, and at 
being wholly conformed to the will of God, he is not yet regenerated, and 
does not so much as mean to cease from abusing God. In Barnes' Notes 
upon 2 Cor. viii. 1, we have the following : — 

" The unceasing and steady aim of every Christian should be perfec- 
tion — perfection in all things — in the love of God, of Christ, of man ; 
perfection of heart, and feeling, and emotion ; perfection in his words, 
and plans, and dealings with men ; perfection in his prayers, and in his 
submission to the will of God. No man can be a Christian who does not 
sincerely desire it, and who does not constantly aim at it. No man is a 
friend of God who can acquiesce in a state of sin, and who is satisfied 
and contented that he is not as holy as God is holy. And .any man who 
has no desire to be perfect as God is, and who does not make it his daily 
and constant aim to be as perfect as God, may set it down as demonstra- 
bly certain that he has no true religion." 

Now if this is so, I would ask how a person can aim at, and intend to 
do, what he knows to be impossible. Is it not a contradiction to say that 
a man can intend to do what he knows he cannot do ? To this it has 
been objected, that if true, it proves too much — that it would prove that 
no man ever was a Christian who did not believe in this doctrine. To 
this I reply : — 

A man may believe in what is really a state of entire sanctification, 
and aim at attaining it, although he may not call it by that name. This 
I believe to be the real fact with Christians ; and they would much more 
frequently attain what they aim at, did they know how to appropriate 
the grace of Christ to their own circumstances. Mrs. President Edwards, 
for example, firmly believed that she could attain a state of entire conse- 
cration. She aimed at, and manifestly attained it, and yet, such were 
her views of constitutional depravity, that she did not call her state one 
of entire sanctification. It has been common for Christians to suppose, 
that a state of entire consecration is attainable ; but while they believe 
in the sinfulness of their natures, they would not of course call even en- 



420 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tire consecration, entire sanctification. Mrs. Edwards believed in, aimed 
at, and attained, entire consecration. She aimed at what she believed 
to be attainable, and she could aim at nothing more. She called it by 
the same name with her husband, who was opposed to the doctrine of 
Christian perfection, as held by the Wesleyan Methodists, manifestly on 
the ground of his notions of physical depravity. I care not what this 
state is called, if the thing be fully explained and insisted upon, together 
with the conditions of attaining it. Call it what you please, Christian 
perfection, heavenly mindedness, the full assurance of faith or hope, or a 
state of entire consecration ; by all these I understand the same thing. 
And it is certain, that by whatever name it is called, the thing must be 
aimed at to be attained. The practicability of its attainment must be 
admitted, or it cannot be aimed at. And now I would humbly inquire, 
whether to preach any thing short of this is not to give countenance to 
sin ? 

12. Another argument in favor of this doctrine is, that the gospel, as 
a matter of fact, has often, not only temporarily, but permanently and 
perfectly, overcome every form of sin, in different individuals. Who has 
not seen the most beastly lusts, drunkenness, lasciviousness, and every 
kind of abomination, long indulged and fully ripe, entirely and forever 
slain by the power of the grace of God ? Now how was this done ? 
Only by bringing this sin fully into the light of the gospel, and showing the 
individual the relation which the death of Christ sustained to that sin. 

Nothing is wanting to slay any and every form of sin, but for the mind 
to be fully baptized into the death of Christ, and to see the bearings of 
one's own sins upon the sufferings, and agonies, and death of the blessed 
Jesus. Let me state a fact to illustrate my meaning. An habitual and 
most inveterate smoker of tobacco, of my acquaintance, after having been 
plied with almost every argument to induce him to break the power of 
the habit and relinquish its use, in vain, on a certain occasion lighted his 
pipe, and was about to put it to his mouth, when the inquiry was started, 
Did Christ die to purchase this vile indulgence for me ? The perceived 
relation of the death of Christ to this sin instantly broke the power of 
the habit, and from that day he has been free. I could relate many 
other facts more striking than this, where a similar view of the relation 
of a particular sin to the atonement of Christ, has, in a moment, not 
only broken the power of the habit, but destroyed entirely and forever, 
the appetite for similar indulgences. And in multitudes of cases when 
the appetite has not been entirely slain, the will has been endowed with 
abundant and abiding efficiency effectually to control it. If the most in- 
veterate habits of sin, and even those that involve physical consequences, 
and have deeply debased the physical constitution, and rendered it a 
source of overpowering temptation to the mind, can be, and often have 



SANCTIFICATION. 421 

been, utterly broken up, and forever slain by the grace of God, why 
should it be doubted, that by the same grace a man can triumph over all 
sin, and that forever ? 

13. If this doctrine is not true, what is true upon the subject? It 
is certainly of great importance that ministers should be definite in their 
instructions ; and if Christians are not expected to be wholly conformed 
to the will of God in this life, how much is expected of them ? Who 
can say, Hitherto canst thou, must thou come, but no further ? It is 
certainly absurd, not to say ridiculous, for ministers to be forever press- 
ing Christians up to higher and higher attainments, saying at every step, 
you can and must go higher, and yet all along informing them, that 
they are expected to fall short of their whole duty, that they can as 
a matter of fact, be better than they are, far better, indefinitely better ; 
but still it is not expected that they will do their whole duty. I have 
often been pained to hear men preach, who were afraid to commit them- 
selves in favor of the whole truth ; and who were yet evidently afraid of 
falling short in their instructions, of insisting that men should stand 
" perfect and complete in all the will of God." To be consistent they are 
evidently perplexed, and well they may be ; for in truth there is no consist- 
ency in their views and teachings. If they do not inculcate, as a matter 
of fact, that men ought to do, and are expected to do, their whole duty, 
they are sadly at a loss to know what to inculcate. They have evidently 
many misgivings about insisting upon less than this, and still they fear 
to go to the full extent of apostolic teaching on this subject. And in 
their attempts to throw in qualifying terms and caveats, to avoid the 
impression, that they believe in the doctrine of entire sanctification, 
they place themselves in a truly awkward position. Cases have occurred 
in which ministers have been asked, how far we may go, must go, and 
are expected to go, in dependence upon the grace of Christ, and how 
holy men may be, and are expected to be, and must be, in this life. 
They could give no other answer to this, than that they can be a great 
deal better than they are. Now this indefiniteness is a great stumbling- 
block to the church. It cannot be according to the teachings of the 
Holy Ghost. 

14. The tendency of a denial of this doctrine is, to my mind, conclu- 
sive proof that the doctrine itself must be true. Many developments in 
the recent history of the church throw light upon this subject. Who 
does not see that the facts developed in the temperance reformation have 
a direct and powerful bearing upon this question ? It has been ascer- 
tained, that there is no possibility of completing the temperance refor- 
mation, except by adopting the principle of total abstinence from all 
intoxicating drinks. Let a temperance lecturer go forth as an evangel- 
ist, to promote revivals on the subject of temperance — let him inveigh 



422 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

against drunkenness, while he admits and defends the moderate use 
of alcohol, or insinuates, at least, that total abstinence is not expected or 
practicable. In this stage of the temperance reformation, every one can 
see that such a man can make no progress ; that he would be employed 
like a child in building dams of sand to obstruct the rushing of mighty 
waters. It is as certain as that causes produce their effects, that no 
permanent reformation could be effected, without adopting and insisting 
on the total abstinence principle. 

And now, if this is true, as it respects the temperance reformation, 
how much more so when applied to the subjects of holiness and sin. A 
man might, by some possibility, even in his own strength, overcome his 
habits of drunkenness, and retain what might be called the temperate 
use of alcohol. But no such thing is possible in a reformation from sin. 
There is no temperate indulgence in sin. Sin, as a matter of fact, is 
never overcome by any man in his own strength. If he admits into his 
creed the necessity of any degree of sin, or if he allows in practice 
any degree of sin, he becomes impenitent, consents to live in sin, and of 
course grieves the Holy Spirit, the certain result of which is a relapsing 
into a state of legal bondage to sin. And this is probably a true history 
of many professed Christians in the church. It is just what might 
be expected from the views and practice of the church upon this subject. 
The secret of backsliding is, that reformations are not carried deep 
enough. Christians are not set with all their hearts to aim at a speedy 
deliverance from all sin, but on the contrary are left, and in many in- 
stances taught, to indulge the expectation that they shall sin as long as 
they live. I probably never shall forget the effect produced on my mind 
by reading, when a young convert, in the diary of David Brainerd, that 
he never expected to make any considerable attainments in holiness 
in this life. I can now easily see that this was a natural inference from 
the theory of physical sinfulness which he held. But not perceiving this 
at the time, I doubt not that this expression of his views had a very 
injurious effect upon me for many years. It led me to reason thus : if 
such a man as David Brainerd did not expect to make much advance- 
ment in holiness in this life, it is vain for me to expect such a thing. 
The fact is, if there be anything that is important to high attainments 

/in holiness, and to the progress of the work of sanctification in this life, 
it is the adoption of the principle of total abstinence from sin. Total 
abstinence from sin must be every man's motto, or sin will certainly 
sweep him away as with a flood. That cannot possibly be a true princi- 
ple in temperance, that leaves the causes which produce drunkenness to 
operate in their full strength. Nor can that be true in regard to holiness 
which leaves the root unextracted, and the certain causes of spiritual 

(decline and backsliding at work in the very heart of the church. And I 



SANCTIFICATION. 423 

am fully convinced that until evangelists and pastors adopt, and carry 
out in practice, the principle of total abstinence from all sin, they will 
as certainly find themselves, every few months, called to do their work 
over again, as a temperance lecturer would who should admit the moder- 
ate use of alcohol. 

Again, who does not know that to call upon sinners to repent, and at 
the same time to inform them that they will not, and cannot, and are 
not expected to repent, would for ever prevent their repentance ? Sup- 
pose you say to a sinner, "You are naturally able to repent; but it is 
certain that you never will repent in this life, either with or without the 
Holy Spirit." Who does not see that such teaching would prevent his 
repentance as surely as he believed it ? To say to a professor of religion, 
\\ You are naturally able to be wholly conformed to the will of God ; but 
it is certain that you never will be, in this life, either in your own 
strength, or by the grace of God ;" if this teaching be believed, it will 
just as certainly prevent his sanctification, as the other teaching would 
the repentance of the sinner. I can speak from experience on this subject. 
While I inculcated the common views, I was often instrumental in 
bringing Christians under great conviction, and into a state of temporary 
repentance and faith. But falling short of urging them up to a point 
where they would become so acquainted with Christ as to abide in him, 
they would of course soon relapse again into their former state. I seldom 
saw, and can now understand that I had no reason to expect to see, 
under the instructions which I then gave, such a state of religious prin- 
ciple, such steady and confirmed walking with God among Christians, 
as I have seen since the change in my views and instructions. 



LECTURE XXXVIII. 

SANCTIFICATION. 
PAUL ENTIRELY SANCTIFIED. 

I might urge a great many other considerations, and as I have said, 
fill a book with scriptures, and arguments, and demonstrations, of the 
attainability of entire sanctification in this life. 

But I forbear, and will present only one more consideration — a con- 
sideration which has great weight in some minds. It is a question of 
great importance, whether any actually ever did attain this state. Some 
who believe it attainable, do not consider it of much importance to show 



424: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

that it has actually been attained. Now I freely admit, that it may be 
attainable, even if it never has been attained. Yet it appears to me that 
as a source of encouragement to the church, it is of great importance 
whether, as a matter of fact, a state of entire and continued holiness has 
been attained in this life. This question covers much ground. But for 
the sake of brevity, I design to examine but one case, and see whether 
there is not reason to believe that, in one instance at least, it has been at- 
tained. The case to which I allude is that of the apostle Paul. And I 
propose to take up and examine the passages that speak of him, for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether there is evidence that he ever attained 
to this state in this life. 

And here let me say that, to my own mind, it seems plain, that Paul 
and John, to say nothing of the other apostles, designed and expected 
the church to understand them as speaking from experience, and as hav- 
ing received of that fulness which they taught to be in Christ and in his 
gospel. 

And I wish to say again and more expressly, that I do not rest the 
practicability of attaining a state of entire and continued holiness at all 
upon the question, whether any ever have attained it, any more than I 
would rest the question, whether the world ever will be converted, upon 
the fact whether it ever has been converted. I have been surprised, 
when the fact that a state of entire holiness has been attained, is urged 
as one argument among a great many to prove its attainability, and that 
too, merely as an encouragement to Christians to lay hold upon this 
blessing — that objectors and reviewers fasten upon this, as the doctrine 
of sanctification, as if by calling this particular question into doubt, they 
could overthrow all the other proof of its attainability. Now this is utterly 
absurd. When, then, I examine the character of Paul with this object 
in view, if it should not appear clear to you that he did attain this state, 
you are not to overlook the fact, that its attainability is settled by other 
arguments, on grounds entirely independent of the question, whether it 
has been attained or not ; and that I merely use this as an argument, 
simply because to me it appears forcible, and fitted to afford great en- 
couragement to Christians to press after this state. 

I will first make some remarks in regard to the manner in which the 
language of Paul, when speaking of himself, should be understood ; and 
then proceed to an examination of the passages which speak of his Chris- 
tian character. 

His character, as revealed in his life, demands that we should under- 
stand him to mean all that he says, when speaking in his own favor. 
The Spirit of inspiration would guard him against speaking too highly 
of himself. No man ever seemed to possess greater modesty, and to feel 
more unwilling to exalt his own attainments. If he considered himself 



SANCTIFICATION, 425 

as not having attained a state of entire sanctification, and as often, if not 
in all things, falling short of his duty, we may expect to find him ac- 
knowledging this in the deepest self-abasement. If he is charged with 
living in sin, and with being wicked in anything, we may expect him, 
when speaking under inspiration, not to justify, but unequivocally to 
condemn himself in those things, if he was really guilty. 

Now, in view of these facts, let us examine those scriptures in which 
he speaks of himself, and is spoken of by others. 

1 Thess. ii. 10 : "Ye are witnesses, and God also, how holily, and 
justly, and unblamably, we behaved ourselves among you that believe." 
Here he unqualifiedly asserts his own holiness. This language is very 
strong, " How holily, justly, and unblamably." If to be holy, just, and 
unblamable, be not entire sanctification, what is ? He appeals to the 
heart-searching God for the truth of what he says, and to their own ob- 
servation, calling on God and on them also to bear witness, that he had 
been holy and without blame. Here we have the testimony of an inspired 
apostle, in the most unqualified language, asserting his own entire sanc- 
tification. Was he deceived ? Can it be that he knew himself all the 
time to have been living in sin ? If such language as this does not 
amount to an unqualified assertion, that he had lived among them with- 
out sin, what can be known by the use of human language ? 

2 Cor. vi. 3-7 : " Giving no offence in anything, that the ministry 
be not blamed ; but in all things approving ourselves as the ministers of 
God, in much patience, in afflictions, in necessity, in distresses, in stripes, 
in imprisonments, in tumults, in labors, in watchings, in fastings ; by 
pureness, by knowledge, by long-suffering, by kindness, by the Holy 
Ghost, by love unfeigned, by the word of truth, by the power of God, by 
the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left." Upon 
these verses I remark : Paul asserts that he gave no offence in anything, 
but in all things approved himself as a minister of God. Among other 
things, he did this " by pureness, by the Holy Ghost, by love unfeigned," 
and "by the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left." 
How could so modest a man as Paul speak of himself in this manner, un- 
less he knew himself to be in a state of entire sanctification, and thought 
it of great importance that the church should know it ? 

2 Cor. i. 12 : " For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our con- 
science, that in simplicity and godly 'sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, 
but by the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the world, and 
more abundantly to you ward." This passage plainly implies the same 
thing, and was manifestly said for the same purpose — to declare the great- 
ness of the grace of God as manifested in himself. 

Acts xxiv. 16 : "And herein do I exercise myself to have always a 
conscience void of offence toward God, and toward men." Paul doubt- 



426 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

less at this time had an enlightened conscience. If an inspired apostle 
could affirm, that he " exercised himself to have always a conscience void 
of oifence toward God and toward men," must he not have been in a state 
of entire sauctification ? 

2 Tim. i. 3 : "I thank God, whom I serve from my forefathers with 
a pure conscience, that without ceasing I have remembrance of thee in 
my prayers night and day." Here again he affirms that he serves God 
with a pure conscience. Could this be, if he was often, and perhaps 
every day, as some suppose, violating his conscience ? 

Gal. ii. 20 : "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live ; yet not 
I, but Christ liveth in me ; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I 
live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for 
me." This does not assert, but strongly implies, that he lived without 
sin, and also that he regarded himself as dead to sin in the sense of being 
permanently sanctified. 

Gal. vi. 14 : "But God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross 
of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and 
I unto the world." This text also affords the same inference as above. 

Phil. i. 21 : " For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain." Here 
the apostle affirms that for him to live was as if Christ lived in the church, 
that is, by his doctrine illustrated by his life, it was as if Christ lived 
again and preached his own gospel to sinners and to the church ; or for 
him to live was to make Christ known as if Christ lived to make himself 
known. How could he say this, unless his example, and doctrine, and 
spirit, were those of Christ ? 

Acts xx. 26 : " Wherefore I take you to record this day, that I am pure 
from the blood of all men." This passage, taken in its connection, shows 
clearly the impression that Paul desired to make upon the minds of those 
to whom he spake. It is certain that he could in no proper sense be 
"'pure from the blood of all men," unless he had done his whole duty. 
If he had been sinfully lacking in any grace, or virtue, or labor, could he 
have said this ? Certainly not. 

1 Cor. ii. 16, 17 : " Wherefore, I beseech you, be ye followers of me. 
For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son, 
and faithful in the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of my 
ways which be in Christ, as I teach everywhere in every church." Here 
Paul manifestly sets himself up as ai? example to the church. How could 
he do this if he were living in sin ? He sent Timotheus to them to re- 
fresh their memories in regard to his doctrine and practice ; implying 
that what he taught in every church he himself practiced. 

1 Cor. xi. 1 : "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ." 
Here Paul commands them to follow him " as he followed Christ ; " not 
so far as he followed Christ, as some seem to understand it, but to follow 






SANCTIFICATION". 427 

him because he followed Christ. How could he, in this unqualified man- 
ner, command the church to copy his example, unless he knew himself 
to be blameless ? 

Phil, iii. 17, 20 : "Brethren, be followers together of me, and mark 
them which walk so as ye have us for an ensample. For our conversa- 
tion is in heaven, from whence we also look for the Saviour, the Lord 
Jesus Christ." Here again, Paul calls upon the church to follow him, 
and particularly to notice those that copied his example, and assigns as 
the reason, "for our conversation is in heaven." 

Phil. iii. 9 : " Those things, which ye have both learned and received, 
and heard, and seen in me, do ; and the God of peace shall be with you." 
The Philippians were commanded to " do those things which they had 
learned, and received, and seen in him." And then he adds, that if they 
do those things, the God of peace shall be with them. Now can it be, 
that he meant that they should understand anything less, than that he 
lived without sin among them ? 

I will next examine those passages which are supposed by some to 
imply that Paul was not in a state of entire sanctification. 

Acts xv. 36-40: "'And some days after, Paul said unto Barnabas, 
Let us go again and visit our brethren in every city where we have 
preached the word of the Lord, and see how they do. And Barnabas 
determined to take with them John whose surname was Mark. But 
Paul thought not good to take him with them, who departed from them 
from Pamphylia, and went not with them to the work. And the con- 
tention was so sharp between them, that they departed asunder one from 
the other ; and so Barnabas took Mark, and sailed to Cyprus ; and Paul 
chose Silas, and departed, being recommended by the brethren unto the 
grace of God." 

This contention between Paul and Barnabas arose out of the fact, that 
John, who was a nephew of Barnabas, had once abruptly left them in 
their travels, it would seem, without any justifiable reason, and had re- 
turned home. It appears that the confidence of Barnabas in his nephew 
was restored. But Paul was not as yet satisfied of t\ie stability of his 
character, and thought it dangerous to trust him as a travelling com- 
panion and fellow laborer. It is not intimated, nor can it fairly be in- 
ferred, that either of them sinned in this contention. If either was to 
be blamed, it seems that Barnabas was in fault, rather than Paul, inas- 
much as he determined to take John with him, without having consulted 
Paul. And he persisted in this determination until he met with such 
firm resistance on the part of Paul, that he took John and sailed abruptly 
for Cyprus ; while Paul choosing Silas as his companion, was recom- 
mended by the brethren to the grace of God, and departed. Now cer- 
tainly there is nothing that we can discover in this transaction, that Paul, 



428 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

or any good man, or an angel, under the circumstances, needs to have 
been ashamed of. It does not appear, that Paul ever acted more from a 
regard to the glory of God and the good of religion, than in this transac- 
tion. And I would humbly inquire, what spirit is that which finds suf- 
ficient evidence in this case to charge an inspired apostle with rebellion 
against God ? 

Acts xxiii. 1-5 : " And Paul, earnestly beholding the council, said, 
Men and brethren, I have lived in all good conscience before God until 
this day. And the high priest Ananias commanded them that stood by 
him to smite him on the mouth. Then said Paul unto him, God shall 
smite thee, thou whited wall : for sittest thou to judge me after the law, 
and command est me to be smitten contrary to the law ? And they that 
stood by said, Eevilest thou God's high priest ? Then said Paul, I wist 
not, brethren, that he was the high priest : for it is written, Thou shalt 
not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." In this case sinful anger has 
been imputed to Paul ; but, so far as I can see, without any just reason. 
To my mind it seems plain, that the contrary is to be inferred. It ap- 
pears, that Paul was not personally acquainted with the then officiating 
high priest. And he manifested the utmost regard to the authority of 
God in quoting from the Old Testament, "Thou shalt not speak evil of 
the ruler of thy people ;" implying, that notwithstanding the abuse he 
had received, he should not have made the reply, had he known him to 
be the high priest. 

Rom. vii. from the fourteenth to the twenty-fifth verse, has by many 
been supposed to be an epitome of Paul's experience at the time he wrote 
the epistle. Upon this I remark : — 

1. The connection and drift of Paul's reasoning show, that the case 
of which he was speaking, whether his own or the case of some one else, 
was adduced by him to illustrate the influence of the law upon the carnal 
mind. This is a case in which sin had the entire dominion, and over- 
came all his resolutions of obedience. 

2. That his use of the singular pronoun, and in the first person, 
proves nothing in regard to the point, whether or not he was speaking of 
himself, for this is common with him, and with other writers, when using 
illustrations. He keeps up the personal pronoun, and passes into the 
eighth chapter ; at the beginning of which, he represents himself, or the 
person of whom he is speaking, as being not only in a different, but in au 
exactly opposite state of mind. Now, if the seventh chapter contains 
Paul's experience, whose experience is this in the eighth chapter ? Are 
we to understand them both as the experience of Paul ? If so, we must 
understand him as first speaking of his experience before, and then after 
he was sanctified. He begins the eighth chapter by saying, "'There is 
therefore now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who 



SANCTIFICATION. 429 

walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit ; " and assigns as a reason, 
that " The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free 
from the law of sin and death." The law of sin and death was that law 
in his members, or the influence of the flesh, of which he had so bitterly 
complained in the seventh chapter. But now, it appears, that he has 
passed into a state in which he is made free from this influence of the 
flesh, — is emancipated and dead to the world and to the flesh, and in a 
state in which " there is no condemnation." Now, if there was no con- 
demnation in the state in which he then was, it must have been, either 
because he did not sin, or, if he did sin, because the law did not condemn 
him ; or because the law of God was repealed or abrogated. Now, if the 
penalty of the law was so set aside in his case, that he could sin without 
condemnation, this is a real abrogation of the law. But as the law was 
not, and could not be set aside, its penalty was not and could not be so 
abrogated, as not to condemn every sin. If Paul lived without condemna- 
tion, it must be because he lived without sin. 

To me it does not appear that Paul speaks of his own experience in 
the seventh chapter of Romans, but that he merely supposes a case 
by way of illustration, and speaks in the first person, and in the present 
tense, simply because it was convenient and suitable to his purpose. 
His object manifestly was, in this and in the beginning of the eighth 
chapter, to contrast the influence of the law and of the gospel — to de- 
scribe in the seventh chapter the state of a man who was living in sin, 
and every day condemned by the law, convicted and constantly struggling 
with his own corruptions, but continually overcome, — and in the eighth 
chapter to exhibit a person in the enjoyment of gospel liberty, where the 
righteousness of the law was fulfilled in the heart by the grace of Christ. 
The seventh chapter may well apply either to a person in a backslidden 
state, or to a convicted person who had never been converted. The 
eighth chapter can clearly be applicable to none but to those who are in 
a state of entire sanctification. 

I have already said, that the seventh chapter contains the history 
of one over whom sin has dominion. Now, to suppose that this was the 
experience of Paul when he wrote the epistle, or of any one who was in 
the liberty of the gospel, is absurd and contrary to the experience of 
every person who ever enjoyed gospel liberty. And further, this is as 
expressly contradicted in the sixth chapter as it can be. As I said, the 
seventh chapter exhibits one over whom sin has dominion : but God says, 
in the sixth chapter and fourteenth verse, " For sin shall not have 
dominion over you ; for ye are not under the law, but under grace." I 
remark finally upon this passage, that if Paul was speaking of himself 
in the seventh chapter of Romans, and really giving a history of his own 
experience, it proves nothing at all in regard to his subsequent sanctifica- 



430 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tion ; for the eighth chapter shows conclusively, that it was not his 
experience at the time he wrote the epistle. The fact that the seventh 
and eighth chapters have been separated since the translation was made, 
as I have before said, has led to much error in the understanding of this 
passage. Nothing is more certain, than that the two chapters were 
designed to describe not only different experiences, but experiences 
opposite to each other. And that both these experiences should belong 
to the same person at the same time, is manifestly impossible. If there- 
fore Paul is speaking in this connection of his own experience, we are 
bound to understand the eighth chapter as describing his experience at 
the time he wrote the epistle ; and the seventh chapter as descriptive of 
a former experience. 

Now, therefore, if any one understands the seventh chapter as 
describing a Christian experience, he must understand it as giving the 
exercises of one in a very imperfect state ; and the eighth chapter as 
descriptive of a soul in a state of entire sanctification. So that this 
epistle, instead of militating against the idea of Paul's entire sanctifica- 
tion, upon the supposition that lie was speaking of himself, fully estab- 
lishes the fact that he was in that state. "What do those brethren mean who 
take the latter part of the seventh chapter as entirely disconnected from 
that which precedes and follows it, and make it tell a sad story on the 
subject of the legal and sinful bondage of an inspired apostle ? What 
cannot be proved from the Bible in this way ? Is it not a sound and 
indispensable rule of biblical interpretation, that a passage is to be taken 
in its connection, and that the scope and leading intention of the writer 
is to be continually borne in mind, in deciding upon the meaning of any 
passage ? Why then, I pray, are the verses that precede, and those that 
immediately follow in the eighth chapter, entirely overlooked in the 
examination of this important passage ? 

Phil. iii. 10-15. " That I may know him, and the power of his res- 
urrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable 
unto his death ; if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the 
dead. Not as though I had already attained, either were already per- 
fect ; but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I 
am apprehended of Christ Jesus. Brethren, I count not myself to have 
apprehended ; but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are 
behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press 
toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ 
Jesus. Let us therefore as many as be perfect, be thus minded : and if 
in anything ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you." 

Here is a plain allusion to the Olympic games, in which men ran for a 
prize, and were not crowned until the end of the race, however well 
they might run. Paul speaks of two kinds of perfection here, one of 



SANCTIFICATION. 431 

which he claims to have attained, and the other he had not. The perfec- 
tion which he had not attained, was that which he did not expect to 
attain until the end of his race, nor indeed until he had attained the 
resurrection from the dead. Until then he was not, and did not expect 
to be, perfect, in the sense that he should "apprehend all that for which 
he was apprehended of Christ Jesus." But all this does not imply that 
he was not living without sin, any more than it implies that Christ was 
living in sin when he said, " I must walk to-day and to-morrow, and the 
third day I shall be perfected." Here Christ speaks of a perfection 
which he had not attained. 

Now it is manifest, that it was the glorified state to which Paul had 
not attained, and which perfection he was pressing after. But in the 
fifteenth verse, he speaks of another kind of perfection, which he pro- 
fessed to have attained. "Let us therefore," he says, "as many as be 
perfect, be thus minded ;" that is, let us be pressing after this high state 
of perfection in glory, " if by any means we may attain unto the resur- 
rection of the dead." The figure of the game should be kept continually 
in mind in the interpretation of this passage. The prize in those races 
was the crown. This was given only at the end of the race. And 
besides, a man was not crowned except he ran lawfully, that is, accord- 
ing to rule. Paul was running for the prize, that is the crown ; not, as 
some suppose, for entire sanctification, but for a crown of glory. This 
he did not expect until he had completed his race. He exhorts those 
who were perfect, that is, those who were running lawfully or according 
to rule, to forget the things that were behind, and press to the mark, 
that is, the goal, for the prize, or the crown of glory, which the Lord 
the righteous judge, who was witnessing his race to award the crown to 
the victor, would give him at that day. 

Now it is manifest to my mind, that Paul does not in this passage, 
teach expressly nor impliedly, that he was living in sin, but the direct 
opposite — that he meant to say, as he had said in many other places, that 
he was unblamable in respect to sin, but that he was aspiring after higher 
attainments, and meant to be satisfied with nothing short of eternal glory. 

Again, Phil. iv. 11-13 : "Not that I speak in respect of want : for I 
have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. I know 
both how to be abased, and I know how to abound : everywhere, and in 
all things, I am instructed, both to be full and to be hungry, both to 
abound and to suffer need. I can do all things through Christ which 
strengthened me." Here Paul undoubtedly meant to affirm, not merely 
his abstract ability to do all his duty, but that he had learned by experi- 
ence, that as a matter of fact and reality, he found himself able to do all 
things required of him. 

In relation to the character of Paul, let me say : — If Paul was not sin- 



432 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

less, he was an extravagant boaster, and such language used by any min- 
ister in these days would be considered as the language of an extravagant 
boaster. This setting himself up as an example so frequently and fully, 
without any caution or qualification, was highly dangerous to the interests 
of the church, if he was not in a state of entire sanctification. 

His language in appealing to God, that in life and heart he was blame- 
less, was blasphemous, unless he was really what he professed to be ; and 
if he was what he professed to be, he was in a state of entire sanctifica- 
tion. It is doing dishonor to God, to maintain, under these circumstan- 
ces, that Paul had not attained the blessing of entire sanctification. He 
nowhere confesses sin after he became an apostle, but invariably justifies 
himself, appealing to man and to God, for his entire integrity and blame- 
lessness of heart and life. To maintain the sinfulness of this apostle, is 
to deny the grace of the gospel, and charge God foolishly. And I cannot 
but inquire, why is this great effort in the church to maintain that Paul 
h>ed in sin, and was never wholly sanctified till death ? 

Two things have appeared wonderful to me : 

1. That so many professed Christians should seem to think themselves 
highly honoring God in extending the claims of the law, and yet denying 
that the grace of the gospel is equal to the demands of the law. 

2. That so many persons seem to have an entirely self-righteous view 
of the subject of sanctification. With respect to the first of these opin- 
ions, much pains has been taken to extend to the utmost the claims of 
the law of God. Much has been said of its exceeding and infinite strict- 
ness, and the great length, and breadth, and height, and depth of its 
claims. Multitudes are engaged in defending the claims of the law, as 
if they greatly feared that the purity of the law would be defiled, its 
strictness and spirituality overlooked, and its high and holy claims set 
aside, or frittered down somehow to the level of human passion and self- 
ishness. But while engaged in their zeal to defend the law, they talk 
and preach, and write, as if they supposed it indispensable, in order to 
sustain the high claims of the law, to deny the grace and power of the 
gospel, and its sufficiency to enable human beings to comply with the re- 
quisitions of the law. Thus they seem to me, unwittingly, to enter the 
lists against the grace of Christ, and with the utmost earnestness and even 
vehemence, to deny that the grace of Christ is sufficient to overcome sin, 
and to fulfil in us the righteousness of the law. Yes, in their zeal for 
the law they appear to me either to overlook, or flatly to deny, the grace 
of the gospel. 

Now let the law be exalted. Let it be magnified and made honorable. 
Let it be shown to be strict, and pure, and perfect, as its Author ; spread 
its claims over the whole field of human and angelic accountability ; carry 
it like a blaze of fire to the deepest recess of every human heart ; exalt it 



SANCTIFICATION. 433 

as high as heaven ; and thunder its authority and claims to the depths of 
hell ; stretch out its line upon the universe of mind ; and let it, as it 
well may, and as it ought, thunder death and terrible damnation against 
every kind and degree of iniquity. Yet let it be remembered for ever, 
that the grace of the gospel is co-extensive with the claims of the law. 
Let no man, therefore, in his strife to maintain the authority of the law, 
insult the Saviour, exercise unbelief himself, or fritter away and drown 
the faith of the church, by holding out the profane idea, that the glori- 
ous gospel of the blessed God, sent home and rendered powerful by the 
efficacious application of the Holy Spirit, is not sufficient to fulfil in us 
" the righteousness of the law," and cause us " to stand perfect and com- 
plete in all the will of God." 

With respect to the second thing which appears wonderful to me, 
namely, that so many seem to have an entirely self-righteous view of the 
doctrine of sanctification, let me say, that they seem afraid to admit, that 
any are entirely and perfectly sanctified in this life, lest they should 
flatter human pride, seeming to take it for granted, that, if any are en- 
tirely sanctified, they have whereof to glory, as if they had done some- 
thing, and were in themselves better than others. Whereas, the doctrine 
of entire sanctification utterly abhors the idea of human merit, disclaims 
and repudiates it as altogether an abomination to God, and to the sanc- 
tified soul. This doctrine, as taught in the Bible, and as I understand 
it, is as far as possible from conniving in the least degree at the idea of 
anything naturally good in saints or sinners. It ascribes the whole of 
salvation and sanctification from first to last, not only till the soul is 
sanctified, but at every moment while it remains in that state, to the in- 
dwelling Spirit, and influence, and grace of Christ. 



LECTURE XXXIX. 



SANCTIFICATION. 



Y. TJie conditions of this attainment. 

1. A state of entire sanctification can never be attained by an indiffer- 
ent waiting of God's time. 

2. Nor by any works of law, or works of any kind, performed in your 
own strength, irrespective of the grace of God. By this I do not mean, 
that, were you disposed to exert your natural powers aright, you could 
not at once obey the law in the ejcexeise of your natural strength, and 
continue to do so. But I do mean, that as you are wholly indisposed to 



434 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

use your natural powers aright, without the grace of God, no efforts that 
you will actually make in your own strength, or independent of his grace, 
will ever result in your entire sanctification. 

3. Not by any direct efforts to feel right. Many spend their time in 
vain efforts to force themselves into a right state of feeling. Now, it 
should be for ever understood, that religion does not consist in a mere 
feeling, emotion, or involuntary affection of any kind. Feelings do not 
result from a direct effort to feel. But, on the contrary, they are the 
spontaneous actings of the mind, when it has under its direct arid deep 
consideration the objects, truths, facts, or realities, that are correlated to 
these involuntary emotions. They are the most easy and natural state 
of mind possible under such circumstances. So far from its requiring an 
effort to put them forth, it would rather, require an effort to prevent 
them, when the mind is intensely considering those objects and consider- 
ations which have a natural tendency to produce them. This is so true, 
that when persons are in the exercise of such affections, they feel no diffi- 
culty at all in their exercise, but wonder how any one can help feeling as 
they do. It seems to them so natural, so easy, and, I may say, so almost 
unavoidable, that they often feel and express astonishment, that any one 
should find it difficult to exercjse the feelings of which they are conscious. 
The course that many persons take on the subject of religion, has often 
appeared wonderful to me. They make themselves, their own state and 
interests, the central point, around which their own minds are continu- 
ally revolving. Their selfishness is so great, that their own interests, 
happiness, and salvation, fill their whole field of vision. And with their 
thoughts and anxieties, and whole souls, clustering around their own sal- 
vation, they complain of a hard heart, that they cannot love God, that 
they do not repent, and cannot believe. They manifestly regard love to 
God, repentance, faith, and all religion, as consisting in mere feelings. 
Being conscious that they do not feel right, as they express it, they are 
the more concerned about themselves, which concern but increases their 
embarrassment, and the difficulty of exercising what they call right affec- 
tions. The less they feel, the more they try to feel — the greater efforts 
they make to feel right without success, the more are they confirmed in 
their selfishness, and the more are their thoughts glued to their own in- 
terests ; and they are, of course, at a greater and greater distance from 
any right state of mind. And thus their selfish anxieties beget in- 
effectual efforts, and these efforts but deepen their anxieties. And if, 
in this state, death should appear in a visible form before them, or the 
last trumpet sound, and they should be summoned to the solemn judg- 
ment, it would but increase their distraction, confirm, and almost give 
omnipotence to their selfishness, and render their sanctification morally 
| impossible. It should never be forgotten, that all true religion consists 



SANCTIFICATION. 435 

in voluntary states of mind, and that the true and only way to attain to 
true religion, is to look at and understand the exact thing to be done, 
and then to put forth at once the voluntary exer cise required. 

4. Not by any efforts to obtain grace by works of law. 

Should the question be proposed to a Jew, " What shall I do that I 
may work the work of God ? " he would answer, Keep the law, both 
moral and ceremonial ; that is, keep the commandments. 

To the same inquiry an Arminian would answer, Improve common 
grace, and you will obtain converting grace ; that is, use the means of 
grace according to the best light you have, and you will obtain the grace 
of salvation. In this answer it is not supposed, that the inquirer already 
has faith ; but that he is in a state of unbelief, and is inquiring after 
converting grace. The answer, therefore, amounts to this ; you must 
get converting grace by your impenitent works ; you must become holy 
by your hypocrisy ; you must work out sanctification by sin. 

To this question, most professed Calvinists would make in substance 
the same reply. They would reject the language, while they retained 
the idea. Their direction would imply, either that the inquirer already 
has faith, or that he must perform some works to obtain it, that is, that 
he must obtain grace by works of law. 

A late Calvinistic writer admits that entire and permanent sanctifica- 
tion is attainable, although he rejects the idea of the actual attainment 
of such a state in this life. He supposes the condition of attaining this 
state or the way to attain it, is by a diligent use of the means of grace, 
and that the saints are sanctified just so far as they make a diligent use 
of the means of sanctification. But as he denies, that any saints ever 
did or will use all the means with suitable diligence, he denies also, of 
course, that entire sanctification ever is attained in this life. The way 
of attaining it, according to his teaching, is by the diligent use of means. 
If then this writer were asked, " what shall I do that I may work the 
works of God ? " — or in other words what shall I do to obtain entire and 
permanent sanctification? his answer, it seems, would be : "Use dili- 
gently all the means of grace ;" that is, you must get grace by works, or, 
with the Arminian, improve common grace, and you will secure sanctify- 
ing grace. Neither an Arminian, nor a Calvinist, would formally direct 
the inquirer to the law, as the ground of justification. But nearly the 
whole church would give directions that would amount to the same thing. 
Their answer would be a legal and not a gospel answer. For whatever 
answer is given to this question, that does not distinctly recognize faith 
as the condition of abiding holiness in Christians, is legal. Unless the 
inquirer is made to understand, that this is the first, grand, fundamental 
duty, without the performance of which all virtue, all giving up of sin, 
all acceptable obedience, is impossible, he is misdirected. He is led to 



436 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

believe that it is possible to please .God without faith, and to obtain grace 
by works of law. There are but two kinds of works — works of law, and 
works of faith. Now, if the inquirer has not the "faith that works by 
love," to set him upon any course of works to get it, is certainly to set 
him to get faith by works of law. Whatever is said to him that does not 
clearly convey the truth, that both justification and sanctifi cation are by 
faith, without works of law, is law, and not gospel. Nothing before or 
without faith, can possibly be done by any one, but works of law. His 
first duty, therefore, is faith ; and every attempt to obtain faith by un- 
believing works, is to lay works at the foundation, and make grace a re- 
sult. It is the direct opposite of gospel truth. 

Take facts as they arise in every day's experience to show that what I 
have stated is true of almost all professors and non-professors. When- 
ever a sinner begins in good earnest to agitate the question, " What shall 
I do to be saved ?" he resolves as a first duty, to break off from his sins, 
that is, in unbelief. Of course, his reformation is only outward. He 
determines to do better — to reform in this, that, and the other thing, 
and thus prepare himself to be converted. He does not expect to be 
saved without grace and faith, but he attempts to get grace by works of 
law. The same is true of multitudes of anxious Christians, who are in- 
quiring what they shall do to overcome the world, the flesh, and the 
devil. They overlook the fact, that " this is the victory that overcometh 
the world, even our faith," that it is with " the shield of faith " they are 
(: to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked." They ask, Why am I over- 
come by sin ? Why can I not get above its power ? Why am I thus the 
slave of my appetites and passions, and the sport of the devil ? They cast 
about for the cause of all this spiritual wretchedness and death. At one 
time, they think they have discovered it in the neglect of oue duty ; and 
at another time in the neglect of another. Sometimes they imagine they 
have found the cause to lie in yielding to one temptation, and sometimes 
in yielding to another. They put forth efforts in this direction, and in 
that direction, and patch up their righteousness on one side, while they 
make a rent in the other side. Thus they spend years in running round 
in a circle, and making dams of sand across the current of their own 
habitudes and tendencies. Instead of at once purifying their hearts by 
faith, they are engaged in trying to arrest the overflowing of the bitter 
waters of their own propensities. Why do I sin ? they inquire ; and 
casting about for the cause, they come to the sage conclusion, It is be- 
cause I neglect such a duty, that is, because I do sin. But how shall I 
get rid of sin ? Answer : By doing my duty, that is, by ceasing from 
sin. Now the real inquiry is, Why do they neglect their duty ? Wliy 
do they commit sin at all ? Where is the foundation of all this mischief? 
Will it be replied, the foundation of all this wickedness is the force of 



SANCTIFICATION. 437 

temptation — in the weakness of our hearts — in the strength of our evil 
propensities and habits ? But all this only brings us back to the real 
inquiry again, How are these things to be overcome ? I answer, by faith 
alone. No works of law have the least tendency to overcome our sins ; 
but rather to confirm the soul in self-righteousness and unbelief. 

The great and fundamental sin, which is at the foundation of all 
other sin, is unbelief. The first thing is, to give up that — to believe the 
word of God. There is no breaking off from one sin without this. 
"Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." "Without faith it is impossible to 
please God." Thus we see, that the backslider and convicted sinner, 
when agonizing to overcome sin, will almost always betake themselves to 
works of law to obtain faith. They will fast, and pray, and read, and 
struggle, and outwardly reform, and thus endeavor to obtain grace. 
Now all this is vain and wrong. Do you ask, shall we not fast, and pray, 
and read, and struggle ? Shall we do nothing but sit down in an tin o- 
mian security and inaction ? I answer, you must do all that God com- 
mands you to do ; but begin where he tells you to begin, and do it in the 
manner in which he commands you to do it ; that is, in the ezercjse of 
that faith that works by love. Purify your hearts by faith. Believe in 
the Son of God. And say not in your heart, " Who shall ascend into 
heaven, that is to bring Christ down from above ; or who shall descend 
into the deep, that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead. But 
what saith it ? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy 
heart, that is, the word of faith which we preach." Now these facts 
show, that even under the gospel, almost all professors of religion, while 
they reject the Jewish notion of justification by works of law, have after 
all adopted a ruinous substitute for it, and suppose, that in some way 
they are to obtain grace by their works. 

5. A state of entire sanctification cannot be attained by attempting to ^- 
copy the experience of others. It is very common for convicted sinners, 
or for Christians inquiring after entire sanctification, in their blindness, 
to ask others to relate their experience, to mark minutely the detail of all 
their e xercise s, and then set themselves to pray for, and make direct 
efforts to attain the same class of exercises, not seeming to understand, 
that they can no more exercise feelings in the detail like others, than they 
can look like others. Human experiences differ as human countenances 
differ. The whole history of a man's former state of mind, comes in of 
course to modify his present and future experience ; so that the precise 
train of feelings which may be requisite in your case, and which will act- 
ually occur, if you are ever sanctified, will not in all its details coincide 
with the exercises of any other human being. It is of vast importance 
for you to understand, that you can be no copyist in any true religious 
experience ; and that you are in great danger of being deceived by Satan, 



43S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

whenever you attempt to copy the experience of others. I beseech you 
therefore to cease from praying for, or trying to obtain, the precise 
experience of any person whatever. All truly Christian experiences are, 
like human countenances, in their outline so much alike as to be readily 
known as the lineaments of the religion of Jesus Christ. But no further 
than this are they alike, any more than human countenances are alike. 

But here let it be remembered, that sanctification does not consist in 
the various affections or emotions of which Christians speak, and which 
are often mistaken for, or confounded with, true religion ; but that 
sanctification consists in entire consecration, and consequently it is all 
out of place for any one to attempt to copy the feelings of another, inas- 
much as feelings do not constitute religion. The feelings of which. 
Christians speak do not constitute true religion, but often result from a 
state of heart. These feelings may properly enough be spoken of as 
Christian experience, for although involuntary states of mind, they are 
experienced by true Christians. The only way to secure them is to set 
the will right, and the emotions will be a natural result. 

6. Not by waiting to make preparations before you come into this 
state. Observe, that the thing about which you are inquiring, is a state of 
entire consecration to God. Now do not imagine that this state of mind 
must be prefaced by a long introduction of preparatory^exercises. It is 
common for persons, when inquiring upon this subject with earnestness, 
to think themselves hindered in this progress by a want of this, or that, 
or the other exercise or state of mind. They look everywhere else but 
at the real difficulty. They assign any other, and every other but the 
true reason, for their not being already in a state of sanctification. The 
true difficulty is voluntary selfishness, or voluntary consecration to self- 
interest and self-gratification. This is the difficulty, and the only 
difficulty, to be overcome. 

7. Not by attending meetings, asking the prayers of other Chris- 
tians, or depending in any way upon the means of getting into this state. 
By this I do not intend to say, that means are unnecessary, or that it is 
not through the instrumentality of truth, that this state of mind is 
induced. But I do mean, that while you are depending upon any 
instrumentality whatever, your mind is diverted from the real point 
before you, and you are never likely to make this attainment. 

8. Not by waiting for any particular views of Christ. When persons 
in the state of mind of which I have been speaking, hear those who live 
in faith describe their views of Christ, they say, Oh, if I had such views, 
I could believe ; I must have these before I can believe. Now you should 
understand, that these views are the result and effect of faith in the 
promise of the Spirit, to take of the things of Christ and show them to 
you. Lay hold of this class of promises, and the Holy Spirit will reveal 



SANCTIFICATIOX. 439 

Christ to you, in the relations in which you need him from time to time. 
Take hold, then, on the simple promise of God. Take God at his word. 
Believe that he means just what he says ; and this will at once bring you 
into the state of mind after which you inquire. 

9. Not in any way which you may mark out for yourself. Persons 
in an inquiring state are very apt, without seeming to be aware of it, to 
send imagination on before them, to stake out the way, and set up a flag 
where they intend to come out. They expect to be thus and thus exer_z 
cised — to have such and such peculiar views and feelings when they have 
attained their object. Now, there probably never was a person who did 
not find himself disappointed in these respects. God says, " I will bring 
the blind by a way that they know not. I will lead them in paths that 
they have not known : I will make darkness light before them, and 
crooked things straight. These things will I do unto them, and not 
forsake them." This suffering your imagination to mark out your path 
is a great hindrance to you, as it sets you upon making many fruitless, 
and worse than fruitless attempts to attain this imaginary state of mind, 
wastes much of your time, and greatly wearies the patience and grieves 
the Spirit of God. While he is trying to lead you right to the point, 
you are hauling off from the course, and insisting, that this which your 
imagination has marked out is the way, instead of that in which he is 
trying to lead you. And thus in your pride and ignorance you are 
causing much delay, and abusing the long-suffering of God. He says, 
" This is the way, walk ye in it." But you say, no — this is the way. 
And thus you stand and parley and banter, while you are every mo- 
ment in danger of grieving the Spirit of God away from you, and of 
losing your soul. 

If there is anything in your imagination that has fixed definitely upon 
any particular manner, time, or place, or circumstance, you will, in all 
probability, either be deceived by the devil, or be entirely disappointed 
in the result. You will find, in all these particular items on which you 
had laid any stress, that the wisdom of man is foolishness with God — 
that your ways are not his ways, nor your thoughts his thoughts. " For 
as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his ways higher than 
your ways and his thoughts higher than your thoughts." But, — 

10. This state is to be attained by faith alone. Let it be for ever re- 
membered, that "without faith it is impossible to please God," and 
" whatsoever is not of faith, is sin." Both justification and sanctification 
are by faith alone. Eom. iii. 30 : " Seeing it is one God who shall justify 
the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith ;" and 
ch. v. 1 : " Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God, 
through our Lord Jesus Christ." Also, ch. ix. 30, 31 ; " What shall we 
say then ? That the Gentiles, who followed not after righteousness, have 



440 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith. But 
Israel, who followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to 
the law of righteousness. Wherefore ? Because they sought it not by 
faith, but, as it were, by the works of the law." 

But let me by no means be understood as teaching sanctification by 
faith, as distinct from and opposed to sanctification by the Holy Spirit, 
or Spirit of Christ, or which is the same thing, by Christ our sanctifica- 
tion, living and reigning in the heart. Faith is rather the instrument or 
condition, than the efficient agent that induces a state of present and 
permanent sanctification. Faith simply receives Christ, as king, to live 
and reign in the soul. It is Christ, in the exercise of his different offices, 
and appropriated in his different relations to the wants of the soul, by 
faith, who secures our sanctification. This he does by Divine discoveries 
to the soul of his Divine perfections and fulness. The condition of these 
discoveries is faith and obedience. He says, John xiv. 21-23 : "He 
that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me ; 
and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, 
and will manifest myself to him. Judas saith unto him, (not Iscariot,) 
Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the 
world ? Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will 
keep my words : and my Father will love him, and we will come unto 
him, and make our abode with him." 

To ascertain the conditions of entire sanctification in this life, we 
must consider what the temptations are that overcome us. When first 
converted, we have seen, that the heart or will consecrates itself and the 
whole being to God. We have also seen, that this is a state of disinter- 
ested benevolence, or a committal of the whole being to the promotion 
of the highest good. We have also seen, that all sin is selfishness, or that 
all sin consists in the will's seeking the indulgence or gratification of self ; 
that it consists in the will's yielding obedience to the propensities, instead 
of obeying God, as his law is revealed in the reason. Now, who cannot 
see what needs to be done to break the power of temptation, and let the 
soul go free ? The fact is, that the department of our sensibility that is 
related to objects of time and sense, has received an enormous develop- 
ment, and is tremblingly alive to all its correlated objects, while, by 
reason of the blindness of the mind to spiritual objects, it is scarcely 
developed at all in its relations to them. Those objects are seldom 
thought of by the carnal mind, and when they are, they are only thought 
of. They are not clearly seen, and of course they are not felt. 

The thought of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of heaven, and 
hell.excites little or no emotion in the carnal mind. The carnal mind is 
alive and awake to earthly and sensible objects, but dead to spiritual 
realities. The spiritual world needs to be revealed to the soul. The 



SANCTIFICATION. 441 

soul needs to see and clearly apprehend its own spiritual condition, rela- 
tions, wants. It needs to become acquainted with God and Christ, to have 
spiritual and eternal realities made plain, and present, and all-absorbing 
realities to the soul. It needs such discoveries of the eternal world, 
of the nature and guilt of sin, and of Christ, the remedy of the soul, as 
to kill or greatly mortify lust, or the appetites and passions in their 
relations to objects of time and sense, and thoroughly to develop the 
sensibility, in its relations to sin and to God, and to the whole circle of 
spiritual realities. This will greatly abate the frequency and power of 
temptation to self-gratification, and break up the voluntary slavery of 
the will. The developments of the sensibility need to be thoroughly 
corrected. This can only be done by the revelation to the inward man, 
by the Holy Spirit, of those great, and solemn, and overpowering realities 
of the ■' spirit land," that lie concealed from the eye of flesh. 

We often see those around us whose sensibility is so developed, in 
some one direction, that they are led captive by appetite and passion in 
that direction, in spite of reason and of God. The inebriate is an exam- 
ple of this. The glutton, the licentious, the avaricious man, are exam- 
ples of this kind. We sometimes, on the other hand, see, by some 
striking providence, such a counter development of the sensibility pro- 
duced, as to slay and put down those particular tendencies, and the whole 
direction of the man's life seems to be changed ; and outwardly, at least, 
it is so. From being a perfect slave to his appetite for strong drink, he 
cannot, without the utmost loathing and disgust, so much as hear the 
name of his once loved beverage mentioned. From being a most avari- 
cious man he becomes deeply disgusted with wealth, and spurns and 
despises it. Now, this has been effected by a counter development of the 
sensibility ; for, in the case supposed, religion has nothing to do with it. 
Religion does not consist in the states of the sensibility, nor in the will's 
being influenced by the sensibility ; but sin consists in the will's being 
thus influenced. One great thing that needs to be done, xo confirm and 
settle the will in the attitude of entire consecration to God,^is to bring 
about a counter development of the sensibility, so that it will not draw 
the will away from God. It needs to be mortified or crucified to the world, 
to objects of time and sense, by so deep and clear, and powerful a revela- 
tion of self to self, and of Christ to the soul, as to awaken and develop 
all its susceptibilities in their relations to him, and to spiritual and 
divine realities. This can easily be done through and by the Holy Spirit, 
who takes of the things of Christ and shows them to us. He so reveals 
Christ, that the soul receives him to the throne of the heart, to reign 
throughout the whole being. When the will, the intellect, and the sensi- 
bility are yielded to him, he develops the intelligence, and the sensibil- 
ity by clear revelations of himself, in all his offices and relations to the 



442 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

soul, confirms the will, mellows and chastens the sensibility, by these 
divine revelations to the intelligence. 

"We need the light of the Holy Spirit to teach us the character of 
God, the nature of his government, the purity of his law, the necessity 
and fact of atonement — to teach us our need of Christ in all his offices and 
relations, governmental, spiritual, and mixed. "We need the revelation 
of Christ to our souls, in such power as to induce in us that appropriat- 
ing faith, without which Christ is not, and cannot be, our salvation. We 
need to know Christ, for example, in such relations as the following : — 

1. As King, to set up his government and write his law in our hearts ; 
to establish his kingdom within us ; to sway his sceptre over our whole 
being. As King he must be spiritually revealed and received. 

2. As our Mediator, to stand between the offended justice of God and 
our guilty souls, to bring about a reconciliation between our souls and 
God. As Mediator he must be known and received. 

3. As our Advocate or Paracletos, our next or best friend, to plead 
our cause with the Father, our righteous and all prevailing advocate to 
secure the triumph of our cause at the bar of God. In this relation he 
must be apprehended and embraced. 

4. As our Kedeemer, to redeem us from the curse of the law, and 
from the power and dominion of sin ; to pay the price demanded by pub- 
lic justice for our release, and to overcome and break up forever our 
spiritual bondage. In this relation also we must know and appreciate 
him by faith. 

5. As the propitiation for our sins, to offer himself as a propitiatory 
or offering for our sins. The apprehension of Christ as making an atone- 
ment for our sins seems to be indispensable to the entertaining of a 
healthy hope of eternal life. It certainly is not healthy for the soul to 
apprehend the mercy of God, without regarding the conditions of its 

_exejccise. It does not sufficiently impress the soul with a sense of the 
justice and holiness of God, with the guilt and desert of sin. It does 
not sufficiently awe the soul and humble it in the deepest dust, to regard 
God as extending pardon, without regard to the sternness of his justice, 
as evinced in requiring that sin should be recognized in the universe, as 
worthy of the wrath and curse of God, as a condition of its forgiveness. 
It is remarkable, and well worthy of all consideration, that those who 
deny the atonement make sin a comparative trifle, and seem to regard 
God's benevolence or love as good nature, rather than, as it is, " a con- 
suming fire " to all the workers of iniquity. Nothing does or can pro- 
duce that awe of God, that fear and holy dread of sin, that self-abasing, 
God-justifying spirit, that a thorough apprehension of the atonement of 
Christ will do. Nothing like this can beget that spirit of self-renuncia- 
tion, of cleaving to Christ, of taking refuge in his blood. In these rela- 



SANCTIFICATION. 443 

tions Christ must be revealed to us, and apprehended and embraced by 
us, as the condition of our entire sanctification. 

It is the work of the Holy Spirit thus to reveal his death in its rela- 
tions to our individual sins, and as related to our sins as individuals. 
The soul needs to apprehend Christ as crucified for us. It is one thing 
for the soul to regard the death of Christ merely as the death of a 
martyr, and an infinitely different thing, as every one knows, who has 
had the experience, to apprehend his death as a real and veritable vica- 
rious sacrifice for our sins, as being truly a substitute for our death. 
The soul needs to apprehend Christ as suffering on the cross for it, or as 
its substitute ; so that it can say, That sacrifice is for me, that suffering 
and that death are for my sins ; that blessed Lamb is slain for my sins. 
If thus fully to apprehend and to appropriate Christ cannot kill sin in 
us, what can ? 

6. We also need to know Christ as risen for our justification. He arose 
and lives to procure our certain acquittal, or our complete pardon and 
acceptance with God. That he lives, and is our justification we need to 
know, to break the bondage of legal motives, and to slay all selfish fear ; 
to break and destroy the power of temptation from this source. The 
clearly convinced soul is often tempted to despondency and unbelief, to 
despair of its own acceptance with God, and it would surely fall into the 
bondage of fear, were it not for the faith of Christ as a risen, living, jus- 
tifying Saviour. In this relation, the soul needs clearly to apprehend 
and fully to appropriate Christ in his completeness, as a condition of 
abiding in a state of disinterested consecration to God. 

7. We need also to have Christ revealed to us as bearing our griefs 
and as carrying our sorrows. The clear apprehension of Christ, as being 
made sorrowful for us, and as bending under sorrows and griefs which in 
justice belonged to us, tends at once to render sin unspeakably odious, 
and Christ infinitely precious to our souls. The idea of Christ our sub- 
stitute, needs to be thoroughly developed in our minds. And this rela- 
tion of Christ needs to be so clearly revealed to us, as to become an 
everywhere present reality to us. We need to have Christ so revealed as 
to so completely ravish and engross our affections, that we would sooner 
die at once than sin against him. Is such a thing impossible ? Indeed 
it is not. Is not the Holy Spirit able, and willing, and ready thus to 
reveal him, upon condition of our asking it in faith ? Surely he is. 

We need to apprehend Christ as the one by whose stripes we are 
healed. We need to know him as relieving our pains and sufferings by 
his own, as preventing our death by his own, as sorrowing that we might 
eternally rejoice, as grieving that we might be unspeakably and eternally 
glad, as dying in unspeakable agony that we might die in deep peace and 
in unspeakable triumph. 



4:4:4: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

8. " As being made sin for us." We need to apprehend him as being 
treated as a sinner, and even as the chief of sinners on our account, or 
for us. This is the representation of scripture, that Christ on our ac- 
count was treated as if he were a sinner. He was made sin for us, that 
is, he was treated as a sinner, or rather as being the representative, or as 
it were the embodiment of sin for us. ! this the soul needs to appre- 
hend — the holy Jesus treated as a sinner, and as if all sin were concen- 
trated in him, on our account ! We procured this treatment of him. 
He consented to take our place in such a sense as to endure the cross, 
and the curse of the law for us. When the soul apprehends this, it is 
ready to die with grief and love. 0, how infinitely it loathes self under 
such an apprehension as this ! In this relation he must not only be ap- 
prehended, but appropriated by faith. 

We also need to apprehend the fact that " he was made sin for us, 
that we might be made the righteousness of G-od in him ;" that Christ 
was treated as a sinner, that we might be treated as righteous ; that we 
might also be made personally righteous by faith in him ; that we might 
inherit and be made partakers of God's righteousness, as that righteous- 
ness exists and is revealed in Christ ; that we might in and by him be 
made righteous as God is righteous. It needs to embrace and lay hold 
by faith upon that righteousness of God, which is brought home to saints 
in Christ, through the atonement and indwelling Spirit. 

9. We also need Christ revealed to the inward being, as " head over 
all things to the church." All these relations are of no avail to our 
sanctification, only in so far forth as they are directly, and inwardly, and 
personally revealed to the soul by the Holy Spirit. It is one thing to have 
thoughts, and ideas, and opinions concerning Christ, and an entirely 
different thing to know Christ, as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. All 
the relations of Christ imply corresponding necessities in us. When the 
Holy Spirit has revealed to us the necessity, and Christ as exactly suited 
to fully meet that necessity, and urged his acceptance in that relation, 
until we have appropriated him by faith, a great work is done. But 
until we are thus revealed to ourselves, and Christ is thus revealed to us 
and accepted by us, nothing is done more than to store our heads with 
notions or opinions and theories, while our hearts are becoming more and 
more, at every moment, like an adamant stone. 

I have often feared, that many professed Christians knew Christ only 
after the flesh ; that is, they have no other knowledge of Christ than what 
they obtain by reading and hearing about him, without any special rev- 
elation of him to the inward being by the Holy Spirit. I do not won- 
der, that such professors and ministers should be totally in the dark, 
upon the subject of entire sanctification in this life. They regard sanc- 
tification as brought about by the formation of holy habits, instead of 



SANCTIFICATION. 445 

resulting from the revelation of Christ to the soul in all his fulness 
and relations, and the soul's renunciation of self and appropriation of 
Christ in these relations. Christ is represented in the Bible as the head 
of the church. The church is represented as his body. He is to the 
church what the head is to the body. The head is the seat of the intel- 
lect, the will, and in short, of the living soul. Consider what the body 
would be without the head, and you may understand what the church 
would be without Christ. But as the church would be without Christ, 
so each believer would be without Christ. But we need to have our 
necessities in this respect clearly revealed to us by the Holy Spirit, and 
this relation of Christ made plain to our apprehension. The utter dark- 
ness of the human mind in regard to its own spiritual state and wants, 
and in regard to the relations and fulness of Christ, is truly wonderful. 
His relations, as mentioned in the Bible, are overlooked almost entirely 
until our wants are discovered. When these are made known, and the 
soul begins in earnest to inquire after a remedy, it needs not inquire in 
vain. " Say not in thine heart, who shall ascend up to heaven ? that is, 
to bring Christ down from above ; or who shall descend into the deep ? 
that is, to bring Christ again from the dead. But what saith it ? The 
word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart." 

how infinitely blind he is to the fulness and glory of Christ, who 
does not know himself and Christ as both are revealed by the Holy Spirit. 
When we are led by the Holy Spirit to look down into the abyss of our 
own emptiness — to behold the horrible pit and miry clay of our own 
habits, and fleshly, and worldly, and infernal entanglements ; when we 
see in the light of God, that our emptiness and necessities are infinite ; 
then, and not till then, are we prepared wholly to cast off self, and to 
put on Christ. The glory and fulness of Christ are not discovered to 
the soul, until it discovers its need of him. But when self, in all its 
loathsomeness and helplessness, is fully revealed, until hope is utterly 
extinct, as it respects every kind and degree of help in ourselves ; and 
when Christ, the all and in all, is revealed to the soul as its all-sufficient 
portion and salvation, then, and not until then, does the soul know its 
salvation. This knowledge is the indispensable condition of appropriat- 
ing faith, or of that act of receiving Christ, or that committal of all to 
him, that takes Christ home to dwell in the heart by faith, and to pre- 
side over all its states and actions. 0, such a knowledge and such a re- 
ception and putting on of Christ is blessed. Happy is he who knows it 
by his own experience. 

It is indispensable to a steady and implicit faith, that the soul should 
have a spiritual apprehension of what is implied in the saying of Christ, 
that all power was delivered unto him. The ability of Christ to do all, 
and even exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, is what 



440 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the soul needs clearly to apprehend, in a spiritual sense that is, to appre- 
hend it, not merely as a theory or as a proposition, but to see the true 
spiritual import of this saying. This is also equally true of all that is 
said in the Bible about Christ, of all his offices and relations. It is one 
thing to theorize, and speculate, and opine, about Christ, and an in- 
finitely different thing to know him as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. 
When Christ is fully revealed to the soul by the Comforter, it will never 
again doubt the attainability and reality of entire sanctification in 
this life. 

When we sin, it is because of our ignorance of Christ. That is, 
whenever temptation overcomes us, it is because we do not know and 
avail ourselves of the relation of Christ that would meet our necessities. 
One great thing that needs to be done is, to correct the developments of 
our sensibility. The appetites and passions are enormously developed in 
their relations .to earthly objects. In relation to things of time and 
sense, our propensities are greatly developed and are alive ; but in rela- 
tion to spiritual truths and objects, and eternal realities, we are naturally 
as dead as stones. When first converted, if we knew enough of our- 
selves and of Christ thoroughly to develop and correct the action of the 
sensibility, and confirm our wills in a state of entire consecration, we 
should not fall. In proportion as the law- work preceding conversion has 
been thorough, and the revelation of Christ at, or immediately subse- 
quent to, conversion, full and clear, just in that proportion, do we wit- 
ness stability in converts. In most, if not in all instances, however, the 
convert is too ignorant of himself, and of course knows too little about 
Christ, to be established in permanent obedience. He needs renewed 
conviction of sin, to be revealed to himself, and to have Christ revealed 
to him, and be formed in him the hope of glory, before he will be stead- 
fast, always abounding in the work of the Lord. 

It must not be inferred, that the knoAvledge of Christ in all these re- 
lations is a condition of our coming into a state of entire consecration to 
God, or of present sanctification. The thing insisted on is, that the 
soul will abide in this state in the hour of temptation only so far forth as 
it betakes itself to Christ in such circumstances of trial, and apprehends 
and appropriates him by faith from time to time in those relations that 
meet the present and pressing necessities of the soul. The temptation is 
the occasion of revealing the necessity, and the Holy Spirit is always 
ready to reveal Christ in the particular relation suited to the newly- 
developed necessity. The perception and appropriation of him in this 
relation, under these circumstances of trial, is the sine qua non of our 
remaining in the state of entire consecration. 

The foregoing are some of the relations which Christ sustains to us as 
to our salvation. I could have enlarged greatly, as you perceive, upon 



SANCTIFICATION. 447 

each of these, and easily have swelled this part of our course of study to 
a large volume. I have only touched upon these relations, as specimens 
of the manner in which he is presented for our acceptance in the Bible, 
and by the Holy Spirit. Do not understand me as teaching, that we 
must first know Christ in all these relations, before we can be sanctified. 
The thing intended is, that coming to know Christ in these relations is a 
condition, or is the indispensable means, of our steadfastness or persever- 
ance in holiness under temptation — that, when we are tempted, from time 
to time nothing can secure us against a fall, but the revelation of Christ 
to the soul in these relations one after another, and our appropriation of 
him to ourselves by faith. The gospel has directly promised, in every 
temptation to open a way of escape, so that we shall be able to bear it. 
The spirit of this promise pledges to us such a revelation of Christ, as to 
secure our standing, if we will lay hold upon him by faith, as revealed. 
Our circumstances of temptation render it necessary, that at one time we 
should apprehend Christ in one relation, and at another time in another. 
For example, at one time we are tempted to despair by Satan's accusing 
us of sin, and suggesting that our sins are too great to be forgiven. In 
this case we need a revelation and an appropriation of Christ, as having 
been made sin for us ; that is, as having atoned for our sins — as being 
our justification or righteousness. This will sustain the soul's confidence 
and preserve its peace. 

At another time we are tempted to despair of ever overcoming our 
tendencies to sin, and to give up our sanctification as a hopeless thing. 
Now we need a revelation of Christ as our sanctification, etc. 

At another time the soul is harassed with the view of the great sub- 
tlety and sagacity of its spiritual enemies, and greatly tempted to despair 
on that account. Now it needs to know Christ as its wisdom. 

Again, it is tempted to discouragement on account of the great num- 
ber and strength of its adversaries. On such occasions it needs Christ 
revealed as the Mighty God, as its strong tower, its hiding place, its 
munition of rocks. 

Again, the soul is oppressed with a sense of the infinite holiness of 
God, and the infinite distance there is between us and God, on account 
of our sinfulness and his infinite holiness, and on account of his infinite 
abhorrence of sin and sinners. Now the soul needs to know Christ as its 
righteousness, and as a mediator between God and man. 

Again, the Christian's mouth is closed with a sense of guilt, so that 
he cannot look up, nor speak to God of pardon and acceptance. He 
trembles and is confounded before God. He lies along on his face, and 
despairing thoughts roll a tide of agony through his soul. He is speech- 
less, and can only groan out his self-accusations before the Lord. Now 
as a condition of rising above this temptation to despair, he needs a 



448 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

revelation of Christ as his advocate, as his high priest, as ever living to 
make intercession for him. This view of Christ will enable the soul to 
commit all to him in this relation, and maintain its peace and hold on to 
its steadfastness. 

Again, the soul is led to tremble in view of its constant exposedness 
to besetments on every side, oppressed with such a sense of its own utter 
helplessness in the presence of its enemies, as almost to despair. Now 
it needs to know Christ as the good shepherd, who keeps a constant 
watch over the sheep, and carries the lambs in his bosom. He needs to 
know him as a watchman and a keeper. 

Again, it is oppressed with the sense of its own utter emptiness, and 
is forced to exclaim, I know that in me, that is. in my flesh, dwelleth no 
good thing. It sees that it has no life, or unction, or power, or spiritual- 
ity in itself. Now it needs to know Christ as the true vine, from which 
it may receive constant and abundant spiritual nourishment. It needs to 
know him as the fountain of the water of life, and in those relations that 
will meet its necessities in this direction. Let these suffice, as specimens 
to illustrate what is intended by entire or permanent sanctification being 
conditioned on the revelation and appropriation of Christ in all the ful- 
ness of his official relations. 



LECTURE XL. 

, SANCTIFICATION. 



VI. Objections answered. 

I will consider those passages of scripture which are by some supposed 
to contradict the doctrine we have been considering. 

1 Kings viii. 46 : "If they sin against thee, (for there is no man that 
sinneth not,) and thou be angry with them, and deliver them to the 
enemy, so that they carry them away captives unto the land of the enemy, 
far or near," etc. On this passage, I remark : — 

1. That this sentiment in nearly the same language, is repeated in 2 
Chron. vi. 26, and in Eccl. vii. 20, where the same original word in the 
same form is used. 

2. These are the strongest passages I know of in the Old Testament, 
and the same remarks are applicable to the three. 

3. I will quote, for the satisfaction of the reader, the note of Dr. 
Adam Clarke upon this passage, and also that of Barclay, the celebrated 
and highly spiritual author of "An Apology for the True Christian Di- 



SANCTIFICATION. 449 

vinity." And let me say, that they appear to me to be satisfactory 
answers to the objection founded upon these passages. 

Clarke : " ' If they sin against thee.' — This must refer to some gen- 
eral defection from truth ; to some species of false worship, idolatry, or 
corruption of the truth and ordinances of the Most High ; as for it, they 
are here stated to be delivered into the hands of their enemies, and car- 
ried away captive, which was the general punishment of idolatry, and 
what is called, [verse 4?,] acting perversely and committing wickedness. 

"'If they sin against thee, for there is no man that sinneth not.' 
The second clause, as it is here translated, renders the supposition in the 
first clause, entirely nugatory ; for, if there be no man that sinneth not, 
it is useless to say, if they sin ; but this contradiction is taken away, by 
reference to the original hi yechetau lah, which should be translated, if 
they shall sin against thee ; or should they sin against thee, hi ein adam 
aslier lo yecheta; 'for there is no man that may not sin ;' that is, there 
is no man impeccable, none infallible ; none that is not liable to trans- 
gress. This is the true meaning of the phrase in various parts of the 
Bible, and so our translators have understood the original, for even in the 
thirty-first verse of this chapter, they have translated yeclieta, if a man 
trespass ; which certainly implies he might or might not do it ; and in 
this way they have translated the same word, if a soul sin, in Lev. v. 1, 
and vi. 2 ; 1 Sam. ii. 25 ; 2 Ohron. iv. 22 ; and in several other places. 
The truth is, the Hebrew has no mood to express words in the permissive 
or optative way, but to express this sense it uses the future tense of the 
conjugation hah 

" This text has been a wonderful strong-hold for all who believe that 
there is no redemption from sin in this life ; that no man can live with- 
out committing sin ; and that we cannot be entirely freed from it till 
we die. 

" 1. The text speaks no such doctrine ; it only speaks of the possibility 
of every man's sinning ; and this must be true of a state of probation. 

" 2. There is not another text in the divine records that is more to 
the purpose than this. 

" 3. The doctrine is flatly in opposition to the design of the gospel ; 
for Jesus came to save his people from their sins, and to destroy the works 
of the devil. 

"4. It is a dangerous and destructive doctrine, and should be blotted 
out of every Christian's creed. There are too many who are seeking to 
excuse their crimes by all means in their power ; and we need not embody 
their excuses in a creed, to complete their deception, by stating that 
their sins are unavoidable." 

Barclay : " Secondly, — Another objection is from two passages of 
scripture, much of one signification. The one is 1 Kings viii. 46 : ' For 
29 



450 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

there is no man that sinneth not.' The other is Eccl. vii. 20 : ' For there 
is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not.' 

" I answer, — 

" 1. These affirm nothing of a daily and continual sinning, so as never 
to be redeemed from it ; but only that all have sinned, that there is none 
that doth not sin, though not always so as never to cease to sin ; and in 
this lies the question. Yea, in that place of the Kings he speaks within 
two verses of the returning of such with all their souls and hearts, which 
implies a possibility of leaving off sin. 

" 2. There is a respect to be had to the seasons and dispensations ; for 
if it should be granted that in Solomon's time there were none that sinned 
not, it will not follow that there are none such now, v or that it is a thing 
not now attainable by the grace of God under the gospel. 

" 3. And lastly, this whole objection hangs upon a false interpretation ; 
for the original Hebrew word may be read in the potential mood, thus, 
— There is no man >who may not sin, as well as in the indicative ; so 
both the old Latin, Junius, and Tremellius, and Vatablus have it, and 
the same word is so used, Ps. cxix. 11 : ' Thy word have I hid in my 
heart, that I might not sin against thee ' — in the potential mood, and 
not in the indicative : which being more answerable to the universal scope 
of the scriptures, the testimony of the truth, and the sense of almost all 
interpreters, doubtless ought to be so understood, and the other interpre- 
tation rejected as spurious. " 

Whatever may be thought of the views of these authors, to me it is a 
plain and satisfactory answer to the objection founded upon these passa- 
ges, that the objection might be strictly true under the Old Testament 
dispensation, and prove nothing in regard to the attainability of a state 
of entire sanctification under the New. What ! does the New Testament 
dispensation differ nothing from the Old in its advantages for the acqui- 
sition of holiness ? If it be true, that no one under the comparatively 
dark dispensation of Judaism, attained a state of permanent sanctifica- 
tion, does that prove such a state is not attainable under the gospel ? It 
is expressly stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that " the old covenant 
made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of abetter hope did." Under 
the old covenant, God expressly promised that he would make a new one 
with the house of Israel, in "writing the law in their hearts," and in 
" engraving it in their inward parts." And this new covenant was to be 
made with the house of Israel, under the Christian dispensation. "What 
then do all such passages in the Old Testament prove, in relation to the 
privileges and holiness of Christians under the new dispensation ? 

Whether any of the Old Testament saints did so far receive the new 
Covenant by way of anticipation, as to enter upon a state of permanent 
sanctification, it is not my present purpose to inquire. Nor will I in- 



SANCTIFICATION. 451 

quire, whether, admitting that Solomon said in his day, that there was 
not a just man upon the earth that liveth and sinneth not, the same 
could with equal truth have been asserted of every generation under the 
Jewish dispensation. It is expressly asserted of Abraham, and multi- 
tudes of the Old Testament saints, that they " died in faith, not having 
received the promises." Now what can this mean ? It cannot be, that 
they did not know the promises ; for to them the promises were made. 
It cannot mean, that they did not receive Christ, for the Bible expressly 
asserts that they did — that "Abraham rejoiced to see Christ's day" — 
that Moses, and indeed all the Old Testament saints, had so much 
knowledge of Christ as a Saviour to be revealed, as to bring them into a 
state of salvation. But still they did not receive the promise of the 
Spirit, as it is poured out under the Christian dispensation. This was 
the great thing all along promised, first to Abraham, or to his seed, which 
is Christ. Gal. iii. 14, 16 : "That the blessing of Abraham might come 
on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ ; that we might receive the prom- 
ise of the Spirit through faith." " Now to Abraham and his seed were 
the promises made. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many ; but as of 
one, and to thy seed, which is Christ ;" and afterwards to the Christian 
church, by all the prophets. Acts ii. 16-21 : " But this is that which was 
spoken by the prophet Joel ; And it shall come to pass in the last days 
(saith God,) I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons 
and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, 
and your old men shall dream dreams ; and on my servants, and on my 
handmaidens, I will pour out in those days of my Spirit ; and they shall 
prophesy ; and I will show wonders in heaven above and signs in the 
earth beneath ; blood, and fire and vapor of smoke ;. the sun shall be 
turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and 
notable day of the Lord come ; and it shall come to pass, that whosoever 
shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved." Acts ii. 38, 39 : 
" Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you 
in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall re- 
ceive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your 
children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God 
shall call." Acts iii. 24, 26 : "Yea, and all the prophets from Samuel, 
and those that follow after, as many as have spoken, have likewise fore- 
told of these days." " Unto you first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, 
sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniqui- 
ties ; " and lastly, by Christ himself, which he expressly styles " the 
promise" of the Father. Acts i. 4, 5 : "And being assembled together 
with them, commanded them that they should not depart from Jerusa- 
lem, but wait for the promise of the Father, which, saith he, ye have 
heard of me. For John truly baptized with water ; but ye shall be 



452 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence." They did not re- 
ceive the light and the glory of the Christian dispensation, nor the ful- 
ness of the Holy Spirit. And it is asserted in the Bible, " they without 
us," that is, without our privileges, "could not be made perfect." 

The next objection is founded upon the Lord's Prayer. In this 
Christ has taught us to pray, " Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive 
those who trespass against us." Here it is objected, that if a person 
should become entirely sanctified, he could no longer use this clause of 
this prayer, which, it is said, was manifestly designed to be used by the 
church to the end of time. Upon this prayer I remark : — 

1. Christ has taught us to pray for entire, in the sense of perpetual 
sanctification. "Thy will be done on earth, as it is done in heaven." 

2. He designed, that we should expect this prayer to be answered, or 
that we should mock him by asking what we do not believe is agreeable 
to his will, and that too which we know could not consistently be granted ; 
and that we are to repeat this insult to God as often as we pray. 

3. The petition for forgiveness of our trespasses, it is plain, must 
apply to past sins, and not to sins we are committing at the time we 
make the prayer ; for it would be absurd and abominable to pray for the 
forgiveness of a sin which we are then in the act of committing. 

4. This prayer cannot properly be made in respect to any sin of which 
we have not repented ; for it would be highly abominable in the sight of 
God, to pray for the forgiveness of a sin of which we did not repent. 

5. If there be any hour or day in which a man has committed no 
actual sin, he could not consistently make this prayer in reference to that 
hour or that day. 

6. But at the very time, it would be highly proper for him to make 
this prayer in relation to all his past sins, and that too, although he may 
have repented of, and confessed them, and prayed for their forgiveness, a 
thousand times before. This does not imply a doubt, whether God has 
forgiven the sins of which we have repented ; but it is only a renewal of 
our grief and humiliation for our sins, and a fresh acknowledgment of, 
and casting ourselves upon, his mercy. God may forgive when we re- 
pent, before we ask him, and while we abhor ourselves so much as to have 
no heart to ask for forgiveness ; but his having forgiven us does not ren- 
der the petition improper. 

7. And although his sins may be forgiven, he ought still to confess 
them, to repent of them, both in this world and in the worid to come. 
And it is perfectly suitable, so long as he lives in the world, to say the 
least, to continue to repent, and repeat the request for forgiveness. For 
myself, I am unable to see why this passage should be made a stumbling- 
block ; for if it be improper to pray for the forgiveness of sins of which 
we have repented, then it is improper to pray for forgiveness at all. And 



SANCTIFICATION. 453 

if this prayer cannot be used with propriety in reference to past sins of 
which we have already repented, it cannot properly be used at all, except 
upon the absurd supposition, that we are to pray for the forgiveness of 
sins which we are now committing, and of which we have not repented. 
And if it be improper to use this form of prayer in reference to all past 
sins of which we have repented, it is just as improper to use it in refer- 
ence to sins committed to-day or yesterday, of which we have repented. 
Another objection is founded on James iii, 1, 2 : " My brethren, be 
not many masters, knowing that we shall receive the greater condemna- 
tion. For in many things we offend all. If any man offend not in 
word, the same is a perfect man, and able also to bridle the whole body." 
Upon this passage I remark : — 

1. The term rendered masters here, may be rendered teachers, 
critics, or censors, and be understood either in a good or bad sense. 
The apostle exhorts the brethren not to be many masters, because if 
they are so, they will incur the greater condemnation ; "for," says he, 
"in many things we offend all." The fact that we all offend is here 
urged as a reason why we should not be many masters ; which shows 
that the term masters is here used in a bad sense. " Be not many mas- 
ters," for if we are masters, " we shall receive the greater condemnation," 
because we are all great offenders. Now I understand this to be the 
simple meaning of this passage ; do not many (or any) of you become 
censors, or critics, and set yourselves up to judge and condemn others. 
Tor inasmuch as you have all sinned yourselves, and we are all great 
offenders, we shall receive the greater condemnation, if we set ourselves 
up as censors. "For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged, 
and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." 

2. It does not appear to me that the apostle designs to affirm any- 
thing at all of the present character of himself, or of those to whom he 
wrote ; nor to have had the remotest allusion to the doctrine of entire 
sanctification, but simply to affirm a well-established truth in its applica- 
tion to a particular sin ; that if they became censors, and injuriously 
condemned others, inasmuch as they had all committed many sins, they 
should receive the greater condemnation. 

3. That the apostle did not design to deny the doctrine of Christian 
perfection or entire sanctification, as maintained in these lectures, seems 
evident from the fact, that he immediately subjoins, " If any man offend 
not in word, the same is a perfect man, and able also to bridle the whole 
body." 

Another objection is founded on 1 John, i. 8 : " If we say we have 
no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Upon this 
I remark : — 

1. Those who make this passage an objection to the doctrine of entire 



4:54: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sanctification in this life, assume that; the apostle is here speaking of 
sanctification instead of justification ; whereas an honest examination of 
the passage, if I mistake not, will render it evident that the apostle 
makes no allusion here to sanctification, but is speaking solely of justifi- 
cation. A little attention to the connection in which this verse stands 
will, I think, render this evident. But before I proceed to state what I 
understand to be the meaning of this passage, let us consider it in the 
connection in which it stands, in the sense in which they understand it 
who quote it for the purpose of opposing the sentiment advocated in 
these lectures. They understand the apostle as affirming, that, if we 
say we are in a state of entire sanctification and do not sin, we deceive 
ourselves, and the truth is not in us. Now if this were the apostle's 
meaning, he involves himself, in this connection, in two flat contradictions. 

2. This verse is immediately preceded by the assertion that the 
"blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." Now it would be 
very remarkable, if immediately after this assertion the apostle should 
mean to say that it does not cleanse us from all sin, and if we say it does, 
we deceive ourselves ; for he had just asserted, that the blood of Jesus 
Christ does cleanse us from all sin. If this were his meaning, it involves 
him in as palpable a contradiction as could be expressed. 

3. This view of the subject then represents the apostle in the conclu- 
sion of the seventh verse, as saying, the blood of Jesus Christ his Son 
cleanseth us from all sin ; and in the eighth verse, as saying, that if we 
suppose ourselves to be cleansed from all sin, we deceive ourselves, thus 
flatly contradicting what he had just said. And in the ninth verse he 
goes on to say, that " He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and 
to cleanse us from all unrighteousness ;" that is, the blood of Jesus 
cleanseth us from all sin ; but if we say it does, we deceive ourselves. 
" But if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our 
sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." Now, all unrighteous- 
ness is sin. If we are cleansed from all unrighteousness, we are cleansed 
from sin. And now suppose a man should confess his sin, and God 
should in faithfulness and justice forgive his sin, and cleanse him from 
all unrighteousness, and then he should confess and profess that G-od 
had done this ; are we to understand, that the apostle would then affirm 
that he deceives himself, in supposing that the blood of Jesus Christ 
cleanseth from all sin ? But, as I have already said, I do not understand 
the apostle as affirming anything in respect to the present moral charac- 
ter of any one, but as speaking of the doctrine of justification. 

This then appears to me to be the meaning of the whole passage. If 
we say that we are not sinners, that is, have no sin to need the blood of 
Christ ; that we have never sinned, and consequently need no Saviour, 
we deceive ourselves. For we have sinned, and nothing but the blood 



SANCTIFICATION. 455 

of Christ cleanseth from sin, or procures our pardon and justification. 
And now, if we will not deny, but confess that we have sinned, "He is 
faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all un- 
righteousness. " " But if we say we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, 
and his word is not in us." 

These are the principal passages that occur to my mind, and those I 
believe upon which the principal stress has been laid, by the opposers of 
this doctrine. And as I do not wish to protract the discussion, I shall 
omit the examination of other passages. 

There are many objections to the doctrine of entire sanctification, 
besides those derived from the passages of scripture which I have con- 
sidered. Some of these objections are doubtless honestly felt, and de- 
serve to be considered. I will therefore proceed to notice such of them 
as now occur to my mind. 

1. It is objected, that the doctrine of entire and permanent sanctifi- 
cation in this life, tends to the errors of modern perfectionism. This 
objection has been urged by some good men, and I doubt not, honestly 
urged. But still I cannot believe that they have duly considered the 
matter. It seems to me, that one fact will set aside this objection. It 
is well known that the Wesleyan Methodists have, as a denomination, 
from the earliest period of their history, maintained this doctrine in all 
its length and breadth. Now if such is the tendency of the doctrine, it 
is passing strange that this tendency has never developed itself in that 
denomination. So far as I can learn, the Methodists have been in a 
great measure, if not entirely, exempt from the errors held by modern 
perfectionists. Perfectionists, as a body, and I believe with, very few 
exceptions, have arisen out of those denominations that deny the doc- 
trine of entire sanctification in this life. 

Now the reason of this is obvious to my mind. When professors of 
religion, who have been all their life subject to bondage, begin to inquire 
earnestly for deliverance from their sins, they have found neither sym- 
pathy nor instruction, in regard to the prospect of getting rid of them in 
this life. Then they have gone to the Bible, and there found, in almost 
every part of it, Christ presented as a Saviour from their sins. But 
when they proclaim this truth, they are at once treated as heretics and 
fanatics by their brethren, until, being overcome of evil, they fall into 
censoriousness ; and finding the church so decidedly and utterly wrong, 
in her opposition to this one great important truth, they lose confidence 
in their ministers and the church, and being influenced by a wrong 
spirit, Satan takes the advantage of them, and drives them to the ex- 
treme of error and delusion. This I believe to be the true history of 
many of the most pious members of the Calvinistic churches. On the 
contrary, the Methodists are very much secured against these errors. 



456 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

They are taught that Jesus Christ is a Saviour from all sin in this world. 
And when they inquire for deliverance, they are pointed to Jesus Christ 
as a present aud all-sufficient Redeemer. Finding sympathy and in- 
struction on this great and agonizing point, their confidence in their 
ministers and their brethren remains, and they walk quietly with them. 

It seems to me impossible that the tendency of this doctrine should 
be to the peculiar errors of the modern perfectionists, and yet not an in- 
stance occur among all the Methodist ministers, or the thousands of 
their members, for one hundred years. 

And here let me say, it is my full conviction, that there are but two 
ways in which ministers of the present day can prevent members of their 
churches from becoming perfectionists. One is, to suffer them to live so 
far from God, that they will not inquire after holiness of heart ; and the 
other is, most fully to inculcate the glorious doctrine of entire consecra- 
tion ; and that it is the high privilege as well as the duty of Christians, 
to live in a state of entire consecration to God. I have many additional 
things to say upon the tendency of this doctrine, but at present this 
must suffice. 

By some it is said to be identical with perfectionism ; and attempts 
are made to show in what particulars antinomian perfectionism and our 
views are the same. On this I remark : — 

(1.) It seems to have been a favorite policy of certain controversial 
writers for a long time, instead of meeting a proposition in the open field 
of fair and Christian argument, to give it a bad name, and attempt to 
put it down, not by force of argument, but by showing that it is identi- 
cal with, or sustains a near relation to Pelagianism, Antinomianism, 
Calvinism, or some other ism, against which certain classes of minds are 
deeply prejudiced. In the recent controversy between what are called 
old and new school divines, who has not witnessed with pain the frequent 
attempts that have been made to put down the new school divinity, as it 
is called, by calling it Pelagianism, and quoting certain passages from 
Pelagius and other writers, to show the identity of sentiment that exists 
between them. 

This is a very unsatisfactory method of attacking or defending any 
doctrine. There are no doubt, many points of agreement between Pela- 
gius and all truly orthodox divines, and so there are many points of dis- 
agreement between them. There are also many points of agreement 
between modern perfectionists and all evangelical Christians, and so 
there are many points of disagreement between them and the Christian 
church in general. That there are some points of agreement between 
their views and my own, is no doubt true. And that we totally disagree 
in regard to those points that constitute their great peculiarities is, if I 
understand them, also true. But did I really agree in all points with 



SANCTIFICATION. 457 

Augustine, or Edwards, or Pelagius, or the modern perfectionists, 
neither the good nor the ill name of any of these would prove my senti- 
ments to be either right or wrong. It would remain, after all, to show 
that those with whom I agreed were either right or wrong, in order, on 
the one hand, to establish that for which I contend, or on the other, to 
overthrow that which I maintain. It is often more convenient to give a 
doctrine or an argument a bad name, than it is soberly and satisfactorily 
to reply to it. 

(2.) It is not a little curious, that we should be charged with holding 
the same sentiments with the perfectionists ; while yet they seem to be 
more violently opposed to our views, since they have come to understand 
them, than almost any other persons whatever. I have been informed 
by one of their leaders, that he regards me as one of the master-builders 
of Babylon. 

With respect to the modern perfectionists, those who have been ac- 
quainted with their writings, know that some of them have gone much 
farther from the truth than others. Some of their leading men, who 
commenced with them, and adopted their name, stopped far short of 
adopting some of their most abominable errors ; still maintaining the 
authority and perpetual obligation of the moral law ; and thus have been 
saved from going into many of the most objectionable and destructive 
notions of the sect. There are many more points of agreement between 
that class of perfectionists and the orthodox church, than between the 
church and any other class of them. And there are still a number of 
important points of difference, as every one knows who is possessed of 
correct information upon this subject. 

I abhor the practice of denouncing whole classes of men for the errors 
of some of that name. I am well aware, that there are many of those 
who are termed perfectionists, who as truly abhor the extremes of error 
into which many of that name have fallen, as perhaps do any persons 
living. 

2. Another objection is, that persons could not live in this world, if 
they were entirely sanctified. Strange ! Does holiness injure a man ? 
Does perfect conformity to all the laws of life and health, both physical 
and moral, render it impossible for a man to live ? If a man break off 
from rebellion against God, will it kill him ? Does there appear to have 
been anything in Christ's holiness inconsistent with life and health ? 
The fact is, that this objection is founded in a gross mistake, in regard 
to what constitutes entire sanctification. It is supposed by those who 
hold this objection, that this state implies a continual and most intense 
degree of excitement, and many things which are not at all implied in it. 
I have thought, that it is rather a glorified than a sanctified state, that 
most men have before their minds, whenever they consider this subject. 



45 S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

When Christ was upon earth, he was in a sanctified but not in a glorified 
state. " It is enough for the disciple that he be as his Master." Now, 
what is there in the moral character of Jesus Christ, as represented in 
his history, that may not and ought not to be fully copied into the life 
of every Christian ? I speak not of his knowledge, but of his spirit and 
temper. Ponder well every circumstance of his life that has come down 
to us, and say, beloved, what is there in it that may not, by the grace of 
God, be copied into your own ? And think you, that a full imitation of 
him, in all that relates to his moral character, would render it impossible 
for you to live in the world ? 

3. Again, it is objected, that should we become entirely, in the sense 
of permanently, sanctified, we could not know it, and should not be able 
intelligently to profess it. I answer : All that a sanctified soul needs to 
know or profess is, that the grace of God in Christ Jesus is sufficient for 
him, so that he finds it to be true, as Paul did, that he can do all things 
through Christ who strengthened him, and that he does not expect to 
sin, but that on the contrary, he is enabled through grace " to reckon 
himself dead indeed unto sin, and alive unto God through Jesus Christ 
our Lord." A saint may not know that he shall never sin again; he 
may expect to sin no more, because of his confidence, not in his own reso- 
lutions, or strength, or attainments, but simply in the infinite grace and 
faithfulness of Christ. He may come to look upon, to regard, account, 
reckon himself, as being dead in deed and in fact unto sin, and as hav- 
ing done with it, and as being alive unto God, and to expect henceforth 
to live wholly to God, as much as he expects to live at all ; and it may 
be true that he will thus live, without his being able to say that he knows 
that he is entirely, in the sense of permanently, sanctified. This he 
need not know, but this he may believe upon the strength of such prom- 
ises as 1 Thess. v. 23,24: "And the very God of peace sanctify you 
wholly : and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be pre- 
served blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is 
he that calleth you, who also will do it." It is also true, that a Christian 
may attain a state in which he will really fall no more into sin, as a 
matter of fact, while, at the same time, he may not be able to express 
even a thorough persuasion that he shall never fall again. All he may 
be able intelligently to say is : " God knoweth I hope to sin no more, 
but the event will show. May the Lord keep me ; I trust that he will." 

4. Another objection is, that the doctrine tends to spiritual pride. 
And is it true, indeed, that to become perfectly humble tends to pride ? 
But entire humility is implied in entire sanctification. Is it true, that 
you must remain in sin, and of course cherish pride, in order to avoid 
pride ? Is your humility more safe in your own hands, and are you 
more secure against spiritual pride, in refusing to receive Christ as 



SANCTIFICATION. 459 

your helper, than you would be in at once embracing him as a full 
Saviour ? 

I have seen several remarks in the papers of late, and have heard 
several suggestions from various quarters, which have but increased the 
fear which I have for some time entertained, that multitudes of Christians, 
and indeed many ministers, have radically defective views of salvation by 
faith in Jesus Christ. To the doctrine of entire sanctification in this 
life, as believed and taught by some of us, it has been frequently of late 
objected, that prayers offered in accordance with this belief, and by a 
sanctified soul, would savor strongly of spiritual pride and self-righteous- 
ness. I have seen this objection stated in its full force of late, in a re- 
ligious periodical, in the form of a supposed prayer of a sanctified soul, 
the object of which was manifestly to expose the shocking absurdity, 
self-righteousness, and spiritual pride, of a prayer, or rather thanksgiv- 
ing, made in accordance with a belief that one is entirely sanctified. 
Now, I must confess, that that prayer, together with objections and re- 
marks which suggest the same idea, have created in my mind no small 
degree of alarm. I fear much that many of our divines, in contending 
for the doctrines of grace, have entirely lost sight of the meaning of the 
language they use, and have in reality but very little practical understand- 
ing of what is intended by salvation by grace, in opposition to salvation 
by works. If this is not the case, I know not how to account for their 
feeling, and for their stating such an objection as this to the doctrine of 
entire sanctification. 

Now, if I understand the doctrine of salvation by grace, both sanctifi- 
cation and justification are wrought by the grace of God, and not by any 
works or merits of our own, irrespective of the grace of Christ through 
faith. If this is the real doctrine of the Bible, what earthly objection 
can there be to our confessing, professing, and thanking God for our 
sanctification, any more than for our justification ? It is true, indeed, 
that in our justification our own agency is not concerned, while in our 
sanctification it is. Yet I understand the doctrine of the Bible to be, that 
both are brought about by grace through faith, and that we should no 
sooner be sanctified without the grace of Christ, than we should be justi- 
fied without it. Now, who pretends to deny this ? And yet if it is true, 
of what weight is that class of objections to which I have alluded ? These 
objections manifestly turn upon the idea, no doubt latent and deep seated 
in the mind, that the real holiness of Christians, in whatever degree it 
exists, is, in some way, to be ascribed to some goodness originating in 
themselves, and not in the grace of Christ. But do let me ask, how is it 
possible that men who entertain, really and practically, right views upon 
this subject, can by any possibility feel, as if it must be proof conclusive 
of self-righteousness and Pharisaism, to profess and thank God for sane- 



V- 



460 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

tification ? Is it not understood on all hands, that sanctification is by 
grace, and that the gospel has made abundant provision for the sanctifi- 
cation of all men ? This certainly is admitted by those who have stated 
this objection. Now, if this is so, which is the most honorable to G-od, 
v to confess and complain that our sins triumph and gain dominion over 
us, or to be able truly and honestly to thank him for having given us 
the victory over our sins ? God has said, "■ Sin shall not have dominion 
over you, for ye are not under the law, but under grace." 

Now, in view of this and multitudes of kindred promises, suppose we 
come to G-od, and say : " Lord, thou hast made these great and pre- 
cious promises, but, as a matter of fact, they do not accord with our own 
experience. For sin does continually have dominion over us. Thy 
grace is not sufficient for us. "We are continually overcome by tempta- 
tion, notwithstanding thy promise, that in every temptation thou wilt 
make a way for us to escape. Thou hast said, the truth shall make us 
free, but we are not free. We are still the slaves of our appetites and 
lusts." 

Now, which, I inquire, is the most honorable to God, to go on with a 
string of confessions and self-accusations, that are in flat contradiction to 
the promises of God, and almost, to say the least, a burlesque upon the 
grace of the gospel, or to be able, through grace, to confess that we have 
found it true in our own experience, that his grace is sufficient for us — 
'that as our day is so our strength is, and that sin does not have dominion 
over us, because we are not under the law, but under grace ? 

To this I know it will be answered, that in this confessing of our sins 
we do not impeach the grace or faithfulness of God, inasmuch as all 
these promises are conditioned upon faith, and consequently, that the 
reason of our remaining in sin is to be ascribed to our unbelief, and is 
therefore no disparagement to the grace of Christ. But I beg that it 
may be duly considered, that faith itself is of the operation of God — is 
itself produced by grace ; and therefore the fact of our being obliged to 
confess our unbelief is a dishonor to the grace of Christ. Is it honorable 
or dishonorable to God, that we should be able to confess that even our 
unbelief is overcome, and that we are able to testify from our own ex- 
perience, "that the grace of the gospel is sufficient for our present salva- 
tion and sanctification ? There is no doubt a vast amount of self-right- 
eousness in the church, which, while it talks of grace, really means noth- 
ing by it. For a man to go any farther than to hope that he is con- 
verted, seems to many minds to savor of self-righteousness. Now, why 
is this, unless -they themselves entertain self-righteous notions in regard 
to conversion ? Many persons would feel shocked to hear a man in 
prayer unqualifiedly thank God that he had been converted and justi- 
fied. And they might just as well feel shocked at this, and upon pre- 



S A NOTIFICATION. 461 

cisely the same principle, as to feel shocked, if he should unqualifiedly 
thank God that he had been sanctified by his grace. 

But again, I say, that the very fact that a man feels shocked to hear 
a converted or a sanctified soul unqualifiedly thank God for the grace 
received, shows that down deep in his heart lies concealed a self-right- 
eous view of the way of salvation, and that in his mind all holiness in 
Christians is a ground of boasting ; and that, if persons have become 
truly and fully sanctified, they really have a ground of boasting before 
God. I know not how else to account for this wonderful prejudice. 
For my own part, I do not conceive it to be the least evidence of self- 
righteousness, when I hear a man sincerely and heartily thank God for 
converting and justifying him by his grace. Nor should I feel either 
shocked, horrified, or disgusted, to hear a man thank God that he had 
sanctified him wholly by his grace. If in either or both cases I had the 
corroborative evidence of an apparently holy life, I should bless God, 
take courage, and feel like calling on all around to glorify God for such 
an instance of his glorious and excellent grace. 

The feeling seems to be very general, that such a prayer or thanks- 
giving is similar, in fact, and in the principle upon which it rests, with 
that of the Pharisee noticed by our Saviour. But what reason is there 
for this assumption ? We are expressly informed, that that was the 
prayer of a Pharisee. But the Pharisees were self-righteous, and ex- 
pressly and openly rejected the grace of Christ. The Pharisee then 
boasted of his own righteousness, originated in and consummated by, his 
own goodness, and not in the grace of Christ. Hence he did not 
thank God, that the grace of Christ had made him unlike other men. 
Now, this prayer was designed to teach us the abominable folly of any 
man's putting in a claim to righteousness and true holiness, irrespective 
of the grace of God by Jesus Christ. But certainly this is an infinitely 
different thing from the thanksgiving of a soul, who fully recognizes 
the grace of Christ, and attributes his sanctification entirely to that 
grace. And I cannot see how a man, who has entirely divested himself 
of Pharisaical notions in respect to the doctrine of sanctification, can 
suppose these two prayers to be analogous in their principle and spirit. 



4:62 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XLI. 

SANCTIFICATION. 
FURTHER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 

5. Again it is objected, that many who have embraced this doctrine, 
really are spiritually proud. To this I answer : 

(1.) So have many who believed the doctrine of regeneration been 
deceived and amazingly puffed up with the idea that they have been 
regenerated when they have not been. But is this a good reason for 
abandoning the doctrine of regeneration, or any reason why the doctrine 
should not be preached ? 

(2.) Let me inquire, whether a simple declaration of what God has 
done for their souls, has not been assumed as of itself sufficient evidence 
of spiritual pride, on the part of those who embrace this doctrine, while 
there was in reality no spiritual pride at all ? It seems next to impossi- 
ble, with the present views of the church, that an individual should really 
attain this state, and profess to live without known sin in a manner so 
humble, as not, of course, to be suspected of enormous spiritual pride. 
This consideration has been a snare to some, who have hesitated and 
even neglected to declare what God had done for their souls, lest they 
should be accused of spiritual pride. And this has been a serious 
injury to their piety. 

G. But again it is objected, that this doctrine tends to censoriousness. 
To this I reply : — 

(1.) It is not denied, that some who have professed to believe this 
doctrine have become censorious. But this no more condemns this 
doctrine than it condemns that of regeneration. And that it tends to 
censoriousness, might just as well be urged against every acknowledged 
doctrine of the Bible, as against this doctrine. 

(2.) Let any Christian do his whole duty to the church and the world 
in their present state, let him speak to them and of them as they really 
are, and he would of course incur the charge of censoriousness. It 
is therefore the most unreasonable thing in the world, to suppose that 
the church in its present state, would not accuse any perfect Christian of 
censoriousness. Entire sanctification implies the doing of all our duty. 
But to do all our duty, we must rebuke sin in high places and in low 
places. Can this be done with all needed severity, without in many 
cases giving offence, and incurring the charge of censoriousness ? No, it 
is impossible ; and to maintain the contrary would be to impeach the 
wisdom and holiness of Jesus Christ himself. 



SANCTIFICATION. 463 

?. It is objected that the believers in this doctrine lower the standard 
of holiness to a level with their own experience. To this I reply, that it 
has been common to set up a false standard, and to overlook the true 
spirit and meaning of the law, and to represent it as requiring something 
else than what it does require ; but this notion is not confined to those 
who believe in this doctrine. The moral law requires one and the same 
thing of all moral agents, namely, that they shall be universally and 
disinterestedly benevolent ; in other words, that they shall love the Lord 
their God with all their heart, and their neighbor as themselves. This 
is all that it does require of any. AVhoever has understood the law 
as requiring less or more than this, has misunderstood it. Love is the 
fulfilling of the law. But I must refer the reader to what I have said 
upon this subject when treating of moral government. 

The law, as we have seen on a former occasion, levels its claims to us 
as we are, and a just exposition of it, as I have already said, must take 
into consideration all the present circumstances of our being. This is 
indispensable to a right apprehension of what constitutes entire sanctifi- 
cation. There may be, as facts show, danger of misapprehension in 
regard to the true spirit and meaning of the law, in the sense that, by 
theorizing and adopting a false philosophy, one may lose sight of the 
deepest affirmations of his reason, in regard to the true spirit and mean- 
ing of the law ; and I would humbly inquire, whether the error has not 
been in giving such an interpretation of the law, as naturally to beget 
the idea so prevalent, that, if a man should become holy, he could not 
live in this world ? In a letter lately received from a beloved, and use- 
ful, and venerated minister of the gospel, while the writer expressed the 
greatest attachment to the doctrine of entire consecration to God, and 
said that he preached the same doctrine which we hold to his people 
every Sabbath, but by another name, still he added, that it was revolting 
to his feelings to hear any mere man set up the claim of obedience to the 
law of God. Now let me inquire, why should this be revolting to the 
feelings of piety ? Must it not be because the law of God is supposed to 
require something of human beings in our state, which it does not 
and cannot require ? Why should such a claim be thought extravagant, 
unless the claims of the living God be thought extravagant ? If the law 
of God really requires no more of men than what is reasonable and possi- 
ble, why should it be revolting to any mind to hear an individual profess 
to have attained to entire obedience ? I know that the brother to whom 
I allude, would be almost the last man deliberately and knowingly to 
give any strained interpretation to the law of God ; and yet, I cannot 
but feel that much of the difficulty that good men have upon this sub- 
ject, has arisen out of a comparison of the lives of saints with a standard 
entirely above that which the law of God does or can demand of persons 



464 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

in all respects in our circumstances, or indeed of any moral agent 
whatever. 

8. Another objection is, that, as a matter of fact, the grace of God is 
not sufficient to secure the entire sanctification of saints in this life. It 
is maintained, that the question of the attainability of entire sanctifica- 
tion in tliis life, resolves itself after all into the question, whether Chris- 
tians are sanctified in this life ? The objectors say, that nothing is suffi- 
cient grace that does not, as a matter of fact, secure the faith, and 
obedience, and perfection of the saints ; and therefore that the provisions 
of the gospel are to be measured by the results ; and that the experience 
of the church decides both the meaning of the promises, and the extent 
of the provisions of grace. Now to this I answer: — If this objection be 
good for anything in regard to entire sanctification, it is equally true in 
regard to the spiritual state of every person in the world. If the fact 
that men are not perfect, proves that no provision is made for their per- 
fection, their being no better than they are proves, that there is no pro- 
vision for their being any better than they are, or that they might not 
have aimed at being any better, with any rational hope of success. But 
who, except a fatalist, will admit any such conclusion as this ? And 
yet I do not see but this conclusion is inevitable from such premises. 
As well might an impenitent sinner urge, that the grace of the gospel is 
not, as a matter of fact, sufficient for him, because it does not convert 
him : as well might he resolve everything into the sovereignty of God, 
and say, the sovereignty of God must convert me, or I shall not be con- 
verted ; and since I am not converted, it is because the grace of God has 
not proved itself sufficient to convert me. But who will excuse the 
sinner, and admit his plea, that the grace and provisions of the gospel 
are not sufficient for him ? 

Let ministers urge upon both saints and sinners the claims of God. 
Let them insist that sinners may, and can, and ought, immediately to 
become Christians, and that Christians can, and may, and ought to live 
wholly to God. Let them urge Christians to live without sin, and hold 
out the same urgency of command, and the same encouragement that 
the new school holds out to sinners ; and we shall soon find that Chris- 
tians are entering into the liberty of perfect love, as sinners have found 
pardon and acceptance. Let ministers hold forth the same gospel to all, 
and insist that the grace of the gospel is as sufficient to save from all sin 
as from a part of it ; and we shall soon see whether the difficulty has 
not been, that the gospel has been hid and denied, until the churches 
have been kept weak through unbelief. The church has been taught 
not to expect the fulfilment of the promises to them ; that it is danger- 
ous error to expect the fulfilment to them, for example, of the promise 
in 1 Thess. v. 23, 24 : " And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; 



SANCTIFICATION. 465 

and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved 
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that 
calleth you, who also will do it." When God says he will sanctify us 
wholly, and preserve us blameless unto the coming of the Lord, masters 
in Israel tell us that to expect this is dangerous error. 

9. Another objection to this doctrine is, that it is contrary to the 
views of some of the greatest and best men in the church : that such 
men as Augustine, Calvin, Doddridge, Edwards etc., were of a different 
opinion. To this I answer : — 

(1.) Suppose they were ; we are to call no man father, in such a 
sense as to yield up to him the determination of our views of Christian 
doctrine. 

(2.) This objection comes with a very ill grace from those who wholly 
reject the opinions of these divines on some of the most important points 
of Christian doctrine. 

(3.) Those men all held the doctrine of physical moral depravity, 
svhich was manifestly the ground of their rejecting the doctrine of entire 
sanctification in this life. Maintaining, as they seem to have done, that 
he constitutional susceptibilities of body and mind were sinfully de- 
rraved, cousistency of course led them to reject the idea, that persons 
could be entirely sanctified while in the body. Now, I would ask what 
consistency is there in quoting them as rejecting the doctrine of entire 
sanctification in this life, while the reason of this rejection in their 
ninds, was founded in the doctrine of physical moral depravity, which 
lotion is entirely denied by those who quote their authority ? 

10. But again ; it is objected, that, if we should attain this state of 
(continual consecration or sanctification, we could not know it until the 
lay of judgment ; and that to maintain its attainability is vain, inas- 
much as no one can know whether he has attained it or not. To this I 
leply :— 

(1.) A man's consciousness is the highest and best evidence of the 
present state of his own mind. I understand consciousness to be the 
mind's recognition of its own existence and exercises, and that it is the 
highest possible evidence to our own minds of what passes within us. 
Consciousness can of course testify only to our present sanctification ; 
but, 

(2.) With the law of God before us as our standard, the testimony of 
consciousness, in regard to whether the mind is conformed to that 
standard or not, is the highest evidence which the mind can have of a 
present state of conformity to that rule. 

(3.) It is a testimony which we cannot doubt, any more than we can 
doubt our existence. How do we know that we exist ? I answer, by 
our consciousness. How do I know that I breathe, or love, or hate, or 



±66 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sit, or stand, or lie down, or rise up, that I am joyful or sorrowful ? In 
short, that I exercise any emotion, or volition, or affection of mind ? 
How do I know that I sin, or repent, or believe ? I answer, by my own 
consciousness. No testimony can be " so direct and convincing as this." 

Now, in order to know that my repentance is genuine, I must know 
what genuine repentance is. So if I would know whether my love to God 
and man, or obedience to the law is genuine, I must have clearly before 
my mind, the real spirit, and meaning, and bearing of the law of God. 
Having the rule before my mind, my own consciousness affords " the most 
direct and convincing evidence possible," whether my present state of 
mind is conformed to the rule. The Spirit of God is never employed in 
testifying to what my consciousness teaches, but insetting in a strong 
light before my mind the rule to which I am to conform my life. It is/ 
his province to make me understand, to induce me to love and obey the' 
truth ; and it is the province of consciousness to testify to my own mincj 
whether I do or do not obey the truth, when I apprehend it. When God 
so presents the truth, as to give the mind assurance, that it understand 
his mind and will upon any subject, the mind's consciousness of its owi 
state in view of that truth, is " the highest and most direct possible 
evidence of whether it obeys or disobeys. 

(4.) If a man cannot be conscious of the character of his own suprenje 
or ultimate choice, in which choice his moral character consists, how cm 
he know when, and of what, he is to repent ? If he has committed sn 
of which he is not conscious, how is he to repent of it ? And if he fys 
a holiness of which he is not conscious, how could he feel that he his 
peace with God ? 

But it is said, that a man may violate the law, not knowing it, and 
consequently have no consciousness that he sinned, but that, afterwards, 
a knowledge of the law may convict him of sin. To this I reply, that if 
there was absolutely no knowledge that the thing in question was wrong, 
the doing of that thing was not sin, inasmuch as some degree of knovl- 
edge of what is right or wrong is indispensable to the moral character of 
any act. In such a case, there may be a sinful ignorance, which may in- 
volve all the guilt of those actions that were done in consequence of it ; 
but that blameworthiness lies in that state of heart that has induced this, 
and not at all in the violation of the rule of which the mind was, at the 
time, entirely ignorant. 

(5.) The Bible everywhere assumes, that we are able to know, and 
unqualifiedly requires us to know, what the moral state of our mind is. 
It commands us to examine ourselves, to know and to prove our own 
selves. Now, how can this be done, but by bringing our hearts into the 
light of the law of God, and then taking the testimony of our own con- 
sciousness, whether we are, or are not, in a state of conformity to the 



SANCTIFICATION. 467 

law ? But if we are not to receive the testimony of onr own conscious- 
ness, in regard to our present sanctification, are we to receive it in re- 
spect to our repentance, or any other exercise of our mind whatever ? 
The fact is, that we may deceive ourselves, by neglecting to compare our- 
selves with the right standard. But when our views of the standard are 
right, and oar consciousness bears witness of a felt, decided, unequivocal 
state of mind, we cannot be deceived any more than we can be deceived 
in regard to our own existence. 

(6.) But it is said, our consciousness does not teach us what the power 
and capacities of our minds are, and that therefore if consciousness could 
teach us in respect to the kind of our exercises, it cannot teach us in 
regard to their degree, whether they are equal to the present capacity of 
our mind. To this I reply : — 

Consciousness does as unequivocally testify whether we do or do not 
love God with all our heart, as it does whether we love him at all. How 
does a man know that he lifts as much as he can, or runs, or walks as 
fast as he is able ? I answer, by his own consciousness. How does he 
know that he repents or loves with all his heart ? I answer, by his own 
consciousness. This is the only possible way in which he can know it. 

The objection implies that God has put within our reach no possible 
means of knowing whether we obey him or not. The Bible does not di- 
rectly reveal the fact to any man, whether he obeys God or not. It 
reveals his duty, but does not reveal the fact whether he obeys. It refers 
for this testimony to his own consciousness. The Spirit of God sets our 
duty before us, but does not directly reveal to us whether we do it or 
not ; for this would imply that every man is under constant inspiration. 

But it is said, the Bible directs our attention to the fact, whether we 
outwardly obey or disobey, as evidence whether we are in a right state of 
mind or not. But I would inquire, How do we know whether we obey 
or disobey ? How do we know anything of our conduct but by our con- 
sciousness ? Our conduct, as observed by others, is to them evidence of 
the state of our hearts. But, I repeat it, our consciousness of obedience 
to God is to us the highest, and indeed the only, evidence of our true 
character. 

If a man's own consciousness is not to be a witness, either for or 
against him, other testimony can never satisfy him of the propriety of 
God's dealing with him in the final judgment. There are cases of com- 
mon occurrence, where the witnesses testify to the guilt or innocence of 
a man, contrary to the testimony of his own consciousness. In all such 
cases, from the very laws of his being, he rejects all other testimony : and 
let me add, that he would reject the testimony of God, and from the very 
laws of his being must reject it, if it contradicted his own consciousness. 
When God convicts a man of sin, it is not bv contradicting his con- 



468 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sciousness ; but by placing the consciousness which he had at the time, in 
the clear strong light of his memory, causing him to discover clearly, 
and to remember distinctly what light he had, what thoughts, what con- 
victions, what intention or design ; in other words, what consciousness 
he had at the time. And this, let me add, is the way, and the only way, 
in which the Spirit of God can convict a man of sin, thus bringing him 
to condemn himself. Now, suppose that God should bear testimony 
against a man, that at such a time he did such a thing, that such and 
such were all the circumstances of the case ; and suppose that at the 
same time the individual's consciousness unequivocally contradicts him. 
The testimony of God in this case could not satisfy the man's mind, nor 
lead him into a state of self-condemnation. The only possible way in 
which this state of mind could be induced, would be to annihilate his 
opposing consciousness, and to convict him simply upon the testimony 
of God. 

(7.) Men may overlook what consciousness is. They may mistake 
the rule of duty, they may confound consciousness with a mere negative 
state of mind, or that in which a man is not conscious of a state of 
opposition to the truth. Yet it must forever remain true that, to our 
own minds, " consciousness must be the highest possible evidence " 
of what passes within us. And if a man does not by his own conscious- 
ness know whether he does the best that he can, under the circumstances 
— whether he has a single eye to the glory of God — and whether he is in 
a state of entire consecration to God — he cannot know it in any way 
whatever. And no testimony whatever, either of God or man, could, 
according to the laws of his being, satisfy him either as to conviction 
of guilt on the one hand, or self- approbation on the other. 

(8.) Let me ask, how those who make this objection know that they 
are not in a sanctified state ? Has God revealed it to them ? Has he 
revealed it in the Bible ? Does the Bible say to A. B., by name, You 
are not in a sanctified state ? Or does it lay down a rule, in the light of 
which his own consciousness bears this testimony against him ? Has 
God'revealed directly by his Spirit, that he is not in a sanctified state, or 
does he hold the rule of duty strongly before the mind, and thus awaken 
the testimony of consciousness that he is not in this state ? Now just in 
the same way consciousness testifies of those that are sanctified, that they 
are in this state. Neither the Bible nor the Spirit of God makes any 
new or particular revelation to them by name. But the Spirit of God 
bears witness to their spirits by setting the rule' in a strong light before 
them. He induces that state of mind which conscience pronounces to 
be conformity to the rule. This is as far as possible from setting aside 
the judgment of God in the case ; for conscience, under these circum- 
stances, is the testimony of God, and the way in which he convinces of 



SANCTIFICATION. 469 

sin on the one hand, and of entire consecration on the other ; and the 
decision of conscience is given to us in consciousness. 

By some it is still objected, that consciousness alone is not evidence 
even to ourselves of our being, or not being, in a state of entire sanctifica- 
tion ; that the judgment of the mind is also employed in deciding the 
true intent and meaning of the law, and is therefore as absolutely a 
witness in the case as consciousness is. "Consciousness," it is said, 
"gives us the exercises of our own mind, and the judgment decides 
whether these exercises are in accordance with the law of God." So 
then it is the judgment rather than the consciousness, that decides 
whether we are, or are not, in a state of entire sanctification ; and there- 
fore if, in our judgment of the law, we happen to be mistaken, than 
which nothing is more common, in such case we are utterly deceived if 
we think ourselves in a state of entire sanctification. To this I answer : — 

It is indeed our judgment that decides upon the intent and meaning 
of the law. We may be mistaken in regard to its true application in cer- 
tain cases, as it respects outward conduct, but let it be remembered, that 
neither sin nor holiness is to be found in the outward act. They both 
belong only to the ultimate intention. No man, as was formerly shown, 
can mistake his real duty. Every one knows, and cannot but know, that 
disinterested benevolence is his duty. This is, and nothing else is, 
his duty. This he can know, and about this he need not mistake. And 
sure it is, that if man can be certain of anything, he can be certain 
in respect to the end for which he lives, or in respect to his supreme 
ultimate intention. 

I deny that it is the judgment which is to us the witness, in respect 
to the state of our own minds. There are several powers of the mind 
called into exercise, in deciding upon the meaning of, and in obeying, 
the law of God ; but it is consciousness alone that gives us these exer- 
cises. Nothing but consciousness can possibly give us any exercise 
of our own minds ; that is, we have no knowledge of any exercise but by 
our own consciousness. Suppose then the judgment is exercised, the will 
is exercised, and all the involuntary powers are exercised. These exer- 
eises are revealed to us only and simply by consciousness ; so that it 
remains an invariable truth, that consciousness is to us the only possible 
witness of what our exercises are, and consequently of the state of our 
own minds. When, therefore, I say, that by consciousness a man may 
know whether he is in a state of sanctification, I mean, that conscious- 
ness is the real and only evidence that we can have of being in this state. 

This objection is based upon a misapprehension of that which consti- 
tutes entire or continued sanctification. It consists, as has been shown, 
in abiding consecration to God, and not as the objection assumes, in in- 
voluntary affections and feelings. When it is considered, that entire 



470 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sanctification consists in an abiding good will to God and to being in 
general, in living to one end, what real impossibility can there be in 
knowing whether we are supremely devoted to this end, or supremely 
devoted to our own interest ? 

11. Again, it is objected, that if this state were attained in this life, 
it would be the end of our probation. To this I reply, that probation 
since the fall of Adam, or those points on which we are in a state of 
probation or trial, are — 

(1. ) Whether we will repent and believe the gospel. 

(2. ) Whether we will persevere in holiness to the end of life. 

Some suppose, that the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints sets 
aside the idea of being at all in a state of probation after conversion. 
They reason thus : If it is certain that the saints will persevere, then 
their probation is ended ; because the question is already settled, not only 
that they are converted, but that they will persevere to the end ; and the 
contingency, in regard to the event, is indispensable to the idea of pro- 
bation. To this I reply, that a thing may be contingent with man that 
is not at all so with God. With God, there is not, and never was any 
contingency, in the sense of uncertainty, with regard to the final destiny 
of any being. But with men almost all things are contingent. God 
knows with absolute certainty whether a man will be converted, and 
whether he will persevere. A man may know that he is converted, and 
may believe that by the grace of God he shall persevere. He may have 
an assurance of this in proportion to the strength of his faith. But the 
knowledge of this fact is not at all inconsistent with his idea of his con- 
tinuance in a state of trial till the day of bis death, inasmuch as his per- 
severance depends upon the exercise of his own voluntary agency ; and 
also, because his perseverance is the condition of his final salvation. 

In the same way some say, that if we have attained a state of entire or 
permanent sanctification, we can no longer be in a state of probation. I 
answer, that perseverance in this depends upon the promises and grace 
of God, just as the final perseverance of the saints does. In neither case 
can we have any other assurance of our perseverance, than that of faith 
in the promise and grace of God ; nor any other knowledge that we shall 
continue in this state, than that which arises out of a belief in the testi- 
mony of God, that he will preserve us blameless until the coming of our 
Lord Jesus Christ. If this be inconsistent with our probation, I see not 
why the doctrine of the saint's perseverance is not equally inconsistent 
with it. If any one is disposed to maintain, that for us to have any 
judgment or belief grounded on the promises of God, in regard to our 
final perseverance, is inconsistent with a state of probation, all I can say 
is, that his views of probation are very different from my own, and so far 
as I understand, from those of the church of God. 



SANCTIFICATION. 471 

Again : there is a very high and important sense in which every moral 
being will remain on probation to all eternity. While under the moral 
government of God, obedience must for ever remain a condition of the 
favor of God. And continued obedience will for ever depend on the 
faithfulness and grace of God ; and the only confidence we can ever have, 
either in heaven, or on earth, that we shall continue to obey, must be 
founded upon the faithfulness and truth of God. 

Again : if it were true, that entering upon a state of permanent sanc- 
tification in this life, were, in some sense, an end of our probation, that 
would be no objection to the doctrine ; for there is a sense in which pro- 
bation often ends long before the termination of this life. Where, for 
example, for any cause God has left sinners to fill up the measure of their 
iniquity, withdrawing forever his Holy Spirit from them, and sealing 
them over to eternal death : this, in a very important sense, is the end 
of their probation, and they are as sure of hell as if they were already 
there. So on the other hand, when a person has received, after believ- 
ing, the sealing of the Spirit unto the day of redemption, as an earnest 
of his inheritance, he may regard, and is bound to regard this as a solemn 
pledge on the part of God, of his final perseverance and salvation, and as 
no longer leaving the final question of his destiny in doubt. 

Now it should be remembered, that in both these cases the result de- 
pends upon the exercise of the agency of the creature. In the case of 
the sinner given up of God, it is certain that he will not repent, though 
his impenitence is voluntary, and by no means a thing naturally neces- 
sary. So, on the other hand, the perseverance of the saints is certain, 
though not necessary. If in either case there should be a radical change 
of character, the result would differ accordingly. 

12. Again : while it is admitted by some, that entire sanctification in 
this life is attainable, yet it is denied, that there is any certainty that it 
will be attained by any one before death ; for it is said, that as all the 
promises of entire sanctification are conditioned upon faith, they therefore 
secure the entire sanctification of no one. To this I reply, that all the 
promises of salvation in the Bible are conditioned upon faith and repent- 
ance ; and therefore it does not follow on this principle, that any person 
ever will be saved. What does all this arguing prove ? The fact is, that 
while the promises of both salvation and sanctification, are conditioned 
upon faith, yet the promises that God will convert and sanctify the elect, 
spirit, soul and body, and preserve and save them, must be fulfilled, and 
will be fulfilled, by free grace drawing and securing the concurrence of free- 
will. With respect to the salvation of sinners, it is promised that Christ 
shall have a seed to serve him, and the Bible abounds with promises 
to Christ that secure the salvation of great multitudes of sinners. So the 
promises, that the church, as a body, at some period of her earthly history, 



472 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

shall be entirely sanctified, are. as it regards the church, unconditional, in 
the sense that they will assuredly be accomplished. But, as I have already 
shown, as it respects individuals, the fulfilment of these promises must 
depend upon the exercise of faith. Both in respect to the salvation 
of sinners and thesanctification of Christians, God is abundantly pledged 
to bring about the salvation of the one and the sanctification of the 
other, to the extent of his promise to Christ. 

13. It is also objected, that the sanctification of the saints depends 
upon the sovereignty of God. To this I reply, that both the sanctifica- 
tion of the saints and the conversion of sinners is, in some sense depen- 
dent upon the sovereign grace of God. But who except an antinomian 
would, for this reason, hesitate to urge it upon sinners to repent imme- 
diately and believe the gospel ? Would any one think of objecting to 
the doctrine or the fact of repentance, that repentance and the conver- 
sion of sinners were dependent upon the sovereignty of God ? And yet, 
if the sovereignty of God can be justly urged as a bar to the doctrine of 
entire sanctification, it may, for aught I see, with equal propriety be 
urged as a bar to the doctrine and fact of repentance. We have no con- 
troversy with any one upon the subject of entire sanctification, who will 
as fully and as firmly hold out the duty and the possibility, and the 
practical attainability, of entire sanctification, as of repentance and sal- 
vation. Let them both be put where the Bible puts them, upon the 
same ground, so far as the duty and the practicability of both are con- 
cerned. Suppose any one should assert, that it were irrational and dan- 
gerous for sinners to hope or expect to be converted, and sanctified, and 
saved, because all this depends upon the sovereignty of God, and they 
do not know what God will do. Who would say this ? But why not as 
well say it, as make the objection to sanctification which we are now 
considering ? 



LECTURE XLIL 

SANCTIFICATION. 
RElfAEKS. 



1. There is an importance to be attached to the sanctification of the 
body, of which very few persons appear to be aware. Indeed, unless the 
bodily appetites and powers be consecrated to the service of God — unless 
we learn to eat, and drink, and sleep, and wake, and labor, and rest, for 
the glory of God, permanent sanctification as a practical thing is out of 
the question. It is plain, that very few persons are aware of the great 



SANCTIFICATION. 473 

influence which their bodies have over their minds, and of the indispen- 
sable necessity of bringing their bodies under, and keeping them in 
subjection. 

Few people seem to keep the fact steadily in view, that unless their 
bodies be rightly managed, they will be so fierce and overpowering a 
source of temptation to the mind, as inevitably to lead it into sin. If 
they indulge themselves in a stimulating diet, and in the use of those 
condiments that irritate and rasp the nervous system, their bodies will 
be, of course and of necessity, the source of powerful and incessant 
temptation to evil tempers and vile affections. If persons were aware of 
the great influence which the body has over the mind, they would realize, 
that they cannot be too careful to preserve the nervous system from the 
influence of every improper article of food or drink, and preserve that 
system as they would the apple of their eye, from every influence that 
could impair its functions. No one who has opportunity to acquire in- 
formation in regard to the laws of life and health, and the best means of 
sanctifying the whole spirit, soul, and body, can be guiltless if he neglects 
these means of knowledge. Every man is bound to make the structure 
and laws of both body and mind the subject of as thorough investigation 
as his circumstances will permit, to inform himself in regard to what are 
the true principles of perfect temperance, and in what way the most can. 
be made of all his powers of body and mind for the glory of God. 

2. From what has been said in these lectures, the reason why the 
church has not been entirely sanctified is very obvious. As a body the 
church has not believed that such a state was attainable until near the 
close of life. And this is a sufficient reason, and indeed the most 
weighty of all reasons, for her not having attained it. 

3. From what has been said, it is easy to see, that the true question 
in regard to entire sanctification in this life is : Is it attainable as a 
matter of fact ? Some have thought the proper question to be : Are 
Christians entirely sanctified in this life ? Now certainly this is not the 
question that needs to be discussed. Suppose it to be fully granted that 
they are not ; this fact is sufficiently accounted for, by the consideration 
that they do not know or believe it to be attainable until the close of life. 
If they believed it to be attainable, it might no longer be true that they 
do not attain it. But if provision really is made for this attainment, it 
amounts to nothing, unless it be recognized and believed. The thing 
needed then is, to bring the church to see and believe, that this is her 
high privilege and her duty. It is not enough, as has been shown, to 
say that it is attainable, simply on the ground of natural ability. This 
is as true of the devil, and the lost in hell, as of men in this world. Bat 
unless grace has put this attainment so within our reach, as that it may 
be aimed at with the reasonable prospect of success, there is, as a matter 



474 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of fact, no more provision for our entire sanctification in this life, than 
for the devil's. As has been said, it seems to be trifling with mankind, 
merely to maintain the attainability of this state, on the ground of 
natural ability only, and at the same time to tell them, that they cer- 
tainly never will exercise this ability unless disposed to do so by the grace 
of God ; and furthermore, that it is a dangerous error for us to expect 
to receive grace from God to secure this result ; that we might by 
natural possibility make this attainment, but it is irrational and danger- 
ous error to expect or hope to make it, or hope to receive sufficient grace 
to secure it. 

The real question is, Has grace brought this attainment so within our 
reach, that we may reasonably expect, by aiming at it, to experience it in 
this life ? It is admitted, that on the ground of natural ability, both 
wicked men and devils have the power to be entirely holy. But it is also 
admitted that their indisposition to use this power aright is so complete, 
that as a matter of fact, they never will, unless influenced to do so by 
the grace of God. I insist therefore that the real question is, whether 
the provisions of the gospel are such, that did the church fully under- 
stand and lay hold upon the proffered grace, she might attain this state ? 
Are we as fully authorized to offer this grace to Christians, as we are the 
grace of repentance and pardon to sinners ? May we as consistently 
urge Christians to lay hold on sanctifying grace sufficient to keep them 
from all sin, as to urge sinners to lay hold of Christ for justification ? 
May we insist upon the one as really and as honestly as the other ? 

4. We see how irrelevant and absurd the objection is, that as a matter 
of fact the church has not attained this state, and therefore it is not at- 
tainable. Why, if they have not understood it to be attainable, it no 
more disproves its attainableness, than the fact that the heathen have not 
embraced the gospel, proves that they will not when they know it. 
Within my memory it was thought to be dangerous to call sinners to re- 
pent and believe the gospel ; and on the contrary, they were told by Cal- 
vinists, that they could not repent, that they must wait God's time ; and 
it was regarded as a dangerous error for a sinner to think that he could 
repent. But who does not know, that the thorough inculcation of an 
opposite doctrine has brought scores of thousands to repentance ? Now 
the same course needs to be pursued with Christians. Instead of being 
told, that it is dangerous to expect to be entirely sanctified in this life, 
they ought to be taught to believe at once, and take hold on the promises 
of perfect love and faith. 

5. You see the necessity of fully preaching and insisting upon this 
doctrine, and of calling it by its true scriptural name. It is astonishing 
to see to what an extent there is a tendency among men to avoid the use 
of scriptural language, and to cleave to the language of such men as 



SAXCTIFICATIOX. 475 

Edwards, and other great and good divines. They object to the terms 
perfection and entire sanctification, and prefer to nse the terms 
entire consecration, and such other terms as have been common in 
the church. 

Now, I would by no means contend about the use of words ; but still 
it does appear to me to be of great importance, that we use scripture lan- 
guage, and insist upon men being "perfect as their Father in Heaven is 
perfect," and being "sanctified wholly, body, soul and spirit." This 
appears to me to be the more important for this reason, that if we use 
the language to which the church has been accustomed upon this subject, 
she will, as she has done, misunderstand us, and will not get before her 
mind that which we really mean. That this is so, is manifest from the 
fact, that the great mass of the church will express alarm at the use of 
the terms perfection and entire sanctification, who will neither express 
nor feel any such alarm, if we speak of entire consecration. This de- 
monstrates, that they do not by any means understand these terms as 
meaning the same thing. And although I understand them as meaning 
precisely the same thing, yet I find myself obliged to use the terms per- 
fection and entire sanctification to possess their minds of. their real mean- 
ing. This is Bible language. It is unobjectionable language. And in- 
asmuch as the church understands entire consecration to mean something 
less than entire sanctification or Christian perfection, it does seem to me 
of great importance, that ministers should use a phraseology which will 
call the attention of the church to the real doctrine of the Bible upon this 
subject. With great humility, I would submit the question to my be- 
loved brethren in the ministry, whether they are not aware, that Chris- 
tians have entirely too low an idea of what is implied in entire consecra- 
tion, and whether it is not useful and best to adopt a phraseology in ad- 
dressing them, that shall call their attention to the real meaning of the 
words which they use ? 

6. Young converts have not been allowed so much as to indulge the 
thought that they could live even for a day wholly without sin. They 
have as a general thing no more been taught to expect to live even for a 
day without sin, than they have been taught to expect immediate trans- 
lation, soul and body, to heaven. Of course, they have not known that 
there was any other way than to go on in sin ; and however shocking and 
distressing the necessity has appeared to them, in the ardor of their first 
love, still they have looked upon it as an unalterable fact, that to be in a 
great measure in bondage to sin is a thing of course while they live im 
this world. Now, with such an orthodoxy as this, with the conviction im 
the church and ministry so ripe, settled and universal, that the utmost 
that the grace of God can do for men in this world is to bring them to- 
repentance, and to leave them to live and die in a state of sinning and 1 



476 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

repenting, is it at all wonderful, that the state of religion should be as it 
really has been ? 

In looking over the results to Christians, of preaching the doctrine in 
question, I feel compelled to say, that so far as all observation can go, I 
have the same evidence that it is truth, and as such is owned and blessed 
of God to the elevation of the holiness of Christians, as I have, that those 
are truths which I have so often preached to sinnere, and which have 
been blessed of God to their conversion. This doctrine seems as naturally 
calculated to elevate the piety of Christians, and as actually to result in 
the elevation of their piety, under the blessing of God, as those truths 
that I have preached to sinners were to their conversion. 

7. Christ has been in a great measure lost sight of in some of his most 
important relations to mankind. He has been known and preached as a 
pardoning and justifying Saviour ; but as an actually indwelling and 
reigning Saviour in the heart, he has been but little known. I was struck 
with a remark a few years since, of a brother whom I have from that time 
greatly loved, who had been for a time in a desponding state of mind, 
borne down with a great sense of his own vileness, but seeing no way of 
escape. At an evening meeting the Lord so revealed himself to him, as 
entirely to overcome the strength of his body, and his brethren were 
obliged to carry him home. The next time I saw him, he exclaimed to 
me with a pathos I shall never forget, (i Brother Finney, the church have 
buried the Saviour." Now it is no doubt true, that the church have be- 
come awfully alienated from Christ — have in a great measure lost a knowl- 
edge of what he is, and ought to be, to her ; and a great many of her 
members, I have good reason to know, in different parts of the country, 
are saying with deep and overpowering emotion, "They have taken away 
my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him." 

8. With all her orthodoxy, the church has been for a long time much 
nearer to Unitarianism than she has imagined. This remark may shock 
some of my readers, and you may think it savors of censoriousness. But, 
beloved, I am sure it is said in no such spirit. These are " the words of 
truth and soberness." So little has been known of Christ, that, if I am 
not entirely mistaken, there are multitudes in the orthodox churches, 
who do not know Christ, and who in heart are Unitarians, while in 
theory they are orthodox. They have never known Christ, in the sense 
of which I have spoken of him in these lectures. 

I have been, for some years, deeply impressed with the fact, that so 
many professors of religion are coming to the ripe conviction that they 
never knew Christ. There have been in this place almost continual de- 
velopments of this fact ; and I doubt, whether there is a minister in the 
land who will present Christ as the gospel presents him, in all the ful- 
ness of his official relations to mankind, who will not be struck and 



SANCTIFICATION. 477 

agonized with developments that will assure him, that the great mass of 
professors of religion do not know the Saviour. It has been to my mind 
a painful and serious question, what I ought to think of the spiritual 
state of those who know so little of the blessed Jesus. That none of them 
have been converted, I dare not say. And yet, that they have been con- 
verted, I am afraid to say. I would not for the world " quench the 
smoking flax, or break the bruised reed," or say anything to stumble, or 
weaken the feeblest lamb of Christ ; and yet my heart is sore pained, 
my soul is sick ; my bowels of compassion yearn over the church of the 
blessed God. 0, the dear church of Christ ! What does she in her 
present state know of the gospel-rest, of that " great and perfect peace" 
which they have whose minds are stayed on God ? The church in this 
place is composed, to a great extent, of professors of religion from 
different parts of the world, who have come hither for educational pur- 
poses, and from religious considerations. And as I said, I have some- 
times been appalled at the disclosures which the Spirit of God has made 
of the real spiritual state of many who have come here, and were con- 
sidered by others before they came, and by themselves, as truly converted 
to God. 

9. If I am not mistaken, there is an extensive feeling among Chris- 
tians and ministers, that much that ought to be known and may be 
known of the Saviour, is not known. Many are beginning to find that 
the Saviour is to them "as a root out of a dry ground, having neither 
form nor comeliness ;" that the gospel which they preach or hear is not 
to them "the power of God unto salvation " from sin ; that it is not to 
them " glad tidings of great joy;" that it is not to them a peace-giving 
gospel ; and many are feeling that if Christ has done for them all that 
his grace is able to do in this life, the plan of salvation is sadly defective ; 
that Christ is not after all a Saviour suited to their necessities ; that the 
religion which they have is not suited to the world in which they live ; 
that it does not, cannot make them free, but leaves them in a state of 
perpetual bondage. Their souls are agonized, and tossed to and fro with- 
out a resting-place. Multitudes also are beginning to see, that there are 
many passages, both in the Old and the New Testament, which they do not 
understand ; that the promises seem to mean much more than they have 
ever realized ; and that the gospel and the plan of salvation, as a whole, 
must be something very different from that which they have as yet ap- 
prehended. There are, if I mistake not, great multitudes all over the 
country, who are inquiring more earnestly than ever before, after a 
knowledge of that Jesus who is to save his people from their sins. 

10. If the doctrine of these lectures is true, you see the immense im- 
portance of preaching it clearly and fully, in revivals of religion. When 
the hearts of converts are warm with their first love, then is the time to 



47S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

make them fully acquainted with their Saviour, to hold him up in all his 
offices and relations, so as to break the power of every sin — to lead them 
to break off forever from all self-dependence, and to receive Christ as a 
present, perfect, everlasting Saviour, so far as this can possibly be done 
with their limited experience. 

11. Unless this course be taken, their backsliding is inevitable. You 
might as well expect to roll back the waters of Niagara with your hand, 
as to stay the tide of their former habitudes of mind, surrounded as they 
are with temptation, without a deep, and thorough, and experimental 
acquaintance with the Saviour. And if they are thrown upon their own 
watchfulness and resources, for strength against temptation, instead of 
being directed to the Saviour, they are certain to become discouraged, 
and fall into dismal bondage. 

12. But, before I conclude these remarks, I must not omit to notice 
the indispensable necessity of a willingness to do the will of God, in order 
rightly to understand this doctrine. If a man is unwilling to give up 
his sins, to deny himself all ungodliness and every worldly lust, if he is 
unwilling to be set apart wholly and forever to the service of the Lord, 
he will either reject this doctrine altogether, or only intellectually admit 
it, without receiving it into his heart. It is an eminently dangerous 
state of mind to assent to this, or any other doctrine of the gospel, and 
not reduce it to practice. 

13. Much evil has been done by those who have professedly embraced 
this doctrine in theory, and rejected it in practice. Their spirit and 
temper have been such as to lead those who saw them to infer, that the 
tendency of the doctrine itself was bad. And it is not to be doubted 
that some who have professed to have experienced the power of this 
doctrine in their hearts, have greatly disgraced religion, by exhibiting a 
very different spirit from that of an entirely sanctified one. But why in 
a Christian land should this be a stumbling block ? When the heathen 
see persons from Christian nations who professedly adopt the Christian 
system, exhibit on their shores, and in their countries, the spirit which 
many of them do, they infer that this is the tendency of the Christian 
religion. To this our missionaries reply, that they are only nominal 
Christians, only speculative, not real believers. Should thousands of 
our church members go among them, they would have the same reason 
to complain ; and might reply to the missionaries, these are not only 
nominal believers, but profess to have experienced the Christian religion 
in their own hearts. Xow what would the missionaries reply ? Why, to 
be sure, that they were professors of religion ; but that they really did 
not know Christ, that they were deceiving themselves with a name to 
live, while in fact they were dead in trespasses and sins. 

It has often been a matter of astonishment to me, that in a Christian 



SANCTIFICATION. 470 

land, it should be a stumbling-block to any, that some, or if you please, 
a majority of those who profess to receive and to have experienced the 
truth of this doctrine, should exhibit an unchristian spirit. What if 
the same objection should be brought against the Christian religion ; 
against any and every doctrine of the gospel, that the great majority of 
all the professed believers and receivers of those doctrines were proud, 
worldly, selfish, and exhibited anything but a right spirit ? This objec- 
tion might be made with truth to the professed Christian church. But 
would the conclusiveness of such an objection be admitted in Christian 
lands ? Who does not know the ready answer to all such objections 
as these, that the doctrines of Christianity do not sanction such con- 
duct, and that it is not the real belief of them that begets any such spirit or 
conduct ; that the Christian religion abhors all these objectionable things. 
And now suppose it should be replied to this, that a tree is known by its 
fruits, and that so great a majority of the professors of religion could 
not exhibit such a spirit, unless it were the tendency of Christianity 
itself to beget it. Who would not reply to this, that this state of mind 
and course of conduct of which they complain, is the natural state ot 
man uninfluenced by the gospel of Christ ; that, in these instances, 
on account of unbelief, the gospel has failed to correct what was already 
wrong, and that it needed not the influence of any corrupt doctrine 
to produce that state of mind ? It appears to me, that these objectors 
against this doctrine, on account of the fact that some and perhaps 
many who have professed to receive it, have exhibited a wrong spirit, 
take it for granted that the doctrine produces this spirit, instead of 
considering that a wrong spirit is natural to men, and that the difficulty 
is that through unbelief, the gospel has failed to correct what was before 
wrong. They reason as if they supposed the human heart needed some- 
thing to beget within it a bad spirit, and as if they supposed, that a 
belief in this doctrine had made men wicked ; instead of recognizing 
the fact, that they were before wicked, and that through unbelief the 
gospel has failed to make them holy. 

14. But let it not be understood, that I suppose or admit, that the 
great mass who have professed to have received this doctrine into their 
hearts, have exhibited a bad spirit. I must say, that it has been emi- 
nently otherwise, so far as my own observation extends. And I am 
fully convinced, that if I have ever seen Christianity and the spirit 
of Christ in the world, it has been exhibited by those, as a general thing, 
who have professed to receive this doctrine into their heart. 

15. How amazingly important it is, that the ministry and the church 
should come fully to a right understanding and embracing of this doc- 
trine. 0, it will be like life from the dead ! The proclamation of it 
is now regarded by multitudes as "good tidings of great joy." From 



4S0 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

every quarter, we get the gladsome intelligence, that souls are entering 
into the deep rest and peace of the gospel, that they are awaking to 
a life of faith and love — and that, instead of sinking down into antino- 
mianism, they are eminently more benevolent, active, holy and useful 
than ever before ; that they are eminently more prayerful, watchful, 
diligent, meek, sober-minded, and heavenly in all their lives. This is 
the character of those, to a very great extent, at least, with whom I 
have been acquainted, who have embraced this doctrine, and professed 
to have experienced its power. I say this for no other reason, than 
to relieve the anxieties of those who have heard very strange reports, and 
whose honest fears have been awakened in regard to the tendency of 
this doctrine. 

16. Much pains have been taken to demonstrate, that our views of 
this subject are wrong. But in all the arguing to this end hitherto, 
there has been one grand defect. None of the opponents of this doctrine 
have yet showed us " a more excellent way, and told us what is right." 
It is certainly impossible to ascertain what is wrong, on any moral sub- 
ject, unless we have before us the standard of right. The mind must 
certainly be acquainted with the rule of right, before it can reasonably 
pronounce anything wrong ; "for by the law is the knowledge of sin." 
It is therefore certainly absurd, for the opponents of the doctrine of en- 
tire sanctification in this life, to pronounce this doctrine wrong without 
being able to show us what is right. To what purpose, then, I pray, do 
they argue, who insist upon this view of the subject as wrong, while they 
do not so much as attempt to tell us what is right ? It cannot be pre- 
tended, that the scriptures teach nothing upon this subject. And the 
question is, what do they teach ? We therefore call upon the denouncers 
of this doctrine, and we think the demand reasonable, to inform us defi- 
nitely, how holy Christians may be, and are expected to be in this life. 
And it should be distinctly understood, that until they bring forward 
the rule laid down in the scripture upon this subject, it is but arrogance 
to pronounce anything wrong ; just as if they should pronounce any- 
thing to be sin without comparing it with the standard of right. Until 
they inform us what the scriptures do teach, we must beg leave to be 
excused from supposing ourselves obliged to believe, that what is taught 
in these lectures is wrong, or contrary to the language and spirit of in- 
spiration. This is certainly a question that ought not to be thrown 
loosely aside, without being settled. The thing at which we aim is, to 
establish a definite rule, or to explain what we suppose to be the real and 
explicit teachings of the Bible upon this point. And we do think it 
absurd, that the opponents of this view should attempt to convince us of 
error, without so much as attempting to show what the truth upon this 
subject is. As if we could easily enough decide what is contrary to 



ELECTION. 481 

right, without possessing any knowledge of right. We therefore beseech 
our brethren, in discussing this subject, to show us what is right. And 
if this is not the truth, to show us a more excellent way, and convince 
us that we are wrong, by showing us what is right. For we have no 
hope of ever seeing that we are wrong, until we can see that something 
else than what is advocated in this discussion, is right. 

17. But before I close my remarks upon this subject, I must not fail 
to state what I regard as the present duty of Christians. It is to hold 
their will in a state of consecration to God, and to lay hold on the 
promises for the blessing promised in such passages as 1 Thess. v. 23, 24 : 
— u And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly, and I pray God your 
whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming 
of our Lord Jesus Christ ; faithful is he that calleth you, who also will 
do it." This is present duty. Let them wait on the Lord in faith, for 
that cleansing of the whole being which they need, to confirm, strengthen, 
settle them. All they can do, and all that God requires them to do, is 
to obey him from moment to moment, and to lay hold of him for the 
blessing of which we have been speaking ; and to be assured, that God 
will bring forth the answer in the best time and in the best manner. If 
you believe, the anointing that abideth will surely be secured in due 
time. 



LECTURE XLIII. 

ELECTION. 



Is discussing this subject, 

I. i" shall notice some points in which there is a general agreement 
among all denominations of Christians respecting the natural and moral 
attributes of God. 

1. It is agreed that eternity is a natural attribute of God in the sense 
that he grows no older. He was just as old before the world or universe 
was made, as he is now, or as he will be at the day of judgment. 

2. It is agreed that omniscience is an attribute of God, in the sense- 
that he knows from a necessity of his infinite nature all things that are 
objects of knowledge. 

3. That he has necessarily and eternally possessed this knowledge, so 
that he never has, and never can have, any accession to his knowledge. 
Every possible thing that ever was, or will be, or can be an object of 
knowledge, has been necessarily and eternally known to God. If this 
were not true, God would be neither infinite nor omniscient. 

ol 



482 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

4. It is agreed also that God exercises an universal providence, em- 
bracing all events that ever did or ever will occur in all worlds. Some of 
these events he secures by his own agency, and others occur under his 
providence, in the sense that he permits or suffers them to occur rather 
than interpose to prevent them. They may be truly said to occur under 
his providence, because his plan of government in some sense embraces 
them all. He made provision to secure those that are good, that is, the 
holy intentions of moral agents, and to overrule for good those that are 
evil, that is, the selfish intentions of moral agents. These intentions are 
events, and may be said to occur under Divine Providence, because all 
events that do, or ever will, occur, are and must be foreseen results of 
God's own agency, or of the work of creation. 

5. It is agreed that infinite benevolence is the sum of the moral at- 
tributes of God. 

6. That God is both naturally and morally immutable ; that in his 
natural attributes he is necessarily so, and in his moral attributes is 
certainly so. 

7. It is agreed that all who are converted, sanctified and saved, are 
converted, sanctified, and saved by God's own agency ; that is, God saves 
them by securing, by his own agency, their personal and individual holi- 
ness. 

II. What the Bible doctrine of election is not, 

1. The Bible doctrine of election is not that any are chosen to salva- 
tion, in such a sense, that they will or can be saved without repentance, 
faith, and sanctification. 

2. Nor is it that some are chosen to salvation, in such a sense, that 
they will be saved irrespective of their being regenerated, and persever- 
ing in holiness to the end of life. The Bible most plainly teaches, that 
these are naturally indispensable conditions of salvation, and of course 
election cannot dispense with them. 

3. Nor is it that any are chosen to salvation for, or on account of 
their own foreseen merits, or good works. 2 Tim. i. 9 : "Who hath saved 
us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but 
according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ 
Jesus before the world began." The foreseen fact, that by the wisest gov- 
ernmental arrangement God could convert and sanctify and fit them for 
heaven, must have been a condition in the sense of a sine qua non, of 
their election to salvation, but could not have been the fundamental rea- 
son for it, as we shall see. God did not elect them to salvation, for or 
on account of their foreseen good works, but upon condition of their fore- 
seen repentance, faith and perseverance. 

4. The Bible doctrine of election is not that God elected some to sal- 



ELECTION. 483 

ration, upon such conditions that it is really uncertain whether they will 
comply with those conditions, and be finally saved. The Bible does not 
leave the question of the final salvation of the elect as a matter of real 
uncertainty. This we shall see in its place. The elect were chosen to 
salvation, upon condition that God foresaw that he could secure their re- 
pentance, faith, and final perseverance. 

III. What the Bible doctrine of election is. * 

It is, that all of Adam's race, who are or ever will be saved, were from 
eternity chosen by God to eternal salvation, through the sanctification of 
their hearts by faith in Christ. In other words, they are chosen to sal- 
vation by means of sanctification. Their salvation is the end — their 
sanctification is a means. Both the end and the means are elected, ap- 
pointed, chosen ; the means as really as the end, and for the sake of the 
end. The election of some individuals and nations to certain privileges, 
and to do certain things, is not the kind of election of which I treat at 
this time ; but I am to consider the doctrine of election as it respects 
election unto salvation, as just explained. 

IV. I am to prove the doctrine as I have stated it to be true. 

1. It is plainly implied in the teaching of the Bible : the Bible every- 
where assumes and implies the truth of this doctrine just as might be 
expected, since it so irresistibly follows from the known and admitted 
attributes of God. Instead of formally revealing it as a truth unknown 
to, or unknowable by, the human reason, the scriptures in a great vari- 
ety of ways speak of the elect, of election, etc., as a truth known by 
irresistible inference from his known attributes. To deny it involves a 
denial of the attributes of God. I have been surprised at the labored 
and learned efforts to show that this doctrine is not expressly taught in 
the Bible. Suppose it were not, what then ? Other truths are taught 
and reason irresistibly affirms truths, from which the doctrine of election, 
as I have stated it, must follow. It is common for the inspired writers 
to treat truths of this class in the same manner in which this is, for the 
most part, treated. Suppose it were possible so to explain every passage of 
scripture as that no one of them should unequivocally assert the doctrine 
in question, this would be to no purpose ; the doctrine would still be 
irresistibly inferrible from the attributes of God. It would still be true, 
that the Bible assumes the truth of the doctrine, and incidentally speaks 
of it as a truth of reason, and as following of course from the attributes 
of God. It is thus treated throughout the entire scriptures. The Bible 
as really assumes the truth of this doctrine, as it does the existence of 
God. It asserts it just as it does the attributes of God. The learned 
and labored efforts to show that this doctrine is not expressly asserted in 



484 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the Bible, are of no value, since it would follow as a certain truth from 
the attributes of God, and from the revealed facts, that some will be 
saved, and that God will save them, even had the Bible been silent on 
the subject. I shall therefore only introduce a few passages for the pur- 
pose of showing that the inspired writers repeatedly recognize the truth 
of this doctrine, and thus preserve their own consistency. But I shall 
not attempt by labored criticism to prove it from scripture, for reasons 
just mentioned. 

Matt. xx. 16 : "So the last shall be first, and the first last, for many 
be called, but few chosen." 

Matt. xxiv. 22 : " And except those days should be shortened, there 
should no flesh be saved ; but for the elect's sake those days shall be 
shortened." 

John xiii. 18 : "I speak not of you all ; I know whom I have chosen." 

John xv. 16 : "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and 
ordained you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit 
should remain ; that whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, 
he may give it you. 19. If ye were of the world, the world would love 
his own ; but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out 
of the world, therefore the world hateth you." 

Eom. viii. 28 : " And we know that all things work together for good 
to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his pur- 
pose. 29. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be 
conformed to the image of his Son., that he might be the first-born among 
many brethren." 

Eom. ix. 10 : " And not only this, but when Eebecca had conceived 
by one, even by our father Isaac ; 11. (For the children being not yet 
born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God 
according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth.) 
12. It was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger. 13. As it 
is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. 14. What shall 
we say then ? Is there unrighteousness with God ? God forbid. 15. 
For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, 
and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." 

Eom. xi. 5 : "Even so at this present time also there is a remnant 
according to the election of grace. 7. What then ? Israel hath not ob- 
tained that which he seeketh for, but the election hath obtained it, and 
the rest were blinded." 

Eph. i. 4 : " According as he hath chosen us in him before the foun- 
dation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before 
him in love. 11. In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being 
predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things 
after the counsel of his own will." 



ELECTION. 4S5 

1 Thess. i. 4 : " Knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God." 

1 Thess. v. 9 : " For God hath not appointed us to wrath, but to ob- 
tain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ." 

% Thess. ii. 13 : "But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for 
you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning 
chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of 
the truth." 

1 Pet. i. 2 : " Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, 
through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of 
the blood of Jesus Christ." 

Eev. xvii. 8 : " The beast that thou sawest was, and is not ; and shall 
ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition : and they that 
dwell on the earth shall wonder, (whose names were not written in the 
book of life from the foundation of the world,) when they behold the 
beast that was, and is not, and yet is." This doctrine is expressly as- 
serted, or indirectly assumed and implied in every part of the Bible, and 
in ways and instances too numerous to be quoted in these lectures. The 
above are only specimens of the scripture treatment of this subject. 

2. It is plainly the doctrine of reason. 

(1.) It is admitted that God by his own agency secures the conversion, 
sanctification, and salvation of all that ever were or will be saved. 

(2. ) Whatever volitions or actions God puts forth to convert and save 
men, he puts forth designing to secure that end ; that is, he does it in 
accordance with a previous design to do as and what he does. This 
must be an universal truth, to wit, that whatever God does for the sal- 
vation of men, he does with the design to secure the salvation of 
all who ever will be saved, or of all whose salvation he foresees that he 
can secure, and with the certain knowledge that he shall secure their sal- 
vation. He also does much for the non-elect, in the sense of using such 
means with them as might secure, and ought to secure, their salvation. 
But as he knows he shall not succeed in securing their salvation, on ac- 
count of their voluntary and persevering wickedness, it cannot be truly 
said, that he uses these means with design to save them, but for other, 
and good, and wise reasons. Although he foresees, that he cannot se- 
cure their salvation, because of their wilful and persevering unbelief, yet 
he sees it important under his government to manifest a readiness to 
save them, and to use such means as he wisely can to save them, and such 
as will ultimately be seen to leave them wholly without excuse. 

But with respect to those whom he foresees that he can and shall save, 
it must be true, since he is a good being, that he uses means for their 
salvation, with the design to save them. And since, as we have seen, he 
is an omniscient being, he must use these means, not only with a design 
to save them, but also with the certainty that he shall save them. With 



486 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

respect to them, lie uses these means for the sake of this end ; that is, 
for the sake of their salvation. 

(3.) But if God ever chooses to save any human beings, he must 
always have chosen to do so, or else he has changed. If he now has, or 
ever will have, any design about it, he must always have had this design ; 
for he never has, and never can have, any new design. If he ever does, 
or will, elect any human being to salvation, he must always have chosen 
or elected him, or he has, or will form some new purpose, which is in- 
consistent with his immutability. 

(4.) If he will ever know who will be saved, he must always have 
known it, or he will obtain some new knowledge, which is contrary to 
his omniscience. 

(5.) We are told by Christ, that at the day of judgment he will say 
to the righteous, " Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom 
prepared for you from the foundation of the world;" that is, from 
eternity. Now, has the Judge at that time any new knowledge or design 
respecting those individuals ? Certainly not. 

(6.) Since God of necessity eternally knew all about the elect that 
will ever be true, he must of necessity have chosen something in respect 
to them ; for it is naturally impossible, that he should have had no 
choice about, or in respect to, them and their salvation. 

(7.) Since God must of necessity from eternity have had some choice 
in respect to their salvation, it follows, that he must have chosen -that 
they should be saved, or that he would not use such means as he foresaw 
would save them. If he chose not to use those means that he foresaw 
would save them, but afterwards saves them, he has changed, which is 
contrary to his immutability. If he always chose that they should be 
saved, this is the very thing for which we are contending. 

(8. ) It must therefore be true, that all whom God will ever save were 
from eternity chosen to salvation by him ; and since he saves them by 
means of sanctification, and does this designedly, it must be that this 
also was eternally designed or intended by him. 

To deny the doctrine of election, therefore, involves a denial of the 
attributes of God. 

(9.) It must also be true, that God foreknew all that ever will be true 
of the non-elect, and must have eternally had some design respecting 
their final destiny. And also that he has from eternity had the same, 
and the only design that he ever will have in respect to them. But this 
will come up for consideration in its place. 

V. What could not have been the reasons for election. 

1. It is admitted that God is infinitely benevolent and wise. It must 
follow that election is founded in some reason or reasons ; and that these 



ELECTION. 487 

reasons are good and sufficient ; reasons that rendered it obligatory upon 
God to choose just as he did, in election. Assuming, as we must, that 
God is wise and good, we are safe in affirming that he could have had 
none but benevolent reasons for his election of some to eternal life in 
preference to others. Hence we are bound to affirm, that election was 
not based upon, nor does it imply partiality in God, in any bad sense of 
that term. Partiality in any being, consists in preferring one to another 
without any good or sufficient reason, or in opposition to good and suffi- 
cient reasons. It being admitted that God is infinitely wise and good, it 
follows, that he cannot be partial ; that he cannot have elected some to 
eternal salvation and passed others by, without some good and sufficient 
reason. That is, he cannot have done it arbitrarily. The great objec- 
tion that is felt and urged by opposers of this doctrine is, that it implies 
partiality in God, and represents him as deciding the eternal destiny of 
moral agents by an arbitrary sovereignty. But this objection is a sheer 
and altogether unwarrantable assumption. It assumes, that God could 
have had no good and sufficient reasons for the election. It has been 
settled, that good is the end upon which God set his heart ; that is, the 
highest well being of himself and the universe of creatures. This end 
must be accomplished by means. If God is infinitely wise and good, he 
must have chosen the best practicable means. But he has chosen the 
best means for that end, and there can be no partiality in that. 

In support of the assumption, that election implies partiality, and 
the exercise of an arbitrary sovereignty in God, it has been affirmed, that 
there might have been divers systems of means for securing the same end 
in every respect equal to each other ; that is, that no reason existed for 
preferring any one, to many others ; that therefore in choosing the 
present, God must have been partial, or must have exercised an arbitrary 
sovereignty. To this I answer : — 

(1.) There is no ground for the assumption, that there are or can be 
divers systems of means of precisely equal value in all respects, in such a 
sense, that there could have been no good reason for preferring one to 
the other. 

(2.) I reply, that if there were divers such systems, choosing the one, 
and not any other, would not imply preference. Choice of any one in 
such case must have proceeded upon the following ground ; to wit, the 
value of the end demanded, that one should be chosen. There being no 
difference between the various systems of means, God chooses one without 
reference to the other, and makes no choice respecting it, any more than 
if it did not exist. He must choose one, he has no reason for preference, 
and consequently he cannot prefer one to the other. His benevolence 
leads him to choose one because the end demands it. He therefore takes 
any one of many exact equals, indifferently, without preferring it to any 



48S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of the others. This implies no partiality in God in any bad sense of the 
term. For upon the supposition, he was shut up to the necessity of 
choosing one among many exact equals. If he is partial in choosing the 
one he does, he would have been equally so had he chosen any other. 
If this is partiality, it is a partiality arising out of the necessity of the 
case, and cannot imply anything objectionable in God. 

That there is no preference in this case is plain, because there is no 
ground or reason for preference whatever, according to the supposition. 
But there can be no choice or preference, when there is absolutely no 
reason for the choice or preference. We have seen on a former occasion, 
that the reason that determines choice, or the reason in view of which, or 
in obedience to which, or for the sake of which, the mind chooses, and 
the object or end chosen, are identical. When there is absolutely no rea- 
son for a choice, there is absolutely no object of choice, nothing to choose, 
and of course there can be no choice. Choice must have an object ; that 
is, choice must terminate upon something. If choice exists, something 
must be chosen. If there are divers systems of means, between which 
there is no possible ground of preference, there can absolutely be no such 
thing as preferring one to the other, for this would be the same as to 
choose without any object of choice, or without choosing anything, which 
is a contradiction. 

If it be said, that there may be absolutely no difference in the system 
of means, so far as the accomplishment of the end is concerned, but that 
one may be preferred or preferable to another, on some other account, I 
ask on what other account ? According to the supposition, it is only 
valued or regarded as an object of choice at all, because of its relation to 
the end. God can absolutely choose it only as a means, a condition, or 
an end ; for all choice must respect these. The inquiry now respects 
means. Now, if as a means, there is absolutely no difference between 
diverse systems in their relation to the end, and the value of the end is 
the sole reason for choosing them, it follows, that to prefer one to another 
is a natural impossibility. But one must be chosen for the sake of the 
end, it matters not which ; any one is taken indifferently so far as others 
are concerned. This is no partiality, and no exercise of arbitrary sove- 
reignty in any objectionable sense. 

But as I said, there is no ground for the assumption, that there are 
various systems of means for accomplishing the great end of benevolence 
in all respects equal. There must have been a best way, a best system, 
and if God is infinitely wise and good, he must have chosen that for that 
reason ; and this is as far as possible from partiality. Neither we, nor 
any other creature may be able now to discover any good reasons for pre- 
ferring the present to any other system, or for electing those who are 
elected, in preference to any other. Nevertheless, such reasons must 



ELECTION. 489 

have been apparent to the Divine mind, or no such election could have 
taken place. 

2. Election was not an exercise of arbitrary sovereignty. By arbitrary 
sovereignty is intended the choosing and acting from mere will, without 
consulting moral obligation or the public good. It is admitted that God 
is infinitely wise and good. It is therefore impossible that he should' 
choose or act arbitrarily in any case whatever. He must have good and 
sufficient reasons for every choice and every act. 

Some seem to have represented God, in the purpose or act of election, 
as electing some and not others, merely because he could or would, or in 
other words, to exhibit his own sovereignty, without any other reasons 
than because so he would have it. But it is impossible for God to act 
arbitrarily, or from any but a good and sufficient reason ; that is, it is 
impossible for him to do so, and continue to be benevolent. We have 
said that God has one, and but one end in view ; that is, he does, and 
says, and suffers all for one and the same reason, namely, to promote the 
highest good of being. He has but one ultimate end, and all his volitions 
are only efforts to secure that end. The highest well being of the uni- 
verse, including his own, is the end on which his supreme and ultimate 
choice terminates. All his volitions are designed to secure this end, and 
in all things he is and must be directed by his infinite intelligence, in 
respect not only to his ultimate end, but also in the choice and use of the 
means of accomplishing this end. It is impossible that this should not 
be true, if he is good. In election then he cannot possibly have exercised 
any arbitrary sovereignty, but must have had the best of reasons for the 
election. His intelligence must have had good reasons for the choice of 
some and not of others to salvation, and have affirmed his obligation in 
view of those reasons to elect just as and whom he did. So good must 
the reasons have been, that to have done otherwise, would have been sin 
in him ; that is, to have done otherwise would not have been wise and 
good. 

3. Election was not based on a foreseen difference in the moral char- 
acter of the elect and the non-elect, previous to regeneration. The Bible 
everywhere affirms, that, previous to regeneration, all men have precisely 
the same character, and possess one common heart or disposition, that 
this character is that of total moral depravity. God did not choose some 
to salvation because he foresaw that they would be less depraved and 
guilty, previous to regeneration, than the non-elect. Paul was one of the 
elect, yet he affirms himself to have been the chief of sinners. We often 
see, and this has been common in every age, the most outwardly aban- 
doned and profligate converted and saved. 

The reason of election is not found in the fact, that God foresaw that 
some would be more readilv converted than others. We often see those 



490 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

who are converted hold out for a long time in great obstinacy and rebel- 
lion, while God brings to bear upon them a great variety of means and 
influences, and takes much more apparent pains to convert them than he 
does to convert many others who are, as well as those who are not, con- 
verted. There is reason to believe, that if the same means were used 
with those who are not converted that are used with those who are, many 
who are not converted would be. It may not be wise in God to use the 
same means for the non-elect, and if he should, they might, or might not 
be saved by them. God often uses means that to us seem more powerful 
to convert the non- elect than are used to convert many of the elect. 
This is fully implied in Matt. xi. 20-24. The fact is, he must have some 
reason aside from their characters for stubbornness or otherwise, for elect- 
ing them to salvation. 

VI. What must have been the reasons for election. 

1. We have seen that God is infinitely wise and good. From the 
wisdom and goodness of God, it follows, that he must have chosen some 
good end, and must have had some plan, or system of means, to secure 
it. The end, we know, is the good of being. The means, we know from 
reason and revelation, include election in the sense explained. It fol- 
lows, that the fundamental reason for election was the highest good of 
the universe. That is, the best system of means for securing the great 
end of benevolence, included the election of just those who were elected, 
and no others. This has been done by the wisdom and benevolence of 
God. It follows, that the highest good demanded it. All choice must 
respect ends, or conditions and means. God has, and can have, but one 
ultimate end. All other choices or volitions must respect means. The 
choice or election of certain persons to eternal salvation, etc., must have 
been founded in the reason, that the great end of benevolence de- 
manded it. 

2. It is very easy to see, that under a moral government, it might be 
impossible so to administer law, as to secure the perpetual and universal 
obedience of all. 

It is also easy to see, that under a remedial system, or system of grace, 
it might be impossible to secure the repentance and salvation of all. God 
must have foreseen all possible and actual results. He must have fore- 
seen how many, and whom he could save by the wisest and best possible 
arrangement, all things considered. The perfect wisdom and benevo- 
lence of God being granted, it follows, that we are bound to regard the 
present system of means as the best, all things considered, that he could 
adopt for the promotion of the great end of his government, or the great 
end of benevolence. The fact, that the wisest and best system of govern- 
ment would secure the salvation of those who are elected, must have 



ELECTION. 491 

been a condition of their being elected. As God does everything for the 
same ultimate reason, it follows, that the intrinsic value of their salva- 
tion was his ultimate end, and that their salvation in particular must 
have been of greater relative value in promoting the highest good of the 
universe at large, and the glory of God, than would have been that of 
others ; so that the intrinsic value of the salvation of those elected in 
particular, the fact that by the wisest arrangement he could save them 
in particular, and the paramount good to be promoted by it, must have 
been the reasons for election. 

VII. When the election tvas made. 

1. Not when the elect are converted. It is admitted, that God is 
omniscient, and has known all things from eternity as really and as 
perfectly as he ever will. It is also admitted, that God is unchangeable, 
and consequently has no new plans, designs, or choices. He must have 
had all the reasons he ever will have for election, from eternity, because 
he always has had all the knowledge of all events that he ever will have ; 
consequently he always or from eternity chose in respect to all events 
just as he always will. There never can be any reason for change in the 
Divine mind, for he never will have any new views of any subject. The 
choice which constitutes election, then, must be an eternal choice. 

2. Thus the scriptures represent it. 

Eph. i. 4 : " According as he hath chosen us in him before the foun- 
dation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before 
him in love." 

Eph. ii. 10 : " For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus 
unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk 
in them." 

2 Tim. i. 9 : " Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, 
not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, 
which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." 

Eev. xvii. 8 : " The beast that thou sawest was, and is not, and shall 
ascend out of the bottomless pit, and go into perdition : and they that 
dwell on the earth shall wonder, (whose names were not written in the 
book of life from the foundation of the world,) when they behold the 
beast that was, and is not, and yet is." 

This language means from eternity, beyond question. 

3. But the question will arise, was election in the order of nature 
subsequent to, or did it precede the Divine foreknowledge. The answer 
to this plainly is, that in the order of nature what could be wisely done 
must have been foreseen before it was determined what should be done. 
And what should be done must, in the order of nature, have preceded' 
the knowledge of what would be done. So that in the order of nature; 



492 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

foreknowledge of what could be wisely done preceded election, and fore- 
knowledge of what would be done, followed or was subsequent to elec- 
tion.* In other words, God must have known whom he could wisely 
save, prior, in the order of nature, to his determination to save them. 
But his knowing who would be saved must have been, in the order of 
nature, subsequent to his election or determination to save them, and 
dependent upon that determination. 

VIII. Election does not render means for the salvation of the elect 
unnecessary, 

"We have seen that the elect are chosen to salvation through the use 
of means. Since they are chosen to be saved by means, they cannot be 
saved in any other way or without them. 

IX. Election is the only ground of hope in the success of means. 

1. ISTo means are of any avail unless God gives them efficiency. 

2. If God gives them efficiency in any case, it is, and will be, in 
accordance with, and in execution of, his election. 

3. It follows that election is the only ground of rational hope in the 
use of means to effect the salvation of any. 

X. Election does not oppose any obstacle to the salvation of the non- 
elect. 

1. God has taken care to bring salvation within the reach of all, and 
to make it possible to all. 

2. He sincerely offers to save all, and does all to save all that he 
wisely can. 

3. His saving some is no discouragement to others, but should rather 
encourage them to lay hold on eternal life. 

4. The election of some is no bar to the salvation of others. 

5. Those who are not elected may be saved, if they will but comply 
with the conditions, which they are able to do. 

6. God sincerely calls, and ministers may sincerely call on the non 
elect to lay hold on salvation. 

7. There is no injury or injustice done to the non-elect by the elec- 
tion of others. Has not God "a right to do what he will with his 
own ?" If he offers salvation to all upon terms the most reasonable, and 

* I say, in the order of nature. With God all duration or time is present. In the 
order of time, therefore, all the divine ideas and purposes are cotemporaneous. But 
the divine ideas must sustain to each other a logical relation. In the above para- 
graph I have stated what must have been the logical order of the Divine ideas in re- 
gard to election. By the order of nature, is intended that connection and relation 
of ideas that must result from the nature of intellect. 



ELECTION. 493 

if he does all he wisely can for the salvation of all, shall some complain 
if God, in doing for all what he wisely can, secures the salvation of some 
and not of others ? 

XL There is no injustice in election. 

<CCrod was under obligation to no one — he might in perfect justice 
have sent all mankind to hell. ^jThe doctrine of election will damn no 
one : by treating the non-elect according to their deserts, he does them 
no injustice ; and surely his exercising grace in the salvation of the 
elect, is no act of injustice to the non-elect ; and especially will this 
appear to be true, if we take into consideration the fact, that the only 
reason why the non-elect will not be saved is, because they pertinaciously 
refuse salvation. He offers mercy to all. The atonement is sufficient 
for all. All may come, and are under an obligation to be saved. He 
strongly desires their salvation, and does all that he wisely can to save 
them. Why then should the doctrine of election be thought unjust ? * 

* To this paragraph it has "been objected as follows : — "Can it be said, that the 
only reason why the non-elect are not saved is their rejection of salvation, etc? Is 
there not a reason back of this ? God does not give that gracious influence in their 
case, which he does in the case of the elect. If the only reason why the non-elect 
are not saved is their pertinacious refusal, then it would follow that the only reason 
why the elect are saved, is their acceptance of salvation. If these two points are 
so, then why all this discussion about election to salvation, and the means to that 
end, and God's reason for electing V The whole matter would resolve itself into free- 
will, and God would stand quite independent of the issue in every case. Then 
would there be no such thing as election." 

The objection contains a non sequitur. 

I say, the only reason why the non-elect are not saved, is because they pertina- 
ciously refuse salvation. But if this is true, he says, "it will follow that the only 
reason why the elect are saved, is their acceptance of salvation. But this does not 
follow. The non-elect fail of salvation only because they resist all the grace that 
God can wisely bestow upon them. This grace they resist, and fail of salvation. 
It is no more reasonable to say, that God's not giving them more divine influence to 
convert them " is a reason back of this," than it would be to say that his not having 
by a gracious influence, restrained them from sin altogether, is " a reason back of " 
their pertinacious resistance of grace. If the non-elect are lost, or fail of salvation 
only because they resist all the grace that God can wisely bestow, it would not fol- 
low that the only reason why the elect are saved, is because they accept, or yield to 
the same measure of gracious influence as that bestowed upon the non-elect, for it 
may be, and in many cases the fact is, that God does bestow more gracious influence 
on the elect, than on the non-elect, because he can wisely do so. Here then is a 
plain non sequitur. Observe, I am writing in the paragraph in question upon the 
justice of the divine proceeding. I say, that so far as this is concerned, he fails of 
salvation, not because God withholds the grace that he could wisely bestow, but 
only because he rejects the grace proffered, and all that can be wisely proffered. 

If I understand this objector, there is another non sequitur in his objection. I 
understand him to say, that upon the supposition th^t the elect and the non-elect 



4:94: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

XII. This is the best that could be done for the inhabitants of this 
world. 

It is reasonable to infer from the infinite benevolence of God, that 
his present government will secure a greater amount of good than could 
have been secured under any other mode of administration. This is as 
certain as that infinite benevolence must prefer a greater to a less good. 

have the same measure of gracious influence, and that the reason why the elect are 
saved, and the non-elect not saved is, that the elect yield to, and the non-elect 
resist this influence ; the whole question resolves into free-will, and there is no 
election about it. If this is his meaning, as I think it must be, it is a plain non 
sequitur. Suppose God foresaw that this would be so, and in view of this foreseen 
fact elected those who he foresaw would yield both to the privileges and gracious 
influence to which he foresaw they would yield, and to salvation as a consequence 
of this influence and yielding. And suppose he foresaw that the non-elect, although 
ordained or elected to enjoy the same measure of gracious influence, would resist 
and reject salvation, and for this cause rejected or reprobated them in his eternal 
purpose. Would not this be election ? To be sure, in this case the different results 
would turn upon the fact that the elect yielded, and the non-elect did not yield, to 
the same measure of gracious influence. But there would be an election of the one 
to eternal life, and a rejection of the other. I cannot see how this objector can say, 
that in this case there could be no election, unless in his idea of election there is 
the exercise of an arbitrary sovereignty. I suppose that God bestows on men une- 
qual measures of gracious influence, but that in this there is nothing arbitrary ; 
that, on the contrary, he sees the wisest and best reasons for this ; that being in 
justice under obligation to none, he exercises his own benevolent discretion, in 
bestowing on all as much gracious influence as he sees to be upon the whole wise 
and good, and enough to throw the entire responsibility of their damnation upon 
them if they are lost. But upon some he foresaw that he could wisely bestow 
a sufficient measure of gracious influence to secure their voluntary yielding, and 
upon others he could not bestow enough in fact to secure this result, In accord- 
ance with this foreknowledge, he chose the elect to both the gracious influence and 
its results, eternal life. In all this there was nothing arbitrary or unjust. He does 
all for all that he wisely can. He does enough for all to leave them without ex- 
cuse. If the non-elect would yield to that measure of gracious influence which he 
can and does bestow upon them, which is the best he can do without acting unwisely, 
and of course wickedly, they would be saved. To this they might yield. To this 
they ought to yield. God has no right to do more than he does for them, all things 
considered ; and there is no reason of which they can j ustly complain why they are 
not saved. They can with no more reason complain of his not giving them more 
gracious influence than that he created them, or that he made them free agents, or 
that he did not restrain them from sin altogether, or do anything else which it had 
been unwise, and therefore wrong to have done. Nor is the fact that God does not 
bestow on them sufficient grace to secure their yielding and salvation, a " reason 
back of their obstinacy to which their not being saved is to be ascribed," any more 
than any one of the above-named things is such a reason. 

This objection proceeds upon the assumption, that election must be uncondi- 
tional to be election at all — that election must be so defined, as to be the cause of 
the difference in the eternal state of the elect and non-elect. But I see not why 



ELECTION. 495 

To suppose that God would prefer a mode of administration that would 
secure a less good than could have been secured under some other mode, 
would manifestly be to accuse him of a want of benevolence. It is doubt- 
less true that he could so vary the course of events as to save other indi- 
viduals than those he does ; to convert more in one particular neighbor- 
hood, or family, or nation, or at one particular time ; or it may be a 
greater number upon the whole than he does. It would not follow that 
he does not secure the greater good upon the whole. 

Suppose there is a man in this town, who has so strongly intrenched 
himself in error, that there is but one man in all the land who is so ac- 
quainted with his refuge of lies as to be able to answer his objections, 
and drive him from his hiding-places. Now, it is possible, that if this 
individual could be brought in contact with him, he might be converted ; 
yet if he is employed in some distant part of the vineyard, his removal 
from that field of labor to this town, might not, upon the whole, be most 
for the glory of God's kingdom ; and more might fail of salvation through 
his removal here, than would be converted by such removal. God has in 
view the good of his whole kingdom. He works upon a vast and com- 
prehensive scale. He has no partialities for individuals, but moves 
forward in the administration of his government with his eye upon the 
general good, designing to secure the greatest amount of happiness with- 
in his kingdom that can be secured by the wisest possible arrangement, 
and administration of his government. 

XIII. How we may ascertain our own election. 

Those of the elect that are already converted, are known by their 
character and conduct. They have evidence of their election in their 
obedience to God. Those that are unconverted may settle the question 
each one for himself, whether he is elected or not, so as to have the most 
satisfactory evidence whether he is of that happy number. If you will 
now submit yourselves to God, you may have evidence that you are 
elected. But every hour you put off submission, increases the evidence 
that you are not elected. 

Every sinner under the gospel has it within his power to accept or 
reject salvation. The elect can know their election only by accepting 
the offered gift. The non-elect can know their non-election only by the 
consciousness of a voluntary rejection of offered life. If any one fears 

election may not be conditioned upon the foreseen fact, that the wisest possible 
administration of moral government would secure the free concurrence of some, 
and not of others. What could be wisely done being foreseen, the purpose that so 
it should be done would be election. No man has a right to define the terms election 
and reprobation in such a sense, as to exclude all conditions, and then insist that 
conditional election is no election at all. 



496 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

that he is one of the non-elect, let him at once renounce his unbelief, 
and cease to reject salvation, and the ground of fear and complaint in- 
stantly falls away. 

INFERENCES AND REMARKS. 

1. Foreknowledge and election are not inconsistent with free agency. 
The elect were chosen to eternal life, upon condition that God foresaw 
that in the perfect exercise of their freedom, they could be induced to 
repent and embrace the gospel. 

2. You see why many persons are opposed to the doctrine of election, 
and try to explain it away ; 1st., they misunderstand it, and 2nd, they 
deduce unwarrantable inferences from it. They suppose it to mean, that 
the elect will be saved at all events, whatever their conduct may be ; and 
again, they infer from the doctrine that there is no possibility of the sal- 
vation of the non-elect. The doctrine, as they understand it, would be 
an encouragement to the elect to persevere in sin, knowing that their 
salvation was sure, and their inference would drive the non-elect to des- 
peration, on the ground that for them to make efforts to be saved would 
be of no avail. But both the doctrine, as they understand it, and the 
inference, are false. For election does not secure the salvation of the 
elect irrespective of their character and conduct ; nor, as we have seen, 
does it throw any obstacle in the way of the salvation of the non-elect. 

3. This view of the subject affords no ground for presumption on the 
one hand, nor for despair upon the other. No one can justly say, If I 
am to be saved I shall be saved, do what I will. Nor can any one say, If 
I am to be damned I shall be damned, do what I will. But the question 
is left, so far as they are concerned, as a matter of entire contingency. 
Sinners, your salvation or damnation is as absolutely suspended upon 
your own choice, as if God neither knew nor designed anything about it. 

4. This doctrine lays no foundation for a controversy with God. But 
on the other hand, it does lay a broad foundation for gratitude, both on 
the part of the elect and non-elect. The elect certainly have great reason 
for thankfulness, that they are thus distinguished. Oh, what a thought, 
to have your name written in the book of life, to be chosen of God an 
heir of eternal salvation, to be adopted into his family, to be destined to 
enjoy his presence, and to bathe your soul in the boundless ocean of his 
love for ever and ever ! Nor are the non-elect without obligations of 
thankfulness. You ought to be grateful, if any of your brethren of the 
human family are saved. If all were lost, God would be just. And if 
any of this dying world receive the gift of eternal life, you ought to be 
grateful, and render everlasting thanks to God. 

5. The non-elect often enjoy as great or greater privileges than the 
elect. Many men have lived and died under the sound of the gospel, 



ELECTION. 497 

have enjoyed all the means of salvation during a long life, and have at 
last died in their sins, while others have been converted upon their first 
hearing the gospel of God. Nor is this difference owing to the fact, that 
the elect always have more of the strivings of the Spirit than the non- 
elect. Many who die in their sins, appear to have had conviction for a 
great part of their lives ; have often been deeply impressed with a strong 
sense of their sins and the value of their souls, but have strongly in- 
trenched themselves under refuges of lies, have loved the world an,d 
hated God, and fought their way through all the obstacles that were 
thrown around them to hedge up their way to death, and have literally 
forced their passage to the gates of hell. Sin was their voluntary choice. 

6. Why should the doctrine of election be made a stumbling-block in 
the way of sinners ? In nothing else do they make the same use of the 
purposes and designs of God, as they do on. the subject of religion ; and 
yet, in everything else, God's purposes and designs are as much settled, 
and have as absolute an influence. God has as certainly designed the day 
and circumstances of your death, as whether your soul shall be saved. 
It is not only expressly declared in the Bible, but is plainly the doctrine 
of reason. What would you say if you should be called in to see a neigh- 
bor who was sick ; and, on inquiry, you should find he would neither eat 
nor drink, and that he was verily starving himself to death. On expos- 
tulating with him upon his conduct, suppose he should calmly reply, that 
he believed in the sovereignty of God, in foreknowledge, election and 
decrees ; that his days were numbered, that the time and circumstances 
of his death were settled, that he could not die before his time, and that 
all efforts he could make would not enable him to live a moment beyond 
his time ; and if you attempted to remonstrate against his inference, and 
such an abuse and perversion of the doctrine of decrees, he should accuse 
you of being a heretic, of not believing in divine sovereignty. Now, 
should you see a man on worldly subjects reasoning and acting thus, you 
would pronounce him insane. Should farmers, mechanics, and mer- 
chants, reason in this way in regard to their worldly business, they would 
be considered fit subjects for bedlam. 

7. How forcibly the perversion and abuse of this doctrine illustrate 
the madness of the human heart, and its utter opposition to the terms of 
salvation ! The fact that God foreknows, and has designs in regard to 
every other event, is not made an excuse for remaining idle, or worse 
than idle, on these subjects. But where men's duty to God is concerned, 
and here alone, they seize these scriptures, and wrest them to their own 
destruction. How impressively does this fact bring out the demonstra- 
tion, that sinners want an excuse for disobeying God ; that they desire 
an apology for living in sin ; that they seek an occasion for making war 
upon their Maker. 

32 



£98 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

8. I have said, that the question is as much open for yonr decision, 
that yon are left as perfectly to the exercise of your freedom, as if God 
neither knew or designed anything in regard to your salvation. Suppose 
there was a great famine in New York city, and that John Jacob Astor 
alone had provisions in great abundance ; that he was a benevolent and 
liberal-minded man, and willing to supply the whole city with provisions, 
free of expense ; and suppose there existed a universal and most unrea- 
sonable prejudice against him, insomuch that when he advertised in the 
daily papers that his store-houses were open, that whosoever would, might 
come and receive provisions, without money and without price, they all, 
with one accord, began to make excuse, and obstinately refused to accept 
the offers. Now, suppose that he should employ all the cartmen to carry 
provisions around the city, and stop at every door. But still they 
strengthened each other's hands, and would rather die than be indebted 
to him for food. Many had said so much against him, that they were 
utterly ashamed to feel and acknowledge their dependence upon him. 
Others were so much under their influence as to be unwilling to offend 
them ; and so strong was the tide of public sentiment, that no one had 
the moral courage to break loose from the multitude and accept of life. 
Now, suppose that Mr. Astor knew beforehand the state of the public 
mind, and that all the citizens hated him, and had rather die than be 
indebted to him for food. Suppose he also knew, from the beginning, 
that there were certain arguments that he could bring to bear upon cer- 
tain individuals, that would change their minds, and that he should pro- 
ceed to press them with these considerations, until they had given up 
their opposition, had most thankfully accepted his provisions, and were 
saved from death. Suppose he used all the arguments and means that 
he wisely could to persuade the rest, but that, notwithstanding all his 
benevolent efforts, they adhered to the resolution, and preferred death to 
submission to his proposals. Suppose, further, he had perfect knowledge 
from the beginning, of the issue of this whole matter, would not the 
question of life and death be as entirely open for the decision of every 
individual as if he knew nothing about it ? 

9. Some may ask, Why does God use means with the non-elect, which 
he is certain they will not accept ? I answer, because he designs that 
they shall be without excuse. He will demonstrate his willingness and 
their obstinacy before the universe. He will stop their mouths effectu- 
ally in judgment by a full offer of salvation ; and although he knows 
that their rejection of the offer will only enhance their guilt, and aggra- 
vate their deep damnation, still he will make the offer, as there is no 
other way in which to illustrate his infinite willingness to save them, and 
their perverse rejection of his grace. 

10. Lastly, God requires you to give all diligence to make your call* 



REPROBATION. 499 

ing and election sure. In choosing his elect, you must understand that 
he has thrown the responsibility of their being saved upon them ; that 
the whole is suspended upon their consent to the terms ; you are all per- 
fectly able to give your consent and this moment to lay hold on eternal 
life. Irrespective of your own choice, no election could save you, and 
no reprobation can damn you. The " Spirit and the Bride say Come : 
let him that heareth say, Come ; let him that is athirst come ; and who- 
soever will, let him take the water of life freely." The responsibility is 
yours. God does all that he wisely can, and challenges you to show what 
more he could do that he has not done. If you go to hell, you must go 
stained with your own blood. God is clear, angels are clear. To your 
own Master you stand or fall ; mercy waits ; the Spirit strives ; Jesus 
stands at the door and knocks. Do not then pervert this doctrine, and 
make it an occasion of stumbling, till you are in the depths of hell. 



LECTURE XLIV. 

REPROBATION. 

Ik discussing this subject I shall endeavor to show, 

I. What the true doctrine of reprobation is not. 

1. It is not that the ultimate end of God in the creation of any was 
their damnation. Neither reason nor revelation confirms, but both con- 
tradict the assumption, that God has created or can create any being for 
the purpose of rendering him miserable as an ultimate end. God is love, 
or he is benevolent, and cannot therefore will the misery of any being as 
an ultimate end, or for its own sake. It is little less than blasphemy to 
represent God as creating any being for the sake of rendering him miser- 
able, as an ultimate end of his creation. 

2. The doctrine is not, that any will be lost or miserable to all eter- 
nity, do what they can to be saved, or in spite of themselves. It is not 
only a libel upon the character of God, but a gross misrepresentation of 
the true doctrine of reprobation, to exhibit God as deciding to send sin- 
ners to hell in spite of themselves, or notwithstanding their endeavors to 
please God and obtain salvation. 

3. Nor is this the true doctrine of reprobation, to wit : that the pur- 
pose or decree of reprobation is the procuring cause of the destruction of 
reprobates. God may design to destroy a soul because of his foreseen 



500 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

wickedness ; but his design to destroy him for this reason does not cause 
his wickedness, and consequently does not prove his destruction. 

4. The doctrine is not, that any decree or purpose of reprobation 
throws any obstacles in the way of the salvation of any one. It is not 
that God has purposed the damnation of any one in such sense as that 
the decree opposes any obstacle to the salvation of any soul under heaven. 

5. Nor is it that any one is sent to hell, except for his own voluntary 
wickedness and ill-desert. 

6. Nor is it that any one will be lost who can be induced, by all the 
means that can be wisely used, to accept salvation, or to repent and be- 
lieve the gospel. 

7. Nor is it, nor does it imply, that all the reprobates might not be 
saved, if they would but comply with the indispensable conditions of sal- 
vation. 

8. Nor does it imply, that the decree of reprobation presents or opposes 
any obstacle to their compliance with the necessary conditions of salvation. 

9. Nor does it imply, that anything hinders or prevents the salvation 
of the reprobate, but their perverse perseverance in sin and rebellion 
against God, and their wilful resistance of all the means that can be 
wisely used for their salvation. 

II. What the true doctrine of reprobation is. 

The term reprobation, both in the Old and the New Testament, sig- 
nifies refuse, cast away. Jer. vi. 30: "Reprobate silver shall men call 
them, because the Lord hath rejected them." The doctrine is, that cer- 
tain individuals of mankind are, in the fixed purpose of God, cast away, 
rejected and finally lost. 

III. This is a doctrine of reason. 

By this is intended, that since the Bible reveals the fact, that some 
will be finally cast away and lost, reason affirms that if God casts them 
off, it must be in accordance with a fixed purpose on his part to do so, for 
their foreseen wickedness. If, as a matter of fact, they will be cast away 
and lost, it must be that God both knows and designs it. That is, he 
both knows that they will be cast away, and designs to cast them off for 
their foreseen wickedness. God can certainly never possess any new 
knowledge respecting their character and deserts, and since he is un- 
changeable, he can never have any new purpose respecting them. 

Again, it follows from the doctrine of election. If God designs to 
save the elect, and the elect only, as has been shown, not for the reason, 
but upon condition of their foreseen repentance and faith in Christ, it 
must be that he designs, or purposes to cast away the wicked, for their' 
foreseen wickedness. He purposes to do something with those whom he 



REPROBATION. 501 

foresees will finally be impenitent. He certainly does not purpose to 
save them. What he will eyer do with them, he now knows that he shall 
do with them. What he will intend to do with them he now intends to 
do with them, or he were not unchangeable. But we have seen that im- 
mutability or unchangeableness is an attribute of God. Therefore the 
present reprobation of those who will be finally cast away or lost, is a 
doctrine of reason. 

The doctrine of reprobation is not the election of a part of mankind 
to damnation, in the same sense that the elect unto salvation are elected 
to be saved. The latter are chosen or elected, not only to salvation, but 
to holiness. Election, with those who are saved, extends not only to the 
end, salvation, but also to the conditions or means ; to wit, the sanctifi- 
cation of the Spirit, and the belief of the truth. This has been shown. 
God has not only chosen them to salvation, but to be conformed to the 
image of his Son. Accordingly, he uses means with them, with the 
design to sanctify and save them. But he has not elected the reprobate 
to wickedness, and does not use means to make them wicked, with the 
ultimate design to destroy them. He knows, indeed, that his creating 
them, together with his providential dispensations, will be the occasion, 
not the cause, of their sin and consequent destruction. But their sin 
and consequent destruction are not the ultimate end God had in view in 
their creation, and in the train of providences that thus result. His ulti- 
mate end must in all cases be benevolent, or must be the promotion of 
good. Their sin and damnation are only an incidental result, and not a 
thing intended as an end, or for its own sake. God can have no pleas- 
ure, in either their sin or consequent misery for its own sake ; but on the 
contrary, he must regard both as in themselves evils of enormous magni- 
tude. He does not, and cannot therefore elect the reprobate to sin and 
damnation, in the same sense in which he elects the saints to holiness 
and salvation. The elect unto salvation he chooses to this end, from 
regard to, or delight in the end. But the reprobate he chooses to destroy, 
not for the sake of their destruction as an end, or from delight in it for 
its own sake ; but he has determined to destroy them for the public 
good, since their foreseen sinfulness demanded it. He does not use 
means to make- them sinful, or with this design ; but his providence is 
directed to another end, which end is good ; and the destruction of the 
reprobate is, as has been said, only an incidental and an unavoidable 
result. That is, God cannot wisely prevent this result. 

IV. This is the doctrine of revelation. 

That this view of the subject is sustained by divine revelation, will 
appear from a consideration of the following passages : — 

Ex. ix. 16 : "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, 



502 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared 
throughout all the earth." 

Prov. xvi. 5 : "Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination 
to the Lord ; though hand join in hand, he shall not be unpunished." 

Mark iv. 11 : " And he said unto them, unto you it is given to know 
the mystery of the kingdom of God, but unto them that are without, all 
these things are done in parables : 12. That seeing they may see, and 
not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest at any 
time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them." 

Eom. ix. 17 : " For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, even for this 
same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, 
and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. 22* 
What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, 
endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruc- 
tion. 23. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the 
vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory. 24. Even us, 
whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles ? " 

2 Cor. xiii. 56 : "Examine yourselves, whether ye be in the faith ; 
prove your own selves ; know ye not your own selves, how that Jesns 
Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates ? But I trust that ye shall 
know that we are not reprobates." 

2 Peter ii. 12 : " But these as natural brute beasts, made to be taken 
and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not ; and 
shall utterly perish in their own corruption." 

Ezek. xviii. 23 : " Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should 
die ? saith the Lord God ; and not that he should return from his ways, 
and live ? 32. For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, 
saith the Lord God, wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye ? " 

Ezek. xxxiii. 11 : " Say unto them, as I live, saith the Lord God, I 
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn 
from his way and live ; turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways ; for why 
will ye die, house of Israel ? " 

2 Peter iii. 9 : " The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as 
some men count slackness, but is long-suffering to usward, not willing 
that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." 

These passages when duly considered are seen to teach : 

1. That some men are reprobates, in the sense that God does not 
design to save, but to destroy them, and, — 

2. That he does not delight in their destruction for its own sake ; 
but would prefer their salvation, if under the circumstances in which his 
wisdom has placed them, they could be induced to obey him. 

3. But that he regards their destruction as a less evil to the universe, 
than would be such a change in the administration and arrangements of 



REPROBATION. 503 

his government as would secure their salvation. Therefore, for their 
foreseen wickedness and perseverance in rebellion, under circumstances 
the most favorable to their virtue and salvation, in which he can wisely 
place them, he is resolved upon their destruction ; and has already in 
purpose cast them off for ever. 

V. Why sinners are reprobated or rejected. 

This has been already substantially answered. But to avoid misap- 
prehension upon a subject so open to cavil, I repeat : 

1. That the reprobation and destruction of the sinner is not an end, 
in the sense that God delights in misery, and destroys sinners to gratify a 
thirst for destruction. Since God is benevolent, it is impossible that this 
should be. 

2. It is not because of any partiality in God, or because he loves the 
elect, and hates the reprobate, in any sense implying partiality. His 
benevolence is disinterested, and cannot of course be partial. 

3. It is not from any want of interest in, and desire to save them, on 
the part of God. This he often affirms, and abundantly attests by his 
dealings with them, and the provision he has made for their salvation. 

4. But the reprobates are reprobated for their foreseen iniquities : — 
Eom. i. 28 : "And even as they did not like to retain God in their 

knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things 
which are not convenient." 

Eom. ii. 6 : f' Who will render to every man according to his deeds : 
7. To them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, 
honor, and immortality, eternal life ; 8. But unto them that are conten- 
tious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation 
and wrath ; 9. Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that 
doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile; 10. But glory, 
honor, and peace, to every man that worketh good ; to the Jew first, and 
also to the Gentile : 11. For there is no respect of persons with God." 

Ezek. xviii. 4 : "Behold all souls are mine ; as the soul of the father, 
so also the soul of the son is mine : the soul that sinneth, it shall die. 
19. Yet say ye, Why ? Doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father ? 
When the son hath done that which is lawful and right, and hath kept 
all my statutes, and hath done them, he shall surely live. 20. The soul 
that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the 
father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son : the right- 
eousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the 
wicked shall be upon him." 

2 Cor. v. 10 : " For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of 
Christ, that every one may receive the things done in the body, accord- 
ing to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." 



504- SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Gal. vi. 7 : "Be not deceived, God is not mocked : for whatsoever a 
man soweth, that shall he also reap." 

Eph. vi. 8 : " Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, 
the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free." 

Col. iii. 24 : "Knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward 
of the inheritance : for ye serve the Lord Christ." 

Eev. xxii. 12 : "And, behold, I come quickly; and my reward is 
With me, to give every man according as his work shall be." 

Jer. vi. 30 : " Eeprobate silver shall men call them, because the Lord 
hath rejected them." 

These passages show the teachings of inspiration on this subject. Be 
it remembered, then, that the reason why any are reprobated, is because 
they are unwilling to be saved ; that is, they are unwilling to be saved on 
the terms upon which alone God can consistently save them. Ask sin- 
ners whether they are willing to be saved, and they all say, yes ; and with 
perfect sincerity they may say this, if they can be saved upon their own 
terms. But when you propose to them the terms of salvation upon which 
the gospel proposes to save them ; when they are required to repent and 
believe the gospel, to forsake their sins, and give themselves up to the 
service of God, they will with one consent begin to make excuse. Now, 
to accept these terms, is heartily and practically to consent to them. For 
them to say, that they are willing to accept salvation, while they actually 
do not accept it, is either to deceive themselves, or to utter an infamous 
falsehood. To be willing is to 'accept it ; and the fact, that they do not 
heartily consent to, and embrace the terms of salvation, is demonstration 
absolute, that they are unwilling. Yes, sinners, the only terms on which 
you can possibly be saved, you reject. Is it not then an insult to God 
for you to pretend that you are willing ? The only true reason why all 
of you are not Christians, is that you are unwilling. You are not made 
unwilling by any act of God, or because you are reprobate ; but if you 
are reprobate, it is because you are unwilling. 

But do any of you object and say, why does not God make us will- 
ing ? Is it not because he has reprobated us, that he does not change 
our hearts and make us willing ? No, sinner, it is not because he has 
reprobated you ; but because you are so obstinate that he cannot, wisely, 
and in consistency with the public good, take such measures as will con- 
vert you. Here you are waiting for God to make you willing to go to 
heaven, and all the while you are diligently using the means to get to 
hell — yes, exerting yourself with greater diligence to get to hell, than it 
would cost to insure your salvation, if applied with equal zeal in the ser- 
vice of your God. You tempt God, and then turn round and ask him 
why he does not make you willing ? Now, sinner, let me ask you, do 
you think you are a reprobate ? If so, what do you think the reason is 



REPROBATION. 505 

that has led the infinitely benevolent God to reprobate you ? There 
must be some reason ; what do you suppose it is ? Did you ever seri- 
ously ask yourself, what is the reason that a wise and infinitely benevo- 
lent God has never made me willing to accept salvation ? It must be for 
one of the following reasons : either — 

(1.) He is a malevolent being, and wills your damnation for its own 
sake ; or — 

(2.) He cannot make you willing if he would ; or — 

(3.) You behave in such a manner in the circumstances in which you 
are, that, to his infinitely benevolent mind it appears unwise to take such 
a course as would bring you to repentance. Such a change in the admin- 
istration of his government as would make you willing, would not, upon 
the whole, be wise. 

Now, which of these do you think it is ? You will not probably take 
the ground that he is malevolent, and desires your damnation because he 
delights in misery ; nor will you, I suppose, take the ground that he 
could not convert you if he would, that is, if he thought it wise to do so. 

The other, then, must be the reason, to wit : that your heart, and 
conduct, and stubbornness, are so abominable in his sight, that, every 
thing considered, he sees that to use such further means with you as to 
secure your conversion, would, on the whole, do more hurt than good to 
his kingdom. I have not time at present to agitate the question whether 
you, as a moral agent, could not resist any possible amount of moral in- 
fluence that could be brought to bear upon you, consistently with your 
moral freedom. 

Do you ask how I know that the reason why God does not make you 
willing is, that he sees that it would be unwise in him to do so ? I an- 
swer, that it is an irresistible inference, from these two facts, that he is 
infinitely benevolent, and that he does not actually make you willing. I 
do not believe that God would neglect anything that he saw to be wise 
and benevolent, in the great matter of man's salvation. Who can believe 
that he could give his only-begotten and well-beloved Son to die for sin- 
ners, and then neglect any wise and benevolent means for their salvation ? 
No, sinner, if you are a reprobate, it is because God foresaw that you 
would do just as you are doing ; that you would be so wicked as to defeat 
all the efforts that he could wisely make for your salvation. What a 
variety of means he has used with you. At one time he has thrown you 
into the furnace of affliction ; and when this has not softened you, he 
has turned round and loaded you with favors. He has sent you his word, 
he has striven by his Spirit, he has allured you by the cross ; he has tried 
to melt you by the groanings of Calvary ; and tried to drive you back 
from the way to death, by rolling in your ears the thunders of damnation. 
At one time clouds and darkness have been round about you ; the heav- 



506 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ens have thundered over your head ; divine vengeance has hung out, all 
around your horizon, the portentous clouds of coming wrath. At another 
time mercy has smiled upon you from above like the noon-day sun, 
breaking through an ocean of storms. He urges every motive ; he lays 
heaven, earth and hell, under perpetual contributions for considerations 
to move your stony heart. But you deafen your ears, and close your eyes, 
and harden your heart, and say, " Cause the holy one of Israel to cease 
from before us." And what is the inference from all this ? How must 
all this end ? " Eeprobate silver shall men call them, because the Lord 
has rejected them." 

VI. When sinners are reprobated. 

3. In respect to the act of casting them off, they are cast away only 
when, and not until, the cup of their iniquity is full. 

2. In respect to the purpose of reprobation, they are in the purpose of 
God reprobated or rejected from eternity. This follows irresistibly from 
the omniscience and immutability of God. He has certainly and neces- 
sarily had from eternity all the knowledge he ever can or will have of the 
character of all men, and must have designed from all eternity all things 
respecting them which he ever will design. This follows from his un- 
changeableness. If he ever does cast off sinners, he must do it designedly 
or undesignedly. He cannot do it without any design. He must there- 
fore do it designedly. But if he does it designedly, it must be either that 
he eternally entertained this design, or that he has changed. But change 
of purpose or design is inconsistent with the moral immutability of God. 
Therefore the purpose of reprobation is eternal ; or the reprobates were 
in the fixed purpose of God cast off and rejected from eternity. 

VII. Reprobation is just. 

Is it not just in God to let men have their own choice, especially when 
the highest possible motives are held out to them as inducements to 
choose eternal life. What ! Is it not just to reprobate men when they 
obstinately refuse salvation — when every thing has been done that is con- 
sistent with infinite wisdom and benevolence to save them ? Shall not 
men be willing to be either saved or lost ? What shall God do with you ? 
You are unwilling to be saved ; why then should you object to being 
damned ? If reprobation under these circumstances is not just, I chal- 
lenge you, sinner, to tell what is just. 

VIII. Reprobation is benevolent. 

It was benevolent in God to create men, though he foresaw that they 
would sin and become reprobate. If he foresaw that, upon the whole, he 
could secure such an amount of virtue and happiness by means of moral 



REPROBATION. 507 

government, as to more than counterbalance the sin and misery of those 
who would be lost, then certainly it was a dictate of benevolence to cre- 
ate them. The question was, whether moral beings should be created, 
and moral government established, when it was foreseen that a great evil 
would be the incidental consequence. Whether this would be benevolent 
or not, must turn upon the question, whether a good might be secured 
that would more than counterbalance the evil. If the virtue and happi- 
ness that could be secured by the administration of moral government, 
would greatly outmeasure the incidental evils arising out of a defection of 
a part of the subjects of this government, it is manifest that a truly be- 
nevolent mind would choose to establish the government, the attendant 
evils to the contrary notwithstanding. Now, if those who are lost de- 
serve their misery, and bring it upon themselves by their own choice, 
when they might have been saved, then certainly in their damnation 
there can be nothing inconsistent with justice or benevolence. God must 
have a moral government, or there can be no such thing as holiness in 
the created universe. For holiness in a creature is nothing else than a 
voluntary conformity to the government of God. 

Since the penalty of the law, although infinite, under the wisest 
possible administration of moral government, could not secure universal 
obedience ; and since multitudes of sinners will not be reclaimed and 
saved by the gospel, one of three things must be done ; either moral 
government must be given up ; or the wicked must be annihilated, or 
they must be reprobated and sent to hell. Now, that moral government 
should be given up, will not be pretended ; annihilation would not be 
just, inasmuch as it would not be an adequate expression of the abhor- 
rence with which the divine ruler regards the violation of his law, and 
consequently it would not meet the demands of public justice. Now, as 
sinners really deserve eternal death, and as their punishment may be of 
real value to the universe, in creating a respect for the authority of God, 
and thus strengthening his government, it is plain that their reprobation 
and damnation is, for the general good, making the best use of the wicked 
that can be made. 

Doubtless God views the loss of the soul as a great evil, and he always 
will look upon it as such, and would gladly avoid the loss of any soul, if 
it were consistent with the wisest administration of his government. 
How slanderous, injurious, and offensive to God it must be, then, to- 
say, that he created sinners on purpose to damn them. He pours forth 
all the tender yearnings of a father over those whom he is obliged to< 
destroy — "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim ? How shall I deliver thee, 
Israel ? How shall I make thee as Admah ? How shall I set thee as 
Zeboim ? My heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled 
together." And now, sinner, can you find it in your heart to accuse 



508 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

the blessed God of a want of benevolence ? " ye serpents ! ye genera- 
tion of vipers ! how can you escape the damnation of hell ?" 

IX. How it may be known who are reprobates. 

It may be difficult for us to ascertain with certainty in this world, 
who are reprobates ; but there are so many marks of reprobation given in 
the Bible, that by a sober and judicious investigation, we may form a 
pretty correct opinion, whether we or those around us are reprobates 
or not. 

1. One evidence of reprobation is a long course of prosperity in sin. 
The Psalmist lays it down as such in Psa. xcii. 7 : " When the wicked 
spring as the grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish, it 
is that they shall be destroyed forever." God often gives the wicked 
their portion in this world, and lets them prosper and wax fat like a 
stalled ox, and then brings them forth to the slaughter. " The wicked 
are reserved unto the day of wrath." When therefore you see an indi- 
vidual for a long time prospering in his sins, there is great reason to fear 
that man is a reprobate, In this passage inspiration assumes the truth 
of the distinction between evidence and proof. The Psalmist does not 
mean to be understood as affirming a universal truth. He did not intend, 
that prosperity in sin was proof conclusive that the prosperous sinner is a 
reprobate. But the least that could have been intended was, that such 
prosperity in sin affords alarming evidence of reprobation. It may be 
called presumptive evidence. 

2. Habitual neglect of the means of grace is a mark of reprobation. 
If men are to be saved at all, it is through the sanctification of the 
Spirit and belief of the truth ; and it will probably be found to be true, 
that not one in ten thousand is saved of those who habitually absent 
themselves from places where God presents his claims. Sometimes, I 
know, a tract, or the conversation or prayer of some friend, may awaken an 
individual, and lead him to the house of God ; but, as a general fact, if a 
man stays away from the means of grace, and neglects his Bible, it is a 
fearful sign of reprobation, and that he will die in his sins. He is vol- 
untary in it, and he does not neglect the means of grace because he is 
reprobated, but was reprobated because God foresaw that he would take 
this course. Suppose a pestilence were prevailing, that was certain to 
prove fatal in every instance where the appropriate remedy was not 
applied. Now, if you wished to know whose days were numbered and 
finished, and who among the sick were certain to die with the disease, if 
you found any among them neglecting and despising the only appropri- 
ate remedy, you would know that they were the persons. 

3. Those who have grown old in sin, are probably reprobates. It is 
a solemn and alarming fact, that a vast majority of those who give 



REPROBATION. 509 

evidence of piety, are converted under twenty-five years of age. Look 
at the history of revivals, and see, even in those that have manifested 
the greatest power, how few aged persons have been converted. The 
men who are set upon the attainment of some worldly object, and de- 
termined to secure that before they will attend to religion, and yield to 
the claims of their Maker, expecting afterwards to be converted, are 
almost always disappointed. Such a cold calculation is odious in the 
sight of God. What ! Take advantage of his forbearance, and say, that 
because he is merciful }^ou will venture to continue in sin, till you have 
secured your worldly objects, and worn yourself out in the service of the 
devil, and thus turn your Maker off with the jaded remnant of your 
abused mortality ! You need not expect God to set his seal of approba- 
tion upon such a calculation as this, and suffer you at last to triumph, 
and say, that you had served the devil as long as you pleased, and got to 
heaven at last. 

4. Absence of chastisements is a sign of reprobation. God says in 
the epistle to the Hebrews : "My son, despise not thou the chastening 
of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of him ; for whom the 
Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth ; 
if ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons ; for what 
son is he whom the Father chasteneth not ; but if ye be without chas- 
tisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons." 

5. When men are chastened and not reformed by it, it is a mark of 
reprobation. A poet has said, " When pain can't bless, heaven quits us 
in despair." God says of such, "Why should ye be stricken any more ? 
Ye will revolt more and more." When your afflictions are unsanctified, 
when you harden yourselves under his stripes, why should he not leave 
you to fill up the measure of your iniquity ? 

6. Embracing damnable heresies, is another mark of reprobation. 
Where persons seem to be given up to believe a lie, there is solemn 
reason for fearing that they are among that number upon whom God 
sends strong delusions, that they may believe a lie, and be damned, 
because they obey not the truth, but have pleasure in unrighteousness. 
Where you see persons giving themselves up to such delusions, the more 
certainly they believe them, the greater reason there is for believing that 
they are reprobates. The truth is so plain, that with the Bible in your 
hands, it is next to impossible to believe a fundamental heresy, without 
being given up to the judicial curse of God. It is so hard to believe a 
lie, with the truth of the Bible before you, that the devil cannot do it. 
If therefore you reject your Bible, and embrace a fundamental false- 
hood, you are more stupid and benighted than the devil is. When a 
man professes to believe a lie, almost the only hope of his salvation that 
remains, is, that he does not cordially believe it. Sinner, beware how 



510 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

you trine with. God's truth. How often have individuals begun to argue 
in favor of heresy, for the sake of argument, and because they loved 
debate, until they have finally come to believe their own lie, and are lost 
for ever. 

X. Objections. 

1. To the idea that God rejected the reprobate for their foreseen 
wickedness, it is replied that, Prov. xvi. 4 : "The Lord hath made all 
things for himself ; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil," teaches 
another doctrine ; that this passage teaches, that God made the repro- 
bates for the day of evil, or for the purpose of destroying them. 

To this I reply, that if he did create them to destroy them, or with a 
design when he created them to destroy them, it does not follow that 
their destruction was an ultimate end, or a thing in which he delighted 
for its own sake. It must be true, as has been said, that he designed 
from eternity to destroy them, in view, and in consequence, of their 
foreseen wickedness ; and of course, he designed their destruction when 
he created them. In one sense then, it was true, that he created them 
for the day of evil, that is, in the sense that he knew how they would 
behave, and designed as a consequence to destroy them when, and before, 
he created them. But this is not the same as his creating them for the 
sake of their destruction as an ultimate end. He had another and a 
higher ultimate end, which end was a benevolent one. He says "I have 
created all things for myself, even the wicked for the day of evil ;" that 
is, he had some great and good end to accomplish by them, and by their 
destruction. He foresaw that he could use them for some good purpose, 
notwithstanding their foreseen wickedness ; and even that he could over- 
rule their sin and destruction to manifest his justice, and thus show forth 
his glory, and thereby strengthen his government. He must have fore- 
seen that the good that might thus, from his overruling providence, 
result to himself and to the universe, would more than compensate for 
the evil of their rebellion and destruction ; and therefore, and upon this 
condition, he created them, knowing that he should destroy and intend- 
ing to destroy them. That destruction was not the ultimate end of their 
creation, must follow from such scriptures as the following : — 

Ezek. xxxiii. 11 : " Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I 
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn 
from his way and live : turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways ; for why 
will ye die, house of Israel ? " 

Ezek. xviii. 23 : Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should 
die ; saith the Lord God,; ; and not that he should return from his ways 
and live ? " 

2 Peter iii. 9 : " The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as 



REPROBATION. 511 

some men count slackness, but is long-suffering to usward, not willing 
that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." 

1 John iv. 8 : "He that loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is love. 
16. And we have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God 
is love ; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him.'* 

Heb. ii. 9 : " But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the 
angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor ; that 
he by the grace of God should taste death for every man." 

2. Another objection to the doctrine of this lecture is founded on 
Rom. ix. 20-23 : " Nay, but man, who art thou that repliest against 
God ? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou 
made me thus ? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump 
to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor ? What if 
God, willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with 
much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that 
he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, 
which he had afore prepared unto glory ?" 

From this passage it has been inferred, that God creates the character 
and disposes of the destinies of both saints and sinners with as absolute 
and as irresistible a sovereignty as that exercised by the potter over his 
clay ; that he creates the elect for salvation, and the reprobate for dam- 
nation, and forms the character of both so as to fit them for their re- 
spective destinies, with an absolutely irresistible and efficient sovereignty ; 
that his ultimate end was in both cases his own glory, and that the value 
of the end justifies the use of the means, that is, of such means. To this 
I reply :— 

(1.) That it is absurd and nonsensical, as we have abundantly seen, 
to talk of creating moral character, either good or bad, by an irresistible 
efficient sovereignty. This is naturally impossible, as it implies a con- 
tradiction. Moral character must be the result of proper, voluntary 
action, and the moral character of the vessels of wrath or of mercy neither 
is, nor can be, formed by any irresistible influence whatever. 

(2.) It is not said nor implied in the passage under consideration, that 
the character of the vessels of wrath was created, or that God had any 
such agency in procuring their character, as he has in forming the char- 
acter of the vessels of mercy. Of the vessels of wrath it is only said they 
are " fitted to destruction," that is, that their characters are adapted for 
hell ; while of the vessels of mercy it is said " which he had afore pre- 
pared unto glory." The vessels of wrath are fitted, or had fitted them- 
selves to destruction, under the light and influence that should have made 
them holy. The vessels of mercy God had, by the special grace and in- 
fluence of the Holy Spirit, engaging and directing their voluntary agency, 
afore prepared for glory. 



512 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

(3.) But the lump spoken of in the text contemplates, not the origi- 
nal creation of men, nor the forming or creating in them of a wicked 
character. But it manifestly contemplates them as already existing as 
the potter's clay exists ; and not only as existing, but also as being sinners. 
God may reasonably proceed to form out of this lump vessels of wrath or 
of mercy, as seems wise and good unto him. He may appoint one por- 
tion to honor and another to dishonor, as is seen by him to be demanded 
by the highest good. 

(4.) The passage under consideration cannot, in any event, be pressed 
into the service of those who would insist, that the destruction of the 
reprobate is chosen for its own sake, and therefore implies malevolence 
in God. Hear what it says : " What if God, willing to show his wrath, 
and make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the ves- 
sels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that he might make known the 
riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared 
unto glory ?" Here it appears, that he designed to show and make known 
his attributes. This cannot have been an ultimate, but must have been 
a proximate, end. The ultimate end must have been the highest glory 
of himself, and the highest good of the universe, as a whole. If God 
willed thus to make known his holiness and his mercy, for the purpose of 
securing the highest good of the universe, who has a right to say, What 
doest thou ? or Why doest thou thus ? 

3. Another objection is, if God knew that they would be reprobate or 
lost, why did he create them ? If he knew that such would be the result, 
and yet created them, it follows that he created them to destroy them. 
I reply :— 

This objection has been already answered, but for the sake of per- 
spicuity I choose here to answer it again. 

From the admitted fact, that God knew when he created them just 
what their destiny would be, it does not follow that their destruction was 
the end for which he created them. He created them, not for their sin 
and destruction as an ultimate end, but for another and a good end, not- 
withstanding his foreknowledge of their sin and ultimate ruin. 

4. It is further objected, that if God designed to make known his at- 
tributes, in the salvation of the vessels of mercy, and in the destruction 
of the vessels of wrath, he must have designed their characters as well as 
their end, inasmuch as their characters are indispensable conditions of 
this result. 

I reply, that it is true, that the characters of both the vessels of wrath 
and of mercy must have been in some sense purposed or designed by 
God. But it does not follow that he designed them both in the same 
sense. The character of the righteous he designed to beget, or induce 
by his own agency ; the character of the wicked he designed to suffer 



REPROBATION. 513 

him to form for himself. He doubtless designed to suffer the one rather 
than to interfere, in such manner and form as would prevent sin, seeing 
as he did, that, hateful as it was in itself, it could be overruled for good. 
The other he designed to produce, or rather induce, both on account of 
the pleasure he has in holiness, and also for the sake of its bearings on 
the subject of it, and upon the universe. 

5. To the doctrine of this lecture it is further objected, that if one is 
a reprobate it is of no use for him to try to be saved. If God knows 
what he will be in character, and designs his destruction, it is impossible 
that it should be otherwise than as God knows and designs, and there- 
fore one may as well give up in despair first as last. 

(1.) To such an objector I would say, you do not know that you are 
a reprobate, and therefore you need not despair. 

(2.) If God designs to cast you off, though you cannot know this, it is 
only because he foresees that you will not repent and believe the gospel ; 
or in other words, for your voluntary wickedness. He foreknows that 
you will be wicked simply because you will be, and not because his fore- 
knowledge makes you so. Neither his foreknowledge respecting your 
character, nor his design to cast you off, in consequence of your charac- 
ter, has any agency in making you wicked. You are therefore perfectly 
free to obey and be saved, and the fact that you will not, is no reason 
why you should not. 

(3.) You might just as reasonably make the same objection to every 
thing that takes place in the universe. Everything that did, or will, or 
can occur, is as infallibly known to God, as the fact of your wickedness 
and destruction is. He also has a fixed and eternal design about every- 
thing that ever did or will occur. He knows how long you will live, 
where you will live, and when and where you will die. His purposes re- 
specting these and all other events are fixed, eternal, and unchangeable. 
Why, then, do you not live without food and say, I cannot make one 
hair black or white ; I cannot die before my time, nor can I prolong my 
days beyond the appointed time, do what I will ; therefore, I will take 
no care of my health ? No ; this would be unreasonable. 

Why not also apply this objection to everything, and settle down in 
despair of ever doing or being anything, but what an irresistible fate 
makes you ? The fact is, that the true doctrine, whether of election or 
reprobation, affords not the least countenance to such a conclusion. The 
foreknowledge and designs of God respecting our conduct or our destiny, 
do not in the least degree interfere with our free agency. We, in every 
case, act just as freely as if God neither knew nor designed anything 
about our conduct. Suppose the farmer should make the same objection 
to sowing his seed, and to doing anything to secure a crop ; what would 
be thought of him ? And yet he might with as much reason, since he 
33 



514: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

can plead the foreknowledge and designs of God, as an excuse for doing 
nothing to secure his salvation. God as really knows now whethei 
you will sow and whether you will have a crop, and has from eternity 
known this, as perfectly as he ever will. He has either designed that you 
shall, or that you shall not, have a crop this year, from all eternity ; and 
it will infallibly come to pass just as he has foreseen and designed. 
Yet you are really just as free to raise a crop, or to neglect to do so, as 
if he neither knew nor designed anything about it. 

The man who will stumble either at the doctrine of election or repro- 
bation, as defined and maintained in these lectures, should, to be consis- 
tent, stumble at everything that takes place, and never try to accomplish 
anything whatever ; because the designs and the foreknowledge of God 
extend equally to everything ; and unless he has expressly revealed how 
it will be, we are left in the dark, in respect to any event, and are left to 
use means to accomplish what we desire, or to prevent what we dread, 
as if God knew and designed nothing about it. 

6. But it is objected, that this is a discouraging doctrine, and liable 
to be a stumbling-block, and therefore should not be inculcated. I an- 
swer — 

(1.) It is taught in the Bible, and plainly follows also from the at- 
tributes of God, as revealed in the reason. The scriptures that teach it 
are not less likely to be a snare and a stumbling-block, than are the 
definition and explanation of the doctrine. 

(2.) The proper statement, explanation, and defence of the doctrines 
of election and reprobation, are important to a proper understanding of 
the nature and attributes of God. 

(3.) The scriptures that teach these doctrines are often subjects of 
cavil, and sometimes of real difficulty. Eeligious teachers should, there- 
fore, state these doctrines and explain them, so as to aid the inquirer 
after truth, and stop the mouths of gainsayers. 

(4.) Again, these doctrines have often been so mis-stated and per- 
verted as to make them amount to an iron system of fatalism. Many 
souls have heard or read these perversions, and greatly need to be en- 
lightened upon the subject. It is therefore all the more important, that 
these truths should find a place in religious instruction. Let them be 
understood, properly stated, explained, and defended, and they can no 
more be a stumbling-block, than the fact of God's omniscience can be so. 



DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 515 



LECTURE XLV. 

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 
In this discussion I shall endeavor to show, — 

I. What is not intended by the term " sovereignty " when applied to God, 

It is not intended, at least by me, that God, in any instance, wills or 
acts arbitrarily, or without good reasons ; reasons so good and so weighty, 
that he could in no case act otherwise than he does, without violating the 
law of his own intelligence and conscience, and consequently without sin. 
Any view of divine sovereignty that implies arbitrariness on the part of 
the divine will, is not only contrary to scripture, but is revolting to 
reason, and blasphemous. God cannot act arbitrarily, in the sense of 
unreasonably, without infinite wickedness. For him to be arbitrary, in 
the sense of unreasonable, would be a wickedness as much greater than 
any creature is capable of committing, as his reason or knowledge is 
greater than theirs. This must be self-evident. God should therefore 
never be represented as a sovereign, in the sense that implies that he is 
actuated by self or arbitrary will, rather than by his infinite intelligence. 

Many seem to me to represent the sovereignty of God as consisting in 
a perfectly arbitrary disposal of events. They seem to conceive of God 
as being wholly above and without any law or rule of action guiding his 
will by his infinite reason and conscience. They appear shocked at the 
idea of God himself being the subject of moral law, and are ready to 
inquire, Who gives law to God ? They seem never to have considered 
that God is, and must be, a law unto himself ; that he is necessarily 
omniscient, and that the divine reason must impose law on, or prescribe 
law to, the divine will. They seem to regard God as living wholly above 
law, and as disposed to have his own will at any rate, reasonable or 
unreasonable ; to set up his own arbitrary pleasure as his only rule of 
action, and to impose this rule upon all his subjects. This sovereignty they 
seem to conceive of as controlling and disposing of all events, with an 
iron or adamantine fatality, inflexible, irresistible, omnipotent. ** Who 
worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." This text they 
dwell much upon, as teaching that God disposes all events absolutely, not 
according to his own infinite wisdom and discretion, but simply accord- 
ing to his own will ; and, as their language would often seem to imply, 
without reference at all to the universal law of benevolence. I will not 
say, that such is the view as it lies in their own mind ; but only that 
from the language they use, such would seem to be their idea of divine 



516 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sovereignty. Such, however, is not the view of this subject which I 
shall state and defend on the present occasion. 

II. What is intended ~by divine sovereignty. 

The sovereignty of God consists in the independence of his will, in 
consulting his own intelligence and discretion, in the selection of his 
end, and the means of accomplishing it. In other words, the sovereignty 
of God is nothing else than infinite benevolence directed by infinite 
knowledge. God consults no one in respect to what shall be done by 
him. He asks no leave to do and require what his own wisdom dictates. 
He consults only himself ; that is, his own infinite intelligence. So far 
is he from being arbitrary in his sovereignty, in the sense of unreasona- 
ble, that he is invariably guided by infinite reason. He consults his own 
intelligence only, not from any arbitrary disposition, but because his 
knowledge is perfect and infinite, and therefore it is safe and wise to 
take counsel nowhere else. It were infinitely unreasonable, and weak, 
and wicked in God to ask leave of any being to act in conformity with 
his own judgment. He must make his own reason his rule of action. 
God is a sovereign, not in the sense that he is not under law, or that he 
is above all law, but in the sense that he is a law to himself ; that he 
knows no law but what is given him by his own reason. In other words 
still, the sovereignty of God consists in such a disposal of all things and 
events, as to meet the ideas of his own reason, or the demands of his 
own intelligence. " He works all things after the counsel of his own 
will," in the sense that he formed and executes his own designs inde- 
pendently ; in the sense that he consults his own infinite discretion ; 
that is, he acts according to his own views of propriety and fituess. 
This he does, be it distinctly understood, without at all setting aside the 
freedom of moral agents. His infinite knowledge enabled him to select 
an end and means, that should consist with and include the perfect 
freedom of moral agents. The subjects of his moral government are 
free to obey or disobey, and take the consequences. But foreseeing 
precisely in all cases how they would act. he has laid his plan accord- 
ingly, so as to bring out the contemplated and desired results. In all 
his plans he consulted none but himself. But this leads me to say, — 

III. That God is and ought to he an absolute and a universal sove- 
reign. 

By absolute, I mean, that his expressed will, in obedience to his 
reason, is law. It is not law because it proceeds from his arbitrary will, 
but becanse it is the revelation or declaration of the affirmations and 
demands of his infinite reason. His expressed will is law, because it is 
an infallible declaration of what is intrinsically fit, suitable, right./ His 



DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 517 

will does not make the things that he commands, right, fit, proper, ob- 
ligatory, in the sense, that should he require it, the opposite of what he 
now requires would be fit, proper, suitable, obligatory ; but in the sense 
that we need no other evidence of what is in itself intrinsically proper, 
fit, obligatory, than the expression of his will. Our reason affirms, that 
what he wills must be right ; not because he wills it, but that he wills it 
because it is right, or obligatory in the nature of things ; that is, our 
reason affirms that he wills as he does, only upon condition, that his 
infinite intelligence affirms that such willing is intrinsically right, and 
therefore he ought to will or command just what he does. 

He is a sovereign in the sense that his will is law, whether we are 
able to see the reason for his commands or not, because our reason affirms 
that he has and must have good and sufficient reasons for every com- 
mand ; so good and sufficient, that he could not do otherwise than re- 
quire what he does, under the circumstances, without violating the law 
of his own intelligence. We therefore need no other reason for affirm- 
ing our obligation to will and to do, than that God requires it ; because 
we always and necessarily assume, that what God requires must be right, 
not because he arbitrarily wills it, but because he does not arbitrarily 
will it : on the contrary that he has, and must have in every instance, 
infinitely good and wise reasons for every requirement. 

Some persons represent God as a sovereign, in the sense, that his 
arbitrary will is the foundation of obligation. But if this is so, he could 
in every instance render the directly opposite course from what he now 
requires, obligatory. But this is absurd. The persons just mentioned 
seem to think, that unless it be admitted that God's will is the founda- 
tion of obligation, it will follow that it does not impose obligation, un- 
less he discloses the reasons for his requirements. But this is a great 
mistake. Our own reason affirms that God's expressed will is always 
law, in the sense that it invariably declares the law of nature, or dis- 
closes the decisions of his own reason. 

God must and ought to be an absolute sovereign in the sense just de- 
fined. This will appear if we consider : — 

1. That his end was chosen and means decided upon, when no being 
but himself existed, and of course, there was no one to consult but 
himself. 

2. Creation and providence are only the results, and the carrying out 
of his plans settled from eternity. 

3. The law of benevolence, as it existed in the divine reason, must 
have eternally demanded of him the very course he has taken. 

4. His highest glory and the highest good of universal being demand 
that he should consult his own discretion, and exercise an absolute and 
a universal sovereignty, in the sense explained. Infinite wisdom and 



51 S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

goodness ought of course to act independently in the promotion of their 
end. If infinite wisdom or knowledge is not to give law, what or who 
shall ? If infinite benevolence shall not declare and enforce law, what 
or who shall ? God's attributes and relations render it obligatory upon 
him to exercise just that holy sovereignty we have ascribed to him. 

(1.) This sovereignty, and no other, he claims for himself. 

Ps. cxv. 3 : " But our God is in the heavens ; he hath done what- 
soever he hath pleased." 

Ps. cxxxv. 6 : " Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, 
and in earth, in the seas, and all deep places." 

Isa. lv. 10 : "For as the rain cometh down, and the snow from 
heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh 
it bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower, and bread to 
the eater ; 11. So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth ; 
it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I 
please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." 

Matt. xi. 25 : " At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, 
Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things 
from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. 26. 
Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." 

Rom. ix. 15 : "For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I 
will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have com- 
passion. 16. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that 
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. 17. For the scripture saith 
unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I 
might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared 
throughout all the earth. 18. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he 
will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." 

Eph. i. 11 : " In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being 
predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things 
after the counsel of his own will." 

(2. ) Again : God claims for himself all the prerogatives of an abso- 
lute and a universal sovereign, in the sense already explained. For ex- 
ample, he claims to be the rightful and sole proprietor of the universe. 

1 Chron. xxix. 11 : "Thine, Lord, is the greatness, and the power, 
and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty ; for all that is in the 
heaven and in the earth is thine ; thine is the kingdom, Lord, and thou 
art exalted as head above all." 

Ps. 1. 10 : " For every beast of the forest is mine, and the cattle 
upon a thousand hills ; 11. I know all the fowls of the mountains ; and 
the wild beasts of the field are mine. 12. If I were hungry, I would not 
tell thee, for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof." 

Ps. xcv. 5 : " The sea is his, and he made it, and his hands formed 



DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 519 

the dry land. 6. come, let us worship, and bow dowo, let us kneel 
before the Lord our Maker ; 7. For he is our God, and we are the people 
of his pasture, and the sheep of his hand." 

Ps. c. 3: "Know ye that the Lord he is God, it is he that hath 
made us, and not we ourselves ; we are his people, and the sheep of his 
pasture." 

Ezek. xyiii. 4 : ' l Behold, all souls are mine ; as the soul of the father, 
so also the soul of the son is mine ; the soul that sinneth it shall die." 

Eom. xiv. 8 : " For whether we live, we live unto the Lord ; and 
whether we die, we die unto the Lord ; whether we live therefore, or 
die, we are the Lord's." 

(3.) Again : God claims to have established the natural or physical 
laws of the universe. 

Ps. cxix. 90 : " Thy faithfulness is unto all generations, thou hast 
established the earth, and it abideth. 91. They continue this day ac- 
cording to thine ordinances, for all are thy servants." 

Prov. iii. 19 : " The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, by 
understanding hath he established the heavens. 20. By his knowledge 
the depths are broken up, and the clouds drop down the dew." 

Jer. xxxi. 35 : "Thus saith the Lord, which giveth the sun for a 
light by day, and the stars for a light by night, which divideth the sea 
when the waves thereof roar ; the Lord of hosts is his name." 

Jer. xxxiii. 25 : " Thus saith the Lord, if my covenant be not with 
day and night, and if I have not appointed the ordinances of heaven and 
earth ; 26. Then will I cast away the seed of Jacob, and David my 
servant, so that I will not take any of his seed to be rulers over the seed 
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob ; for I will cause their captivity to return, 
and have mercy on them." 

(4.) God claims the right to exercise supreme authority. 

1 Chron. xxix. 11 : " Thine, Lord, is the greatness and the power, 
and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty ; for all that is in the 
heaven and the earth is thine ; thine is the kingdom, Lord, and thou 
art exalted as head above all." 

Ps. xlvii. 7 : " For God is the king of all the earth, sing ye praises 
with understanding." 

Isa. xxxiii. 22 : " For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our law- 
giver, the Lord is our king ; he will save us." 

(5.) God claims the right to exercise his own discretion in using such 
means, and in exerting such an agency as will secure the regeneration of 
men, or not, as it appears wise to him. 

Deut. xxix. 4 : " Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to per- 
ceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day." 

Jer. v. 14 : " Wherefore thus saith the Lord God of hosts, Because 



520 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

ye speak this word, behold, I will make my words in thy mouth fire, and 
this people wood, and it shall devour them." 

Matt. xiii. 10 : "And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why 
speakest thou to them in parables ? He answered and said unto them, 
Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of 
heaven, but to them it is not given." 

Rom. ix. 22 : * What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make 
his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of 
wrath fitted to destruction. 23. And that he might make known the 
riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared 
unto glory." 

2 Tim. ii. 25 : " In meekness instructing those that oppose them- 
selves j if God perad venture will give them repentance to the acknowl- 
edging of the truth." 

(6.) God claims the right to try his creatures by means of temptation. 

Deut. xiii. 1 : "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of 
dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, 2. And the sign or the won- 
der come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, let us go after 
other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them ; 3. 
" Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer 
of dreams ; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye 
love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul." 

1 Kings xxii. 20 : " And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, 
that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead ? And one said on this 
manner, and another said on that manner. 21. And there came forth a 
spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. 22. And 
the Lord said unto him, Wherewith ? And he said, I will go forth, and 
I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, 
Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also ; go forth, and do so." 

Job ii. 3. " And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my 
servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an 
upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil ? And still he 
holdeth fast his integrity, although thou movedst me against him, to de- 
stroy him without cause. 7. So went Satan forth from the presence of 
the Lord, and smote Job with sore boils, from the sole of his foot unto 
his crown." 

Matt. iv. 1 : " Then was Jesus led up of the spirit into the wilder- 
ness to be tempted of the devil." 

(7.) God also claims the right to use all creatures, and to dispose of 
all creatures and events, so as to fulfil his own designs. 

2 Sam. vii. 14 : "I will be his father, and he shall be my son ; if he 
commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the 
stripes of the children of men." 



DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY. 521 

2 Kings v. 1 : " Now Naaman, captain of the host of the king of 
Syria, was a great man with his master, and honorable, because by him 
the Lord had given deliverance unto Syria ; he was also a mighty man in 
valor, but he was a leper." 

Job i. 15 : " And the Sabeans fell upon them, and took them away ; 
yea, they have slain the servants with the edge of the sword ; and I am 
escaped alone to tell thee. 17. While he was yet speaking, there came also 
another, and said, The Chaldeans made out three bands, and fell upon the 
camels, and have carried them away ; yea, and slain the servants with 
the edge of the sword ; and I only am escaped to tell thee. And Job 
said, Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return 
thither ; the Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away ; blessed be the 
name of the Lord." 

Isa. x. 5 : "0 Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their 
hand is mine indignation : 6. I will send him against an hypocritical na- 
tion, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take 
the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of 
the streets. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think 
so ; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few. 12. 
"Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when the Lord hath performed his 
whole work upon Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit 
of the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks. 
15. Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith ? or 
shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it ? as if the rod 
should shake itself against them that lift it up, or as if the staff should 
lift up itself, as if it were no wood." 

Ezek. xxiv. 14 : " And I will lay my vengeance upon Edom by the 
hand of my people Israel ; and they shall do in Edom according to mine 
anger, and according to my fury ; and they shall know my vengeance, 
saith the Lord God." 

Hab. i. 6 : " For, lo, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty 
nation, which shall march through the breadth of the land, to possess 
the dwelling-places that are not theirs. 12. Art thou not from everlast- 
ing, Lord, my God, mine Holy One ? We shall not die, Lord, thou 
hast ordained them for judgment ; and mighty God, thou hast estab- 
lished them for correction." 

(8.) God claims the right to take the life of his sinful subjects at his 
own discretion. 

Gen. xxii. 2 : "And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, 
whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah, and offer him 
there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains, which I will tell 
thee of." 

Deut. xx. 16 : " But of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy 



522 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalfc save alive nothing that 
breatheth. 17. But thou shalt utterly destroy them ; namely, the Hit- 
tites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, 
and the Jebusites, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee : 18. That 
they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have 
done unto their gods ; so should ye sin against the Lord your God." 

1 Sam. xv. 3 : "Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all 
that they have, and spare them not ; but slay both man and woman, in- 
fant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." 

(9.) God declares that he will maintain his own sovereignty. 

Isa. xlii. 8 : * 1 1 am the Lord ; that is my name : and my glory will 
I not give to another, neither my praise to graven images." 

Isa. xlviii. 11 : " For mine own sake, even for mine own sake, will I 
do it : for how should my name be polluted ? and I will not give my 
glory unto another." 

These passages will disclose the general tenor of scripture upon this 
subject. 

KEMAKKS. 

1. The Sovereignty of God is an infinitely amiable, sweet, holy, and 
desirable sovereignty. Some seem to conceive of it as if it were revolting 
and tyrannical. But it is the infinite opposite of this, and is the perfec- 
tion of all that is reasonable, kind and good. 

Isa. lvii. 15 : "For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth 
eternity, whose name is holy : I dwell in the high and holy place, with 
him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the 
humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones. 16. For I will not 
contend for ever, neither will I be always wroth : for the spirit should 
fail before me, and the souls which I have made. 17. For the iniquity 
of his covetousness was I wroth, and smote him : I hid me, and was 
wroth, and he went on frowardly in the way of his heart. 18. I have 
seen his ways, and will heal him ; I will lead him also, and restore com- 
forts unto him, and to his mourners. 19. I create the fruit of the lips ; 
Peace, peace to him that is far off, and to him that is near, saith the 
Lord ; and I will heal him." 

2. Many seem afraid to think or speak of God's sovereignty, and even 
pass over, with a very slight reading, those passages of scripture that so 
fully declare it. They think it unwise and dangerous to preach upon 
the subject, especially unless it be to deny or explain away the sove- 
reignty of God. This fear in pious minds has no doubt originated in a 
misconception of the nature of this sovereignty. They have been led 
either by false teaching, or in some way, to conceive of the divine sove- 
reignty as an iron and unreasonable despotism. That is, they have un- 



DIVINE SOVEREIGNITY. 523 

derstood the doctrine of divine sovereignty to so represent God. They 
therefore fear and reject it. But let it be remembered and for ever un- 
derstood, to the eternal joy and unspeakable consolation of all holy beings, 
that God's sovereignty is nothing else than infinite love directed by infi- 
nite knowledge, in such a disposal of events as to secure the highest well- 
being of the universe ; that, in the whole details of creation, providence 
and grace, there is not a solitary measure of his that is not infinitely wise 
and good. 

3. A proper understanding of God's universal agency and sovereignty, V> 
of the perfect wisdom and benevolence of every measure of his govern- 
ment, providential and moral, is essential to the best improvement of all 
his dispensations toward us, and to those around us. When it is under- 
stood, that God's hand is directly or indirectly in everything that occurs, 
and that he is infinitely wise and good, and equally wise and good in 
every single dispensation — that he has one end steadily and always, in 
view — that he does all for one and the same ultimate end — and that this 
end is the highest good of himself and of universal being ; — I say, when 
these things are understood and considered,, there is a divine sweetness 
in all his dispensations. There is then a divine reasonableness, and 
amiableness, and kindness, thrown like a broad mantle of infinite love 
over all his character, works and ways. The soul, in contemplating such 

a sacred, universal, holy sovereignty, takes on a sweet smile of delightful 
complacency, and feels secure, and reposes in perfect peace, surrounded 
and supported by the everlasting arms. 

4. Many entertain most ruinous conceptions of divine sovereignty. 
They manifestly conceive of it as proceeding wholly independent of law, 
and of second causes, or means. They often are heard to use language 
that implies this. They say, "if it is God's will, you cannot hinder it. 
If God has begun the work, he will accomplish it." In fact, their lan- 
guage means nothing, unless they assume that in the dispensation of 
grace all is miracle. They often represent a thing as manifestly from 
God, or as providential, because it was, or appeared to be, so disconnected 
with appropriate means and instrumentalities. In other words it was 
quite miraculous. 

Now, I suppose, that God's sovereignty manifests itself through and 
by means, or second causes, and appropriate instrumentalities. God is 
as much a sovereign in the kingdom of nature as of grace. Suppose 
farmers, mechanics, and shopkeepers should adopt, in practice, this 
absurd view of divine sovereignty of which I am speaking ? Why, they 
would succeed about as well in raising crops and in transacting business, 
as those Christians and ministers who apply their views of sovereignty to 
spiritual matters, do in saving souls. 

/ 



524 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

LECTURE XLYL 

PURPOSES OF GOD. 

Ik discussing this subject I shall endeavor to show, 

I. What I understand ly the purposes of God. 

Purposes, in this discussion, I shall use as synonymous with design, 
intention. The purposes of God must be ultimate and proximate. That 
is, God has and must have an ultimate end. He must purpose to accom- 
plish something by his works and providence, which he regards as a good 
in itself, or as valuable to himself, and to being in general. This I call 
his ultimate end. That God has such an end or purpose, follows from 
the already established facts, that God is a moral agent, and that he is 
infinitely wise and good. For surely he could not be justly considered as 
either wise or good, had he no intrinsically valuable end which he aims 
to realize, by his works of creation and providence. His purpose to 
secure his great and ultimate end, I call his ultimate purpose. His 
proximate purposes respect the means by which he aims to secure his 
end. If he purposes to realize an end, he must of course purpose the 
necessary means for its accomplishment. The purposes that respect the 
means are what I call in this discussion, his proximate purposes. 

II. Distinction between purpose and decree. 

Purpose has just been defined, and the definition need not be re- 
peated. The term decree is used in a variety of senses. The term is 
used in the Bible as synonymous — 

1. With fore-ordination or determination, appointment. 

Job xxviii. 10 : " He putteth forth his hand upon the rock ; he over- 1 
turneth the mountains by the roots. 26. When he made a decree for the 
rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder." 

Ps. xi. 2 : "I will declare the decree, the Lord hath said unto me, 
Thou art my son ; this day have I begotten thee. " 

Ps. cxlviii. 6 : " He hath also established them for ever and ever ; he 
hath made a decree which shall not pass." 

Prov. viii. 29 : " When he gave to the sea his decree, that the waters 
should not pass his commandment ; when he appointed the foundations 
of the earth." 

Jer. v. 22 : " Fear ye not me ? saith the Lord : will ye not tremble at 
my presence, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by a 
perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof toss 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 525 

themselves, yet can they not prevail ; though they roar, yet can they 
not pass over it ? " 

Dan. iv. 24 : Si This is the interpretation, king, and this is the de- 
cree of the Most High, which is come upon my lord the king." 

2. It is used as synonymous with ordinance, statute, law. 

Dan. vi. 7 : " All the presidents of the kingdom, the governors, and 
the princes, the counsellors, and the captains, have consulted together to 
establish a royal statute, and to make a firm decree, that whosoever shall 
ask a petition of any god or man for thirty days, save of thee, king, he 
shall be cast into the den of lions. 8. Now, king, establish the decree, 
and sign the writing, that it be not changed, according to the law of the 
Medes and Persians, which altereth not. 26. I make a decree, that in 
every dominion of my kingdom men tremble and fear before the God of 
Daniel ; for he is the living God, and steadfast for ever, and his kingdom 
that which shall not be destroyed, and his dominion shall be even unto 
the end." 

This term has been generally used by theological writers as synony- 
mous with fore-ordination, appointment. To decree, with these writers, 
is to appoint, ordain, establish, settle, fix, render certain. This class of 
writers also often confound decree with purpose, and use the word as 
meaning the same thing. I see no objection to using the term decree, in, 
respect to a certain class of physical events, as synonymous with appoint- 
ment, fore-ordination, fixing, rendering certain. But I think this use of 
it, applied, as it has been, to the actions of moral agents, is highly ob- 
jectionable, and calculated to countenance the idea of fatality and neces- 
sity, in respect to the actions of men. It seems inadmissible to speak of 
God's decreeing the free actions of moral agents, in the sense of fixing, 
settling, determining fore-ordaining them as he fixes, settles, renders cer- 
tain all physical events. The latter he has fixed or rendered certain by 
a law of necessity. The former, that is, free acts, although they maybe, 
and are certain, yet they are not rendered so by a law of fate or necessity ; 
or by an ordinance or decree that fixes them so, that it is not possible 
they should be otherwise. 

In respect to the government of God, I prefer to use the term purpose, 
as I have said, to signify the design of God, both in respect to the end at 
which he aims, and the means he intends or purposes to use to accomplish 
it. The term decree I use as synonymous with command, law, or ordi- 
nance. The former I use as expressive of what God purposes or designs 
to do himself, and by his own agency, and also what he purposes or de- 
signs to accomplish by others. The latter I use as expressive of God's 
will, command, or law. He regulates his own conduct and agency in 
accordance with the former, that is, with his purposes. He requires his 
creatures to conform to the latter, that is, to his decrees or laws. We 



526 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

shall see, in its proper place, that hoth his purposes and his actions are 
conformed to the spirit of his decrees, or laws ; that is, that he is benevo- 
lent in his purposes and conduct, as he requires his creatures to be. I 
distinguish what God purposes or designs to accomplish by others, and 
what they design. God's end or purpose is alwaj^s benevolent. He always 
designs good. His creatures are often selfish, and their designs are often 
the direct opposite to the purpose of God, even in the same events. For 
example, see the following cases : — 

Gen. xlv. 4 : " And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me, 
I pray you ; and they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your brother, 
whom ye sold into Egypt. 5. Now therefore, be not grieved, nor angry 
with yourselves that ye sold me hither ; for God did send me before you, 
to preserve life. 6. For these two years hath the famine been in the 
land, and yet there are five years, in the which there shall neither be 
earing nor harvest." 

Gen. 1. 19 : " And Joseph said unto them, Fear not ; for am I in the 
place of God ? 20. But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God 
meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much peo- 
ple alive." 

Isa. x. 5 : " Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their 
hand is mine indignation. 6. I will send him against a hypocritical 
nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to 
take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the 
mire of the streets. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, but it is in his heart 
to destroy, and cut off nations not a few. 12. Wherefore it shall come to 
pass, that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon Mount 
Zion and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the 
king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks." 

Mark xv. 9 : "But Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I re- 
lease unto you the king of the Jews ? 10. (For he knew that the chief 
priests had delivered him for envy)." 

John iii. 16 : " For God so loved the world, that he gave his only- 
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but 
have everlasting life." 

Acts ii. 23 : " Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and 
fore-knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have cru- 
cified and slain." 

III. There must be so?ne sense in which God's purposes extend to all 
events. 

1. This is evident from reason. His plans must, in some sense, include 
all actual events. He must foreknow all events by a law of necessity. 
This is implied in his omniscience. He must have matured and adopted 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 527 

his plan in view of, and with reference to, all events. He must hare 
had some purpose or design respecting all events that he foresaw. All 
events transpire in consequence of his own creating agency ; that is, 
they all result in some way directly or indirectly, either by his design or 
sufferance, from his own agency. He either designedly brings them to 
pass, or suffers them to come to pass without interposing to prevent 
them. He must have known that they would occur. He must have 
either positively designed that they should, or, knowing that they would 
result from the mistakes or selfishness of his creatures, negatively de- 
signed not to prevent them, or, he had no purpose or design about them. 
The last hypothesis is plainly impossible. He cannot be indifferent 
to any event. He knows all events, and must have some purpose or 
design respecting them. 

2. The Bible abundantly represents God's purposes as in some sense 
extending to all events. For example : — 

Deut. xxxii. 4 : " He is the Eock, his work is perfect ; for all his 
ways are judgment ; a God of truth, and without iniquity ; just and 
right is he." 

Ps. civ. 24 : ' * Lord, how wonderful are thy works ; in wisdom 
hast thou made them all ; the earth is full of thy riches." 

Job xiv. 5 : " Seeing his days are determined, the number of his 
months are with thee ; thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot 
pass." 

Isa. xiv. 26 : " This is the purpose that is purposed upon the 
whole earth ; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the 
nations." 

Acts xvii. 26 : " And hath made of one blood all nations of men for 
to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times 
before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation." 

Eph. i. 11 : "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being 
predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things 
after the counsel of his own will." 

Acts ii. 23 : " Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and 
fore-knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have cruci- 
fied and slain." 

Acts iv. 27 : " For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom 
thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, 
and the people of Israel, were gathered together, 28. For to do whatso- 
ever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." 

Acts xiii. 29 : " And when they had fulfilled all that was written of 
him, they took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre." 

Jude 4 : " For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were 
before of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the 



528 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

grace of our God, into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, 
and our Lord Jesus Christ." 

Kev. xvii. 17 : '*' For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, 
and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of 
God shall be fulfilled." 

Acts xxxvii. 22 : " And now I exhort you to be of good cheer ; for 
there shall be no loss of any man's life among you, but of the ship. 23. 
For there stood by me this night the angel of God, whose I am, and 
whom I serve, 24. Saying, Fear not Paul, thou must be brought before 
Caesar ; and, lo, God hath given thee all them that sail with thee. 30. 
And as the shipmen were about to flee out of the ship, when they had 
let down the boat into the sea, under color as though they would have 
cast anchors out of the foreship, 31. Paul said to the centurion and to 
the soldiers, except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved." 

2 Thess. ii. 13 : " But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for 
you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the begin- 
ning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and 
belief of the truth." 

1 Pet. i. 2: ts Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the 
Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprink- 
ling of the blood of Jesus Christ." 

Ps. cxlvii. 8 : " Who covereth the heaven with clouds, who prepar- 
eth rain for the earth, who maketh grass to grow upon the mountains. 
9. He giveth to the beast his food, and to the young ravens which cry. 
15. He sendeth forth his commandment upon earth ; his word runneth 
very swiftly. 16. He giveth snow like wool ; he scattereth the hoar-frost 
like ashes. 17. He casteth forth his ice like morsels ; who can stand 
before his cold ? 18. He sendeth out his word and melteth them, he 
causeth his winds to blow, and the waters flow." 

Isa. xlv. 7 : ' * I form the light, and create darkness ; I make peace 
and create evil. I the Lord do all these things." 

Dan. iv. 36 : " And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as 
nothing ; and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and 
among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say 
unto him, What doest thou ? " 

Amos. iii. 6 : " Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people 
not be afraid ? Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not 
done it?" 

Matt. x. 29 : " Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing ? and one of 
them shall not fall on the ground without your Father." 

Kom. xi. 36 : For of him, and through him, and to him, are all 
things. " 

Eph. i. 11 : " In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 529 

predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things 
after the counsel of his own will." 

Matt. v. 45 : " That ye may be the children of your Father which is 
in heaven ; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, 
and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." 

Matt. vi. 26 : " Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither 
do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet your heavenly Father feedeth 
them. Are ye not much better than they ? 28. And why take ye 
thought for raiment ? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; 
they toil not, neither do they spin. 19. And yet I say unto you, that 
even Solomon in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. 30. 
Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and 
to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, 
ye of little faith ?" 

Jer. x. 23 : " Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself ; 
it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps." 

Jer. xviii. 6 : " house of Israel, cannot I do with you as this pot- 
ter ? saith the Lord. Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are 
ye in mine hand, house of Israel." 

2 Cor. iii. 5 : " Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any- 
thing, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of Cod." 

Neh. ix. 5: "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone: thou hast made 
heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all 
things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein, and thou pre- 
servest them all ; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee." 

Ezek. xiv. 6 : " And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken 
a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet ; and I will stretch out 
my hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people 
Israel." 

Luke x. 21 : " In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit, and said, I 
thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid 
these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto 
babes : even so, Father ; for so it seemed good in thy sight." 

John xii. 32 : " Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias 
said again, 40. He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart ; 
that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, 
and be converted, and I should heal them. 41. These thing said Esaias, 
when he saw his glory, and spake of him." 

Rom. ix. 18 : " Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have 
mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." 

2 Thess. ii. 10 : " And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in 
them that perish ; because they received not the love of the truth, that 
they might be saved. 11. And for this cause Cod shall send them 
34 



530 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

strong delusions, that they should believe a lie ; 12. That they all might be 
damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." 
These passages will show the general tenor of scripture upon this 
subject. 

IV. Different sense in which God purposes different events. 

1. The great end of all his works and ways he must have purposed 
positively, that is, absolutely. This end, namely his own good and the 
highest good of the universe, he set his heart upon securing. This end 
he no doubt properly intended, or purposed to secure. This must have 
been his ultimate intention or purpose. This end was no doubt a direct 
object of choice. 

2. God must no doubt also, in some sense, have purposed all the 
necessary means to this result. Such actions as tended naturally, or on 
account of their own nature, to this result, he must have purposed posi- 
tively, in the sense that he delighted in them, and chose them because 
of their own nature, or of their natural relation to the great end he 
proposed to accomplish by them. Observe, the end was an ultimate 
end, delighted in and chosen for its own sake. This end was the highest 
good or well-being of himself and the universe of sentient existences. 
This has been sufficiently shown in former lectures ; and besides it 
follows of necessity from the nature and attributes of G-od. If this were 
not so, he would be neither wise nor good. Since he delighted in and 
chose the end for its own sake or value, and purposed it with a positive 
purpose, he must also have chosen and delighted in the necessary means. 
He must have created the universe, both of matter and of mind, and 
established its laws, with direct reference to, and for the sake of, the 
end he purposed to accomplish. The end was valuable in itself, and 
chosen for that reason. The necessary means were as really valuable as 
the end which depended upon them. This value, though real, because 
of their tendency and natural results, is not ultimate, but relative ; that 
is, they are not, in the same sense that the end is, valuable in themselves; 
but they being the necessary means to this end, are as really valuable as 
the end that depends upon them. Thus our necessary food is not valua- 
ble in itself, but is the necessary means of prolonging our lives. There- 
fore, though not an ultimate good, yet it is a real good of as great value, 
as the end that naturally depends upon it. The naturally necessary 
means of securing a valuable end we justly esteem as equally valuable 
with the end, although this value is not absolute but relative. We are 
so accustomed to set a value on the means, equal to the estimated impor- 
tance of the end to which they sustain the relation of necessary means, 
that we come loosely to regard and to speak of them as valuable in them- 
selves, when in fact their value is not absolute but relative. 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 531 

God must have purposed to secure, so far as he wisely could, obe- 
dience to the laws of the universe. These laws were established for the 
sake of the end to which they tended, and obedience to them must have 
been regarded by God as of real, though not ultimate, value, equal to 
that of the end, for the accomplishment of which they were ordained. 
He must have delighted in obedience to these laws for the sake of the 
end, and must have purposed to secure this obedience so far as he could 
in the nature of things ; that is, in so far as he wisely could. Since 
moral law is a rule for the government of free moral agents, it is con- 
ceivable, that, in some cases, this law might be violated by the subjects 
of it, unless God resorted to means to prevent it, that might introduce 
an evil of greater magnitude than the violation of the law in the in- 
stances under consideration would be. It is conceivable, that, in some 
cases, God might be able so to overrule a. violation of his laws, as upon 
the whole to secure a greater good than could be secured, by introducing 
such a change into the policy and measures of his administration, or so 
framing his administration, as to prevent altogether the violation of any 
law. In this case, he might regard the violation as the less of two evils, 
and suffer it rather than change the arrangements of his government. 
He might sincerely deplore and abhor these violations of law, and yet 
might see it not wise to prevent them, because the measures necessary to 
prevent them might result in an evil of still greater magnitude. He 
might purpose to suffer these violations, and take the trouble to overrule 
them, so far as was possible, for the promotion of the end he had in 
view, rather than interpose for their prevention. These violations he 
might not have purposed in any other sense than that he foresaw them, 
and purposed not to prevent them, but on the contrary to suffer them to 
occur, and to overrule them for good, so far as this was practicable. 
These events, or violations of law, have no natural tendency to promote 
the highest well-being of God and of the universe, but have in themselves 
a directly opposite tendency. Nevertheless, God could so overrule them 
as that these occurrences would be a less evil than that change would be 
that could have prevented them. Violations of law then, he might have 
purposed only to suffer, while obedience to law he might have designed 
to produce or secure. 

3. We have seen, that God and men may have different motives in 
the same event, as in the case of the brethren of Joseph, already alluded 
to:— 

Gen. xlv. 4 : " And Joseph said unto his brethren, Come near to me, 
I pray you. And they came near. And he said, I am Joseph your 
brother, whom ye sold into Egypt. Now therefore be not grieved nor 
angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither ; for God did send me before 
you to preserve life. 6. For these two years hath the famine been in the 



532 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

land : and yet there are five years, in the which there shall neither be 
earing nor harvest !" 

As also in the case of the king of Assyria : Is. x. 5 : " Assyrian, the 
rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. 6. I 
will send him against a hypocritical nation, and against the people of 
my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the 
prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. 7. Howbeit 
he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so ; but it is in his heart 
to destroy and cut off nations not a few. 12. Wherefore it shall come to 
pass, that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon mount 
Zion, and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the 
king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks." 

Also, John iii. 16 : "For God so loved the world, that he gave his 
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but 
have everlasting life." 

Acts ii. 23. " Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and 
foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified 
and slain." 

These, and such like instances, show that wicked agents may, and 
often do, and when wicked always do, entertain a very different reason 
for their conduct from what God entertains in suffering it. They have 
a selfish end in view, or do what they do for a selfish reason. God, on 
the contrary, has a benevolent end in view in not interposing to prevent 
their sin ; that is, he hates their sin as tending in itself, to destroy, or 
defeat the great end of benevolence. But foreseeing that the sin, not- 
withstanding its natural evil tendency, may be so overruled, as upon the 
whole to result in a less evil than the changes requisite to prevent it 
would, he benevolently prefers to suffer it rather than interpose to prevent 
it. He would, no doubt, prefer their perfect obedience, under the circum- 
stances in which they are, but would sooner suffer them to sin, than so 
change the circumstances as to prevent it ; the latter being, all things con- 
sidered, the greater of two evils. God then always suffers his laws to be 
violated, because he cannot benevolently prevent it under the circum- 
stances. He suffers it for benevolent reasons. But the sinner always has 
selfish reasons. 

4. The Bible informs us, that God brings good out of evil, in the 
sense that he overrules sin to promote his own glory, and the good of 
being : — 

Ps. lxxvi. 10. " Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee ; the re- 
mainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." 

Eom. iii. 5 : " But if our unrighteousness commend the righteous- 
ness of God, what shall we say ? Is God unrighteous who taketh ven- 
geance ? (I speak as a man.) 7. For if the truth of God hath more 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 533 

abounded through my lie unto his glory ; why yet am I judged as a sin- 
ner ? And not rather (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm 
that we say,) Let us do evil, that good may come ? whose damnation is 
just." 

Rom. v. 20 : " Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might 
abound ; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." 

Eom. viii. 28 : " And we know that all things work together for good 
to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his pur- 
pose." 

5. The Bible also informs us that God does not aim at producing sin 
in creation and providence ; that is, that he does not purpose the exist- 
ence of sin in such a sense as to design to secure and promote it, in the 
administration of his government. In other words still, sin is not the 
object of a positive purpose on the part of God. It exists only by suf- 
ferance, and not as a thing which naturally tends to secure his great end, 
and which therefore he values on that account and endeavors to promote, 
as he does obedience to the law. 

Jer. vii. 9. " Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear 
falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye 
know not ? 10. And come and stand before me in this house, which is 
called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abomina- 
tions ?" 

1 Cor. xiv. 33 : " For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace, 
as in all churches of the saints." 

James i. 13 : " Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of 
God ; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any 
man ; 14. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own 
lust, and enticed. 15. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth 
sin ; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. 16. Do not err, 
my beloved brethren. 17. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from 
above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no va- 
riableness, neither shadow of turning." 

James iii. 14 : " But if ye have bitter envying and strife in your 
hearts, glory not, and lie not against the truth. 15. This wisdom de- 
scendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. 16. For where 
envying and strife is, there is confusion, and every evil work. 17. But 
the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, and gentle, 
and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality 
and hypocrisy." 

1 John ii. 16 : " For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and 
the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of 
the world." 

Obedience to law is an object of positive purpose. God purposes to 



534 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

promote it, and uses means with that design. Sin occurs incidentally, so 
far as the purpose of God is concerned. It need not be, and doubtless is 
not, the object of positive design or purpose, but comes to pass because 
it cannot wisely be prevented. God uses means to promote obedience. 
But moral agents, in the exercise of their free agency, often disobey in 
spite of all the inducements to the contrary which God can wisely set be- 
fore them. God never sets aside the freedom of moral agents to prevent 
their sinning, nor to secure their obedience. The Bible everywhere rep- 
resents men as acting freely under the government and universal provi- 
dence of God, and it represents sin as the result of, or as consisting in, 
an abuse of their freedom. 

Gen. xlii. 21 : "And they said one to another, We are verily guilty 
concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he 
besought us, and we would not hear ; therefore is this distress come upon 
us." 

Ex. viii. 32 : "And Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time also, 
neither would he let the people go." 

Ex. ix. 27 : " And Pharaoh sent, and called for Moses and Aaron, 
and said unto them, I have sinned this time : the Lord is righteous, and 
I and my people are wicked. " 

Ex. x. 16 : " Then Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron in haste ; and 
he said, I have sinned against the Lord your God, and against you. 17. 
Now therefore forgive, I pray thee, my sin only this once, and entreat 
the Lord your God, that he may take away from me this death only." 

Deut. xxx. 19 : "I call heaven and earth to record this day against 
you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing : 
therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." 

Josh. xxiv. 15 : " And if it seem evil unto you to serve the Lord, 
choose ye this day whom ye will serve ; whether the gods which your 
fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the 
Amorites, in whose land ye dwell ; but as for me and my house, we will 
serve the Lord." 

2 Sam. xxiv. 1 : "And again the anger of the Lord was kindled 
against Israel, and he moved David against them to say, Go, number 
Israel and Judah. 10. And David's heart smote him after that he had 
numbered the people. And David said unto the Lord, I have sinned 
greatly in that I have done : and now, I beseech thee, Lord, takeaway 
the iniquity of thy servant ; for I have done very foolishly." 

Prov. i. 10 : " My son, if sinners entice thee, consent thou not. 29. 
Eor that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord ; 
30. They would none of my counsel ; they despised all my reproof ; 31. 
Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with 
their own devices." 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 535 

Prov. xvi. 9 : ' ' A man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth 
his steps." 

The following things appear to be true in respect to the purposes of 
God, as taught both by reason and revelation : — ■ 

(1.) That God's purposes extend in some sense to all events. 

(2.) That he positively purposes the highest good of being, as a whole 
as his end. 

(3.) That he has ordained wise and wholesome laws as the necessary 
means of securing this end. 

(4.) That he positively purposes to secure obedience to these laws in 
so far as he wisely can, and uses means with this design. 

(5.) That he does not positively purpose to secure disobedience to his 
laws in any case, and use means with that design ; but that he only 
purposes to suffer violations of his law rather than prevent them, because 
he foresees that, by his overruling power, he can prevent the violation 
from resulting in so great an evil as the change necessary to prevent it 
would do. Or in other words, he sees that he can secure a greater good 
upon the whole, by suffering the violation under the circumstances in 
which it occurs, than he could by interposing to prevent it. This is not 
the same thing as to say, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest 
good. Tor should all moral agents perfectly obey, under the identical 
circumstances in which they disobey, this might, and doubtless would 
result in the highest possible good. But God, foreseeing that it were 
more conducive to the highest good of being to suffer some to sin, rather 
than so change the circumstances as to prevent it, purposed to suffer 
their sin, and overrule it for good ; but he did not aim at producing it, 
and use means with that intent. 

V. GocVs revealed ivill is never inconsistent ivitli his secret purpose. 

It has been common to represent sin as the necessary occasion, condi- 
tion, or means of the greatest good, in such a sense, that upon the whole 
God secretly, but really prefers sin to holiness in every case where it 
exists ; that while he has forbidden sin under all circumstances, upon 
pain of eternal death, yet because it is the necessary occasion, condition, 
or means of the greatest good, God really prefers its existence to holiness 
in every instance in which it exists. It has been said, sin exists. God 
does not therefore prevent it. But he could and would prevent it, if he 
did not upon the whole prefer it to holiness, in the circumstances in 
which it occurs. Its existence, then, it has been said, is proof conclusive 
that God secretly prefers its existence to holiness, in every case in which 
it occurs. But this is a non sequitur. It does not follow from the 
existence of sin, that God prefers sin to holiness in the circumstances 
in which it occurs ; but it may be that he only prefers sin to such a 



536 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

change of circumstances as would prevent it. Suppose I require my 
son to do a certain thing. I know that he will do it, if I remain at 
home and see to it. But I know also, that if I go from home he will not 
do it. Now I might prefer that he should do as I command, and con- 
sider his disobedience as a great evil ; still I might regard it as a less evil 
than for me to remain at home, and keep my eye upon him. I might have 
just reasons for supposing that, under the circumstances, a greater good 
could be secured upon the whole by my going from home, although his 
disobedience might be the consequence, than by remaining at home, 
and preventing his disobedience. Benevolence therefore might require 
me to go. 

But should my son infer from my leaving him, under these circum- 
stances, that I really, though secretly, preferred his disobedience to his 
obedience, under the identical circumstances in which I gave the com- 
mand, would his inference be legitimate ? No, indeed. All that he 
could justly infer from my leaving him, with the knowledge that he 
would disobey me if I did, would be, that although I regarded his diso- 
bedience as a great evil, yet I regarded remaining at home a greater. 

Just so, it may be when sin exists. God is sincere in prohibiting it. 
He would greatly prefer that it should not exist. All that can be 
justly inferred from his not preventing it is, that, although he regards 
its existence as a great and real evil, yet upon the whole he regards it as 
a less evil, than would result from so great a change in the administra- 
tion of his government as would prevent it. He is therefore entirely 
and infinitely sincere in requiring obedience, and in prohibiting disobe- 
dience, and his secret purpose is in strict keeping with his revealed will. 
Were the moral law universally obeyed, under the circumstances in 
which all moral agents exist, no one can say, that this would not be 
better for the universe, and more pleasing to God than disobedience is 
in the same circumstances. Nor is it fair to infer, that upon the whole, 
God must prefer sin to holiness, where it occurs, from the fact that 
he does not prevent it. As has been said, all that can justly be inferred 
from his not preventing it is, that under the circumstances he prefers 
not sin to holiness, but prefers to suffer the agent to sin and take the 
consequences, rather than introduce such changes in the policy and ad- 
ministration of his government as would prevent it. Or it may be said, 
that the present system is the best that infinite wisdom could devise and 
execute, not because of sin, but in spite of it, and notwithstanding sin 
is a real though incidental evil. 

It is a palpable contradiction and an absurdity to affirm, that any 
being can sin, intending thereby to promote the greatest good. This 
will appear if we consider : — 

1. That it is admitted on all hands, that benevolence is virtue. 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 537 

2. That benevolence consists in willing good, or the highest good 
of being as an end. 

3. That it is duty to will both the end and the necessary means to 
promote it. 

4. That right and benevolence are always at one, that is, that which 
is benevolent must always be right, and can in no case be wrong. 

5. That consequently it can never be sin to choose the highest good 
of being, with all the necessary occasions, conditions, and means of pro- 
moting it. 

6. It is impossible therefore for a being to sin, or to consent to sin, as 
an occasion, condition, or means, or designing thereby to promote the 
highest good of being ; for this design would be virtue, and not sin. 
Whether all virtue consists in benevolence, or not, still it must be ad- 
mitted, that all forms of virtue must be consistent with benevolence, un- 
less it be admitted, that there can be a law of right inconsistent with, and 
opposed to, the law of benevolence. But this would be to admit, that 
two moral laws might be opposed to each other ; which would be to 
admit, that a moral agent might be under an obligation to obey two op- 
posing laws at the same time, which is a contradiction. Thus it appears, 
that there can be no law of right opposed to, or separate from, the law 
of benevolence. Benevolence and right must then always be at one. If 
this be so, it follows, that whatever benevolence demands, cannot be 
wrong, but must be right. But the law of benevolence demands not 
only the choice of the highest good of being as an end, but also demands 
the choice of all the known necessary occasions, conditions, and means 
with a design to promote that end. .. j 

It is naturally impossible to sin, in using means designed and known 
to be necessary to the promotion of the end of benevolence. It is there- 
fore naturally impossible to do evil, or to sin, that good may come, or 
with the design to promote good thereby. \^ 

Let those who hold that right and benevolence may be opposed to 
each other, and that a moral agent can sin with a benevolent intention, 
see what their doctrine amounts to, and get out of the absurdity as best 
they can. The fact is, if willing the highest good of being is always vir- 
tuous, it must always be right to will all the necessary occasions, condi- 
tions, and means to that end. It is therefore a contradiction to say that 
sin can be among the necessary and intended occasions, conditions, and 
means : that is, that any one could sin intending thereby to promote the 
highest good. 

But it is not pretended by those who hold this dogma, that sin sustains 
to the highest good the same relations that holiness does. Holiness has a 
natural tendency to promote the highest good ; but the supposition now 
under consideration is, that sin is hateful in itself, and that it therefore 



538 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

must dissatisfy and disgust all moral agents, and that its natural tend- 
ency is to defeat the end of moral government, and to prevent rather 
than promote the highest good ; but that God foresees that, notwith- 
standing its intrinsically odious and injurious nature, he can so overrule 
it as to make it the condition, occasion, or instrument of the highest 
good of himself and of his universe, and that for this reason he really 
upon the whole is pleased that it should occur, and prefers its existence 
in every instance in which it does exist, to holiness in its stead. The 
supposition is, that sin is in its own nature infinitely odious and abomi- 
nable to God, and perfectly odious to all holy moral agents, yet it is the 
occasion of calling into development and exercise such emotions and feel- 
ings in God and in holy beings, and such modifications of benevolence, 
as do really more than compensate for all the disgust and painful emo- 
tions that result to holy beings, and for all the remorse, agony, despair, 
and endless suffering, that result to sinners. 

It is not supposed by any one that I know of, that sin naturally tends 
to promote the highest good at all, but only that God can, and does, so 
overrule and counteract its natural tendency, as to make it the occasion 
or condition of a greater good, than holiness would be in its stead. Now 
in reply to this, I would say, that I pretend not to determine to what 
extent God can, and will, overrule and counteract the naturally evil and 
injurious tendency of sin. It surely is enough to say that God prohibits 
it and that it is impossible for creatures to know that sin is the neces- 
sary occasion, or condition, or means of the highest good. 

4 If sin is known by God to be the necessary occasion, condition, or 
means of the highest good of himself and of the universe, whatever it 
may be in itself, yet viewed in its relations, it must be regarded by him 
as of infinite value, since it is the indispensable condition of infinite 
good.' According to this theory, sin in every instance in which it exists, 
is and must be regarded by God as of infinitely greater value than holi- 
ness would be in its stead. He must then, upon the whole, have infinite 
complacency in it. But this leads me to attend to the principal argu- 
ments by which it is supposed this theory is maintained. It is said, for 
example : — 

(1.) That the highest good of the universe of moral agents is condi- 
tionated upon the revelation of the attributes and character of God to 
them ; that but for sin these attributes, at least some of them, could 
never have been revealed, inasmuch as without sin there would have been 
no occasion for their display or manifestation ; that neither justice nor 
mercy, nor forbearance, nor self denial, nor meekness, could have found 
the occasions of their exercise or manifestation, had sin never existed. 

To this I reply, that sin has indeed furnished the occasion for a glori- 
ous manifestation of the moral perfections of God. From this we see 



PURPOSES OP GOD. 532 

that God's perfections enable him greatly to overrule sin, and to bring 
good out of evil : but from this we are not authorized to infer, that God 
could not have revealed these attributes to his creatures without the exist- 
ence of sin. Nor can we say, that these revelations would have been 
necessary to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe, had all 
moral agents perfectly and uniformly obeyed. When we consider what 
the moral attributes of God are, it is easy to see that there may be 
myriads of moral attributes in God of which no creature has, or ever will 
have, any knowledge ; and the knowledge of which is not at all essential 
to the highest perfection and happiness of the universe of creatures. 
God's moral attributes are only his benevolence, existing and contemplated 
in its various relations to the universe of beings. Benevolence in any 
being must possess as many attributes as there are possible relations 
under which it can be contemplated, and should their occasions arise, 
these attributes would stand forth in exercise. It is not at all probable, 
that all of the attributes of benevolence, either in the Creator or in creat- 
ures, have yet found the occasions of their exercise, nor, perhaps, will 
they ever. As new occasions rise to all eternity, benevolence will develop 
new and striking attributes, and manifest itself under endless forms and 
varieties of loveliness. There can be no such thing as exhausting its 
capabilities of development. 

In God benevolence is infinite. Creatures can never know all its at- 
tributes, nor approach any nearer to knowing all of them than they now 
are. There can be no end to its capabilities of developing in exercise 
new forms of beauty and loveliness. It is true, that God has taken oc- 
casion to show forth the glory of his benevolence through the existence 
of sin. He has seized the occasion, though mournful in itself, to mani- 
fest some of the attributes of his benevolence by the exercise of them. It 
is also true, that we cannot know how or by what means God could have 
revealed these attributes, if sin had not existed ; and it is also true, that 
we cannot know that such a revelation was impossible without the exist- 
ence of sin ; nor that, but for sin, the revelation would have been neces- 
sary to the highest good of the universe. 

God forbids sin, and requires universal holiness. He must be sincere 
in this. But sin exists. Shall we say that he secretly chooses that it 
should, and really, though secretly, prefers its existence to holiness, in> 
the circumstances in which it occurs ? Or shall we assume, that it is an 
evil, that God regards it as such, but that he cannot wisely prevent it ;: 
that is, to prevent it would introduce a still greater evil ? It is an evil, 
and a great evil, but still the less of two evils ; that is, to suffer it to 
occur, under the circumstances, is a less evil than such a change of cir- 
cumstances, as would prevent it, would be. This is all we can justly infer 
from its existence. This leaves the sincerity of God unimpeached, and 



540 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

sustains his consistency, and the consistency and integrity of his law. 
The opposite supposition represents God and the law as infinitely de- 
ceitful. 

(2.) It has been said, that the Bible sustains the supposition, that sin 
is the necessary means of the highest good. I trust the passages that 
have been quoted, disprove this saying. 

(3.) It is said, that to represent sin as not the means of the highest 
good, and God as unable to prevent it, is to represent God as unable to 
accomplish all his will ; whereas he says, he will do all his pleasure, and 
that nothing is too hard for him. 

I answer : God pleases to do only what is naturally possible, and he 
is well pleased to do that and nothing more. This he is able to do. 
This he will do. This he does. This is all he claims to be able to do ; 
and this is all that in fact infinite wisdom and power can do. 

(4.) But it is said, that if sin is an evil, and God can neither prevent 
nor overrule it, so as to make it a means of greater good than could be 
-secured without it, he must be unhappy in view of this fact, because he 
cannot prevent it, and secure a higher good without it. 

I answer : God neither desires nor wills to perform natural impossi- 
bilities. God is a reasonable being, and does not aim at nor desire im- 
possibilities. He is well content to do as well as, in the nature of the 
case, is possible, and has no unreasonable regrets because he is not more 
than infinite, and that he cannot accomplish what is impossible to in- 
finity itself. His good pleasure is, to secure all the good that is possible 
to infinity : with this he is infinitely well pleased. 

Again : does not the objection, that the view of the subject here pre- 
sented limits the divine power, lie with all its force against those who 
make this objection ? To hold that sin is the necessary means or condi- 
tion of the highest good, is to hold that God was unable to promote the 
highest good without resorting to such vile means as sin. Sin is an 
abomination in itself ; and do not they, as really and as much limit the 
power of God, who maintain his inability to promote the highest good 
without it, as they do who hold, that he could not wisely so interfere 
with the free actions of moral agents as to prevent it ? Sin exists. God 
abhors it. How is its existence to be accounted for ? I suppose it to be 
an evil unavoidably incidental to that system of moral government which, 
notwithstanding the evil, was upon the whole the best that could be 
adopted. Others suppose that sin is the necessary means or condition 
of the greatest good ; and account for its existence in this way : — that is, 
they suppose that God admits or permits its existence as a necessary oc- 
casion, condition, or means of the highest good ; that he was not able to 
secure the highest good without it. The two explanations of the ad- 
mitted fact that sin exists, differ in this : — 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 541 

One method of explanation holds, that sin is the necessary occasion, 
condition, or means of the highest good ; and that God actually, upon 
the whole, prefers the existence of sin to holiness, in every instance in 
which it exists ; because, in those circumstances, it is a condition or 
means of greater good than could have been secured by holiness in its 
stead. This theory represents God as unable to secure his end by other 
means, or upon other conditions, than sin. The other theory holds, 
that God really prefers holiness to sin in every instance in which it 
occurs ; that he regards sin as an evil, but that while he regards it as an 
evil, he suffers its existence as a less evil than such a change in the ad- 
ministration of his government as would prevent it, would be. Both 
theories must admit, that in some sense God could not wisely prevent it. 
Explain the fact of its existence as you will, it must be admitted, that in 
some sense God was not able to prevent it, and secure his end. 

If it be said, that God could neither wisely prevent it, nor so overrule 
it as to make it the means or condition of the highest good, he must be 
rendered unhappy by its existence ; I reply, that this must be equally 
true upon the other hypothesis. Sin is hateful, and its consequences are 
a great evil. These consequences will be eternal and indefinitely great. 
God must disapprove these consequences. If sin is the necessary condi- 
tion or means of the greatest good, must not God lament that he cannot 
secure the good without a resort to such loathsome, and such horrible 
means ? If his inability wisely to prevent it will interfere with and di- 
minish his happiness, must not the same be true of his inability to secure 
the highest good, without such means as will prove the eternal destruc- 
tion of millions ? 

VI. Wisdom and lenevolence of the purposes of God. 

We have seen that God is both wise and benevolent. This is the doc- 
trine both of reason and of revelation. The reason intuitively affirms 
that God is, and is perfect. The Bible assumes that he is, and declares 
that he is perfect. Both wisdom and benevolence must be attributes of 
the infinite and perfect God. These attributes enter into the reason's 
idea of God. The reason could not recognize any being as God to whom_ 
these attributes did not belong. But if infinite wisdom and benevolence 
are moral attributes of God, it follows of course that all his designs orjj 
purposes are both perfectly wise and benevolent. God has chosen the 
best possible end, and pursues it in the use of the best practicable means. 
His purposes embrace the end and the means necessary to secure it, to- 
gether with the best practicable disposal of the sin, which is the inciden- 
tal result of his choosing this end and using these means ; and they extend 
no further ; they are all therefore perfectly wise and good. 



542 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

VII. The immutability of the divine purposes. 

We have seen that immutability is not only a natural, but also a moral 
attribute of God. The reason affirms, that the self-existent and infinitely 
perfect God is unchangeable in all his attributes. The ground of this 
affirmation it is not my purpose here to inquire into. It is sufficient here 
to say, what every one knows, that such is the affirmation of the reason. 
This is also everywhere assumed and taught in the Bible. God's moral 
attributes are not immutable in the sense of necessity, but only in the 
sense of certainty. Although God is not necessarily benevolent, yet he is 
as immutably so, as if he were necessarily so. If his benevolence were 
necessary, it would not be virtuous, for the simple reason that it would 
not be free. But being free, its immutability renders it all the more 
praiseworthy. 

VIII. The purposes of God are a ground of eternal and joyful confi- 
dence. 

That is, they may reasonably be a source of eternal comfort, joy, and 
peace. Selfish beings will not of course rejoice in them, but benevolent 
beings will and must. If they are infinitely wise and good, and sure to 
be accomplished, they must form a rational ground of unfailing confi- 
dence and joy. God says : — 

Isa. xlvi. 10 : " Declaring the end from the beginning, and from 
ancient times the things that are not } r et done, saying, My counsel shall 
stand, and I will do all my pleasure." 

Psa. xxxiii. 11: "The counsel of the Lord stand eth for ever, the 
thoughts of his heart to all generations." 

Prov. xix. 21 : " There are many devices in a man's heart, neverthe- 
less, the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand." 

Acts v. 39 : " But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply 
ye be found even to fight against God." 

These, and many parallel passages are reasonably the source of per- 
petual confidence and joy to those who love God, and sympathize with him. 

IX. The relation of God's purposes to his prescience or foreknoivledge. 

We have seen that God is omniscient, that is, that he necessarily and 
eternally knows whatever is, or can be, an object of knowledge. His 
purposes must also be eternal and immutable, as we have seen. In the 
order of time, therefore, his purposes and his foreknowledge must be 
coeval, that is, they must be co-eternal. 

But in the order of nature, God's knowledge of what he could do, and 
what could be done, must have preceded his purposes : that is, he could 
not, so to speak, in the order of nature, have formed his purpose and 



PURPOSES OF GOD. 513 

made up his mind what to do, until he had considered what could be 
done, and what was best to be done. Until all possible ends, and ways, 
and means, were weighed and understood, it was of course impossible to 
make a selection, and settle upon the end with all the necessary means ; 
and also settle upon the ways and means of overruling any evil, natural 
or moral, that might be seen to be unavoidably incidental to any system. 
Thus it appears, that, in the order of nature, fore-knowledge of what 
could be done, and what he could do, must have preceded the purpose to 
do. The purpose resulted from the prescience or fore-knowledge. He 
knew what he could do, before he decided what he would do. But, on 
the other hand, the purpose to do must, in the order of nature, have pre- 
ceded the knowledge of what he should do, or of what would be done, or 
would come to pass as a result of his purpose. Viewed relatively to what 
he could do, and what could be done, the Divine prescience must in the 
order of nature have preceded the Divine purposes. But viewed rela- 
tively to what he would do, and what would be done, and would come to 
pass, the Divine purposes must, in the order of nature, have preceded the 
Divine prescience. But I say again, as fore-knowledge was necessarily 
eternal with G-od, his purposes must also have been eternal, and there- 
fore, in the order of time, neither his prescience could have preceded his 
purposes, nor his purposes have preceded his prescience. They must 
have been cotemporaneous and co-eternal. 

X. God's purposes are not inconsistent ivith, hut demand the use oj 
means loth on Ms part, and on our part, to accomplish them. 

The great end upon which he has set his heart necessarily depends 
upon the use of means, both moral and physical, to accomplish it. The 
highest well-being of the whole universe is his end. This end can be 
secured only by securing conformity to the laws of matter and of mind. 
Mind is influenced by motives, and hence moral and physical government 
are naturally necessary means of securing the great end proposed by the 
Divine mind. 

Hence also results the necessity of a vast and complicated system of 
means and influences, such as we see spread around us on every hand. 
The history of the universe is but the history of creation, and of the 
means which God is using to secure his end, with their natural and inci- 
dental results. It has already been shown, that the Bible teaches that the 
purposes of God include and respect both means and ends. I will only add, 
that God's purposes do not render any event, dependent upon the acts of 
a moral agent, necessarily certain, or certain with a certainty of necessity. 
Although, as was before said, all events are certain with some kind of 
certainty, and would be and must be, if they are ever to come to pass, 
whether God purposes them, or whether he foreknows them or not ; yet 



544- SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

no event, depending upon the will of a free agent, is, or can be, certain 
with a certainty of necessity. The agent could by natural possibility do 
otherwise than he will do, or than God purposes to suffer him to do, or 
wills that he shall do. God's purposes, let it be understood, are not a 
system of fatality. They leave every moral agent entirely free to choose 
and act freely. God knows infallibly how every creature will act, and 
has made all his arrangements accordingly, to overrule the wicked 
actions of moral agents on the one hand, and to produce or induce, the 
holy actions of others on the other hand. But be it remembered, that 
neither the Divine fore-knowledge nor the Divine purpose, in any in- 
stance, sets aside the free agency of the creature. He, in every instance, 
acts as freely and as responsibly, as if God neither knew nor purposed 
anything respecting his conduct, or his destiny. 

God's purposes extend to all events in some sense, as has been shown. 
They extend as really to the most common events of life as to the most 
rare. But in respect to the every day transactions of life, men are not 
wont to stumble, and cavil, and say, Why, if I am to live, I shall live, 
whatever I may do to destroy my health and life ; and if I am to die, I 
cannot live, do what I will. No, in these events they will not throw off 
responsibility, and cast themselves upon the purposes of God ; but on 
the contrary, they are as much engaged to secure the end they have in 
view, as if God neither knew nor purposed anything about it. AVhy 
then should they do as they often do, in regard to the salvation of their 
souls, cast off responsibility, and settle down in listless inactivity, as if 
the purposes of God in respect to salvation were but a system of iron 
fatality, from which there is no escape ? Surely " madness is in their 
hearts while they live." But let them understand, that, in thus doing, 
they sin against the Lord, and be sure their sin will find them out. 



LECTURE XLVII. 

PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 

Ik discussing this subject, I will, 

I. Notice the different hinds of certainty. 

Every thing must be certain with some kind of certainty. There is a 
way in which all things and events either have been, are, or will be. All 
events that ever did or will occur, were and are as really certain before 
as after their occurrence. To an omniscient mind their real certainty 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 545 

might and must have been known, as really before as after their occur- 
rence. All future events, for example, will occur in some way, and there 
is no real uncertainty in fact, nor can there be any real uncertainty in 
the knowledge of God respecting them. They are really as certain 
before they come to pass as they will ever be, and they are as truly and 
perfectly known as certain by God as they ever will be. They are as 
truly present to the Divine fore-knowledge as they ever will be. What- 
ever of contingency and uncertainty there may be respecting them in 
some respects, yet, in point of fact, all events are certain, and there is 
no real uncertainty in respect to any event that ever did or will occur. 
This would be equally true, whether God or any other being knew how 
they would be or not. The fore-knowledge of God does not make them 
certain. He knows them to be certain simply because they are so. 
Omniscience is the necessary knowledge of all objects of knowledge, past, 
present, and future. But omniscience does not create objects of knowl- 
edge. It does not render events certain, but only knows how they cer- 
tainly will be, because it is certain, not only that they will be, but how 
and when they will be. All the free actions of moral agents are as really 
certain before they occur, as they ever will be. And God must as truly 
know how they will be before they occur, as he does after they have 
occurred. 

1. The first kind of certainty that I shall notice, is that of absolute 
necessity ; that is, a certainty depending on no conditions whatever. 
This is the highest kind of certainty. It belongs to the absolute and 
the infinite, to the existence of space, duration, and to the existence of 
God ; and in short to everything that is self-existent, infinite, and im- 
mutable in a natural sense ; that is, to everything infinite that does not 
imply voluntariness. The natural attributes of God are certain by this 
kind of certainty, but his moral attributes, consisting as they do in a 
voluntary state of mind, though infinite and eternal, do not belong to 
this class. 

2. A second kind of certainty is that of physical, but conditional 
necessity. To this class belong all those events that come to pass under 
the operation of physical law. These belong properly to the chain 
of cause and effect. The cause existing, the effect must exist. The 
event is rendered certain and necessary by the existence of its cause. Its 
certainty is conditionated upon its cause. The cause existing, the event 
must follow by a law of necessity, and the events would not occur of 
course, did not their causes exist. The causes being what they are, the 
events must be what they are. This class of events are as really certain 
as the foregoing class. By speaking of one of them as certain in a higher 
sense than the other, it is not intended, that one class is any more certain 
than the other, but only that the certainty is of a different kind. For 

35 



516 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

example, the first class are certain by a kind of certainty that does not, 
and never did depend on the will of any being whatever. There never 
was any possibility that these things should be otherwise than they are. 
This, it will be seen, must be true of space and duration, and of the 
existence and the natural attributes of God. 

But all other things except the self-existent, the naturally immutable 
and eternal, are certain only as they are conditionated directly or indi- 
rectly upon the will of some being. For example, all the events of the 
physical universe were rendered certain by creation, and the establishing 
and upholding of those physical and necessary laws that cause these 
events. These are, therefore, certain by a conditioned, though physical 
necessity. There is no freedom or liberty in the events themselves ; they 
occur necessarily, when their causes or conditions are supplied. 

3. A third kind of certainty is that of a moral certainty. I call it a 
moral certainty, not because the class of events which belong to it are 
less certain than the foregoing, but because they consist in, or are 
conditionated upon, the free actions of moral agents. This class do not 
occur under the operation of a law of necessity, though they occur with 
certainty. There is no contingency predicable of the absolutely certain 
in the sense of absolute certainty above defined. The second class of 
certainties are contingent only in respect to their causes. Upon condi- 
tion that the causes are certain, the events depending upon them are 
certain, without or beyond any contingency. This third class, though 
no less certain than the former two, are nevertheless contingent in the 
highest sense in which anything can be contingent. They occur under 
the operation of free will, and consequently there is not one of them 
that might not by natural possibility fail, or be otherwise than it is 
or will in fact be. This kind of certainty I call a moral certainty, 
as opposed to a physical certainty, that is, it is not a certainty of neces- 
sity in any sense ; it is only a mere certainty, or a voluntary certainty, a 
free certainty, a certainty that might, by natural possibility in every 
case, be no certainty at all. But, on the contrary, the opposite might 
in every instance be certain by a natural possibility. God in every 
instance, knows how these events will be, as really as if they occurred by 
necessity ; but his foreknowledge does not affect their certainty one way 
or the other. They might in every instance by natural possibility be no 
certainties at all, or be the opposite of what they are or will be, God's 
foreknowledge in anywise notwithstanding. God knows them to be 
certain, not because his knowledge has any influence of itself to necessi- 
tate them, but because they are certain in themselves. Because it is 
certain in itself that they will be, God knows that they will be. To this 
class of events belong all the free actions of moral agents. All events 
may be traced ultimately to the action of God's free will ; that is, God's 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 517 

free actions gave existence to the universe, with all its physical agencies 
and laws, so that all physical events are in some sense owing to, and 
result from the actions of free will. But physical events occur neverthe- 
less under the immediate operation of a law of necessity. The class now 
under consideration depend not upon the operation of physical law as 
their cause. They are caused by the free agent himself. They find the 
occasions of their occurrence in the providential events with which moral 
agents are surrounded, and therefore may be traced indirectly, and more 
or less remotely, to the actions of the Divine will. 

Concerning this class of events, I would further remark that they are 
not only contingent in such a sense, that they might in every case by 
natural possibility be other than they are, but there may be, humanly 
speaking, the utmost danger that they will be otherwise than they really 
will be, that is, there may be danger, and the utmost danger, in the only 
sense in which there can be in fact any danger that any event will be 
otherwise than what it turns out to be. All events being really certain, 
there is in fact no danger that any event whatever will turn out differ- 
ently from what it does, in the sense that it is not certain how it will be. 
But since all acts of free will, and all events dependent on those acts, 
are contingent in the highest sense in which any event can in the natura 
of things be contingent ; and in the sense that, humanly speaking, there 
may be millions of chances to one that they will be otherwise than they 
will in fact turn out to be, — we say of all this class of events, that there 
is danger that they may or may not occur. 

Again : I remark in respect to this class of events, that God may 
foresee that so intricate is the labyrinth, and so complicated are the 
occasions of failure, that nothing but the utmost watchfulness and dili- 
gent use of means on his part, and on our part, can secure the occurrence 
of the event. Everything revealed in the Bible concerning the perse- 
verance and final salvation of the saints, and everything that is true, and 
that God knows of the free actions and destinies of the saints, may be of 
this class. These events are nevertheless certain, and are known to God 
as certainties. Not one of them will, in fact, turn out differently from 
what he foresees that they will ; and yet by natural possibility, they 
might every one of them turn out differently ; and there may, in the 
only sense in which danger is predicable of anything, be the utmost 
danger that some or all of them will turn out differently from what they 
in fact will. These events are contingent in such a sense, that should 
the means fail to be used, or should any event in the whole chain of 
influences connected with their occurrence, be otherwise than it is, the 
end or event resulting, would or might be otherwise, than in fact it will 
be. They are, nevertheless, certain, every one of them, together with all 
the influences upon which each free act depends. Nothing is uncertain 



548 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

in respect to whether it will occur or not ; and yet no free act, or event 
depending upon a free act, is certain, in the sense that it cannot by 
natural possibility be otherwise, nor in the sense that there may not be 
great danger, or, humanly speaking, a probability that it will be other- 
wise, and that, humanly speaking, there may not be many chances to one 
that it will be otherwise. 

When I say, that any event may, by natural possibility, be otherwise 
than what it will in fact be, I mean, that the free agent has natural 
power in every instance to choose otherwise than he does or actually will 
choose. As an illustration of both the contingency and the certainty of 
this class of events, suppose a man about to attempt to cross Lake Erie on 
a wire, or to pass down the falls of Niagara in a bark canoe. The result 
of this attempt is really certain. God must know how it will be. But 
this result, though certain, is conditionated upon a multitude of things, 
each of which the agent has natural power to make otherwise than in fact 
he will. To secure his safe crossing, every volition must be just what 
and as it will be ; but there is not one among them that might not, by 
natural possibility, be the opposite of what it will be. 

Again, the case may be such, and the danger of failure so great, that 
nothing could secure the safe crossing, but a revelation from God that 
would inspire confidence, that the adventurer should in fact cross the 
lake, or venture down the falls safely : I say, this revelation of God 
might be indispensable to his safe crossing. Suppose it were revealed to 
a man under such circumstances, that he should actually arrive in safety ; 
but the revelation was accompanied with the emphatic assurance, that 
the end depended upon the most diligent, cautious, and persevering use 
of means on his part, and that any failure in these would defeat the end. 
Both the revelation of the certainty of success, and the emphatic warn- 
ing, might be indispensable to the securing of the end. Now, if the 
adventurer had confidence in the promise of success, he would have con- 
fidence in the caution not to neglect the necessary means, and his confi- 
dence in both might secure the desired result. But take an example 
from scripture : — 

Acts xxvii. 21 : "But after long abstinence, Paul stood forth in the 
midst of them, and said, Sirs, ye should have hearkened unto me, and 
not have loosed from Crete, and to have gained this harm and loss. 22. 
And now I exhort you to be of good cheer : for there shall be no loss of 
any man's life among you, but of the ship. For there stood by me this 
night the angel of God, whose I am, and whom I serve, 24. Saying, 
Fear not, Paul : thou must be brought before Caesar : and lo, God hath 
given thee all them that sail with thee. 25. Wherefore, sirs, be of good 
cheer : for I believe God, that it shall be even as it was told me. 26. 
Howbeit we must be cast upon a certain island. 27. But when the four- 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 54D 

teenth night was come, as we were driven up and down in Adria, about 
midnight the ship-men deemed that they drew near to some country ; 
28. And sounded, and found it twenty fathoms : and when they had gone 
a little further, they sounded again, and found it fifteen fathoms. 29. 
Then fearing lest we should have fallen upon rocks, they cast anchors 
out of the stern, and wished for the day. 30. And as the ship-men were 
about to flee out of the ship, when they had let down the boat into the 
sea, under color as though they would have cast anchors out of the fore- 
ship, 31. Paul said to the centurion and to the soldiers, Except these 
abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved." Here the end was foreknown and 
expressly foretold at first, without any condition expressed, though they 
plainly understood that the end was to be secured by means. Paul after- 
wards informed them, that if they neglected the means, the end would 
fail. Both the means and the end were certain in fact, and God there- 
fore expressly revealed the certainty of the result, and afterwards by a 
subsequent revelation secured the use of the necessary means. Here was 
no uncertainty, in the sense that the thing might, in fact, turn out other- 
Avise than it did, and yet it was uncertain in the sense that, by natural 
possibility, both the means and the end might fail. 

I remark, again, in respect to events that are morally certain, that if 
they are greatly desired, they are not the more, but all the less, in dan- 
ger of failing, by how much stronger the confidence is that they will 
occur, provided it be understood, that they are certain only by a moral 
certainty ; that is, provided it be understood, that the event is conditioned 
upon the free acts of the agent himself. 

Again : it is generally admitted, that hope is a condition of success in 
any enterprise ; and if this is so, assurance of success, upon the proper 
conditions, cannot tend to defeat the end. 

I remark, again, that there is a difference between real danger, and a 
knowledge or sense of danger. There may be as great and as real dan- 
ger when we have no sense or knowledge of it, as when we have. And on 
the other hand, when we have the highest and the keenest sense of dan- 
ger, there may be, in fact, no real danger ; and indeed, as has been 
said, there never is any danger in the sense that anything will, as a mat- 
ter of fact, turn out differently from what God foresees it will be. 

Again : the fact that anything is revealed as certain, does not make 
it certain ; that is, the revelation does not make it certain. It had been 
certain, had not this certainty been revealed, unless it be in cases where 
the revelation is a condition or means of the certainty revealed. An 
event may be really certain, and may be revealed as certain, and yet, 
humanly speaking, there may be millions of chances to one, that it will 
not be as it is revealed ; that is, so far as human foresight can go, the 
probabilities may all be against it. 



550 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 



II. State what is not intended ly the perseverance of the saints, as 1 
hold the doctrine. 

1. It is not intended that any sinner will be saved without complying 
with the conditions of salvation ; that is, without regeneration, and per- 
severing in obedience to the end of life, in a sense to be hereafter ex- 
plained. 

2. It is not intended that saints, or the truly regenerate, cannot fall 
from grace, and be finally lost, by natural possibility. It must be natu- 
rally possible for all moral agents to sin at any time. Saints on earth 
and in heaven can by natural possibility apostatize and fall, and be lost. 
Were not this naturally possible, there would be no virtue in perseverance. 

3. It is not intended, that the true saints are in no danger of apostacy 
and ultimate damnation. For, humanly speaking, there may be, and 
doubtless is, the greatest danger in respect to many, if not of all of them, 
in the only sense in which danger is predicable of any event whatever, 
that they will apostatize, and be ultimately lost. 

4. It is not intended, that there may not be, humanly speaking, myr- 
iads of chances to one, that some, or that many of them will fall and be 
lost. This may be, as we say, highly probable ; that is, it may be proba- 
ble in the only sense in which it is probable, that any event whatever may 
be different from what it will turn out to be. 

5. It is not intended, that the salvation of the saints is possible, ex- 
cept upon condition of great watchfulness and effort, and perseverance 
on their part, and great grace on the part of God. 

6. It is not intended, that their salvation is certain, in any higher 
sense than all their future free actions are. The result is conditioned 
upon their free actions, and the end can be no more certain than its 
means or conditions. If the ultimate salvation of the saints is certain, 
it is certain only upon condition, that their perseverance in obedience to 
the end of life is certain. Every act of this obedience is free and contin- 
gent in the highest sense in which contingency can be predicated of any 
thing whatever. It is also uncertain by the highest kind of uncertainty 
that can be predicated of any event whatever. Therefore there is and 
must be, as much real danger of the saints failing of ultimate salvation, 
as there is that any event whatever will be different from what it turns 
out to be. 

But here it should be distinctly remembered, as was said, that there 
is a difference between a certainty and a knowledge of it. It is one thing 
for an event to be really certain, and another thing for us to have a 
knowledge of it as certain. Everything is really equally certain, but 
many things are not revealed to us as certain. Those that are revealed 
as certain, are no more really so than others, but with respect to future 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 551 

things, not in some way revealed to us, we know not how they will prove 
to be. The fact that a thing is revealed to us as certain does not make 
it certain, nor is it really any the less uncertain because it is revealed to 
us as certain, unless the revelation tends to secure the certainty. Sup- 
pose the ultimate salvation of all the saints is certain, and that this cer- 
tainty is revealed to us ; unless this revelation is the means of securing 
their salvation, they are in just as much real danger of ultimately failing 
of eternal life, as if no such revelation had been made. Notwithstand- 
ing the certainty of their salvation, and the fact that this certainty is re- 
vealed to them, there is just as much real, though unknown, certainty or 
uncertainty, in respect to any future event whatever, as there is in re- 
spect to this. All events are certain with some kind of certainty, and 
would be whether any being whatever knew the certainty or not. So all 
events, consisting in or depending upon the free acts of free agents, are 
really as uncertain as any event can be, and this is true whether the cer- 
tainty is revealed or not. The salvation of the saints then, is not certain 
with any higher certainty than belongs to all future events that consist 
in, or are conditionated upon, the free acts of free will, though this cer- 
tainty may be revealed to us in one case, and not in the other. 

7. Of course the salvation of the saints is not certain by any kind or 
degree of certainty that affords the least ground of hope of impunity in 
a course of sin. " For if they are to be saved, they are to be saved upon 
condition of continuing in faith and obedience to the end of life." 

Moreover, their salvation is no more certain than their future free 
obedience is. The certainty of future free obedience, and a knowledge 
of this certainty, cannot be a reason for not obeying, or afford encour- 
agement to live in sin. So no more can the knowledge of the conditional 
and moral certainty of our salvation afford a ground for hope of impunity 
in a life of sin. 

8. The salvation of the saints is not certain by any kind or degree of 
certainty that renders their salvation or their damnation any more im- 
possible, than it renders impossible any future acts of sin or obedience. 
Consequently, it is not certain in such a sense as to afford the least en- 
couragement for hope of salvation in sin, any more than a certainty that 
a farmer would raise a crop upon condition of his diligent, and timely, 
and persevering use of the appropriate means, would encourage him to 
neglect those means. If the farmer had a knowledge of the certainty 
with its conditions, it would be no temptation to neglect the means ; but, 
on the other hand, this knowledge would operate as a powerful incentive 
to the required use of them. So neither can the knowledge of the cer- 
tainty of the salvation of the saints, with the condition of it, be to them 
a temptation to live in sin ; but, on the contrary, this knowledge must 
act as a powerful incentive to the exercise of confidence in God, and per- 



552 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

severance in holiness unto the end. So neither can the certainty that 
the necessary means will be used, afford any encouragement to neglect 
the use of them in the case of man's salvation, any more than the revealed 
certainty that a farmer will sow his field and have a crop, would encour- 
age him to neglect to sow. The known certainty of both the means and 
the end, with an understanding of the moral nature of the certainty, has 
no natural tendency to beget presumption and neglect ; but, on the con- 
trary, to beget a diligent, and cheerful, and confident use of the neces- 
sary means. 

III. Show ivliat is intended by the doctrine in question. 

It is intended, that all who are at any time true saints of God, are 
preserved by his grace and Spirit through faith, in the sense that subse- 
quently to regeneration, obedience is their rule, and disobedience only the 
exception ; and that being thus kept, they will certainly be saved with 
an everlasting salvation. 

Before I proceed to the direct proof of the doctrine, a few remarks 
may be desirable. 

1. I would remark, that I have felt greater hesitancy in forming and 
expressing my views upon this, than upon almost any other question in 
theology. I have read whatever I could find upon both sides of this 
question, and have uniformly found myself dissatisfied with the argu- 
ments on both sides. After very full and repeated discussion, I feel 
better able to make up and express an opinion upon the subject than 
formerly. I have at some periods of my ministry been nearly on the 
point of coming to the conclusion that the doctrine is not true. But I 
could never find myself able to give a satisfactory reason for the rejection 
of the doctrine. Apparent facts that have come under my observation 
have sometimes led me seriously to doubt the soundness of the doctrine ; 
but I cannot see, and the more I examine the more unable I find myself 
to see, how a denial of it can be reconciled with the scriptures. 

I shall give the substance of what I regard as the scripture proof of 
this doctrine, and beg the reader to make up his opinion for himself by 
a careful examination. Perhaps what has been satisfactory to my mind 
may not be so to the minds of others. Let no one believe this, or any 
other doctrine upon my authority, but " prove all things and hold fast 
that which is good." 

2. I observe, that its truth cannot be inferred from the nature of re- 
generation. It is true, as was said, and as will be farther shown, that 
perseverance is an attribute or characteristic of Christian character ; but 
this does not necessarily result from the nature of regeneration, but from 
the indwelling Spirit of Christ. It has been common for that class of 
writers and theologians, who hold what is called the Taste Scheme of 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 553 

regeneration, to infer the truth of this doctrine from the nature of the 
change that constitutes the new birth. In this they have been entirely 
consistent. If, as they suppose, regeneration consists in a change in the 
constitution of the mind, in the implanting or infusion of a new consti- 
tutional taste, relish, or appetite ; if it consists in or implies a change 
back of all voluntary action, and such a change as to secure and necessi- 
tate a change of voluntary action ; why, then it is consistent, to infer 
from such a change the perseverance of the saints, unless it can be made 
to appear that either God, or Satan, or voluntary sin, can change the 
nature back again. If, in regeneration, the nature is really changed, if 
there be some new appetite or taste implanted, some holy principle im- 
planted or infused into the constitution, why, then it must follow, that 
they will persevere by a physical law of the new nature or constitution. 
I see not how, in this case, they could even be the subjects of temporary 
backsliding, unless the new appetite should temporarily fail, as does 
sometimes our appetite for food. But if this may be, yet if regeneration 
consists in or implies a new creation of something that is not voluntary, 
a creation of a new nature, instead of a new character, I admit, that 
perseverance might be reasonably inferred from the fact of such a 
change. But since I reject wholly this theory of regeneration, and 
maintain that it is wholly a voluntary change, I cannot consistently infer 
the final salvation of the saints from the nature of the change that occurs 
in regeneration. I have been struck with the inconsistency of those 
who hold the Taste Scheme of regeneration, and yet contend, not only 
for falling from a regenerate state, but also that the regenerate may and 
do fall into a state of entire depravity, every time they sin ; that they 
fall from this state of physical or constitutional regeneration every time 
they commit sin, and must be regenerated or converted anew, or be lost. 
Now this is not reconcilable with the idea of the physical regeneration. 
3. Nor can we infer the perseverance of the saints, with any justice, 
from their being, at their conversion, brought into a state of justifi- 
cation. 

By perseverance some seem to mean, not that the saints do persevere 
or continue in obedience, but that they will be saved at any rate, whether 
they persevere in obedience or not. It was against this idea that such 
men as the Wesleys, and Fletcher, and their coadjutors fought so val- 
iantly. They resisted justly and successfully the doctrine of perpetual 
justification, upon condition of one act of faith, and maintained that the 
saints as well as sinners are condemned whenever they sin. They also 
contended that there is no kind of certainty that all true saints will be 
saved. Since I have endeavored to refute the doctrine of a perpetual 
justification, conditioned upon the first act of faith, I cannot of course 
infer the final salvation of the saints from the nature of justification. 



55± SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Those who hold, that the first act of faith introduces the soul into a 
new relation of such a nature that, from thenceforth, it is not con- 
demned by the law, do what it will, may justly infer from the nature of 
such a justification, that all who ever exercise faith will escape the pen- 
alty of the Divine law. But we have seen, that this is not the nature of 
gospel justification, and therefore we must not infer that all saints will 
be saved, from the mere fact that they have once believed and been 
justified. 



LECTURE XL VIII. 

PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS PROVED. 

The following considerations, taken together, seem to me to estab- 
lish the truth of the doctrine in question beyond reasonable doubt. 

1. God has from eternity resolved upon the salvation of all the elect. 
This we have seen. No one of this number will ever be lost. These 
are given to Christ from eternity, as a seed to serve him. The con- 
version, perseverance, and final salvation of the elect, we have seen to be 
secured. Their conversion, perseverance, and salvation, are secured by 
means of the grace of God in Christ Jesus, prevailing through the gospel, 
so to influence their free-will as to bring about this result. The instruc- 
tions, promises, threatenings, warnings, expostulations of the Bible, with 
all the influences with which they are surrounded, are the instrumentali- 
ties by means of which the Holy Spirit converts, sanctifies, and saves 
them. At every step, as Fletcher acknowledges, "grace is beforehand 
with free will." God first comes to, and moves upon, the sinner; but 
the sinner does not come to and move, or attempt to move, God. God 
first draws, and the sinner yields. God calls and the sinner answers. 
The sinner would never approach God, did not God draw him. 

Again : God calls effectually, but not irresistibly, before the sinner 
yields. He does not yield and answer to a slight call. Some indeed 
wait to be drawn harder, and to be called louder and longer than others ; 
but no one, in fact, comes to God until effectually persuaded to do so ; 
that is, until he is effectually hunted from his refuges of lies, and drawn 
with so great and powerful a drawing, as not to force, but to overcome, his 
reluctance or voluntary selfishness, and as to induce him to turn to God 
and to believe in Christ. That the sinner is wholly disinclined to obey, 
up to the very moment in which he is persuaded and induced to yield, 
there can be no doubt. His turning, as we have seen, is an act of his 
own, but he is induced to turn by the drawings of the Holy Spirit. 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 555 

Every person who was ever truly converted knows, that his conver- 
sion is not to be ascribed to himself, in any other sense, than that he 
finally consented, being drawn and persuaded by the Holy Spirit. The 
glory belongs to God, for the sinner only yielded after, perhaps, pro- 
tracted resistance, and never until after he was so convinced as to have 
no further excuse or apology for sin, nor until the Spirit, by means of 
truth, and argument, and persuasion, fairly overcame him, and con- 
strained, not forced him to submit. This is a brief statement of the facts 
connected with the conversion of every soul that was ever converted to 
God. This is true of the conversion of all the elect of God ; and if others 
besides the elect are ever converted, this is a true account of their con- 
version. 

Again : the same is true of their perseverance in holiness, in every 
instance, in every act. The saints persevere, not by virtue of a constitu- 
tional change, but as a result of the abiding and indwelling influence of 
the Holy Spirit. "Free grace is always beforehand with free-will ;" that 
is, the will never obeys, in any instance, nor for one moment, except as 
it is persuaded to do so as really as at the first. The work begun by the 
Holy Spirit is not carried on, except as the same Spirit continues to work 
in the saints to will and to do of his good pleasure. Saints do not begin 
in the Spirit, and then become perfect through or by the flesh. There 
is no holy exercise that is not as really to be ascribed to the grace and to 
the influence of the Holy Spirit, as is conversion itself. 

The saints convert not themselves, in the sense that they turn or yield, 
until persuaded by the HolyfSpirit. God converts them in the sense, 
that he effectually draws or persuades them. They turn themselves, in 
the sense that their turning is their own act. God turns them, in the 
sense that he induces or produces their turning. The same is true of 
their whole course of obedience in this life. The saints keep themselves, 
in the sense, that all obedience is their own ; all their piety consists in 
their own voluntary obedience ; but God keeps them, in the sense, that 
in every instance, and at every moment of obedience, he persuades, and 
enlightens, and draws them, insomuch, that he secures their voluntary 
obedience ; that is, he draws and they follow. He persuades, and they 
yield to his persuasions. He works in them to will and to do, and they 
will and do. God always anticipates all their holy exercises, and per- 
suades the saints to put them forth. This is so abundantly taught in 
the Bible, that to quote scripture to prove it were but to waste your time. 
The saints are not only said to be converted, but also sanctified, and kept 
by the power of God. 

No saint then keeps himself, except in so far as he is kept by the' 
grace, and Spirit, and power of God. There is therefore no hope for any 
saint, and no reason to calculate upon the salvation of any one, unless 



oo6 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

God prevails to keep him from falling away and perishing. All who ever 
are saved, or ever will be, are saved by and through free grace, prevailing 
over free will, that is, by free grace securing the voluntary concurrence of 
free will. This God does, and is sure to do, with all the elect. It was 
upon condition of the foreseen fact, that God could by the wisest admin- 
istration of his government, secure this result, they were elected to eter- 
nal salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth. 
Now observe how the elect are saved. All the threatenings, warnings, 
and teachings of the Bible are addressed to them, as to all others. If 
there are any saints, at any time, who are not of the elect, the Bible no- 
where notices any such persons, or speaks of them, as any less or more 
secnre than the elect. 

Again : the Bible nowhere represents or implies, that any but the elect 
are converted. It does not represent any but the elect as at any time 
coming in heart to Christ — as at any time regenerated or born of God. 
The Bible nowhere acknowledges two classes of saints, elect and non- 
elect. But, if there were two such classes, and the salvation of the elect 
was certain, as it really is, and that of the non-elect not certain, it is in- 
credible that the Bible should not reveal this fact. Again : so far is the 
Bible from recognizing or implying any such distinction, that it every- 
where implies the contrary. It divides mankind into two, and but two 
classes, and these it sets one over against the other. These are con- 
trasted by the names, saint and sinner ; people of God, and people of this 
world ; children of God, and children of this world, or children of the 
devil ; the elect and the reprobate, that is, the chosen and the rejected ; 
the sanctified and the un sanctified ; the regenerated and the unregener- 
ated ; the penitent and the impenitent. By whatever names they are 
called, it is manifest that the same classes and none others are meant. 
The elect of God is a common name for the saints or people of God. I 
cannot find in the Bible any evidence, that any were converted at any 
time, but the elect, or those whose salvation is sure. The elect are, or 
will be, every one of them certainly converted and saved. If any one 
chooses to contend that any other are ever converted, the burden of 
proof is upon him ; let him prove it, if he can. But this he must prove, 
in order to establish the fact, that any truly regenerated persons are ever 
lost, for sure it is, that no one of the elect will ever be lost. But, since 
I am to take the affirmative, I must take the burden of showing, that 
none but the elect are recognized in the scriptures as saints ; and as I am 
speaking only of the salvation of the saints, I shall take it for granted* 
that all those who were from eternity chosen to eternal salvation, through 
sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth, will certainly be 
saved. 

Now, if it can be shown, that some saints have been really lost, it will 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 557 

follow, that some have been converted who were not of the elect. And, 
on the other hand, if it can be shown that no saint has been, or will be, 
finally lost ; but, on the contrary, that all the true saints are, and will 
be, saved, it will follow that none but the elect are converted. For all 
who are, or will be, saved, are saved by God, and saved by design, and in 
accordance with an eternal design, and of course they were elected to sal- 
vation from eternity. 

1 have already said, that it is incredible that the Bible should read as 
it does, and that it should nowhere distinguish between elect and non- 
elect saints, if there is any such distinction. It cannot be said with jus- 
tice, that the Bible purposely conceals from all saints the fact of their 
election, lest it should be a stumbling-block to them. This we have seen 
is not the fact, but on the contrary, that the elect, at least in some in- 
stances, have known that they were elect. 

But it is said, that Peter exhorts the saints to " give all diligence to 
make their calling and election sure ;" from which it is inferred, that 
they did not know that they were elect ; and furthermore, that it might 
be that, although they were real saints, nevertheless they were not, at 
least all of them, of the elect. The words here referred to stand in the 
following connection : — 

2 Pet. i. 1 : " Simon Peter, a servant and an apostle of Jesus Christ, 
to them that have obtained like precious faith with us, through the 
righteousness of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ : 2. Grace and peace 
be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God, and of Jesus our 
Lord ; 3. According as his divine power has given unto us all things that 
pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath 
called us to glory and virtue : 4. Whereby are given unto us exceeding 
great and precious promises ; that by these ye might be partakers of the 
divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through 
lust. 5. And beside this, giving all diligence, add to your faith, virtue ; 
and to virtue, knowledge ; 6. And to knowledge, temperance ; and to 
temperance, patience ; and to patience, godliness ; 7. And to godliness, 
brotherly kindness ; and to brotherly kindness, charity. 8. For if these 
things be in you and abound, they make you that ye shall neither be bar- 
ren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. 9. But 
he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see afar off, and hath 
forgotten that he was purged from his old sins. 10. Wherefore the 
rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure : 
for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall." Upon this- passage, I re- 
mark, — 

That Peter addressed this epistle to all who had faith, that is, to all 
true Christians, as appears from the first verse. He addressed no one by 
name, but left it for every one to be sure that he had faith. He then 



558 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

proceeds to exhort them to grow in grace, assuring them that, if any one 
did not do so, he had forgotten that he was purged from his former sins ; 
that is, if any one lacked that which he enjoined, it would prove that he 
had not true faith, or that he had backslidden. Then he adds, as in the 
10th yerse : " Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make 
your calling and election sure : for if ye do these things, ye shall never 
fall." The apostle plainly assumes : — 

(1.) That the called and elected will be saved ; to make their calling 
and election sure, was to make their salvation sure : and, 

(2.) That none others are saved but the called and elected, for if 
others are saved, it were of no consequence whether they were of the 
called and elected or not, provided they were saved ; 

(3.) That he regarded none as Christians, or as at any time having 
true faith, but the called and elected ; for he was not exhorting supposed 
impenitent sinners to become Christians, but supposed Christians to be 
sure of their calling and election. This shows that he regarded all 
Christians as of the called and elected. To be sure of their calling and 
election was to be sure of their salvation. The apostle did not certainly 
mean to exhort them to become of the number of the elect, for this num- 
ber we have seen was settled from eternity ; but by diligence and growth 
in grace to secure their salvation, or thus to prove or demonstrate their 
calling and election. He meant also to admonish them that, although 
called and elected, still their ultimate salvation was conditionated upon 
their diligent growth in grace, and perseverance in holiness to the end of 
life. He therefore exhorts them to make their calling and election sure, 
which is the same as to secure their salvation. He speaks of calling and 
election as indissolubly connected. Effectual calling either results from 
election, or election from calling. "We have seen that election is eternal ; 
therefore election cannot result from calling, but calling must result from 
election. 

Again : Christians and saints, and the children and people of God, 
the disciples of Christ, and the elect, are to all appearance regarded 
throughout the Bible as the same class. 

Again : Christ says, John vi. 37 : " All that the Father giveth me 
shall come to me ; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. 
39. And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which 
he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at 
the last day." 

Here Jesus says, that all who are given to him by the Father shall 
come to him, and that of those that come to him, it is his Father's will 
that he should lose none, but that he should raise them up, (that is, to 
eternal life,) at the last day. He does not say here, that none do come 
to him who are not given to him by the Father, but this is plainly 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 559 

implied, for he says, 37th. "All that the Father giveth me shall come to 
me ; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." What he 
means by not casting them out, is plain from verse 39. That is, " It is 
the Father's will that of all that shall come to me I should lose nothing." 
By not casting them out, then, he intended that he should surely save 
them, that is, all that came to him. But if he saves them, they must 
have been given to Christ and have been elected, or they were not. If 
they were not elected, or given to Christ by the Father, they will never 
be saved, unless some are saved without God's designing or choosing to 
save them. If any are saved, God saves them, through or by Christ. 
If he saves them, he does it designedly, and not without design. But if 
he ever does, or will design it, he has from eternity designed it. So 
then, it appears, that all who come to Christ were given to him of the 
Father ; and that he will lose none of them, but will raise them up at 
the last day. My object at present, however, is not to insist that no one 
that comes to Christ will be lost, but only that all who come to Christ are 
of the number that were given to him of the Father, or are of the elect. 

Again : compare verses 37, 39, 44, 45. He says : John vi. 37 : "All 
that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him that cometh to me 
I will in no wise cast out. 39. And this is the Father's will which hath 
sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but 
should raise it up again at the last day. 44. No man can come to me 
except the Father which hath sent me, draw him, and I will raise him 
up at the last day. 45. It is written in the Prophets, And they shall be 
all taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath 
learned of the Father, cometh unto me." 

Here it appears that no one can come to Christ except he be drawn 
of the Father. Every one who is drawn by the Father with an effectual 
drawing, or every one who hears and learns of the Father comes to Christ, 
and no other. The Father draws none to Christ, but those whom he has 
given to Christ ; for these, and these only, are the children of God. Isa. 
liv. 13 : " And all thy children shall be taught of the Lord ; and great 
shall be the peace of thy children." From these passages it appears 
that none come to Christ but those who are drawn by the Father, and 
that none are drawn by the Father but those whom he has given to his 
Son, or the elect ; and that of those who are thus drawn to Christ, it 
is the Father's will that he should lose none, but that he should raise 
them up at the last day ; that is, that he should save them. But observe, 
it is my particular object just now to establish the fact, that none come 
to Christ but those who are of the number that are given to Christ, and 
also that every one who is given to him shall come to him. These* and 
these only are effectually called or drawn of the Father. All are called 
in the sense of being earnestly and honestly invited, and all the divine 



560 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

persuasion is addressed to them that can wisely be addressed to them. 
But others, besides those given to the Son, are not, as a matter of fact, 
persuaded and effectually drawn, in a sense that secures the i( concur- 
rence of free will with free grace." 

The same truth is strongly implied in many other passages in the 
teachings of Christ. For example, he says,— 

John x. 1 : "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that entereth not by 
the door into the sheep-fold, but climbeth up some other way, the same 
is a thief and a robber. 2. But he that entereth in by the door is the 
shepherd of the sheep. 3. To him the porter openeth : and the sheep 
hear his voice ; and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them 
out. 4. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before 
them, and the sheep follow him : for they know his voice. 5. And 
a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him : for they know 
not the voice of strangers. 6. This parable spake Jesus unto them : but 
they understood not what things they were which he spake unto them." 

He then proceeds to expound the parable. He is the good shepherd 
having the care of his Father's sheep. He says : — 

7. " Then said Jesus unto them again, Verily, verily, I say unto you, 
I am the door of the sheep. 8. All that ever came before me are thieves 
and robbers : but the sheep did not hear them. 9. I am the door ; by 
me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and go in and out, and find 
pasture. 10. The thief cometh not, but for to steal, and to kill, and to 
destroy : I am come that they might have life, and that they might have 
it more abundantly. 11. I am the good shepherd : the good shepherd 
giveth his life for the sheep. 12. But he that is a hireling, and not the 
shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, seeth the wolf coming, and 
leaveth the sheep, and fleeth, and the wolf catcheth them, and scatter- 
eth the sheep. 13. The hireling fleeth, because he is a hireling, and 
careth not for the sheep. 14. I am the good shepherd, and know my 
sheep, and am known of mine. 15. As the Father knoweth me, even so 
know I the Father : and I lay down my life for the sheep. 16. And 
other sheep I have, which are not of this fold : them also I must bring, 
and they shall hear my voice ; and there shall be one fold, and one 
shepherd. 1. Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down 
my life, that I might take it again." 

He had other sheep which were not yet called — they were not of this 
fold — that is, they were not Jews, but Gentiles ; these he must bring. 
To the unbelieving and cavilling Jews he said : — 

John x. 26 : " But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as 
I said unto you. 27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and 
they follow me. 28. And I give unto them eternal life ; and they shall 
never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. 29. My 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 561 

Father which gave them me, is greater than all ; and none is able to 
pluck them out of my Father's hand." 

Here it is plainly implied, that all those were sheep who were given 
to him by the Father, and that all such would surely hear and know his 
voice and follow him, but those that were not of his sheep, or were not 
given him by the Father, would not believe. He says, verse 26 : But ye 
believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. What he 
here says amounts to this : all those are sheep who are given to me of my 
Father. All my sheep thus given, shall and will hear my voice, and fol- 
low me, and none others will. I do not notice in this place what he says 
of the certainty of their salvation, because my present object is only to 
show that those and those only come to Christ who are given to him of 
the Father, or are of the elect. 

This same truth is either expressly taught, or strongly implied in a 
great many passages, and indeed it seems to me to be the doctrine of the 
whole Bible. Rom. viii. 28 : " And we know that all things work to- 
gether for good to them that love God, to them who are the called ac- 
cording to his purpose." Here they that love God are represented as 
identical with those "who are the called according to his purpose." In 
other words, they who love God are the called according to, or in conse- 
quence of their election. All that love God do so because they have 
been effectually called, according to the purpose or election of God. This 
passage seems to settle the question, especially when viewed in its con- 
nection, that all who ever love God are of the elect, and that they are 
prevailed upon to love God in conformity with their election. 

We shall have occasion, by and by, to examine the connection in which 
this passage is found, for the purpose of showing that all who at any 
time truly come to love God, will be saved. I have only quoted this 
twenty-eighth verse here for the purpose of showing, not directly, that 
all that love God at any time will be saved, but that they are of the num- 
ber of the elect, from which fact their ultimate salvation must be inferred. 

It is plain that the apostles regarded regeneration as conclusive evi- 
dence of election. The manner in which they address Christians seems 
to me to put this beyond a doubt. Paul, in writing to the Thessalonians, 
2 Thes. ii. 13, says, " But we are bound to give thanks alway to God 
for you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the be- 
ginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and 
belief of the truth." Here the apostle speaks of all the brethren at Thes- 
salonica as beloved of the Lord, and as being from eternity chosen to sal- 
vation. He felt called upon to give thanks to God for this reason, that 
God had chosen them to salvation from eternity. This he represents as 
true of the whole church : that is, doubtless, of all true Christians in the 
church. Indeed, the apostles everywhere speak as if they regarded all 
36 



\-^ 



562 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

true saints as of the elect, and their saintship as evidence of their elec- 
tion. Peter, in writing to the Christians in his first letter, says : 

1 Pet. i. 1 : "Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the strangers scat- 
tered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia, 2. 
Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanc- 
tification of the Spirit unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of 
Jesus Christ : Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied. 3. Blessed be 
the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which, according to his 
abundant mercy, hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resur- 
rection of Jesus Christ from the dead. 4. To an inheritance incorrupti- 
ble, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you, 
5. Who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready 
to be revealed in the last time : 6. Wherein ye greatly rejoice, though 
now for a season, if need be, ye are in heaviness through manifold temp- 
tations ; 7. That the trial of your faith, being much more precious than 
that of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found 
unto praise, and honor, and glory, at the appearing of Jesus Christ : 8. 
Whom having not seen ye love ; in whom, though now ye see him not, 
yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full of glory : 9. Ke- 
ceiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls." 

Here it is plain that Peter regarded all who had been born again to a 
lively hope, or who were regenerated, as elected, or as chosen to salvation. 
I might pursue this argument to an indefinite length, but I must attend 
to other considerations in support of the doctrine in question. 

I will for the present close what I have to say under this particular 
branch of the argument, by reminding you that Christ has expressly as- 
serted that no man can or does come to him except the Father draw him, 
and that the Father draws to him those — and by fair inference those only 
— whom he has given to Christ ; and further, that it is the Father's will, 
that of those whom the Father had given to Christ, and drawn to him, 
Christ should lose none, but should raise them up at the last day. It is, 
I think, evident, that when Christ asserts it to be his Father's will, that 
of those whom the Father had given him he should lose none, but should 
raise them up at the last day, he intended to say, that his Father not 
merely desired and willed this, but that such was his design. That the 
Father designed to secure their salvation/ This we shall more fully see 
in its proper place. 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 563 



LECTURE XLIX. 

PERSEVERANCE PROVED. 

2. I remark, that God is able to preserve and keep the true saints 
from apostacy, in consistency with their liberty : 2 Tim. i. 12 : " For 
the which cause I also suffer these things ; nevertheless, I am not 
ashamed ; for I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he 
is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day." 
Here the apostle expresses the fullest confidence in the ability of Christ 
to keep him : and indeed, as has been said, it is most manifest that the 
apostles expected to persevere and be saved only because they believed in 
the ability and willingness of God to keep them from falling. Again : 
Rom. xiv. 4 : " Who art thou that judgest another man's servant ; to 
his own master he standeth or falleth ; yea, he shall be holden up, for 
God is able to make him stand." Again, Phil. iii. 21 : " Who shall 
change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious 
body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all 
things unto himself." Again, Eph. iii. 20 : " Now unto him that is able 
to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to 
the power that worketh in us." Again, Jude 24 : " Now unto him that 
is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the 
presence of his glory with exceeding joy." Again, 2 Cor. ix. 8 : "And 
God is able to make all grace abound towards you ; that ye, always 
having all sufficiency in all things, may abound to every good work." 
Eph. i. 18 : The eyes of your understanding being enlightened ; that ye 
may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the 
glory of his inheritance in the saints. 19. And what is the exceeding 
greatness of his power to usward who believe, according to the working 
of his mighty power, 20. Which he wrought in Christ, when he raised 
him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly 
places." Again, Heb. vii. 25 : " Wherefore he is able to save them to 
the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make 
intercession for them." These and many other passages prove beyond a 
doubt that God is able co preserve his saints. 

3. God is not only able to keep all that come to Christ, or all true 
Christians, but he is also willing. But Christ has settled this question, 
as we have seen. 

John vi. 3? : "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and 
him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. 38. For I came down 
from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me ; 



56-i SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

39. And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which 
he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at 
the last day. 40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every 
one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting 
life ; and I will raise him up at the last day." 

Here, then, we have just seen these two points settled, namely, that 
God is able to save all saints, or all who at any time truly believe and 
come to Christ ; and, that he is willing, or wills to do it. Now if he is 
both able and willing to keep and save all the saints, he certainly will 
do it. 

But here I know it will be objected, that by this course of argument, 
the doctrine of universal salvation may be established. The Bible, it is 
said, represents God as both able and willing to save all men, and if his 
being both able and willing to save the saints, proves that they will all 
be saved, it follows that his being able and willing to save all men proves 
that all men will be saved. But the cases are not parallel ; for God no- 
where professes ability to save all men, but on the contrary, disclaims 
such ability, and professes to be unable to save all men ; that is, he can- 
not, under the circumstances, wisely save them, nor can he wisely do any 
more for saints or sinners than he does. No passage can be found in 
the Bible, in which God asserts his ability to save all men. The pas- 
sages that affirm that "God can do all things," and that "nothing is 
too hard for the Lord," and the like, cannot be understood as affirming 
God's ability to save all men. They do imply, that he has power to do 
whatever is an object of physical omnipotence ; but to save sinners is 
not an object of physical power. Their salvation, if accomplished at 
all, must be brought about by a moral and persuasive influence, and 
not by the exercise of physical omnipotence. In the sense in which we 
can justly apply the terms ability and inability to this subject, God is 
really unable to do what it is unwise for him to do. He has an end in 
view. This end is the highest good and blessedness of universal being. 
This end can be accomplished only by the appropriate means, or upon 
certain conditions. These conditions include the perfect holiness of 
mdral agents. If God cannot wisely use such means as will secure the 
conversion and sanctification of sinners, he cannot save them. That is, 
he is unable to save them. This he repeatedly professes to be unable 
to do. 

Ezek. xviii. 23 : iC Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should 
die, saith the Lord God ; and not that he should return from his ways, 
and live ? 32. For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, 
saith the Lord God ; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye." 

Ezek. xxxiii. 11. " Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I 
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 565 

from his way and live : turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways ; for why 
will ye die, house of Israel ? " 

Isa. v. 4 : " What could have been done more to my vineyard that I 
have not done in it ? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth 
grapes, brought it forth wild grapes ? " 

Hos. xi. 8 : " How shall I give thee up, Ephraim ? How shall I 
deliver thee, Israel ? How shall I make thee as Admah ? How shall I 
set thee as Zeboim ? My heart is turned within me, my repentings are 
kindled together." 

These are only specimens of the manner in which God speaks of his 
ability to save sinners, and to do more for the church or the world than 
he does. From such professions on the part of God, we are to under- 
stand him, as disclaiming ability to do more or otherwise than he does, 
in consistency with the highest good of being in general. Since the 
highest good of being in general is the end which he is aiming to secure, 
he " may justly be said to be unable to do "whatever he cannot do in con- 
sistency with the use of those means that will secure this end." God, 
therefore, does not affirm his ability to save all men, but fully disclaims 
any such ability, and professes to do, and to be doing, all that he can to 
save them. He professes to be perfectly benevolent and infinitely wise, 
and to be doing all that infinite wisdom and benevolence can do for sin- 
ners and for all men, and complains, that all he can do does not save, 
and will not save many of them. 

But with respect to the saints, he does expressly affirm his ability to 
keep them, in a sense that will secure their salvation. This we have 
seen. He does for them all that he wisely can, and does enough, as he 
expressly affirms, to secure their salvation. No one can attentively read 
and consider the passages relating to God's ability to save all men, and 
his ability to save his people, without perceiving, that the two cases are 
not parallel, but that in fact they are contrasts. He expressly affirms 
his ability to keep, to sanctify, and to save his elect children, whilst he 
repeatedly, either expressly, or by implication, disclaims ability to save 
all men. 

Again : the Bible nowhere represents God as willing the salvation of 
all men, in the same sense in which it represents him as willing the sal- 
vation of Christians, or of his elect. Such passages as the following are 
specimens of God's professions of willingness to save all men. 

1 Tinj. ii. 4 : " Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto 
the knowledge of the truth." 

John iii. 16. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-be- 
gotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have 
everlasting life. 17. For God sent not his Son into the world to con- 
demn the world ; but that the world through him might be saved." 



566 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

2 Peter iii. 9 : "The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as 
some men count slackness ; but is long-suffering to usward, not willing 
that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." 

These and similar passages teach that God wills the salvation of all men, 
only in the sense of desiring it. This we know from the fact, that he 
nowhere intimates a willingness, in the sense of a design or intention, to 
save all men ; but on the contrary, plainly reveals an opposite purpose 
or design ; that is, he reveals the fact, that he cannot, shall not, and of 
course, does not, expect or design to save all men. By the profession of 
a willingness to save all men, we can therefore justly understand him to 
mean, only that he desires the salvation of all men, and that he would 
secure their salvation if he wisely could. This is all that we can under- 
stand him as affirming, unless we would accuse him of self-contradic- 
tion. 

But he professes a willingness to save his elect, or in other words, all 
regenerate persons, or all believers in Christ, and all whoever will truly 
believe in him, in the sense of purposing or designing to save them. This 
is most manifest from the scriptures we have already examined, and this 
will still further appear from the passages to be examined. 

We have seen that the Father has given a certain number to Christ, 
with express design to secure their salvation ; that he has committed to 
him all the requisite power and influences to save them, and that they will 
actually be saved. Nothing like this can be found in the Bible, respect- 
ing any other class of men whatever. This objection, then, is without 
foundation, and the argument from the ability and willingness of God to 
save his saints, remains in full force and conclusiveness. 

4. Again : Christ expressly prayed for all believers, and in a manner 
that secures their being kept and saved : — 

John xvii. 2 : "As thoii hast given him power over all flesh, that he 
should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him. 6. I have 
manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the 
world; thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have 
kept thy word. 7. Now they have known that all things whatsoever thou 
hast given me are of thee ; 8. For I have given unto them the words 
which thou gavest me ; and they have received them, and have known 
surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst 
send me. 9. I pray for them ; I pray not for the world, but for them 
which thou hast given me, for they are thine. 10. And all mine are 
thine, and thine are mine ; and I am glorified in them. 11. And now I 
am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to 
thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast 
given me, that they may be one, as we are. 12. While I was with them 
in the world, I kept them in thy name : those that thou gavest me I have 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 567 

kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition, that the scrip- 
ture might be fulfilled. 13. And now come I to thee ; and these things 
I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in them- 
selves. 14. I have given them thy word ; and the world hath hated them, 
because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world. 20. 
Neither pray I for these alone y but for them also which shall believe on 
me through their word. 21. That they all may be one ; as thou, Father, 
art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us ; that the world 
may believe that thou hast sent me. 22. And the glory which thou 
gavest me, I have given them ; that they may be one, even as we are one. 
23. I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, 
and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved 
them as thou hast loved me. 24. Father, I will that they also whom 
thou hast given me, be with me where I am ; that they may behold my 
glory, which thou hast given me ; for thou lovedst me before the founda- 
tion of the world." 

Now observe, that in this most affecting prayer Christ says, — 

(1.) Verse 2. " As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he 
should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him." We have 
seen, that, in the 6th chapter of this book Christ expressly teaches, that 
all are given to him that come to him by the Father. 

(2.) He proceeds to affirm, that he had in the exercise of this power 
kept in his Father's name all who had been given, and had come to him, 
and had lost none. 

(3.) He asks the Father henceforth to keep them in his own name, as 
he was about to leave them, as to his bodily presence. He says, verse 15, 
"I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that 
thou shouldest keep them from the evil." Again, he says, 20-24 : 
"Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on 
me through their word. That they all may be one ; as thou, Father, art 
in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us ; that the world 
may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou gavest 
me I have given them ; that they may be one, even as we are one. I in 
them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one ; and that 
the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as 
thou hast loved me. Father, I will that they also whom thou hast 
given me be with me where I am ; that they may behold my glory, which 
thou hast given me ; for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the 
world." 

Now, as surely as Christ's prayer is answered, all believers will be 
saved ; that is, at least all who ever have believed, or ever will believe, 
subsequent to the offering of this prayer. But Christ's prayers are 
always answered. 



568 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

To this it is objected, that a part of this same prayer is not answered, 
and of course never will be. It is said, for example, that in the 21st 
verse he prays for the union of all believers, which has been far enough 
from having been answered. The verse reads, " That they all may be 
one ; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be 
one in us ; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." Here 
he explains the sense in which he prays that all believers may be one, 
not that they should be all of one denomination or creed, but that they 
should possess one and the same spirit ; that the same spirit that united 
the Father and the Son, that is, the Holy Spirit, who is in the Father and 
the Son, might also be in all Christians. This is plainly his meaning ; 
and that this is true of all real Christians, that they possess the Holy 
Spirit, or the Spirit that dwells in the Father and the Son, no one can 
doubt who understands and believes his Bible. 

But it is objected again, that Christ prayed to be delivered from 
crucifixion, and his prayer was not answered. 

I reply, that he did not pray for this, if at all, unqualifiedly. He 
says, if it be possible, nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." If it 
were the pains of the cross from which his soul shrunk in the garden, 
and from which he desired, if possible, to be excused, it is plain that he 
did not pray unqualifiedly to be delivered ; but, on the contrary, sub- 
mitted the question to the will of his Father. But in the prayer, in 
John 17, he made no such condition. He knew that in this case it was 
his Father's will to grant his request. Of this he had expressly informed 
his disciples, as we have seen ; that is, that it was his Father's will to 
keep and save all who were given to Christ, and had been drawn by the 
Father to Christ. The Spirit of this petition accords precisely with his 
teaching upon the subject. He had taught before that all believers 
would be kept and saved, and that this was his Father's will ; now, 
could he, either expressly or impliedly, in this prayer, put in the condi- 
tion that was in the prayer just referred to, namely, " If it be thy will ?" 
But, although what has been said is a full answer to the assertion that 
Christ's prayers were not always answered, it may be, for some minds, 
important to say, that it is far from being certain that Christ prayed to 
be delivered from crucifixion. 

But be this as it may, we are to remember that Christ expressly 
affirms, that his Father always hears, that is, answers his prayers. 

John. xi. 42 : " And I knew that thou hearest me always : but because 
of the people which stand by I said it, that they may believe that thou 
hast sent me." 

Again, Paul says of Christ, Heb. vii. 25 : " Wherefore he is able also 
to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he 
ever liveth to make intercession for them." 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 569 

Here he asserts, that Christ is able to save unto the uttermost all that 
come unto God by him, seeing he always lives to make intercession for 
them. This, as plainly as possible, implies that his intercessions are all- 
prevailing. Indeed, as he is the mediator, they must be. 

Now let us consider how far we have advanced in establishing the 
perseverance and final salvation of all believers. 

(1.) We have seen, that all the elect to salvation will be saved. 
(2.) That all true believers are of this number. 
(3.) That God and Christ are able to keep them from apostasy, and 
save them. 

(4.) That he is willing or wills to do it. 

(5.) That Christ expressly prayed for the perseverance and final sal- 
vation of all believers. 

(6.) That he prayed in express accordance with the revealed will of 
his Father ; and — 

(7.) That his prayers always prevail and are answered. 
In Christ's prayer in John, chap, xvii., he expressly affirms that he 
did not pray for the world, that is, for all men. He prayed only for 
those whom the Father had given him. For these he prayed, not merely 
that God would save them upon condition of their perseverance, but 
that God would keep them from the evil that is in the world, and save 
them, and make them one, in the sense, that one Spirit should be in 
them all. He asked manifestly the same things for all that in future 
believe, that he asked for those who had already believed. 

Should I proceed no further the argument is complete, and the proof 
conclusive. But since this doctrine is so abundantly taught, either ex- 
pressly or impliedly, in the Bible, I proceed to the consideration of a num- 
ber of other passages which will throw still further light on the subject. 
5. Christ expressly and designedly teaches this doctrine; 
John vi. 39 : " And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, 
that of all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing, but should 
raise it up again at the last day. 40. And this is the will of him that 
sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may 
have everlasting life : and I will raise him up at the last day. 47. Yerily, 
verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me hath everlasting life. 
51. I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If any man 
eat of this bread, he shall live forever : and the bread that I will give is 
my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." 

Here he expressly teaches, as we have before seen, that it is his 
Father's will, that all believers, or all who at any time believe, (for this 
is plainly his meaning,) shall be saved ; that he should lose none 'of 
them, but as we have seen, John xvii. 2, should give them eternal life. 
Then he claims ability to keep and save them agreeably to his Father's 



570 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

will. This, remember, respects all believers, or all who are given to 
Christ, who, we have learned, are the same persons. 

Again : John x. 27 : " My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, 
and they follow me : 28. And I give unto them eternal life ; and they 
shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. 29. 
My Father which gave them me, is greater than all ; and none is able 
to pluck them out of my Father's hand." 

The whole connection shows, that Christ intended to teach the cer- 
tainty of the salvation of all his sheep, or of all the elect, or, which is 
the same, of all true believers. But, to this it is objected, that none are 
sheep any longer than they remain obedient, and therefore the assertion 
that he will save the sheep, does not secure those who at any time sin. 
Bat I reply, that Christ recognizes all the elect as his sheep, whether 
converted, or whether in a state of temporary backsliding, or not. He 
represents his sheep as hearing his voice, and as following him, and 
those who are not of his sheep as not hearing his voice, and as not fol- 
lowing him, John x. 16 : "And other sheep I have which are not of this 
fold : them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and there 
shall be one fold, and one shepherd. 26. But ye believe not, because ye 
are not of my sheep, as I said unto you." 

Again, Matt, xviii. 12 : " How think ye ? If a man have a hundred 
sheep, and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety and 
nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone 
astray ? 13. And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he re- 
joiceth more of that sheep, than of the ninety and nine which went not 
astray. 14. Even so it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, 
that one of these little ones should perish." 

The design of this parable is to teach the doctrine I am defending. 
If not, what is its design ? This is a full answer to the objection, that 
no one is recognized as a sheep who has gone astray. 

But again, it is said, that although no one else can pluck the sheep 
out of the Father's hand, yet we can do it ourselves. I grant that we can 
by natural possibility ; but this objection is good for nothing, for Christ 
expressly says, John x. 27 : " My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, 
and they follow me : 28. And I give unto them eternal life ; and they 
shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. 29. 
My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all ; and none is able to 
pluck them out of my Father's hand." 

Not only is no one able to pluck them out of his Father's hand, but 
Christ gives unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish. This 
implies, that while they might or are able to apostatize and be lost, 
yet, as a matter of fact, they never will. What could be made out 
of all he says of himself as a shepherd in this passage, if, after all, 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 571. 

lie loses some of his sheep ? Let any one ponder the whole chap- 
ter and see. 

6. Another argument, in support of the doctrine under consideration, 
I deduce from the fact, that Paul, an inspired apostle, believed it. 

Phil. i. 1 : " Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all 
the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and 
deacons ; 2. Grace be unto you, and peace, from God our Father, and 
from the Lord Jesus Christ. 3. I thank my God upon every remem- 
brance of you, 4. (Always in every prayer of mine for you all making re- 
quest with joy,) 5. For your fellowship in the gospel, from the first day 
until now. 6. Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath 
begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ. 

Here the apostle represents himself as giving thanks for all the saints 
at Philippi, upon the ground of his confidence that he who had begun a 
good work in them would perform, or perfect it, until the day of Christ. 
His confidence did not rest in them, but in the faithfulness of Christ. 
He did not express a confidence, that they would of themselves persevere, 
but that he who had begun a good work in them, would carry it on : 
that is, that he would so work in them as to keep them, and as to secure 
their perseverance to the end. This he expected with respect to all the 
saints at Philippi. . But if he believed this of all the saints at that place, 
it is plainly and fairly inferable that he believed it, simply because he 
expected this, as to all true saints. He does not intimate, that he ex- 
pected this because of any peculiarity in their case, — that is, not because 
they were better than other saints, or that God would do more for them 
than for others. He seems plainly to have expressed this confidence, 
upon the ground of his expectation, that he who begins a good work in 
any saint, will carry it on and perfect it until the day of Christ. Should 
it be said, that Paul intended merely to express the conviction or opinion 
of a good man, that the Philippian saints would be saved, but that he 
did not intend to utter this as the voice of inspiration ; I reply, that 
Paul plainly expresses a confidence that they would all be saved, and that 
God would perfect the work which he had begun. Now, how came he 
by this confidence ? He was an inspired man. If inspiration had taught 
him that real saints do fall away and are lost, how could he consistently 
express so thorough a persuasion, that all the saints at Philippi would be 
saved ? If Paul believed in the perseverance of the saints, it must be 
true, or he was deceived in respect to this important doctrine. But is it 
not safe to trust Paul's opinion of this doctrine ? If any one is disposed 
to contend, that we cannot with strict justice infer that Paul believed, 
the same in respect to God's perfecting the work in all saints, that he' 
believed in respecting the Philippians, I will not contend with him 
with respect to this. It is, however, clear, that Paul no where in this 



572 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

epistle, nor elsewhere, intimates that he had higher expectations in re- 
gard to the salvation of the Philippians, than he had in respect to the 
salvation of all true saints. In writing to the churches, the apostles ap- 
pear to have regarded and spoken of all true saints as the elect-children 
of God. They seem to represent the salvation of all such persons as cer- 
tain, but always keeping in mind and holding forth, either expressly or 
by way of implication, the nature of this certainty, that it was condi- 
tioned upon the right and persevering use of their own agency. They 
consequently constantly endeavor to guard the churches against delusion, 
in regard to their being real saints, and admonish them to prove them- 
selves in this respect, and also warn them against the supposition, that 
they can be saved, without actual perseverance in faith and obedience to 
the end of life. 

7. The apostles seemed to regard the conversion of sinners as an 
evidence that God designed to save them, or that they were of the 
elect : — 

Acts ii. 47 : " Praising God, and having favor with all the people. 
And the Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved." 

Acts xiii. 48. " And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad 
and glorified the word of the Lord ; and as many as were ordained to 
eternal life, believed." 

In these passages as elsewhere, the conversion of sinners is spoken of 
as settling the question of their salvation. But if true saints do fall 
from grace and perish, why should the inspired writers so often express 
themselves, as if they regarded the regeneration of a person as an indi- 
cation that he is one of the elect, and as securing his salvation ? 

So common is it for Christ and the apostles to speak of regeneration 
as settling the question of the salvation of those who are regenerated, 
that great multitudes have overlooked the fact, that there was any other 
condition of salvation insisted on in the Bible. When the jailor de- 
manded of Paul and Silas what he should do to be saved, Paul replied to 
him, " Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and 
thy house." 

Here, as is common in the Bible, faith is spoken of as if it were the 
sole condition of salvation. Eepentance, faith, regeneration, etc., are 
often, as every student of the Bible knows, spoken of as if they were the 
only conditions of salvation. Now, it seems to me, that this could not, 
and ought not to be, if there is not a certain connection of some sort 
between real conversion and eternal salvation. It is trae, the necessity 
of perseverance to the end is often mentioned and insisted upon in the 
Bible as a condition of salvation, just as might be expected when we con- 
sider the nature of the certainty in question. If there is not, however, 
a certain connection between true regeneration, or faith, or repentance 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 573 

and salvation, it seems to me incredible, that we should so often find 
faith, and repentance, and conversion spoken of as if they secured 
salvation. 

Those who believe are represented as already having eternal life, as 
not coming into condemnation, but as having passed from death unto 
life. The following passages are specimens of the manner in which the 
scriptures speak upon this subject. 

John i. 12 : " But as many as received him, to them gave he power, 
to become the sons of G-od, even to them that believe on his name ; 13. 
Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the 
will of man, but of God." 

John iii. 36 : " He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, 
and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life ; but the wrath of 
God abideth on him. 16. For God so loved the world, that he gave his 
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, 
but have everlasting life. 18. He that believeth on him is not con- 
demned ; but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he 
hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." 

John iv. 14 : " But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give 
him, shall never thirst : but the water that I shall give him shall be in 
him a well of water springing up into everlasting life." 

John v. 24 : " Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my 
word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall 
not come into condemnation ; but is passed from death unto life." 

John vi. 37 : " All that the Father giveth me shall come to me ; and 
him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. 40. And this is the 
will of him that sent me, That every one which seeth the Son, and be- 
lieveth on him, may have everlasting life ; and I will raise him up at the 
last day. 45. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught 
of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the 
Father, cometh unto me. 47. Verily, verily, I say unto you. He that 
believeth on me hath everlasting life." 

Acts ii. 38 : " Then Peter said unto them, Eepent, and "be baptized 
every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins ; 
and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." 

Mark xvi. 15 : " And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, 
and preach the gospel to every creature. 16. He that believeth and is 
baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be damned." 

Now it seems to me, that this numerous class of passage* strongly im- 
ply that there is a certain connection of some sort between coming to 
Christ, receiving Christ, etc., and eternal life. Observe, I do not con- 
tend that perseverance in faith and obedience is not also a condition of 
salvation, but on the contrary, that it actually is. Nor do I contend 



574 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

that such like representations as the above, settle the question that all 
who at any time repent, believe, or come to Christ, will be saved. The 
thing which I here intend is, that this class of texts is just what we 
might expect, if the fact of regeneration were certainly connected with 
salvation, and just what it seems they ought not to be, in case this were 
not true. 

To this it is objected, that many who attended on Christ's ministry 
are represented from time to time as believing, of whom it is almost im- 
mediately said, that they turned back and walked no more with him. I 
answer, that the Bible manifestly recognizes different kinds of faith, 
such as an intellectual faith, a faith of miracles, and the faith of the 
heart. The following are specimens of the Bible treatment of this 
subject : 

Acts viii. 13 : "Then Simon himself believed also : and when he was 
baptized, he continued with Philip, and wondered, beholding the mira- 
cles and signs which were done. 21. Thou hast neither part nor lot in 
this matter : for thy heart is not right in the sight of God.'*' 

James ii. 19 : " Thou believest that there is one God ; thou doest 
well : the devils also believe and tremble." 

These and many other passages manifestly speak of an intellectual 
faith, or of a simple conviction of the truth. 

Matt. vii. 22, 23 ; 1 Cor. xiii. 1, 2, are specimens of the manner in 
which the faith of miracles is represented. 

See Rom. x. 9, 10, 11 ; Acts viii. 37 ; Gal. v. 6. These and such 
like passages speak of evangelical faith, or the faith of the heart. When 
the multitude are spoken of as believing under Christ's instruction, or in 
view of his miracles, and then as going back and walking no more with 
him, we are doubtless to understand those passages as teaching simply, 
that they were at the time convinced of his Messiahship, and that they 
intellectually believed that he was what he professed to be. But their 
history seems to forbid the conclusion that they were truly regenerated, 
or that they had the true faith of the gospel. 

Again : John speaks of those who openly apostatized as if they had 
not been true Christians : 1 John ii. 19 : "They went out from us, but 
they were not of us ; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt 
have continued with us : but they went out, that they might be made man- 
ifest that they were not all of us." Observe the force of the expressions, 
"They went out from us, but they were not of us ;" that is, were not 
truly Christians. Why does he say so ? He assigns the reason for this 
assertion : "for if they had been of us, they would have continued with 
us, but they went out that they might be made manifest that they 
were not all of us." That is, a part of the professed disciples went 
out from the rest and returned to the world, that it might be made 



PERSEVERANCE OP SAINTS. 575 

manifest who were and who were not Christians. I do not say, however, 
that this is indubitably taught in this passage ; but it cannot be denied, 
that this is its most natural construction. 

8. The inhabitants of heaven seem to believe that there is a certain 
connection between repentance and salvation. 

Luke xv. 7 : " I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven 
over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just 
persons which need no repentance." 

Now surely this joy is premature, unless they expect the penitent 
to be saved. If, after all, there is an uncertainty about the result, 
in their estimation, and if it may be, or there is a probability, that the 
penitent will fall, and suffer a vastly more aggravated damnation than if 
he had never been enlightened, one would think that they would at least 
suspend their triumph until the result was known. To be sure they 
might rejoice, if the sinner broke oh* temporarily from his sin, and 
rejoice at the bare prospect of his salvation; but to me this passage 
reads just as it might be expected to read, if they regarded repentance as 
certainly connected with ultimate salvation. 

Again : there are several parables that seem to take the perseverance 
of the saints for granted, or to assume its truth. The one immediately 
preceding the verse upon which I have just remarked is one of them. 

Luke xv. 3 : " And he spake this parable unto them saying : 4. 
What man of you, having a hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth 
not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which 
is lost, until he find it ? 5. And when he hath found it, he layeth it on 
his shoulders, rejoicing. 6. And when he cometh home, he calleth 
together his friends and neighbors, saying unto them, Eejoice with me ; 
for I have found my sheep which was lost. 7. I say unto you, that 
likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more 
than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance." 

Now, why this joy at the return of a strayed or lost sheep, if there is 
no certainty, or scarcely any probability, that he will not stray again, 
and be finally lost with an aggravated destruction ? Immediately follow- 
ing this is another parable of the same import. 

Luke xv. 8 : "Either what woman, having ten pieces of silver, if 
she lose one piece, doth not light a candle, and sweep the house, and 
seek diligently till she find it ? 9. And when she hath found it, she 
calleth her friends and her neighbors together, saying, Rejoice with me ; 
for I have found that which was lost. 10. Likewise, I say unto you, 
there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that 
repenteth." 

Here again it may be asked, why this great joy at finding the sinner, 
unless his conversion is to result in his salvation ? 



576 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

I do not quote these passages as proving the doctrine in question, bui 
only as specimens of the class of passages that seem to assume the truth 
of the doctrine, and as being just what might be expected, if the doctrine 
is true, and just what might not be expected if the doctrine is not true. 

To this it may be, and has been replied, that there are many passages 
that are just what we could not expect, if the perseverance of the saints 
were true. The following are relied upon as examples of this class : — 

Heb. vi. 1: "Therefore, leaving the principles of the doctrine of 
Christ, let us go on unto perfection ; not laying again the foundation of 
repentance from dead works, and of faith toward God ; 2. Of the doc- 
trine of baptisms, and of laying on of hands, and of resurrection of the 
dead, and of eternal judgment. 3. And this will we do if God permit. 

4. For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have 
tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost ; 

5. And have tasted of the good word of God, and the powers of the 
world to come ; 6. If they shall fall away, to renew them again unto 
repentance ; seeing they crucify to themselves the son of God afresh, 
and put him to an open shame." 

Ez. xviii. 24: "But when the righteous turneth away from his 
righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the 
abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live ? All his right- 
eousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned ; in his trespass that 
he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall 
he die." 

Ezek. xxxiii. 13 : "When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall 
surely live ; if he trust to his own righteousness and commit iniquity, 
all his righteousness shall not be remembered ; but for his iniquity that 
he hath committed, he shall die for it." 

Matt. x. 22 : " And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake ; 
but he that endureth to the end shall be saved." 

John xv. 6 : "If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, 
and is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and 
they are burned." 

1 Cor. x. 12 : " Wherefore let him that thinketh he standeth take 
heed lest he fall." 

Heb. iii. 6 : " But Christ as a Son over his own house ; whose house are 
we, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto 
the end. 12. Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil 
heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God. 13. But exhort one 
another daily, while it is called to-day ; lest any of you be hardened 
through the deceitfulness of sin. 14. For we are made partakers of 
Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the 
end." 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 577 

Heb. iv. 1 : " Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of 
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. 11. 
Let us labor therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the 
same example of unbelief." 

2 Peter i. 10 : "Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to 
make your calling and election sure : for if ye do these things, ye shall 
never fall." 

In reply to this objection I remark, that instead of these passages be- 
ing otherwise than might be expected if the doctrine in question were 
true, and therefore implying that the doctrine is not true, they are pre- 
cisely what might be expected, if the doctrine as I have stated it, were 
true. If the certainty be but a moral certainty, even when the fact of 
conversion is settled beyond all doubt, or possibility of mistake, if the 
final salvation of the truly regenerate be as really conditioned upon per- 
severance as if there was no certainty about it ; and if, moreover, the fact 
of conversion is seldom settled in this life beyond the possibility of mis- 
take, then these passages, instead of implying any real uncertainty in re- 
gard to the final salvation of the saints, are just as and what might be 
expected, because they are just what is needed, upon the supposition, 
that the doctrine in question is true. They do not affirm that any true 
saints are, or will be, lost. They do imply the natural possibility, and, 
humanly speaking, the danger of such an event. They further imply, 
that without watchfulness and perseverance salvation is impossible. They 
also imply, that caution, warning, and threatening, are needed. They 
also imply, that some men, to say the least, are not certain of their own 
salvation, and that they do not certainly know that they are saints, be- 
yond all possibility of mistake. 

Now, these things that are fairly implied in this class of passages are 
really true : hence these passages just meet the necessities of the church, 
and are therefore just what might be expected when all the facts in the 
case are considered. I do not intend that this class of passages imply 
the truth of the doctrine under consideration, but that they are consist- 
ent with it, and might be expected, if the doctrine, as I have stated it, 
be true. 

9. Eegeneration is represented as securing perseverance in obedi- 
ence : — 

First, In those passages that make it the condition of salvation. 

Secondly, In those passages that expressly affirm, that the truly re- 
generated do not, and cannot, live in sin. 

1 John iii. 9 : " Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his 
seed remaineth in him : and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." 

1 John iv. 7 : " Beloved, let us love one another : for love is of God ; 
and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God." 
37 



578 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

1 John v. 1 : "Whosoever belie veth that; Jesus is the Christ is born of 
God : and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is be- 
gotten of him. 4. For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: 
and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. 18. 
We know that whosoever is born of God sinneth not : but he that is be- 
gotten of God keepeth himself, and that wicked one toucheth him not." 

These and similar passages expressly teach the persevering nature of 
true religion, through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit : in other words, 
they teach that the truly regenerate do not sin, in the sense at least of 
living in anything like habitual sin. They teach, that with all truly re- 
generate souls, holiness is at least the rule, and sin only the exception ; 
that instead of its being true, that the regenerate souls live a great ma- 
jority of their days subsequent to regeneration in sin, it is true that they 
so seldom sin, that in strong language it may be said in truth, they do 
not sin. This language so strongly and expressly teaches that persever- 
ance is an unfailing attribute of Christian character, that but for the fact 
that other passages constrain us to understand these passages as strong 
language used in a qualified sense, we should naturally understand them 
as affirming that no truly regenerate soul does at any time sin. But since 
it is a sound rule of interpreting the language of an author, that he is, if 
possible, to be made consistent with himself ; and since John, in other 
passages in this same epistle and elsewhere, represents that Christians, or 
truly regenerate persons, do sometimes sin ; and since this is frequently 
taught in the Bible, we must understand these passages just quoted as 
only affirming a general and not a universal truth ; that is, that truly re- 
generate persons do not sin anything like habitually, but that holiness 
is the rule with them, and sin only the exception. Certainly these pas- 
sages cannot be reasonably understood as affirming and meaning less than 
this. I know that it has been said, that being born of God is used by 
John in these cases in a higher sense, and as meaning more than simple 
conversion or regeneration, as representing a higher state than can be 
predicated of all true Christians. But observe, he especially affirms that 
all who truly believe are born of God. 

Again : Christ speaks as if he regarded those only as having truly be- 
lieved who persevere in obedience. John viii. 31 : " Then said Jesus to 
those Jews which believed on him, if ye continue in my word, then are 
ye my disciples indeed." 

The parable of the sower appears to have been designed expressly to 
teach the persevering nature of true religion. Luke viii. 5 : " A sower 
went out to sow his seed : and as he sowed, some fell by the way side, 
and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air devoured it. 6. And 
some fell upon a rock ; and as soon as it was sprung up, it withered 
away, because it lacked moisture. 7. And some fell among thorns; 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 579 

and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it. 8. And other fell on 
good ground, and sprang up, and bare fruit a hundred fold. And when 
he had said these things, he cried, He that hath ears to hear, let him 
hear. 11. Now the parable is this : The seed is the word of God. 12. 
Those by the way side are they that hear ; then cometh the devil, and 
taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be 
saved. 13. They on the rock are they, which, when they hear, receive 
the word with joy ; and these have no root, which for a while believe, 
and in time of temptation fall away. 14. And that which fell among 
thorns are they, which when they have heard, go forth, and are choked 
with cares, and riches, and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit to per- 
fection. 15. But that on the good ground are they, which, in an honest 
and good heart, having heard the word, keep it, and bring forth fruit 
with patience." 

If this parable was not designed to distinguish true religion from its 
counterfeits, and to illustrate the persevering nature of true religion, I 
do not know, and cannot conceive, what was its design. I need not en- 
large upon it. Let any one read and consider the parable for himself. 

Again : the parable of the leaven seems designed also to teach the 
progressive and persevering nature of true religion. 

Matt. xiii. 33 : "Another parable spake he unto them : the kingdom 
of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three meas- 
ures of meal, till the whole was leavened." 

This parable I understand to represent or teach the aggressive nature 
of true faith and piety, as it exhibits itself both in the hearts and lives of 
individual Christians, and also as it progresses and extends itself in the 
world. It is in its nature persevering and aggressive, and when it once 
truly exists, it will through grace triumph. When I speak of the perse- 
vering nature of true religion, I do not mean, that religion as it exists in 
the hearts of the saints in this life would of itself, if unsupported by the 
grace and indwelling Spirit of God, prevail and triumph over its enemies ; 
but the thing intended is, that through the faithfulness of God, he that 
has begun or shall begin a good work in any heart, will perfect it until 
the day of Jesus Christ. The persevering character of true religion is 
owing to the indwelling Spirit of God. 

This leads me to remark again, that repentance is made the condition 
of receiving the Holy Spirit ; and when this Spirit is received, it is 
with the express promise and pledge that he shall abide in the heart 
for ever. 

John vii. 37 : " In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus 
stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst let him come unto me and 
drink. He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his 
belly shall flow rivers of living water. 39. (But this spake he of the 



580 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive ; for the Holy Ghost 
was not yet given ; because that Jesus was not yet glorified.") 

Here we learn that water represents the Holy Spirit. This is abund- 
antly taught in the Bible. Now let us hear what Christ said to the 
woman of Samaria. 

John iv. 13 : " Jesus answered and said unto her, Whosoever drinketh 
of this water shall thirst again. 14. But whosoever drinketh of the water 
that I shall give him, shall never thirst : but the water that I shall give 
him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life." 

The prominent truth taught in this text is, that whosoever shall drink 
of this water shall never thirst. In this particular respect the Saviour 
contrasts it with the water of Jacob's well, and says, 13, 14 : " Jesus an- 
swered and said unto her, Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst 
again : but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall 
never thirst ; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well 
of water springing up into everlasting life." This Christ plainly states 
as a fact. 

That is, he shall never perish for lack of this Spirit or water, but it 
shall abide in him, and spring up into eternal life. The Spirit shall 
remain in him, and secure him against falling and perishing. The fact 
that the Spirit shall abide with and in all who ever receive him, and shall 
prevail to secure their salvation, seems to be plainly taught in this passage. 

Again, Eom. viii. 9 : "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, 
if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not 
the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. 10. And if Christ be in you, the 
body is dead because of sin ; but the Spirit is life because of righteous- 
ness. 11. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead 
dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken 
your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." 

Here it is expressly declared, that none are Christians who have not 
the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of Christ, and that they who are Christ's do 
not walk after the flesh, but after the Spirit ; that they who are Christ's 
have crucified, that is killed, the lusts of the flesh. This is the real char- 
acter of all true saints. Suchlike passages, observe, are designed to dis- 
tinguish true religion from its counterfeits, and to teach that perseverance 
in true obedience is a characteristic of all real saints. • 

10. Christ represents it as impossible to deceive the elect. Matt, 
xxiv. 24 : We have seen that the elect unto salvation include all true 
Christians ; that is, that all Christians are the elect children of God. 
They have come to Christ. Observe, the Saviour himself teaches, as we 
have seen : 

(1.) That no one can come to, or believe in him, unless the Father 
draw him. 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 581 

(2.) That the Father draws those, and only those to Christ, whom he 
has given to him. 

(3.) That all whom the Father has given to him shall come to him, 
and of those that come to him he will lose none, but will raise them up at 
the last day. 

John vi. 44: "No man can come to me except the Father which 
hath sent me, draw him ; and I will raise him up at the last day. 45. 
It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. 
Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, 
cometh unto me. 39. All that the Father giveth me shall come to me ; 
and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. 38. For I came 
down from heaven not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent 
me. 37. And this is the father's will which hath sent me, that of all 
which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up 
again at the last day. 40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that 
every one which seeth the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting 
life ; and I will raise him up at the last day." 

False theories are represented as permitted to test the piety of true 
and false professors. 1 Cor. xi. 19 : " For there must be also heresies 
among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among 
you." Those that are of the elect, or are true children of God, will not 
follow heresies. Christ says, John x. 4, 6 : " And when he putteth 
forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him ; 
for they know his voice. 9. And a stranger will they not follow, but 
will flee from him : for they know not the voice of strangers. 27. 
My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me. .28. 
And I give unto them eternal life ; and they shall never perish, neither 
shall any pluck them out of my hand." 

But those who are not true believers will not, and do not hear and 
know his voice, and follow him. John x. 26 : " But ye believe not, 
because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you." 

11. The eighth chapter of Romans seems to settle the question, or 
rather is of itself a clear proof of the doctrine we are examining. We 
need to read and ponder prayerfully the whole chapter, to apprehend 
distinctly the scope of the apostle's teaching upon this subject. He had 
in the seventh chapter been dwelling upon and portraying a legal ex- 
perience. He begins this eighth chapter by asserting, Eom. viii. 1 : 
" There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ 
Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. 2. For the 
law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law 
of sin and death. 3. For what the law could not do, in that it was 
weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sin- 
ful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh : 4. That the right- 



582 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

eousness of the la,v might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh 
but after the Spirit. 5. For they that are after the flesh do mind the 
things of the flesh ; but they that are after the Spirit, the things of the 
Spirit. 6. For to be carnally minded is death ; but to be spiritually 
minded is life and peace. 7. Because the carnal mind is enmity against 
God ; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. 8. 
So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God. 9. But ye are not 
in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in 
you. Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. 
10. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin ; but the 
Spirit is life, because of righteousness. 11. But if the Spirit of him 
that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ 
from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that 
dwelleth in you. 12. Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the 
flesh, to live after the flesh. 13. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall 
die ; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye 
shall live. 14. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the 
sons of God. 15. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again 
to fear ; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, 
Abba, Father. 16. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, 
that we are the children of God : 17. And if children, then heirs ; 
heirs of God and joint heirs with Jesus Christ : if so be that we suffer 
with him, that we may be also glorified together. 18. For I reckon, 
that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared 
with the glory which shall be revealed in us." 

Here he describes the character of true believers as distinguished 
from mere legalists, of whom he had been speaking. True believers, he 
here asserts, are justified ; they are in Christ Jesus ; they walk not after 
the flesh, but after the Spirit ; the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in 
them, that is, the law is written in their hearts ; they have the Spirit of 
Christ, the Spirit of adoption ; the Spirit witnesses with their spirit that 
they are the adopted children of God ; " If children, then heirs, heirs of 
God and joint heirs with Christ ;" the sufferings of this present time are 
not worthy to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed in them. 
Verse 24, he says : " For we are saved by hope ; but hope that is seen, is 
not hope ; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for ? M 

He then proceeds to notice the ground of this hope : verses 26 and 
27. " Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities ; for we know not 
what we should pray for as we ought ; but the Spirit itself maketh in- 
tercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that 
searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he 
maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God." This, 
observe, he affirms to be true of all who are Christ's, or who are 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 5S3 

true believers. Of this Spirit he affirms the following things: (1.) 
That all Christians possess this Spirit. (2.) That this Spirit bears 
witness with the spirits of Christians that they are the children of 
God. (3.) That he makes intercession for the saints according to 
the will of God ; that is, that he prays in them or excites them to 
pray, and to pray aright, for those things which it is the will of God to 
grant to them. He then in the 28th verse says, "And we know that all 
things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are 
the called according to his purpose." Here he represents those who love 
God, and those who are the called according to his purpose, as the same 
persons ; and affirms, that we know that all things shall work together 
for their good. This he notices as a second ground of hope. He next 
proceeds to state, how we know that all things work together for the good 
of those that love God : or, which he regards as the same thing, to those 
who are the elect, called according to the election or purpose of God. 
He says, verse 29, "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate 
to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born 
among many brethren :" that is, we know it, because they are predesti- 
nated to be conformed to the image of his Son. Not if they will be, but 
to be, and therefore, all things must directly or indirectly contribute to 
this result. He then says, " Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them 
he also called ; and whom he called, them he also justified ; and whom 
he justified, them he also glorified." That is, furthermore, we know 
this, and have good ground of hope from the fact, that whom he did 
predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, them, that is the 
same persons, he also called ; and whom, that is, the same persons whom 
he had predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son and had 
called, them he also justified ; and whom he predestinated, and called, 
and justified, them, that is, the same persons, he also glorified. 

Here then, he concludes, is a firm foundation for the hope of which 
he had spoken, the grounds of which he had been pointing out. He ac- 
cordingly proceeds to say in a spirit of triumph : — 

Eom. viii. 31 : "What shall we then say to these things ? If God be 
for us, who can be against us ? 32. He that spared not his own Son, 
but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely 
give us all things ? 33. "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's 
elect ? It is God that justifieth. 34. Who is he that condemneth ? It 
is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the 
right hand of Goa^ who also ma$etn intercession for us," 

Here he says, * * if God be for us, who can be against us ? " and then 
proceeds to point out several other considerations that enter into this 
ground of confidence. All who love God are his elect, God justifies 
them, and who is he that condemns them ? God is for them, and who 



584 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

shall be against them ? God freely gave his Son for all of them, how 
much more shall he freely give them all things ? If he did not withhold 
his Son, surely he would withhold nothing else from them that was neces- 
sary to secure their salvation. Furthermore, it was Christ that died, and 
still more and rather, that had risen again, and maketh intercession for 
them. If these things are so, we may well inquire : — 

Rom. viii. 35 : " Who shall separate us from the love of Christ ? 
Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or 
peril, or sword ? 36. (As it is written, For thy sake we are killed all the 
day long ; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.)" 

He then triumphantly affirms, verses 37-39 : " Nay, in all these things 
we are more than conquerors, through him that loved us. For I am per- 
suaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor 
powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, 
nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, 
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." 

If Paul in the eighth of Eomans does not settle the question, that all 
true saints will be saved, how could it be settled ? Let us in few words 
sum up the argument, as he here presents it :— 

We are saved already in anticipation, or in hope ; and only by hope, 
for as yet we have not received our crown. The grounds of this hope 
are, that we are in Christ Jesus, have the Spirit of Christ, Spirit of adop- 
tion. We walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. This Spirit wit- 
nesses that we are children and heirs of God. He makes intercession for 
us according to the will of God. We also know, that all things work to- 
gether for good to them who love God, for they are the called according 
to his purpose. They who are called, that is, effectually called, are called 
in conformity with their predestination to be conformed to the image of 
God. Hence those who are thus predestinated are called, and justified, 
and glorified. Therefore, no one can lay anything to the charge of God's 
elect. God justifies, and who shall condemn them ? Christ died for 
them, yea rather, has risen and makes intercession for them. God with- 
held not his Son, and of course will withhold from Christians nothing 
that is essential to secure their salvation. Wherefore he concludes, that 
nothing shall be able to separate us from the love of God. 

I know that to this it has been replied, that although nothing else can 
separate us from the love of God, yet we may separate ourselves from his 
love. 

To this I answer, true ; we may, or can do so ; but the question is, 
shall we, or will any of the elected and called do so ? No, indeed ; for 
this is the thing which the apostle intended to affirm, namely, the cer- 
tainty of the salvation of all true saints. The apostle manifestly in this 
passage assumes, or affirms, that all who ever truly loved God are elect, 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 585 

or are chosen to be conformed to the image of his Son ; and are called, 
and sanctified, and justified, in conformity with such predestination. 
If this is not his meaning, what is ? If this is not his meaning, what 
ground of hope do we, after all, find in what he says ? The apostle seems 
to have had the same thought in his mind in writing to the Hebrews. 

Heb. vi. 17 : "Wherein God willing more abundantly to show unto 
the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by 
an oath; 18. That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible 
for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for 
refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us ; 19. Which hope we have 
as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast, and which entereth 
into that within t]ie veil ; 20. Whither the forerunner is for us entered, 
even Jesus, made a high-priest forever, after the order of Melchisedec." 

There are a great many other passages of scripture, of the same 
import as those I have quoted in support of this doctrine, as every one 
knows who has taken the trouble to examine for himself. But I have 
pursued this investigation far enough. If what has been said fails to 
satisfy any mind, it is presumed that nothing which might be added 
would produce conviction. I will therefore, after replying to some 
further objections, conclude the discussion of this subject. 



LECTURE L. 

PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 
OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 

1. It is said that the natural tendency of this doctrine condemns it ; 
that it tends to beget and foster a carnal presumption in a life of sin, on 
the part of those who think themselves saints. 

There is, I reply, a broad and obvious distinction between the abuse 
of a good thing or doctrine, and its natural tendency. The legitimate 
tendency of a thing or doctrine may be good, and yet it may be abused 
and perverted. This is true of the atonement, and the offer of pardon 
through Christ. These doctrines have been, and are, greatly objected to 
by Universalists and Unitarians, as having a tendency to encourage the 
hope of impunity in sin. It is said by them, that to hold out the idea 
that Christ has made an atonement for sin, and that the oldest and 
vilest sinners may be forgiven and saved, tends directly to immorality, 
and to encourage the hope of ultimate impunity in a life of sin — the 
hope that, after a sinful life, the sinner may at last repent and be saved. 



586 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Now, there is so much plausibility in this objection to the doctrine 
of pardon and atonement, that many sensible men have rejected those 
doctrines because of this objection. They have regarded the objection 
as unanswerable. But a close examination will show, that the objection 
against those doctrines is entirely without foundation ; and not only so, 
but that the real natural tendency of those doctrines affords a strong 
presumptive argument in their favor. 

The telling of a convinced and self-condemned sinner, that Christ 
has died for his sins, and offers freely and at once to forgive all the past, 
has no natural tendency to beget a spirit of perseverance in rebellion ; 
but is on the contrary the readiest, and safest, and I may add, the only 
effectual method of subduing him, and bringing him to immediate 
repentance. But suppose, on the other hand, you tell him there is no 
forgiveness, that he must be punished for his sins at all events, what 
tendency has this to bring him to immediate and genuine repentance ; 
to beget within him the love required by the law of God ? Assuring 
him of punishment for all his sins, might serve to restrain outward mani- 
festations of a sinful heart, but certainly it tends not to subdue selfish- 
ness, and to cleanse the heart ; whereas the offer of mercy through the 
death of Christ, has a most sin-subduing tendency. It is such a mani- 
festation to the sinner of God's great love to him, his real pity for him, 
and readiness to overlook and blot out the past, as tends to break down 
the stubborn heart into genuine repentance, and to beget the sincerest 
love to God and Christ, together with the deepest self-loathing and self- 
abasement on account of sin. Thus the doctrines of the atonement and 
pardon through a crucified Eedeemer, instead of being condemned by 
their legitimate tendency, are greatly confirmed thereby. These doc- 
trines are no doubt liable to abuse, and so is every good thing ; but 
is this a good reason for rejecting them ? Our necessary food and drink 
may be abused, and often are, and so are all the most essential blessings 
of life. Should we reject them on this account ? 

It is admitted that the doctrines of atonement and forgiveness 
through Christ, are greatly abused by careless sinners and hypocrites ; 
but is this a good reason for denying and withholding them from the 
convicted sinner, who is earnestly inquiring what he shall do to be saved ? 
No indeed ! 

It is also admitted, that the doctrine of the perseverance of the 
saints is liable to abuse, and often is abused by the carnal and deceived 
professor ; but is this a good reason for rejecting it, and for withholding 
its consolations from the tempted, tempest-tossed saint ? By no means. 
Such are the circumstances of temptation from within and without, 
in which the saints are placed in this life, that when they are made 
really acquainted with themselves, and are brought to a proper apprecia- 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 587 

tion of the circumstances in which they are, they have but little rational 
ground of hope, except what is found in this doctrine. The natural 
tendency and inevitable consequence of a thorough revelation of them- 
selves to themselves, would be to beget despair, but for the covenanted 
grace and faithfulness of God. What saint who has ever been revealed 
to himself by the Holy Spirit, has not seen what Paul saw when he 
said, " In me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing ?" Who 
that has been made acquainted with himself, does not know that he never 
did, and never will take one step towards heaven, except as he is antici- 
pated and drawn by the grace of God in Christ Jesus ? Who that knows 
himself does not understand that he never would have been converted, 
but for the grace of God anticipating and exciting the first motions of 
his mind in a right direction ? And what true saint does not know, 
that such are his former habitudes, and such the circumstances of trial 
under which he is placed, and such the downward tendency of his own 
soul that although converted, he shall not persevere for an hour, except 
the indwelling grace and Spirit of God shall hold him up, and quicken 
him in the path of holiness ? 

Where, I would ask, is the ground of hope for the saints as they exist 
in this world ? Not in the fact that they have been physically regen- 
erated, so that to fall is naturally impossible. Not in the fact that they 
have passed through any such change of nature as to secure their perse- 
verance for an hour, if left to themselves. Not in the fact that they can 
or will sustain themselves for a day or a moment by their resolutions. 
Where then is their hope ? There is not even a ground of probability, 
that any one of them will ever be saved, unless the doctrine in question 
be true, that is, unless the promised grace and faithfulness of God in 
Christ Jesus goes before, and from step to step secures their perseverance. 
But if this grace is promised to any saint, as his only ground of confi- 
dence, or even hope that he shall be saved, it is equally, and upon the 
same conditions, promised to all the saints. No one more than another 
can place the least reasonable dependence on anything, except the grace 
equally promised and vouchsafed to all. What does a man know of him- 
self who hopes to be saved, and who yet does not depend wholly on 
promises of grace in Christ Jesus ? 

The natural tendency of true and thorough conviction of sin, and of 
such a knowledge of ourselves, as is essential to salvation, is to beget andi 
foster despondency and despair ; and, as I said, the soul in this condition, 
has absolutely little or no ground of hope of ultimate salvation, except 
that which this doctrine, when rightly understood, affords. However 
far he may have progressed in the way of life, he sees, when he thoroughly 
knows the truth, that he has progressed not a step, except as he has been 
drawn and inclined by the indwelling grace and Spirit of Christ ; and 



588 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

that he shall absolutely go no further in the way to heaven, unless the 
same gracious influence is continued, in such a sense, and to such an ex- 
tent, as to overcome all the temptations with which he is beset. His 
only hope is in the fact, that God has promised to keep and preserve him. 
Nothing but God's faithfulness to his Son procured the conversion of any 
saint. Nothing but this same faithfulness has procured his perseverance 
for a day, and nothing else can render the salvation of any soul at all 
probable. What can a man be thinking about, or what can he know of 
himself, who does not know this ? Unless the same grace that secures 
the conversion of the saints, secures their perseverance to the end, there 
is no hope for them. It is true, that the promises tc sinners - ( and to 
saints are conditioned upon their faith, and upon the right exercise of 
their own agency ; and it is also true, that grace secures the fulfilment 
of the conditions of the promises, in every instance in which they are 
fulfilled, or they never would be fulfilled. 

We have seen that the promises of the Father to the Son secure the 
bestowment upon the saints of all grace to ensure their final salvation. 
It shocks and distresses me to hear professed Christians talk of being 
saved at all, except upon the ground of the anticipating, and persevering, 
and sin-overcoming, and hell-subduing grace of God in Christ Jesus. 
Why, I should as soon expect the devil to be saved, as that any saint on 
earth will be, if left, with all the promises of God in his hands, to stand 
and persevere without the drawings, and inward teachings, and over-per- 
suading influences of the Holy Spirit. Shame on a theology that sus- 
pends the ultimate salvation of the saints upon the broken reed of their 
own resolutions in their best estate ! Their firmest resolutions are noth- 
ing unless they are formed and supported by the influence of the Spirit 
of grace, going before, and exciting, and persuading to their formation 
and their continuance. This is everywhere taught in the Bible ; and 
who that has considered the matter does not know, that this is the ex- 
perience of every saint ? Where, then, is the ground of hope, if the 
doctrine in question be denied ? " If the foundation be destroyed, what 
shall the righteous do ?" Where, then, is the evil tendency of this doc- 
trine ? It has naturally no evil tendency. Can the assurance of eternal 
salvation through the blood, and love, and grace of Christ, have a natural 
tendency to harden the heart of a child of God against his Father and 
his Saviour ? Can the revealed fact, that he shall be more than a con- 
queror through Christ, beget in him a disposition to sin against Christ ? 
Impossible ! This doctrine, though liable to abuse by hypocrites, is nev- 
ertheless the sheet anchor of the saints in hours of conflict. And shall 
the children be deprived of the bread of life, because sinners will pervert 
the use of it to their own destruction ? This doctrine is absolutely need- 
ful to prevent despair, when conviction is deep, and conflicts with temp- 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 589 

tation are sharp. Its natural tendency is to slay and keep down selfish- 
ness, to forestall selfish efforts and resolutions, and to sustain the confi- 
dence of the soul at all times. It tends to subdue sin, to humble the 
soul under a sense of the great love and faithfulness of God in Christ 
Jesus ; to influence the soul to live upon Christ, and to renounce entirely 
and for ever all confidence in the flesh. Indeed, its tendency is the direct 
opposite of that asserted in the objection. It is the abuse, and not the 
natural tendency of this doctrine, against which this objection is urged. 
But the abuse of a doctrine is no reason why it should be rejected. 

2. But it is said that real saints do sometimes fall into at least tem- 
porary backsliding, in which cases the belief of this doctrine tends to lull 
them into carnal security, and to prolong their backsliding, if not to em- 
bolden them to apostatize. 

To this I reply that if real Christians do backslide, they lose for the 
time being their evidence of acceptance with God ; and withal they know 
that in their present state they cannot be saved. . This objection is lev- 
eled rather against that view of perseverance that says, " once in grace, 
always in grace ;" that teaches the doctrine of perpetual justification upon 
condition of one act of faith. The doctrine as stated in these lectures, 
holds out no ground of hope to a backslider, except upon condition of 
return and perseverance to the end. Moreover, the doctrine as here 
taught is, that perseverance in holiness, in the sense, that, subsequent to 
regeneration holiness is at least the rule, and sin only the exception, is an 
attribute of Christian character. Every moment, therefore, a backslider 
remains in sin, he must have less evidence that he is a child of God. 

But as I said, he loses confidence in his own Christianity, and in this 
state of backsliding he does not believe the doctrine of perseverance, as a 
doctrine of revelation. It is absurd to say, that while backslidden from 
God he still has faith in his word, and believes this doctrine as a Chris- 
tian doctrine, and upon the strength of the testimony of God. He does 
not in this state really believe the doctrine, and therefore it is not the 
tendency of the doctrine when believed that harms him, but a gross abuse 
and perversion of it. But the perversion of a doctrine is no objection to 
it. The real tendency of the doctrine is to break the heart of the back- 
slider, to exhibit to him the great love, and faithfulness, and grace of 
God which tend naturally to subdue selfishness, and to humble the 
heart. When backsliders are emboldened by this doctrine and rendered 
presumptuous, it is never by any other than a gross perversion and 
abuse of it. 

Those who persist in such objections should reflect upon their own 
inconsistency, in making a manifest perversion and abuse of this doc- 
trine an objection to it, when they hold other doctrines, equally liable 
to abuse and equally abused, in spite of such abuse. Let such persons 



590 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

see, that they are practically adopting a principle, and insisting upon 
its application in this case, which, if carried out, would set aside the 
whole gospel. 

3. It is objected, that the Bible speaks of the saints as if there were 
real danger of their being lost. It requires them to spend the time of 
their sojourning here in fear, and abounds with cautions, and warnings, 
and threatenings, that are certainly out of place, and not at all to be re- 
garded, if the salvation of the saints is a revealed certainty. How, it is 
inquired, can we fear, if God has revealed the certainty of our salvation ? 
Is not fear in such a case a result of unbelief ? Can God reveal to us the 
fact, that we shall certainly be saved, and then call on us or exhort us to 
fear that we shall not be saved ? Can he require us to doubt his word 
and his oath ? If God has revealed the certainty of the salvation of all 
true saints, can. any saint fear that he shall not be saved without down- 
right unbelief ? and can God approve and even enjoin such fears ? If a 
person is conscious of possessing the character ascribed to the true saints 
in the Bible, is he not bound upon the supposition that this doctrine is 
true, to have and to entertain the most unwavering assurance that he 
shall be saved ? Has he any right to doubt it, or to fear that he shall 
not be saved ? 

I answer, that no true saint who has an evidence or an earnest of his 
acceptance with God, such as the true saint may have, has a right to 
doubt for a moment that he shall be saved, nor has he a right to fear, 
that he shall not be saved. I also add, that the Bible nowhere encour- 
ages, or calls upon the saints to fear, that they shall not be saved, or 
that they shall be lost. It calls on them to fear something else, to fear 
to sin or apostatize, lest they should be lost, but not that they shall sin 
and be lost. The following are specimens of the exhortations and warn- 
ings given, to the saints : — 

Matt. xxvi. 41. " Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation; 
the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." 

Mark xiii. 33 : "Take ye heed, watch and pray; for ye know not 
when the time is. 34. For the Son of Man is as a man taking a far 
journey, who left his house, and gave authority to his servants, and to 
every man his work, and commanded the porter to watch. 35. Watch 
ye therefore ; for ye know not when the master of the house cometh, at 
even, or at midnight, or at cock-crowing, or in the morning ; 36. Lest, 
coming suddenly, he find you sleeping. 37. And what I say unto you, I 
say unto all, Watch. " 

Luke xii. 37 : "Blessed are those servants, whom the Lord wheu he 
cometh, shall find watching ; verily I say unto you, That he shall gird 
himself, and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and 
serve them." 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 591 

1 Cor. x. 12 : " Wherefore, let him that thinketh he standeth take 
heed lest he fall." 

1 Cor. xix. 13 : " Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit yon like 
men, be strong." 

Eph. v. 15 : " See then that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools, but 
as wise, 16. Eedeeming the time, because the days are evil." 

Eph. vi. 10 : " Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord and in 
the power of his might. 11. Put on the whole armor of God, that ye 
may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil." 

Phil. i. 27 : " Only let your conversation be as it becometh the 
gospel of Christ ; that whether I come and see you, or else be absent, I 
may hear of your affairs, that ye stand fast in one spirit, with one mind 
striving together for the faith of the gospel ; 28. And in nothing terri- 
fied by your adversaries ; which is to them an evident token of perdition, 
but to you of salvation, and that of God." 

1 Thess. v. 6 : " Therefore, let us not sleep, as do others ; but let us 
watch and be sober." 

1 Tim. vi. 12 : " Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal 
life, whereunto thou art also called, and hast professed a good profession 
before many witnesses." 

2. Tim. ii. 3 : "Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of 
Jesus Christ." 

2 Tim. iv. 5 : " But watch thou in all things, endure afflictions, do 
the work of an evangelist, make full proof of thy ministry. " 

1 Pet. iv. 7 : " But the end of all things is at hand ; be ye therefore 
sober, and watch unto prayer." 

Matt. x. 22 : "And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake ; 
but he that endureth to the end shall be saved." 

John xv. 6 : " If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, 
and is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and 
they are burned." 

Eom. ii. 6 : " Who will render to every man according to his deeds ; 
7. To them who, by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, 
and honor, and immortality, eternal life." 

1 Cor. ix. 27 : " But I keep under my body, and bring it into sub- 
jection ; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I my- 
self should be a castaway." 

2 Cor. vi. 1 : " We, then, as workers together with him, beseech you 
also that ye receive not the grace of God in vain." 

Col. i. 23 : " If ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be 
not moved away from the hope of the gospel, which ye have heard, and 
which was preached to every creature which is under heaven : whereof I 
Paul am made a minister." 



592 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Heb. iii. 6 : "But Christ as a Son over his own house ; whose house 
are we, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm 
unto the end. 12. Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an 
evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God. 13. But ex- 
hort one another daily, while it is called to-day ; lest any of you be 
hardened through the deceitfulness of sin. 14. For we are made par- 
takers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto 
the end." 

Heb. iv. 1 : " Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of 
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. 11. 
Let us labor therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the 
same example of unbelief." 

2 Pet i. 10 : " Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to 
make your calling and election sure ; for if ye do these things, ye shall 
never fall." 

Eev. ii. 10. " Fear none of those things which thou shalt suffer ; 
behold, the devil shall cast some of you into prison, that ye may be 
tried : and ye shall have tribulation ten days ; be thou faithful unto 
death, and I will give thee a crown of life. 11. He that hath an ear, let 
him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches ; he that overcometh 
shall not be hurt of the second death. 17. He that hath an ear, ]et him 
hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches : To him that overcometh 
will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, 
and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth, saving he 
that receiveth it. 26. And he that overcometh, and keepeth my words 
unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations." 

Eev. xxi. 7 : "He that overcometh shall inherit all things ; and I 
will be his God, and he shall be my son." 

1 Pet. i. 17 : "'And if ye call on the Father, who without respect of 
persons judgeth according to every man's work, pass the time of your 
sojourning here in fear." 

I find no instance in the Bible in which the saints are enjoined or 
exhorted to fear that they shall actually be lost ; but, on the contrary, 
this kind of fear is everywhere, in the word of God, discountenanced and 
rebuked, and the saints are exhorted to the utmost assurance that Christ 
will keep and preserve them to the end, and finally bestow on them eter- 
nal life. They are warned against sin and apostacy, and are informed 
that if they do apostatize they shall be lost. They are expressly informed, 
that their salvation is conditioned upon their perseverance in holiness to 
the end. They are also called upon to watch against sin and apostacy ; 
to fear both, lest they should be lost. 

Heb. iv. 1 : "Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of 
entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it." 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 593 

Heb. vi. 1 : " Therefore, leaving the principles of the doctrine of 
Christ, let us go on unto perfection ; not laying again the foundation of 
repentance from dead works, and of faith toward God, 2. Of the doc- 
trine of baptism, and of laying on of hands, and of resurrection of the 
dead, and of eternal judgment. 3. And this will we do, if God permit. 

4. For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have 
tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost ; 

5. And have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world 
to come, 6. If they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance ; 
seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to 
an open shame." 

Heb. iii. 12 : " Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an 
evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God. 13. But exhort 
one another daily, while it is called to-day ; lest any of you be hardened 
through the deceitfulness of sin. 14. For we are made partakers of 
Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end." 

They are required to fear to sin, but not to fear that they shall sin in 
any sense that implies any expectation of sinning. They are to fear to 
apostatize, but not to expect, or fear that they shall apostatize. They 
are to fear to be lost, but not that they shall be lost. To fear to sin lest 
we should be lost, is a very different thing from fearing that we shall sin 
and shall be lost. There is just as much need of our fearing to sin, and 
of fearing to be lost, as there would be if there were no certainty of our 
salvation. When we consider the nature of the certainty of the salva- 
tion of the saints, that it is only a moral and conditional certainty, we 
can see the propriety and the necessity of the warnings and threatenings 
which we find addressed to them in the Bible. The language of the 
Bible is just what it might be expected to be, in case the salvation of the 
saints were certain, with a moral and conditional certainty. 

But again : this objection is based upon a gross error in respect to 
the philosophy of moral government. Moral law exists with its sanctions 
as really in heaven as on earth, and its sanctions have in heaven the very 
influence that they ought to have on earth. It is as true in heaven as on 
earth, that the soul that sinneth shall die. Now, can the sanctions of 
law exert no influence in heaven ? I suppose no reasonable person will 
doubt the certainty, and the known certainty of the perseverance of all 
saints there. But if they are certain that they shall not sin and fall, can 
they not be the subjects of fear in any sense ? I answer, yes. They are 
naturally able to sin, and maybe sometimes placed under circumstances 
where they are tempted to selfishness. Indeed, the very nature of mind 
renders it certain, that the saints will always have need of watchfulness 
against temptation and sin. 

Now, it is the design of the sanctions of law in all worlds to produce 



59± SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

hope on the one hand, and fear on the other ; in holy beings the hope of 
reward, and the fear to sin lest they should perish. This hope and fear 
in a being duly influenced by them, is not selfishness. It is madness and 
desperate wickedness not to be influenced by them. Our reason affirms 
that we ought to be influenced by them, that our own salvation is of in- 
finite value, and that our damnation were an infinite evil. It therefore 
affirms that we ought to secure the one and to avoid the other. This is 
law both on earth and in heaven. This we are not to do selfishly, that 
is, to seek our own salvation, or to avoid our own damnation, exclusively 
or only, but to seek to save as many as possible ; to love our neighbor as 
ourselves, and ourselves as our neighbor. In all worlds the sanctions of 
law ought to have their influence, and with holy beings they have. Holy 
beings are really subjects of fear to sin, and to be lost, and are the, only 
beings who have the kind of fear which God requires, and which it is the 
design of the sanctions of law and of the gospel to inspire. What ! Are 
we to be told that a certainty of safety is wholly inconsistent with every 
kind and degree of fear ? What, then, is the use of law in heaven ? 
Must a man on earth or in heaven doubt whether he shall have eternal 
life, in order to leave room for the influence of moral law, and of hope, 
and of fear, or in order to leave play for the motives of moral govern- 
ment ? There is room for the same fear in heaven that ought to be on 
earth. ~No one has aright to expect to violate the precept, and thereby 
incur the penalty of law. But every one is bound to fear to do so. The 
penalty was never designed on earth, any more than it is in heaven, to 
beget a slavish fear, or a fear that we shall sin and be damned ; but only 
a fear to sin and be damned. A fear to sin and to be lost, will, to all 
eternity, no doubt, be a means of confirming holy beings in heaven. The 
law will be the same there as here. Free agency will be the same there 
as here. Perseverance in holiness will be a condition of continued salva- 
tion there as really as here. There may, and doubtless will, be tempta- 
tions there as well as here. They will, therefore, need there substantially 
the same motives to keep them that they need and have here. There 
will there be laws and conditions of continued bliss as here. There will 
be the same place, and in kind, if not in degree, the same occasion for 
fear there that there is here. I say again, that the objection we are con- 
sidering, overlooks both the true philosophy of mind, and of the influ- 
ence of the sanctions of moral law. 

The objection we are considering is based upon the assumption that 
warnings, exhortation to fear, etc., are inconsistent with the revealed cer- 
tainty of the salvation of the saints. But does not the Bible furnish 
abundant instances of warning in cases where the result is revealed as 
certain ? The case of Paul's shipwreck is in point. This case has been 
once alluded to, but I recur to it for the sake of illustration in this place. 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 595 

God, by Paul, revealed the fact, that no life on board the ship should be 
lost. This he declared as a fact, without any revealed qualification or 
condition. But when the sailors, who alone knew how to manage the 
ship, were about to abandon her, Paul informs them that their abiding 
in the ship was a condition of their salvation from death. The means 
were really as certain as the end ; yet the end was conditioned upon the 
means, and if the means failed, the end would fail. Therefore Paul ap- 
pealed to their fears of death to secure them against neglecting the means 
of safety. He did not intend to excite in them a distrust of the promise 
of God, but only to apprise them of the conditional nature of the cer- 
tainty of their safety which had been revealed to them, and thus cause 
them at once to fear to neglect the means, and to confide in the certainty 
of safety in the diligent use of them. But this is a case, be it understood, 
directly in point, and by itself affords a full answer to the objection under 
consideration. It is a case where a revealed certainty of the event was 
entirely consistent with warning and threatening. Nay, it is a case where 
the certainty, though real, was dependent upon the warning and threat- 
ening, and the consequent fear to neglect the means. This case is a full 
illustration of the revealed certainty of the ultimate salvation of the 
saints ; and were there no other case in the Bible where warning and 
threatening are addressed to those whose safety is revealed, this case would 
be a full answer to the assertion, that warnings and threatenings are in- 
consistent with revealed certainty. Paul feared to have the means of safety 
neglected, but he did not fear that they really would be, because he knew 
that they would not. 

To the pertinency of this case as an illustration, it is objected, that 
the prophet pronounced the destruction of Nineveh in forty days to be 
certain, as really as Paul in this case revealed the certainty of the safety 
of all on board the ship ; therefore, it is contended that Paul did not in- 
tend to reveal the result as certain, because when a revelation was made 
respecting the destruction of Nineveh, in just as unqualified terms, the 
event showed that it was not certain. To this I reply, that in the case 
of Jonah, it is manifest from the whole narrative that neither Jonah nor 
the Ninevites understood the event as unconditionally certain. Jonah 
expressly assigned to God his knowledge of the uncertainty of the event, 
as an excuse for not delivering his message. So the people themselves 
understood, that the event might not be certain, as their conduct abun- 
dantly shows. The difference in the two cases is just this : one was a 
real and a revealed certainty, and the other was neither. Why then 
should this case be adduced as setting aside that of the shipwreck ? But 
it is said, that no condition was revealed in the one case more than in the 
other. Now so far as the history is recorded, no mention is made in the 
case of Nineveh, that Jonah intimated that there was any condition upon 



596 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

which the destruction of the city could be avoided : yet it is plain, that 
both Jonah and the Ninevites understood the threatening to be condi- 
tional, in the sense of the event's being uncertain. Jonah himself did 
not expect it with much certainty. But in the case of Paul, he expressly 
affirms, that he believed. God that it should be' as he had declared, that 
there should be the loss of no man's life, and he encouraged them to be- 
lieve the same thing. Paul understood the end to be certain, though he 
knew, and soon informed them, that the certainty was a moral one, and 
conditioned upon the diligent use of means. The two cases are by no 
means parallel. It is true that Nineveh would have been destroyed, had 
they not used the appropriate means to prevent it ; and the same is true 
of the ship's crew ; and it is also true that, in both cases, it was really 
certain that the means would not be neglected ; yet in one case, the cer- 
tainty was really understood to be revealed, and was believed in, and not 
in the other. Now observe, the point to be illustrated by reference to 
this case of shipwreck. It is just this : Can a man have any fear, and 
can there be ground and need of caution and fear, where there is a real 
and revealed, and believed or known certainty ? The objection I am 
answering is, that, if the salvation of the saints is certain, and revealed 
as such, and is believed to be certain, there is then no ground of fear, and 
no necessity or room for warning, threatening, etc. But this case of 
shipwreck is one in which all these things meet. 

(1.) The event was certain, and of course the conditions were sure to 
be fulfilled. 

(2.) The certainty was revealed. 
(3.) It was believed. Yet, 

(4.) There was warning, and threatening, and fear, to neglect the 
means. But these things did not all meet in the case of Jonah and the 
Ninevites. In this case, 

(1.) It was not certain that the city would be destroyed. 
(2.) It was not understood to be revealed as certain. 
(3.) It was not believed to be certain. 

"Why, then, I ask again, should these cases be taken as parallels ? 
Paul repeatedly speaks of his own salvation as certain, and yet in a 
manner that conditionates it upon his perseverance in faith and obedi- 
ence to the end. He says : — 

Phil. i. 19 : "For I know that this shall turn to my salvation 
through your prayer, and the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ. 25. 
And having this confidence, I know I shall abide and continue with you 
all, for your furtherance and joy of faith." 

2 Tim. iv. 18 : " And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil 
work, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom : to whom be 
glory forever and ever." 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 597 

In this place it is plain, that he regarded his perseverance and ulti- 
mate salvation, by and through the grace of God, as certain. Paul 
everywhere, as every attentive reader of the Bible knows, renounces 
all hope but in the indwelling grace and Spirit of Christ. Still he felt 
confident of his salvation. But if he had no confidence in himself, 
on what was his confidence based ? Again : — 

2 Tim. i. 12 : " For the which cause I also suffer these things : 
nevertheless I am not ashamed ; for I know whom I have believed, and 
am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto 
him against that day." 

Here again Paul expresses the fullest confidence of his own salvation. 
He did not merely intend to say that Christ was able, if he was disposed, 
to keep that which he had committed to him, but he assumed his will- 
ingness and asserted his ability, as the ground of his confidence. That 
he here expressed entire confidence in his ultimate salvation, cannot 
reasonably be doubted. He did not say that he was persuaded that 
Christ was able to save him, if he persevered ; but his confidence was 
founded in the fact, that Christ was able to secure his perseverance. It 
was because he was persuaded that Christ was able to keep him, that he 
had any assurance, and I might add even hope, of his own salvation. 
The same reason he assigned as the ground of confidence that others 
would be saved. To the Thessalonians he says, 2 Thess. iii. 3 : " But 
the Lord is faithful, who shall establish you, and keep you from evil." 
Again, Jude says, ver. 24: "Now unto him that is able to keep you 
from falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory 
with exceeding joy." Again, Peter says, of all the elect or saints, 1 
Peter i. 5 : "Who are kept by the powder of God through faith unto 
salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time." Thus we see, that the 
ground of confidence with the apostles was, that God and Christ could 
and would keep them, not without their own efforts, but that he would 
induce them to be faithful, and so secure this result. The same was 
true of Christ, as is manifested in his last prayer for them. John xvii. 
15, 16 : "I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, 
but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil. They are not of the 
world, even as I am not of the world." But the apostles frequently 
express their confidence, both in the certainty of their own salvation, 
and also in the salvation of those to whom they wrote. Paul says, 1 
Cor. ix. 26, 27 : " I therefore so run, not as uncertainly, so fight I, not 
as one that beateth the air : But I keep under my body, and bring 
it into subjection : lest that by any means, when I have preached to 
others, I myself should be a castaway." Here he expresses the fullest 
confidence that he shall win the crown, but at the same time recog- 
nizes the condition of his salvation, and informs us that he took care to 



598 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

fulfil it, lest he should be a castaway." He says, verse 26 : "I there- 
fore so run, not as uncertainly, so fight I, not as one who beateth the 
air." He alludes to the Olympic games, and in this connection says, 
verses 24 and 25 : " Know ye not that they which run in a race run all, 
but one receiveth the prize ? So run, that ye may obtain. And every 
man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things. Now they 
do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible." He then 
adds, verses 26 and 27 : "-I therefore so run, not as uncertainly, so fight 
I not as one that beateth the air : But I keep under my body, and bring 
it into subjection ; lest that by any means, when I have preached to 
others, I myself should be a castaway." 

Of those who ran in these games, but one could win the prize. But 
not so in the Christian face : here all might win. In those games, 
because but one could possibly win, there was much uncertainty in 
respect to whether any one in particular could win the prize. In the 
Christian race there was no need of any such uncertainty. As it re- 
spected himself he says, " I therefore so run, not as uncertainly, so fight 
I, not as one that beateth the air :" that is, I do not run with any 
uncertainty or irresolution, because of uncertainty in respect to whether 
I shall win the prize. Nor do I fight as one that beateth the air, or 
as one who fights uncertainly or in vain ; but while I have this confi- 
dence, I keep under my body. It has been denied that Paul intended 
to express a confidence in his salvation in this place ; but this cannot be 
reasonably denied. He was speaking in this connection of the Christian 
race, and of the conditions of winning the victor's crown. He affirms 
that there was no real uncertainty whether he should win the crown. 
In the Olympic games there was uncertainty, because but one could win ; 
but here no such ground of uncertainty existed ; and, moreover, with 
him there was no real uncertainty at all, while at the same time he 
understood the conditional nature of the certainty, and kept under 
his body, etc. Can any one suppose that Paul really had any doubt 
in regard to his own ultimate salvation ? Now observe, these passages 
in respect to Paul are not adduced to prove that all saints will be saved ; 
nor that, if Paul was sure of his salvation, therefore all saints may be. 
To prove this is not my present design, but simply to show, that while 
Paul was sure, and had no doubt of his ultimate salvation, he yet feared 
to neglect the means. He was not disheartened in the Christian race 
with a sense of uncertainty, as they who ran in the Olympic games. He 
was not, as they might be, irresolute on account of their great uncer- 
tainty of winning. He expected to win, and yet he dared not neglect 
the conditions of winning. Nay, he expected to win, because he ex- 
pected to fulfil the conditions ; and he expected to fulfil the conditions, 
not because he had any confidence in himself, but because he confided 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 599 

in the grace and Spirit of God to secure his perseverance. Nevertheless, 
he kept under his body, and feared self-indulgence, lest he should be a 
castaway. 

Paul affirms of the Thessalonians, that he knew their election of God. 
1 Thess. i. 14 : " Knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God." In 
both his epistles to this church, he often speaks of them in a manner that 
implies, that he regarded their salvation as certain, and yet he also fre- 
quently warns and exhorts them to faithfulness, and to guard against 
being deceived by false teachers, etc. 2 Thess. ii. 1-3 : "Now we be- 
seech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by 
our gathering together unto him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or 
be troubled, neither by spirit nor by word, nor by letter as from us, as 
that the day of Christ is at hand, Let no man deceive you by any means ; 
for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and 
that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition." He addresses the same 
strain of exhortation to them that he does to all Christians, and plies 
them with admonition and warning, just as might be expected, consider- 
ing the moral and conditional nature of the certainty of their salvation. 

In writing to the Philippians, he says, Phil. i. 6, 7 : " Being confi- 
dent of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you, 
will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ. Even as it is meet for me 
to think this of you all, because I have you in my heart ; inasmuch as 
both in my bonds, and in the defence and confirmation of the gospel, ye 
are all partakers of my grace." Here he expresses the confidence of an 
inspired apostle, that Christ would secure their salvation. But yet in 
the 2d chapter, 12th and 13th verses, he says : "Wherefore, my beloved, 
as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much 
more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trem- 
bling ; For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of his 
good pleasure." Here he warns them to work out their salvation with 
fear and trembling. There is no stronger passage than this, where the 
saints are exhorted to fear ; and mark, this is addressed to the very per- 
sons of whom he had just said, i. 6 : "Being confident of this very thing, 
that he which hath begun a good work in you, will perform it until the 
day of Jesus Christ." Almost at the same breath he expresses the confi- 
dence of an inspired apostle, that he who had begun a good work in them 
would carry it on until the day of Jesus Christ ; that is, that he would 
surely save them ; and at the same time exhorts them to " work out their 
salvation with fear and trembling." Paul also addresses the church at 
Ephesus as follows : — 

Eph. i. 1 : " Paul an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God, to 
the saints which are at Ephesus, and to the faithful in Christ Jesus: 2. 
Grace be to you, and peace, from God our Father, and from the Lord 



600 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Jesns Christ : 3. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places 
in Christ : 4. According as he hath chosen us in him before the founda- 
tion of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him 
in love: 5. Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by 
Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, 6. To 
the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in 
the Beloved. 7. In whom we have redemption through his blood, the 
forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace; 8. Wherein he 
hath abounded toward us in all wisdom and prudence; 9. Having made 
known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure 
which he hath purposed in himself: 10. That in the dispensation of the 
fulness of times, he might gather together in one all things in Christ, 
both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him: 11. In 
whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated accord- 
ing to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of 
his own will: 12. That we should be to the praise of his glory, who first 
trusted in Christ." 

Now, let any one read the epistle through, and he will find, that 
these same elect persons are addressed throughout with precept, exhorta- 
tion, and warning, just as all other saints throughout the Bible. To 
quote the instances of this were only to quote much of the epistle. In- 
deed this is the common usage of the inspired writers, to address the 
saints as the elect of God, as persons whose salvation was secure as a mat- 
ter of fact, but whose salvation was after all conditionated upon their 
perseverance in holiness ; and they hence proceed to warn, admonish, 
and exhort them, just as we might expect when we consider the nature 
of the certainty of which they were speaking. 

But if it be still urged, that the fact of election is not revealed in any 
case to the individuals who compose the elect ; that if the fact of election 
were revealed to any one, to him threatenings and warnings would be out 
of place ; I reply, that this is only saying, that if certainty is revealed as 
such at any time, and in respect to anything, then warnings, and threat- 
enings, and fears, are wholly out of place. But this is not true, as we 
have seen in the case of the shipwreck. Here the certainty was revealed 
to the individuals concerned, and accredited. Christ also revealed to 
his apostles the fact of their election, as we have seen, also to Paul. Can 
any one reasonably call in question the fact, that the apostles understood 
well their election of God, not only to the apostleship, but also to eter- 
nal life ? Observe again, what Paul says in writing to the church at 
Ephesus, in the passage which has just been quoted. 

Here he expressly recognizes himself as one of the elect, as he does 
elsewhere, and as the apostles always do, directly or by way of implica- 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 601 

tion, and yet Paul and the other apostles did not feel that warning, and 
watchfulness, and fear to sin were at all out of place with them. 

Job speaks as if the certainty of his salvation had been revealed to 
him. He says : 

Job xix. 25 : " For I know that my Eedeemer liveth, and that he 
shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. 26. And though after my 
skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God : 27. Whom 
I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another ; 
though my reins be consumed within me." 

Can any one suppose that Job regarded threatenings, and warnings, 
and fear to sin, as out of place with him ? It is generally admitted, 
that there is such a thing as the full assurance of faith or hope, or as 
attaining to the certain knowledge that salvation is secure to us. But 
would a saint who has made this attainment be less affected than others 
by all the threatenings, and warnings, and exhortations to fear, found 
in the Bible ? Would such souls cease to tremble at the word of God ? 
Would they cease to pass their time of sojourning here with fear? 
Would they cease to " work out their salvation with fear and trembling?" 
Would God no longer regard them as belonging to the class of persons 
mentioned in Isa. lxvi. 1 : " For all those things hath mine hand made, 
and all those things have been, saith the Lord : but to this man will I 
look, even to him that is of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at my word ? " 

Christ prayed for the salvation of his apostles, in their presence, in 
such a manner as to leave no room for them to doubt their ultimate sal- 
vation, if they expected his prayers to be answered. He did the same 
with respect to all that should believe on him through their word. Now 
will you affirm, that they who are conscious of believing in Jesus, must 
cease to have confidence in the efficacy of his prayers, before they can 
feel the power, and propriety, and influence of warnings, and threaten- 
ings, and the various motives that are addressed to the elect of God to 
preserve them from falling ? The supposition is preposterous. What ! 
Must we doubt the efficacy of his prayers, in order to credit and appre- 
ciate the force of his warnings ? In fact, the more holy any one is, and 
the more certain he is of his eternal salvation, the more does sin become 
an object of loathing, of fear, and even of terror, to him. The more 
holy he is, the more readily he trembles at the word of God, and the 
more sensibly and easily he is affected by a contemplation of sin and 
divine wrath, the more awful and terrible these things appear to him, 
and the more solemnly do they affect him, although he has the fullest 
assurance that he shall never taste of either sin or hell. It is true, in- 
deed, as we shall have occasion to remark hereafter, that in general, the 
Bible assumes that individuals are not sure of their salvation, and upon 
that assumption proceeds to warn them. 



602 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

But still it is insisted that, if the end is certain, so are the means ; 
and if one is revealed as certain, so is the other ; and that therefore it is 
absurd, and implies unbelief, to fear that we shall neglect the means, or 
that either the end or means will fail. But as we have said, to fear to 
neglect the means, and to fear that we shall neglect them, are not the 
same. We are naturally able to neglect them, and there is just as much 
real danger of our neglecting them, as there would be if no revelation 
were made about it, unless the revelation of the certainty of their use be 
a means of securing the use of them. We are therefore to fear -to neglect 
them. There is, in fact, as much real danger of our neglecting the 
means of our salvation, as there is that any event whatever will be dif- 
ferent from what it turns out to be. There is no more real danger in 
one case than in the other ; but in one case the certainty is revealed, 
and in the other not. Therefore, when the certainty is not revealed, it 
is reasonable to fear that the event will not be as we desire, and as it 
ought to be. But in the other, — that is, when the certainty is revealed, 
we have no right to fear that it will be otherwise than as revealed, nor to 
fear that the means will in fact be neglected ; but in all such cases we 
should fear to neglect the means, as really and as much, as if no revela- 
tion of certainty had been made ; just as Paul did in the case of his 
shipwreck. 

Again, it is inquired, are we not to fear that any of the saints will 
be lost, and pray for them under the influence of this fear ? I answer, 
no. The saints are the elect. None of God's elect will be lost. We are 
to pray for them as Christ prayed for his apostles, and as he prayed for 
all believers, not with the fear that they will be lost, for this were pray- 
ing in unbelief ; but we are to pray for all persons known to be saints, 
that they may persevere unto the end and be saved, with confidence that 
our prayer will be answered. But it is said, that Paul expressed doubts 
in regard to the salvation of the churches in Galatia. I answer, that he 
expressed no doubt in respect to their ultimate salvation; he says, "I 
desire to be present with you now, and to change my voice ; for I stand 
in doubt of you." Gal. iv. 20. In the margin it reads, " I am perplexed 
for you." He says in the next chapter : "I have confidence in you 
through the Lord, that ye will be none otherwise minded ; but he that 
troubleth you shall bear his judgment, whosoever he be." Gal. v. 10: 
Paul set himself zealously to reclaim these churches from error, and ex- 
presses full confidence of the result ; and no where, that I see, intimates, 
that he doubted whether they would finally be saved. 

But it is said still, that if the salvation of all the saints is secured, and 
this certainty is revealed, there is no real danger of their either neglect- 
ing the necessary means, or of their being lost, and therefore warnings, 
and threatenings, and fears are vain ; and that the certainty being 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 603 

granted, it is irrational and impossible to fear, without doubting the truth 
of God ; that certainty is certainty, and it matters not at all of what kind 
the certainty is ; that if it be granted that the event is certain, all dan- 
ger, and of course all cause of fear, is out of the question. 

To this form of the objection I reply, that it proceeds upon the as- 
sumption, that there is no danger of the saints falling, if God has revealed 
the certainty of their ultimate salvation. But what do we mean by 
danger ? It has already been said, that all events are certain, in the sense 
that it is and was from eternity as really certain that they will be, and 
how they will be ; and that all their circumstances and conditions are, 
and eternally were, as certain as they ever will be. So that there never 
is any real danger, in the sense of uncertainty, that any event will be 
otherwise than it turns out in fact to be. By danger, then, is not meant 
that there is really any uncertainty in respect to how anything will be. 
But all that can properly be intended by danger is, that there is a natu- 
ral possibility, and, humanly speaking, a probability, that it may be other- 
wise than as we desire ; that this is probable in the sense that there is, 
humanly speaking, from the circumstances of the case, and so far as we 
can judge, from the course of events, a probability that a thing may not 
occur as we would have it. 

Now, a natural possibility always exists in respect to the falling and 
final destruction of the saints ; and in most cases at least, the circum- 
stances are such that, humanly speaking, and aside from the grace of 
God, there is not only real danger, but a certainty that they will fail of 
eternal life. There are, humanly speaking, many chances to one that 
they will fall and be lost. Now, this danger is as real as if nothing of 
certainty had been revealed. The event would have been as certain with- 
out the revelation of the certainty as with it, unless it be true, which I 
suppose in many cases is the fact, that the revelation of the certainty 
helps to secure their perseverance. 

But thus far I have replied to the objection, upon the assumption, 
that the certainty of the salvation of the saints is revealed, in the sense 
that individual saints may know the certainty of their own salvation. I 
have shown, as I trust, that admitting this to be true, yet the nature of 
the certainty leaves abundant room for the influence of a wholesome sense 
of danger, and for the feeling of hope and fear. But the fact is, that in. 
but few cases comparatively does it appear, that the certainty is revealed 
to the individuals as such. The salvation of all true saints is revealed, as. 
we have seen, and the characteristics of true saints are revealed in the- 
Bible. So that it is possible for individual saints to possess a comforta- 
ble assurance of salvation, upon the knowledge that they are saints. 
And as was shown, it is doubtless true that in some cases, in the days of 
inspiration, and not improbably in some cases since the Bible was com- 



604 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

plete, individuals have had a direct revelation by the Holy Spirit that 
they were saints, and accepted of God. 

But in the great majority of cases in all time hitherto, the saints 
have had no personal and clear revelation of their being saints, and 
no evidence of it, except what they gather from an experience that in 
their view accords with the Bible description of the character of the 
saints. When Peter addressed his epistles to the elect saints, for exam- 
ple, although he regarded the elect as certain of salvation, yet he did 
not distinguish and address individuals by name ; but left it for them to 
be satisfied of their own election and saintship, by their own conscious- 
ness of possessing the character that belongs to the saints. He did not 
reveal to any one in particular the fact of his own election. This was 
for the most part true of all the letters written to the churches. Although 
they were addressed as a body, as elect, and as saints, yet from this they 
were not to infer, that they were all saints or elect, but were to learn 
that fact, and who were real saints, from their conscious character. 

We have seen, in another place, that the Bible represents persever- 
ance, in the sense already explained, as an attribute of Christian charac- 
ter ; and therefore no one can have evidence that he is a saint, any 
farther than he is conscious of abiding in obedience. If saints do abide 
in the light, and have the assurance that they are saints, we have seen 
the sense in which they may be influenced by hope and fear, and the 
sense in which moral law with its sanctions may be useful to them. 
But when a saint shall backslide, he must lose the evidence of his being 
a saint, and then all the warnings and threatenings may take full effect 
upon him. He finds himself not persevering, and has of course to infer 
that he is not a saint ; and the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints 
can be no comfort to him. It is in fact against him ; for this doctrine 
is, that the saints do persevere ; every day he lives in backsliding, it 
becomes less evident that he is a saint. The Bible is manifestly written, 
for the most part, upon the assumption, that individual saints do not 
certainly know their election, and the certainty of their own salvation. 
It therefore addresses them, as if there were real uncertainty in respect 
to their salvation ; that is, as if, as individuals, they were not certain of 
salvation. It represents the salvation of real saints as certain, but 
represents many professed saints as having fallen, and warns them 
against presumption and self-deception, in the matter of their profession, 
privileges, and experience. It represents the danger of delusion as great, 
and exhorts them to examine and prove themselves, and see whether 
they are truly saints. The warnings found in the Bible are, for the 
most part, evidently of this kind ; that is, they assume that individuals 
may deceive themselves, and presumptuously assume their own election, 
and saintship, and safety, from their privileges, relations, and experi- 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 605 

ences. Inspiration, therefore, proceeds to warn them, assuming that 
they do not know the certainty of their own individual salvation. We 
shall by and by have occasion to examine some passages that will illus- 
trate and confirm this remark. 

There is, therefore, I apprehend, no real difficulty in accounting for 
the manner in which the Bible is written, upon the supposition that the 
doctrine under consideration is true. But on the contrary, it appears to 
me, that the scriptures are just what might be expected, if the doctrine 
were true. When we consider the nature of the certainty in all cases, 
and also that the great mass of professed Christians have no certain 
revelation of their being real saints, that there is so much real danger of 
deception, in regard to our own characters, and that so many are and 
have been deceived ; — I say, when we consider these things, there can be 
no difficulty in accounting for the manner in which both professors and 
real saints are addressed in the word of God. 



LECTURE LI. 

PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 
FURTHER OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 

4. A fourth objection to this doctrine is, that if, by the persever- 
ance of the saints is intended, that they live anything like lives of habit- 
ual obedience to God, then facts are against it. 

To this objection I reply : that by the perseverance of the saints, as 
I use these terms, is intended that, subsequently to their regeneration, 
holiness is the rule of their lives, and sin only the exception. But it 
is said, that facts contradict this. 

(1.) The case of king Saul is brought forward as an instance in point 
to sustain the objection. 

To this I reply : that it is far from being clear that Saul was ever a 
truly regenerate man. He appears, in connection with his appointment to 
the throne of Israel, to have been the subject of divine illuminations, in 
so far as to be much changed in his views and deportment, and as to have 
had another heart, in so much that he prophesied, etc. ; but it is nowhere 
intimated that he became a truly regenerate man, a truly praying child 
of God. Similar changes are not unfrequently witnessed in men, and 
changes evidently brought about by the illuminations of the Holy Spirit, 
where there is no good reason to believe that the subjects of them were 
truly regenerated. From the history of Saul, subsequent to the change 



606 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

of which we are speaking, we gather absolutely nothing that looks like 
true piety. His ease therefore cannot properly be brought as an objec- 
tion to the doctrine in question, for the plain reason, that evidence is 
wanting that he ever was a saint. His prophesying, as is evident from 
the connection in which it is spoken of, was merely speaking fervently 
upon religious subjects. He was so much enlightened, as to manifest for 
a time considerable excitement upon the subject of religion, and as to 
mingle with the schools of the prophets, and take an interest in their 
exercises. But this was only similar to what we often witness, when the 
end, and indeed when all the circumstances, duly considered, show 
clearly that true regeneration has not taken place. Who has not seen 
men have, for the time being, another, but not a holy, heart ? 

(2.) It is said, that David did not persevere in obedience, in the sense 
that obedience was his rule, and sin only the exception. To this I reply — 

(i.) It is not pretended that there is any doubt respecting the final 
salvation of David. 

(ii.) That David did not persevere, in the sense above defined, wants 
proof. His Psalms, together with his whole history, show that he was a 
highly spiritual man. He was an eminent type of Christ, and, for a man 
in his circumstances, was a remarkable saint. To be sure, David prac- 
ticed polygamy, and did many things that in us, under the light of the 
gospel, would be sin. But it should be considered, that David lived 
under a dispensation of comparative obscurity, and therefore many things 
which would now be unlawful and sinful, were not so in him.. That 
David, with comparatively few exceptions, lived up to the light he had, 
cannot be reasonably called in question. He is said to have been a man 
after God's own heart. I know this is said of him as a king, but I know 
also that, as king this could not have been said of him, unless he had 
feared and served the Lord, and in the main lived up to the light with 
which he was surrounded. 

(3.) It is also said, that Solomon king of Israel did not persevere, in 
the sense contended for in this discourse. 

Of Solomon I would say, that he at one period of his life, for how long 
a time it does not appear, fell into grievous backsliding, and appears 
in some sense to have tolerated idolatry. His final apostacy has been 
inferred from the fact, that idolatry was practiced in Israel, after his 
supposed repentance ; and until the end of his life, the people were 
allowed to offer sacrifices, and to burn incense in the high places, and 
therefore his repentance was not genuine. 

To this I reply, that the same was true also during the reign of 
several of the pious kings who succeeded him, and is probably to be 
accounted for by the fact, that neither Solomon nor his successors had, 
for a -.considerable time, political power or influence enough to abolish 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 607 

idolatry altogether. The people were greatly divided in their religious 
views and worship. Many were the priests and devotees of the groves 
and high places, and multitudes of the high and more influential classes 
clave to their idols. It was a very difficult matter to put an effectual 
stop to idolatry, and perhaps was impossible in Solomon's day, and for a 
long time after. Solomon's idolatrous wives and concubines had doubtless 
exerted, great influence in rendering idolatry popular with the people, 
and it was not until several generations had passed away, that the pious 
kings seem to have had sufficient political power to banish idolatry from 
the nation. Solomon's final apostacy, then, cannot be inferred from the 
fact, that idolatry continued to be practiced in the nation until long after 
his death. There is no reason to believe that he continued to practice 
it himself. 

But, from the writings of Solomon, we may gather sufficient evidence 
that, in the general, he did not live a wicked life, though he fell into 
many grievous sins. His Ecclesiastes seems to have been written after he 
was reclaimed from backsliding, as appears from the fact, that the book 
contains many statements of his views and experiences while in his wan- 
derings from God. It appears to me, that the book is inexplicable upon 
any other supposition. In his wanderings from God, as is common, he 
fell into great doubts and embarrassments in regard to the works and 
ways of God. He became sceptical, and in the book under consideration, 
he states the sceptical views that he had entertained. But the book, as 
a whole, contains conclusive evidence of piety at the time it was written. 
This probably will not be called in question. 

(4.) Observation, it is said, conflicts with the doctrine in question. 
So far as human observation can go, I admit that this is so ; that many 
persons seem to be born again, and to run well for a time, and afterwards 
fall, and apparently live and die in sin. But it should be remarked, that 
observation cannot be conclusive upon this subject, because we cannot 
certainly know, that any of the cases just alluded to are real conversions 
to God. Hence the objection fails of conclusiveness. Were it certainly 
known, that such persons were truly regenerated, and that afterwards 
they fall away and live in sin, and die in that state, it would follow, that 
the doctrine, at least in the form in which I have stated it, cannot be true. 
But this is not, and cannot be certainly known by observation. If, as I 
trust, it has been found to be true, in our examination, that the Bible 
plainly teaches the doctrine in question, in the form in which I have 
stated it, it must follow of course that observation cannot disprove it, for 
the reason that it is not a question that lies within the reach of observa- 
tion, in such a sense as to admit of certainty, or of any such kind or de- 
gree of evidence as to shake the sure testimony of the Bible. 

5. But an appeal is also made to consciousness to overthrow this doc- 



608 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

trine. It is said, that the real saints, at least in some instances, know 
themselves to have lived a great part of their lives in sin, and even by 
far the greater part of their days subsequent to regeneration. 

This objection or assertion may be answered substantially as was the 
last. It is true, indeed, that the saints may know themselves to have 
been regenerated ; and it is also true, that many may think they know 
this when they are deceived. A man may know himself to be awake, but 
from this it does not follow that no one can think himself awake while he 
is asleep. But since upon examination, it has been found that the Bible 
plainly teaches the doctrine of the saints' perseverance, in the sense in 
which I have defined it, we must of course yield the objection founded 
on experience, and grant that such experiences can weigh nothing against 
the testimony of God. The objection of course cannot be conclusive ; 
for it is not one of the nature that admits of no error or doubt. The 
Bible defines all the essential attributes of Christian character. Now, if 
upon examination, perseverance in the sense here insisted on is proved to 
be one of them, it is absurd to array against the doctrine the conscious- 
ness of not persevering. It is to assume that we, and not the Bible, can 
decide who is a Christian, and what are the essential attributes of Chris- 
tian character. 

6. But it is also objected to the doctrine of the perseverance of the 
saints, that several passages of scripture plainly teach that some real saints 
have fallen away and been lost. I will therefore now proceed to the ex- 
amination of those passages upon which the principal reliance is placed 
to disprove this doctrine. The first one which I shall notice is found in 
1 Cor. x. 1 : "Moreover, brethren, I would not that ye should be igno- 
rant, how that all our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through 
the sea ; 2. And were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the 
sea ; 3. And did all eat of the same spiritual meat ; 4. And did all drink 
the same spiritual drink ; (for they drank of that spiritual rock that 
followed them, and that rock was Christ) ; 5. But with many of them 
God was not well pleased, for they were overthrown in the wilderness. 
6. Now these things were our examples, to the intent we should not lust 
after evil things, as they also lusted. 7. Neither be ye idolaters, as were 
some of them, as it is written ; The people sat down to eat and drink, 
and rose up to play. 8. Neither let us commit fornication as some of 
them committed, and fell in one day three and twenty thousand. 9. 
Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted, and were de- 
stroyed of serpents. 10. Neither murmur ye, as some of them also mur- 
mured, and were destroyed of the destroyer. 11. Now all these things 
happened unto them for ensamples, and they are written for our admoni- 
tion, upon whom the ends of the world are come. 12. Wherefore, let 
him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 609 

It is said of this passage, that the history of the Israelites is here in- 
troduced as a warning to real Christians ; consequently, the apostle must 
have assumed, that those of the Israelites who fell were real saints, or 
there would have been no pertinency or force in his allusion. To this I 
reply, that the pertinency and force of the allusion appear to me to have 
been as follows. The Israelites composed the visible church of God. 
At the time mentioned, they were all professors of religion. All pos- 
sessed great light and privileges compared with the rest of the world ; 
they therefore felt confident of their acceptance with God, and of their 
consequent safety and salvation. But with many of them God was not 
well pleased. Some of them turned out to be idolaters and were de- 
stroyed. Now, says the apostle, let this be a warning to you. You are 
in like manner professors of religion. You are all members of the visi- 
ble church of God to which the promises are made. You have great 
light and privileges when compared with the world at large. You may 
think yourselves to be altogether safe, and sure of final salvation. But 
remember, that the history of the ancient church is written for your 
benefit ; and the destruction of those just alluded to, is recorded for 
your admonition. Be not high minded, but fear. Do not be presump- 
tuous, because you are members in good standing in the visible church, 
and possess great light and privileges ; but remember, that many before 
you, who were like you in these respects, have lost their souls ; " Where- 
fore let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." 

If the apostle had intended to convey the impression that they were 
real saints that fell in the wilderness, and that real saints do fall away 
and are lost, he would no doubt have said, let him that standeth, in- 
stead of him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall. The 
term rendered thinketh is represented by Eobinson as correctly trans- 
lated in this passage. The meaning of the apostle appears to have been 
this, that others who were, from their circumstances and fancied char- 
acters, very confident of their safety, had been finally cast off. and lost ; 
therefore, take heed to yourselves, lest being similarly situated, you in 
like manner deceive yourselves ; and while you think that you stand, 
you should fall and perish. 

But it may be said, that the apostle speaks of those as falling who 
had eaten of the spiritual meat, and drank of the rock Christ, and there- 
fore must have been real saints. To this I reply, that the apostle does 
indeed use universal language, and speak of all the Israelites as doing 
these things ; but who will soberly contend that he intended really to be 
understood as affirming, that all the Israelites that passed through the 
sea, etc., were true saints ? What he says does not necessitate the con- 
clusion that any of them were truly regenerated saints. They were all 
baptized unto Moses, that is, were all introduced into the covenant of 
39 



610 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

which he was the mediator. They all ate of the same spiritual bread, 
that is, the manna on which the Lord fed them. They all drank of the 
spiritual rock; that is, of the water that gushed from the rock when 
Moses smote it with his rod, and which rock was a type of Christ, as 
was also the manna. Now, does the apostle mean to say, that all the 
Israelites understood the typical meaning of these waters, and this 
manna, and that they were all truly spiritual or regenerate persons ? I 
think not. All that he intended appears to me to be, that all the church 
of the Jews at the time were so far partakers of the grace of Christ as to 
receive this baptism, and as to have this spiritual or typical bread and 
water, and also to enjoy great light and much miraculous instruction, 
but that, nevertheless, with many of them God was displeased. Their 
being baptized in their passage through the Eed .Sea, did not imply that 
they so understood and consented to it at the time, nor does the assertion 
that they ate the spiritual food, and drank of the spiritual rock, imply 
anything more than that they enjoyed these great and high privileges, 
and counted themselves as very secure in consequence of them. It is 
certainly straining the sense to make the apostle affirm, that all the 
Israelites were real saints who passed through the sea. Ir eed, it is 
doubtful whether he intended to affirm the real piety of any of them. 
It was not essential to his purpose to do so. 

In examining the class of passages adduced to prove that some real 
saints have fallen from grace and been lost, I am only concerned to show, 
that they do not by fair construction necessitate this conclusion. I may 
admit that, if the doctrine of perseverance were not found to be clearly 
taught in the Bible, the not unnatural construction of some of the class 
of texts in question might lead to the conclusion that some, yea many, 
real saints have been lost. 

But, since, from the previous examination it has appeared, that the 
doctrine is plainly and unequivocally taught in the Bible, all that needs 
to be shown of the class of texts now under consideration is, that they 
do not, when fairly interpreted, really and unequivocally teach that 
some true saints have been lost. This showing will sufficiently vindicate 
the scriptures against the imputation of self-contradiction, in both 
affirming and denying the same doctrine. Observe, I am not called 
upon to show, that the passages in question cannot be so construed, and 
with considerable plausibility, as to make them contradict this doctrine ; 
but all I am called upon to show in this place is, that they do not neces- 
sarily, by fair construction, contradict it ; that they do not necessitate 
the admission either that the Bible contradicts itself, or that a different 
construction must be given to the passages that seem to teach this 
doctrine. 

With these remarks I proceed to the examination of 2 Peter ii. 9-22 : 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 611 

" The Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations, and to 
reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished : but chiefly 
them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness, and despise 
government : presumptuous are they, self-willed ; they are not afraid to 
speak evil of dignities. Whereas angels, which are greater in power and 
might, bring not railing accusation against them before the Lord. But 
these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil 
of the things that they understand not ; and shall utterly perish in their 
own corruption ; and shall receive the reward of unrighteousness, as 
they that count it pleasure to riot in the day-time. Spots they are, and 
blemishes, sporting themselves with their own deceivings, while they 
feast with you ; having eyes full of adultery, and that cannot cease from 
sin ; beguiling unstable souls : a heart they have exercised with covetous 
practices ; cursed children, which have forsaken the right way, and are 
gone astray, following the way of Balaam the son of Bosor, who loved the 
wages of unrighteousness ; but was rebuked for his iniquity : the dumb 
ass speaking with man's voice, forbade the madness of the prophet. These 
are wells without water, clouds that are carried with a tempest ; to whom 
the mist f darkness is reserved forever. For when they speak great 
swelling words of vanity, they allure through the lusts of the flesh, 
through much wantonness, those that were clean escaped from them who 
live in error. While they promise them liberty, they themselves are the 
servants of corruption : for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is 
he brought into bondage. For if after they have escaped the pollutions 
of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus 
Christ, they are again entangled therein and overcome, the latter end is 
worse with them than the beginning. For it had been better for them 
not to have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known 
it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. But it is 
happened unto them according to the true proverb, The dog is turned to 
his own vomit again ; and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in 
the mire." 

NTow observe, the apostle calls the persons of whom he speaks (: wells 
without water : clouds that are carried with a tempest :" that is, without 
rain. His whole description of them shows, that he is speaking of false 
professors or hypocrites. But it is inferred, that they are fallen saints, 
because it is said they have "forsaken the right way, and are gone astray 
after the error of Balaam," etc. But this does not necessarily imply that 
they were in heart ever in the right way, but that they have forsaken the 
right way, so far as the outward life is concerned : in which respect they 
had doubtless been in the right way, or they would not have been ad- 
mitted to membership in the church. 

But it is said of these false professors, that " they allure through lust 



612 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

and much wantonness those who were clean escaped from those who live 
in error." But neither does this necessitate the conclusion, that they 
had escaped in heart from those that lived in error, but merely that they 
had for the time being outwardly abandoned their idolatrous practices 
and companions, and had made a profession, and put on the form of 
Christianity. 

But it is also said, verse 20-22 : il For if after they have escaped the 
pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour 
Jesus Christ, they are again entangled therein and overcome, the latter 
end is worse than the beginning. 21. For it had been better for them 
not to have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known 
it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. 22. But 
it is happened unto them according to the true proverb, The dog is 
turned to his own vomit again ; and the sow that was washed to her wal- 
lowing in the mire." 

Neither does this necessitate the conclusion, that they had in heart 
escaped from the pollutions that are in the world, but merely that they 
had outwardly reformed. What is said in the last verse seems to favor 
this construction. Verse 22 : " But it is happened unto them according 
to the true proverb, The dog is turned to his own vomit again ; and the 
sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire." That is, the dog 
has returned to his vomit, because he remains a dog, and is not changed ; 
and the sow that is washed to her wallowing in the mire, . because she is 
still a sow, and her washing has not changed her nature. So, the apos- 
tle would say, by returning to their former ways, do the persons in ques- 
tion show, that they have experienced no radical change ; but on the 
contrary, that they are only like a washed sow, sinners still, who have 
been only outwardly cleansed, while within they are the same as ever. 
This appears to me to be all that can fairly be made out of this passage. 

I will now attend to 1 Tim. i. 19, 20 : " Holding faith and a good con- 
science, which some having put away, concerning faith have made ship- 
wreck : of whom is Hymeneus and Alexander, whom I have delivered 
unto Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme." Of this text I may 
say, that the apostle was writing to Timothy as an eminent religious 
teacher, and was giving him cautions respecting his influence in that re- 
lation. Hymeneus and Alexander, as we may infer from this, and which 
is still more plainly taught in other passages, were religious teachers, who 
had cast off or perverted the true faith or doctrine of the gospel, and 
thus made shipwreck. They had put away faith and a good conscience, 
and by so doing had made shipwreck of the true gospel. This passage 
does not teach that these men were true Christians, nor does it neces- 
sarily imply that any had been true saints who had gone with them. 
The expression, "some having put away," does not necessarily imply 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. . 613 

that they once had true faith and a good conscience, but only that they 
taught that which was inconsistent with either ; or it may mean that they 
had rejected or refused both faith and a good conscience ; that they 
practised and taught things inconsistent with either true faith, or with 
the true gospel, or with a good conscience, and had therefore run upon 
a rock, and wrecked their souls, and the souls of those who followed 
them. But this proves nothing in respect to their ever having been real 
saints. 

The apostle was speaking in popular language, and represented things 
as they appeared to the observer. Thus we should speak of spurious con- 
verts. It certainly does not appear to me, that this passage would, with- 
out forced construction, warrant the conclusion that some real saints had 
been lost, even apart from those passages which, we have seen, seem un- 
equivocally to teach the doctrine. Much less, when those passages are 
considered, are we, as I think we have seen, authorized so to construe 
this passage as to make it either contradict them, or to necessitate such 
a modification of their construction as is contended for by those who 
deny the doctrine in question. If the doctrine in question is not really 
taught in the Bible, we certainly should not believe it • but if it is, we 
must not lightly reject it. We need candidly to weigh each passage, and 
to understand, if we can, just what is the mind of God as therein re- 
vealed. 

The case of Judas has been relied upon as an instance of utter apos- 
tacy, and of consequent destruction. It is said, that in the Psalms Judas 
is spoken of as the familiar friend of Christ in whom he trusted. Psalms 
xli. 9 : " Yea, mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which did 
eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me." 

There is no reason to believe that Ps. xli. primarily respected either 
Christ or Judas. Christ quotes the 9th verse, as is common in the New 
Testament, not because it was originally spoken of himself or of Judas, 
but because his case was like that of the Psalmist. In the passage in 
which Christ quotes these words, he directly negatives the idea of Judas 
being one of his true disciples. He says, John xiii. 18, "I speak not of 
you all ; I know whom I have chosen ; but that the scripture may be 
fulfilled, He that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against 
me." 

Here Christ plainly teaches, that he to whom he applied these words, 
was not chosen in the sense of being chosen to salvation, or in the sense 
of his being a true saint. He says : — 

John vi. 64 : ' ' But there are some of you who believe not. For Jesus 
knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who 
should betray him. 65. And he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no 
man can come unto me, except it were given him of my Father. 70. 



614 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a 
devil ? 71. He spake of Judas Iscariot the son of Simon : for he it was 
that should betray him, being one of the twelve." 

He had chosen twelve to follow him as pupils or disciples ; but one of 
them he had known from the beginning to be a wicked man. In John 
xvii. 12 : Christ says, " While I was with them in the world, I kept them 
in thy name : those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them 
is lost, but the son of perdition ; that the scripture might be fulfilled." 
Christ has been represented as saying to his Father in this passage, that 
he had lost none that the Father had given him except the son of perdi- 
tion, that is Judas. But this is not the meaning of the passage in 
Christ's prayer. He intended that of those that the Father had given 
him, he had lost none ; but the son of perdition was lost that the scrip- 
ture might be fulfilled. 

The same form of expression is used in Luke iv. 27 : "And many lepers 
were in Israel in the time of Eliseus the prophet ; and none of them was 
cleansed, saving Naaman the Syrian. Here E ' 1 m is used in the original 
as meaning not except, but as an adversative conjunction but. Naaman 
was not an Israelite, but a heathen. Christ here used the same form of 
expression as in John xvii. 12. In this passage in Luke it is plain, that 
he intended that the prophet was not sent to any Israelite, hut to a hea- 
then. This same form is also used, Matt. xii. 4 : " How he entered into 
the house of God, and did eat the shew-bread, which was not lawful for 
him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the 
priests." 

Here the same form of expression in the original is used, as in John 
xvii. 12. "The plain meaning of this form in Matt. xii. 4 : is but, not 
except. It was not lawful for David, nor for his companions to eat the 
shew-bread, but it was lawful for the priests to do so. So also, Acts xxi. 
25 : "As touching the Gentiles which believe, we have written and con- 
cluded that they ob*serve no such thing, save only that they keep them- 
selves from things offered unto idols, and from blood, and from strangled, 
and from fornication." Here the same form is used, and the plain mean- 
ing of the phraseology is just that which I am contending for, in the pas- 
sage in Christ's prayer. Likewise, Eev. xxi. 27: " And there shall in no 
wise enter into it anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh 
abomination, or maketh a lie ; but they which are written in the Lamb's 
book of life." Here again the same form of expression, and the same 
word in the original, are used in the sense now contended for. Nothing 
shall enter into the city that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomi- 
nation or maketh a lie, but they which are written in the Lamb's book 
of life, shall enter in. So beyond reasonable doubt, Christ intended to 
say in his prayer to his Father : While I was with them in the world I 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 615 

kept them in thy name : those that thou gavest me I have kept and none 
of them is lost, that is, I have lost none of those whom thou hast given 
me ; but the son of perdition is lost, according to the scriptures. 

But it seems to me, that the context shows clearly what the Saviour 
intended by this form of expression. He says, verses 11 and 12 : " And 
now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come 
to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou 
hast given me, that they may be one as we are. While I was with them 
in the world, I kept them in thy name : those that thou gavest me I have 
kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition ; that the scrip- 
ture might be fulfilled :" that is : "Do thou keep them in thine own 
name and lose none of them, for while I was with them I kept them in 
thy name, and lost none of them ; but the son of perdition is lost." He 
evidently did not mean to say, I lost but one whom thou gavest me ; or 
that he kept in his Father's name all except one of those whom the Father 
had given him. He says, 6 : " I have manifested thy name unto the men 
which thou gavest me out of the world : thine they were, and thou gavest 
them me ; and they have kept thy word. 7. Now they have known that 
all things, whatsoever thou hast given me, are of thee. 8. For I have 
given unto them the words which thou gavest me ; and they have received 
them, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have 
believed that thou didst send me. 9. I pray for them : I pray not for 
the world, but for them which thou hast given me ; for they are thine. 
10. And all mine are thine, and thine are mine ; and I am glorified in 
them. 11. And now I am no more in the world but these are in the 
world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thy own name 
those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one as we are. 12. 
While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name : those 
that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of 
perdition ; that the scripture might be fulfilled." 

Here he plainly represents, that all who had been given him by the 
Father, had known and kept the word of God. They had believed and 
persevered, and Christ was glorified in them. Since he had kept them 
in his Father's name, and had lost none of them, he proceeds to pray, 
that now the Father will keep them in his own name. Let any one 
ponder well this passage from verses 6 to 12, and he will see, I trust, that 
this is a true view of the subject. At any rate this cannot be a proof 
text to establish the fact, that any have fallen from grace ; for the plain 
reason, that the text can quite as naturally at least, and I think with 
much greater propriety, be quoted to sustain the doctrine which it is 
adduced to disprove. Again : — 

Matt, xviii. 21 : "Then came Peter to him, and said, Lord, how often 
shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him ? Till seven times ? 



616 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

22. Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee until seven times ; but 
until seventy times seven. 23. Therefore is the kingdom of heaven 
likened unto a certain king, which would take account of his servants. 
24. And when he had begun to reckon, one was brought unto him which 
owed him ten thousand talents. 25. But forasmuch as he had not to 
pay, his lord commanded him to be sold, and his wife and children, and 
all that he had, and payment to be made. 26. The servant therefore 
fell down and worshipped him, saying, Lord, have patience with me, and 
I will pay thee all. 27. Then the lord of that servant was moved with 
compassion, and loosed him, and forgave him the debt. 28. But the 
same servant went out, and found one of his fellow-servants, which owed 
him a hundred pence ; and he laid hands on him, and took him by the 
throat, saying, Pay me that thou owest. 29. And his fellow- servant fell 
down at his feet, and besought him, saying, Have patience with me, and 
I will pay thee all. 30. And he would not ; bat went and cast him into 
prison, till he should pay the debt. 31. So when his fellow- servants saw 
what was done, they were very sorry, and came and told unto their lord 
all that was done. 32. Then his lord, after that he had called him, 
said unto him, thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, 
because thou desiredst me : 33. Shouldest not thou also have had com- 
passion on thy fellow-servant, even as I had pity on thee ? 34. And his 
lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all 
that was due unto him. 35. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do 
also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother 
their trespasses." 

This has been adduced to prove that some do fall from grace, espe- 
cially the 32d to the 34th verses. But from this whole passage it is 
evident, that what the Lord meant was to set in a strong light the 
necessity of a forgiving spirit, and that this is a condition of salvation. 
It is a parable designed to illustrate this truth, but does not assert as a 
fact, that any truly pardoned soul was ever lost ; nor does it imply this, 
as any one may see who will duly weigh the whole parable. It does 
plainly imply, that a pardoned soul would be lost should he apostatize ; 
but it does not imply that such a soul ever did apostatize. 

I consider next, 1 Tim. v. 12 : " Having damnation, because they 
have cast off their first faith." This passage stands in the following 
connection : — 

1 Tim. v. 9 : " Let not a widow be taken into the number under 
threescore years old, having been the wife of one man : 10. "Well reported 
of for good works ; if she have brought up children, if she have lodged 
strangers, if she have washed the saints' feet, if she have relieved the 
afflicted, if she have diligently followed every good work. 11. But the 
younger widows refuse, for when they have begun to wax wanton against 



PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS. 617 

Christ they will marry ; 12. Having damnation, because they have cast 
off their first faith. 13. And withal they learn to be idle, wandering 
about from house to house ; and not only idle, but tattlers also, and busy 
bodies, speaking things which they ought not." 

The word rendered damnation in this passage is often rendered 
judgment and condemnation ; and the meaning may be, that the 
younger widows were found to wax wanton and fall into condemnation, 
and for a time at least to disgrace their profession, by casting off their 
first faith ; or it may mean, that they were apt to be found among those 
who renounced the profession of the true faith, which they at first pro- 
fessed. They were young widows, uneducated as heathen women were 
and are, and it could not be surprising that many of this class should 
make a spurious profession, and afterwards cast off their profession 
through wantonness, and disgrace their profession. The apostle, there- 
fore, warns Timothy against too hasty a reception of them, or against 
having too early a confidence in the reality of their piety. 

Again : it has been said, that from Christ's letters to the churches in 
Asia, recorded in Revelation, we learn that those churches, some of 
them at least, were in a state of apostacy from God ; and that from the 
fact that the judgments of God annihilated those churches, there is rea- 
son to believe that the apostacy was complete and final, and their de- 
struction certain. To this I reply, that those letters were written to 
churches as such, just as the prophets spoke of the Jewish church as 
such. The things which the prophets declare of the Jewish church, were 
declared of them as a body of professed saints, some generations of 
whom had more, and some less, real piety. The prophets would rebuke 
one generation for their backsliding and apostacy, without meaning to 
represent that the particular individuals they addressed were ever true 
saints, but meaning only that the body as such was in a degenerate and 
apostate state, compared with what the body as such had been in former 
times. So Christ writes to the churches of Asia, and reproves them for 
their backslidden and apostate condition, asserts that they had fallen, 
had left their first love, etc., from which, however, we are not to infer, 
that he intended to say this of those who had been truly converted as 
individuals, but merely that those churches as bodies had fallen, and 
were now composed of members as a whole who were in the state of 
which he complained. 

The churches of Asia were doubtless, when first gathered by the 
apostles and primitive ministers, full of faith, and zeal, and love. But 
things had changed. Many of the members had changed, and perhaps 
every member who had originally composed those churches was dead, 
previous to the time when these letters were written. However this 
may be, there had doubtless been great changes in the membership of 



618 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 

those churches ; and since they were evidently addressed as bodies, it 
cannot be fairly inferred, from what is said, that the same persons ad- 
dressed had fallen from a state of high spirituality into backsliding 01 
apostacy, but that that was true only of the then present membership, 
when compared with the former membership and state of the churches. 
These letters cannot be justly relied upon as disproving the doctrine in 
question; for the utmost that can be made of them is, that those 
churches as bodies were at the time in a state of declension. 

The passages we have examined are, so far as I know, the principal 
ones upon which reliance has been placed to disprove the doctrine in 
question. I have read over attentively several times the views of Mr. 
Fletcher, in his Scripture Scales, and the passages quoted by him to dis- 
prove this doctrine. His chief reliance is manifestly upon the numerous 
passages that imply the possibility and danger of falling, rather than on 
any passages that unequivocally teach that any have fallen or will utterly 
fall. I am not aware that any respectable writer has laid much stress 
upon other passages than those I have examined, as expressly teaching, 
or unequivocally implying the fact of the fall and ruin of real saints. 
There may be such writers and such passages as those of which I speak ; 
but if there are, I do not recollect to have seen them. 

KEMAKKS. 

1. If the doctriue under consideration is not true, I cannot see upon 
what ground we can affirm, or even confidently hope, that many of our 
pious friends who have died have gone to heaven. Suppose they held on 
their way until the last hours of life. If we may not believe that the 
faithfulness of God prevailed to keep them through the last conflict, 
what reason have we to affirm that they were preserved from sin and 
apostacy in their last hours, and saved ? If the sovereign grace of God 
do not protect them against the wiles and malice of Satan, in their fee- 
bleness, and in the wreck of their habitation of clay, what has become of 
them ? I must confess that, if I did not expect the covenanted mercy 
and faithfulness of God to prevail, and to sustain the soul under such 
circumstances, I should have very little expectation that any would be 
saved. If I could have any confidence that Christians would stand fast 
while in health, aside from the truth of this doctrine, still I should 
expect that Satan would overcome them in the end, when they passed 
through the last great struggle. Who could then trust to the strength 
of his own purposes ? 

2. But I could no more hope, that myself or any one else, would per- 
severe in holiness in our best estate, even for one day or hour, if not kept 
by the power of God through faith, than I could hope to fly to heaven. 
As I have before said, there is no hope of any one's persevering, except 



PERSEVERANCE OP SAINTS. 619 

in so far as free grace anticipates and secures the concurrence of free 
will. The soul must be called, and effectually called, and perpetually 
called, or it will not follow Christ for an hour. I say again, that by 
effectual calling, I do not mean an irresistible calling. I do not mean 
a calling that cannot, or that might not be resisted ; but I do mean by 
an effectual calling, a calling that is not in fact resisted, a calling that 
does in fact secure the voluntary obedience of the soul. This is my only 
hope in respect to myself, or anybody else. This grace I regard as vouch- 
safed to me in the covenant of grace, or as a reward of Christ's obedience 
unto death. It is pledged to secure the salvation of those whom the Father 
has from eternity given to the Son. The Holy Spirit is given to them 
to secure their salvation, and I have no expectation that any others will 
ever be saved. But these, every one of them, will surely be saved. There 
is, there can be no hope for any others. Others are able to repent, but 
they will not. Others might be saved, if they would believe, and comply 
with the conditions of salvation, but they will not. 

We have seen, that none come to Christ, except they are drawn of 
the Father, and that the Father draws to Christ those and those only 
Avhom he has given to Christ, and also, that it is the Father's design that 
of those whom he has given to Christ, he should lose none, but that he 
should raise them up at the last day. This is the only hope that any will 
be saved. Strike out this foundation, and what shall the righteous do ? 
Strike out from the Bible the doctrine of God's covenanted faithfulness 
to Christ — the truth that the Father has given to him a certain number 
whose salvation he foresees that he could and should secure, and I despair 
of myself and of every body else. Where is any other ground of hope ? 
I know not where. 



EOT. 



INDEX. 



Ability and obligation, 336. 

Ability, natural, 320. 

Adam's sin, 253, 357. 

Antinomianism, 393. 

Atonement, 258— Principles of government, 258— 
Justice, retributive and public, 259, 265— Ne- 
cessity of penalties, 260— Meaning of the 
term, 261— Teachings of reason, 261— Fact of, 
266— What constitutes it, 270— Satisfaction of 
public justice, 271— Extent of 274— Objec- 
tions, 279. 

Attributes of love, 135. 

Attributes of moral law, 135. 

Attributes of selfishness, 183. 

B. 

Barclay, 449. 

Benevolence theory, tendency of, 93. 
Benevolence not partial, 181. 
Benevolent desires, 188. 



Chalmers, 352. 
Children moral agents, 256. 
Christ, offices of, 401, 442. 
Christians and politics, 218. 
Christian in sin, 110. 
Clarke, Dr. Adam, 448. 
Commercial justice, 162. 
Compassion, attribute of love, 154. 
Complacency in holiness, 147. 
Complacent love, 149. 
Condescension, 174. 
Consciousness, 457. 
Conversion and regeneration, 282. 
Creation, end of God in, 214. 
Cruelty, 193. 

r>. 

Decree and purpose, 524. 

Degrees of guilt, 202. 

Degrees of virtue, 203. 

Depravity, moral and physical, 228, 254— Total, 
232, 234— View of Dr. Woods, 236— Presby- 
terian Confession, 240— Examination of scrip- 
ture, 241. 

Desert of punishment, 210. 

Disinterestedness, attribute of love, 141. 

Disobedience to moral law, 180. 

Divine efficiency scheme, 293. 

Duty and obligation, 66. 

E. 

Edwards on ability, 323. 334— On the will, 328. 
Efficiency, attribute of love, 145— attribute of 

selfishness, 189. 
Eighth of Romans, 581. 
Election, 481— Bible doctrine of, 482— Doctrine 

of reason, 485— Reasons for, 486— When made, 

491— Not unjust, 493— How ascertained, 495. 
Endless punishment, 209. 
Evidences of impenitence, 370— of regeneration, 

300. 
Excitement and obedience, 125. 
Expediency, doctrine of, 87. 

IP. 

Faculties of moral agency, 136. 
Faith, 373— A condition of justification, 389— In- 
crease of, 111. 



Falsehood, 196. 
Fanaticism, 91. 
Foreknowledge of God, 542. 
Freedom of will 324. 

G-. 

God, hatred of, 199-Moral attributes of, 137. 1 

God's end in creation, 214. 

God's foreknowledge, 542. 

God's law, sanctions of, 208. 

God's purposes, 524 -Extent of, 526— As related 
to different events, 530— Wisdom and benev- 
olence of, 541— As related to God's foreknowl- 
edge, 542 — As requiring use of means— 543. 

God's sovereignty, 515. 

Good, natural and moral, 72— absolute and rela- 
tive, 72— Good and virtue, 76. 

Government, 214— A necessity, 215. 

Grace, growth in, 114. 

Gracious ability, 341. 

Gratitude, obligation of, 59. 

Guilt, degrees of, 202. 

H. 

Hatred of God, 199. 

Holiness, 177— Deficient in degree, 104— As rela- 
ted to the affections, 106. 

Human government, 214— A necessity, 215— Ob- 
jections, 216— God's use of, 217— Limits of, 
221— Legitimate form, 222— Revolutions in, 
223— Penalties of, 224, 260. 

Humility, 170. 

1*. 

Impartiality, attribute of love, 142. 

Impenitence, 368 — Evidences of, 370. 

Inability, 252— Natural, 323— Moral, 327— Physi 

cal, 337— Notion of, how accounted for, 353. 
Inalienable rights, 225. 
Infants, character of, 247. 
Injustice, 194. 
Intemperance, 200. 
Intensity of choice, 97. 
Intention and obligation, 22. 
Intention, ultimate and proximate, 24. 

«T. 

Justice, attribute of love, 159— Retributive, 161, 

259— Commercial, 162. 
Justification, 117, 382— Nature of. 382— Conditions 

of, 384— Conditioned on sanctification, 391 — 

Ground of, 398 — Westminster Confession, 

398. 

X,. 
Liberty, attribute of love, 140. 
Locke, 353. 

Love, its attributes, 135. 
Love of complacency, 149. 

Meekness, 169. 
Mercy, attribute of love, 157. 
Mixed action, theory of, 114. 
Moral action, unity of, 95. 
Moral agency, 13— Faculties of, 136. 
Moral attributes of God. 137. 
Moral depravity, universal, 233— How accounted 
lor, 235, 252. 



C22 



INDEX. 



Moral excellence of God, 49. 

Moral government, 6. 

Moral inability, 327. 

Moral law, 1— Obedience to, 95— Eule of duty, 115 

—Disobedience to, 180— In heaven, 593. 
Moral order and obligation, 64. 
Moral suasion scheme, 298. 
Motives mixed, 102. 

1ST. 

Natural affections and obedience, 125 
Natural ability, 320. 
Natural inability, 323. 

Nature and relations of mo^al beings, and obliga- 
tion, 65. 
New covenant, 410. 

O. 

Obedience, 95, 124— Not partial, 96— Entire, 115 — 
Condition of justification, 117— As related to 
constitutional traits, 124 — To natural affec- 
tions 125— Impaired powers, 130— Condition 
of prevailing prayer, 131 — As related to the 
judgment of others, 132. 

Obligation, 12— Conditions of, 12— To executive 
acts, 18— Extent of, 20— Foundation of, 27— In 
relation to the will of God, 30, 80— Of grati- 
tude, 59— Complex theory, 69— How meas- 
ured, 203— Kelation to ability, 336. 

Offices of Christ, 442. 

Opposition to holiness, 191. 

Opposition to sin, 150. 



Paley's theory of obligation, 34, 85. 

Parable of the good shepherd, 560— of the lost 
sheep\ 575 — of the sower, 578. 

Partial obedience, 96. 

Patience, 166. 

Pelagianism, 456. 

Penal sanction of God's law, 209. 

Penalty in human government, 224, 260. 

Perfectionism, 455. 

Perseverance, condition of justification, 391. 

Perseverance of saints, 544 — Different kinds of 
certainty, 544^The doctrine, 550— Not to be 
inferred from regeneration, 552— Nor from 
justification, 553 — Proved, 554— Parable of 
good shepherd, 560 — Ability and willing- 
ness of God, 563— Christ's prayer, 566— Christ's 
teaching, 569— Paul's teaching, 571— View of 
apostles, 572— Eighth of Romans, 581— Ob- 
jections answered, 585 — Paul's shipwreck, 
595— Place for fear, 602— Saul, 605— David, 606 
—Solomon, 606— Israelites, 608— Passages op- 
posed to perseverance, 610— Judas, 613. 

Politics and Christian duty, 218. 

Powers impaired, 130. 

Prayer, condition of. 131. 

Prayer of Christ, 566. 

Punishment, desert of. 210— Endless, 209. 

Purpose and decree, 524. 

Presbyterian Confession, 240. 

Pride, 171, 197. 

Probation, 470. 

TJ. 

Reason of moral government, 7. 

Reformers, 313. 

Regeneration, 282— Distinction between regenera- 
tion and conversion, 282 — Its nature, 285 — 
Agencies employed, 287— Necessity of, 287— 
Instrumentalities emplo3 r ed, 289— Subject 
both passive and active, 290— Theories of. 291 
—Taste scheme . i9i-kDivine efficiency scheme, 
293— Suscep ability scheme, 295 — Theory of 
moral suasion, 298— Evidences of, 300— Sim- 
ilar experiences of saints, and sinners, 301— 
Different experiences, 309— Victory over sin, 
317. 

Religion and virtue, 116. 

Religion a phenomenon of will, 149. 

Retributive justice, 161, 259. 



Resolutions, 223. 

Repentance, 364— Partial, 122— Present sin, 123- 
Meaning of term, 384. 

Reprobation, 499— Doctrine of reason, 500— Doc- 
trine of revelation, 501 — Reprobates, how- 
known, 508— Reasons for, 503— just and benev- 
olent. 506— Objections, 510. 

Right and obligation, 38. 

Rightarianism, tendency of, 90. 

Rights inalienable, 225. 

Right intention and wrong volition, 108. 

Right to govern, 7. 



Sabbath desecration, 227. 

Sanctification, 402— Definition of terms. 403— 
Question at issue, 406 — Attainable in this 
life, 407 — Tendency of denial of the doctrine. 
418— Mrs. Edwards's experience, 419— Attained 
by faith, 439— A condition of justification. 
391— Bible argument, 408— Paul sanctified. 423 
—Self-righteous views, 432, 461— Conditions 
of attainment, 433— Works of law, 435— Offi- 
ces of Christ, 442— Objections, 448— Testi- 
mony of consciousness, 457— As related to 
probation, 470. 

Sanctions of law, 208. 

Self-denial, 171, 314. 

Self-gratification and selfishness, 152. 

Self-interestedness, 186. 

Selfishness, 151— Attributes of, 183— Unreason- 
ableness of, 1S4— The propensities, 186— Par- 
tiality of, 187. 

Selfish theory, tendency of, 85. 

Self-love, 180. 

Sentient being and good, 74. 

Sentimental benevolence, 155. 

Seventh of Romans, 359, 428. 

Sin voluntary, 122. 

Sin a unit, 183. 

Sin not chosen for its own sake, 152, ISO. 

Sin natural to mankind, 257. 

Sin not necessary to highest good, 535. 

Sin of Adam, 253, 357. 

Sinful nature, 231, 245. 

Sinners, amiability of, 307. 

Slavery, 227. 

Sovereignty of God, 515— Meaning of term, 515— 
Bible doctrine, 518. 

Stability, 176. 

Susceptibility scheme, 295. 

T. 

Tappan, H. P., 234. 

Taste scheme, 291. 

Tendency of theories of obligation, 80. 

Theory of mixed action, tendency of, 114. 

Total moral depravity, 202, 234. 

XT. 

Unbelief, 377. 

Unity of moral action, 95— Objections, 110 — 

Scripture teaching, 113. 
Universality, attribute of love, 144. 
Utilitarianism, tendency of, 87. 
Utility and obligation, 35. 

V. 

Veracity, 163. 
Victory over sin, 317. 
Virtue and religion, 116. 
Virtue, attribute of love, 140. 
Virtue, degrees of, 203. 

Voluntariness, attribute of love, 139 — attribute 
of selfishness, 183. 

W. 

War, 225. 

Westminster Confession, 339, 396, 39S. 

Wrong per se, 92. 



Xavier, 132. 



X. 



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